Skip to content

Chennai Court October 1881 Judgments

Browse smarter

Open an 18-section brief on any judgment

Structured AI Brief in seconds on any result - plus Semantic Search when you need meaning, not just keywords.

  • AI Brief & Ask
  • Semantic AI Search
  • Devil's Bench

Credentials emailed - log in to pick up where you left off.

Oct 24 1881

Vydianadayyan Vs. Sitaramayyan

Court: Chennai

Decided on: Oct-24-1881

Reported in: (1882)ILR5Mad52

Charles A. Turner, Kt., C.J.1. This is an appeal from an order made under Section 32, Act X of 1877. Appellant sued the first defendant upon a bond executed in his favour. The first defendant pleaded in substance that appellant and his uncle, the respondent, formed a joint Hindu family, that the bond was taken on behalf of the joint family, and that he had made a part-payment to the respondent. The respondent, supporting the statement made by the first defendant, sought to intervene. He had also brought suit upon the same bond against the first defendant. Appellant resisted the respondent's application to be made a defendant, on the ground that the money 'secured by the bond was his own. The Subordinate Judge of Kumbakonam added the respondent as a defendant,, and it is argued in appeal that this is not a case within the scope of Section 32,. and reliance is placed on Norris v. Beazly L.R. 2 C.P.D. 80 Horwell v. The London General Omnibus Company L.R. 2 Ex. D. 365 Ex parte Smith L.R. 2...


Oct 04 1881

Ramasekara Pillai Vs. Dharmaraya Goundan and anr.

Court: Chennai

Decided on: Oct-04-1881

Reported in: (1882)ILR5Mad113

Charles A. Turner, Kt., C.J. and Muttusami Ayyar, J.1. We are unable to say the Munsif has misconstrued the law.2. The period of limitation for: an application of this nature commences to run from the date of the resistance, obstruction, or dispossession. The resistance, obstruction, or dispossession referred to can hardly be any other resistance, &c;, than that mentioned as forming the subject of the complaint. This is the plain interpretation of the terms of the Act, nor is the construction unreasonable, for a Court exercising ordinary care would not issue a second warrant for delivery of possession after an earlier warrant had been returned unexecuted by reason of obstruction, unless the decree-holder had at once taken action to question the propriety of the obstruction, or there had been some change of circumstances. On the other hand, if it be held limitation is to be computed from the date of first obstruction, the provision would take no count of cases in which an abstraction at...


  • ‹ Prev
  • Next ›

AI Briefs · Semantic Search · Save & annotate judgments

Start your 7-day free trial