Allahabad Court December 1969 Judgments
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Reference Under Section 28 of Act No. Vii of 1870
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Dec-31-1969
Reported in: (1895)ILR17All238
Burkitt, J.1. This is a reference from the taxing officer to me as taxing Judge under the provisions of Section 5 of the Court-fees Act. In considering it I have had the great advantage of the assistance of my brothers KNOX and BLAIR, who at my request sat with me to hear it argued. They authorise me to say that they concur in the order I am about to pass and in the reasons for it.2. The matter has arisen in the following manner: During the winding up of the Himalaya Bank, Limited, the Judge of Saharanpur, acting under Sections 162, 163 and 214 of the Companies Acts of 1882 and 1887, directed certain Directors and Officers of the Bank to repay large sums of money to the Bank. Memoranda of appeal to this Court were admitted on a Court-fee stamp of Rs. 2 under Article 11 of the second schedule to the Court-fees Act. Subsequently however the officer whose duty it is to see that fees are paid under the second chapter of the Court-fees Act reported to the Registrar that in his opinion those...
Fakir Muhammad Vs. Ghulam HusaIn and anr.
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Dec-31-1969
Reported in: (1875)ILR1All580
Robert Stuart, C.J.1. It appears to me that the judgment of the Privy Council see Matab Chund v. Bulram Singh 13 Moore's Ind. Ap. 479, referred to has no application to the present case. That was a judgment under a totally different limitation law from that which we have now to consider. Section 20 of Act XIV of 1859 provided that 'no process of execution shall issue from any Court not established by Royal Charter to enforce any judgment, decree, or order of such Court, unless some proceeding shall have been taken to enforce such judgment, decree, or order, or to keep the same in force within three years next preceding the application for such execution.' But the provisions of Act IX of 1871 are much more precise, for under No. 167 of the second schedule the time when the period of limitation begins to run is 'the date of applying to the Court to enforce or keep in force the decree or order.' I can quite understand that this may operate harshly in many cases, but the meaning is too pla...
Seth Gobind Dass Vs. Major-general Showers
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Dec-31-1969
Reported in: (1875)ILR1All400
1. We are disposed to hold that the irregularities in publishing and conducting the sale are such as to render it invalid.2. The place where the sale was to take place was not described with sufficient distinctness, nor was proclamation made on the spot as required, and there is no reason why the requirements of the law in this respect should have been omitted. But we further hold that the sale should not have been conducted by the officer of the Civil Court, but should have been held by the Collector, the estate being land paving revenue to Government within the meaning of Section 248 of Act VIII of 1859.3. The property is a jungle grant situated in the eastern Dun, which at the time of the sale, had been granted to, and was in possession of General Showers. It was granted under the rules for such grants, which were subsequently formally embodied in the deed of 21st February 1877. Under the terms of the grant, no revenue was payable by the grantee for the first three years, but became...
Muhammad Yusuf Vs. Lachmi NaraIn and ors.
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Dec-31-1969
Reported in: (1895)ILR17All63
John Edge, Kt., C.J. and Banerji, J.1. The only question before us in this appeal is whether the defendants-appellants, having received from the mortgagor a moiety of the mortgage-debt, and having, on that payment, released a moiety of the mortgaged property, have thereby bron up their mortgagzo as to allow the plaintiff to redeem that portion of the mortgaged property in which he is interested by payment of a proportion of the mortgage-debt still due to these defendants-appellants. The rule as to the redemption of a portion of mortgaged property on payment of a proportion of the mortgage-debt which has been acted on in these provinces since the passing of Act No. IV of 1882 is to be deduced from the last paragraph of Section 60 of that Act. We may say that before the passing of Act No. IV of 1882, the principle to be deduced from I the last paragraph of Section 60, to which we have referred, was the principle, so far as we are aware, which was applied in these provinces, and the right...
Akbar Ali Vs. Bela Bibi
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Dec-31-1969
Reported in: (1902)ILR24All119
Burkitt, J.1. This is one of three appeals in a pre-emption suit against a decree of the District Judge of Azamgarh declaring that the appellant Musammat Bela had forfeited her preemptive rights, and giving a decree for possession of the preempted property in equal shares to two other rival claimants, one of whom is the respondent, Mir Akbar Ali.2. The property, the subject of the pre-emption claim, consists of a 4 pie share which belonged to one Waris Ali. On October 20th, 1898, Waris Ali conveyed that property by sale to one Muhammad Ali, who is admittedly a 'stranger.'3. Thereupon on October 2nd, 1899, the appellant Musammat Bela Bibi instituted a pre-emption suit against the vendor and vendee, and obtained a decree by consent on November 14th, 1899. The decree was for possession of the pre-empted property on payment of the sale consideration, Rs. 975, within a limited period to the vendee. Not having so much ready money available Musammat Bela Bibi on December 6th, 1899, mortgaged ...
Balmukand Vs. Pancham
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Dec-31-1969
Reported in: (1888)ILR10All400
Mahmood, J.1. The facts necessary for the disposal of this appeal may be briefly recapitulated as follows.2. One Musammat Umedi Kuar, by a sale-deed executed on the 10th July 1883, sold the property now in suit in favor of Balmukand, the appellant before me. That sale appears to have been made in contravention of the preemptive right possessed by Pancham, the respondent before me, and he sued for the enforcement of that right, and on the 20th December 1883, obtained a decree awarding him the pre-emptive right and possession of the property on payment of a sum of Rs. 125, together with costs. From that decree an appeal was preferred by the purchaser, Balmukand, and the Lower Appellate Court, which had to deal with that case, decreed the appeal so far as to increase the sum of Rs. 125 to Rs. 200 as consideration of the sale, and in regard to costs that Court decreed that the parties should pay their own costs. The decree specified that the sum of Rs. 200 was to be deposited by the pre-em...
Damodar Das Vs. Gokal Chand and ors.
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Dec-31-1969
Reported in: (1885)ILR7All79
Oldfield, J.1. In my opinion, the words 'at or before the first hearing' in Section 53 of the Civil Procedure Code are directory only, and allow of a discretion, of course to be properly exercised, of rejecting or amending a plaint after the first hearing.2. In Burjore v. Bhagana I.L.R. 10 Cal. 557 : L.R. 11 Ind. Ap. 7 the Privy Council ruled that the words in Section 602 of the Civil Procedure Code, directing that security for costs shall be given within a certain time specified in the section, are only directory, and that the Court has a discretion to extend the time, and this ruling was followed by the Full Bench of this Court in Fazul-un-nissa Begam v. Oxford I.L.R. 6 All. 250.3. The question raised in those cases is analogous to the one now before us, which was decided by the Bombay High Court in Modhe v. Dongre I.L.R. 5 Bom. 609 and I concur in the view of the law expressed by that Court.Straight, Offg. C.J., and Brodhurst and Duthoit, JJ.4. In our opinion the question referred t...
In Re: Gudar Singh
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Dec-31-1969
Reported in: (1897)ILR19All291
John Edge, Kt., C.J.1. Magistrate of the first class having taken proceedings under Section 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against Gudar Singh and others, is said, in the course of those proceedings and before evidence had been taken, to have stated in Court that unless Gudar Singh admitted his guilt and furnished the necessary security, he would be dealt with severely and would be sent to jail. I have taken that statement from the third paragraph of an affidavit which was sworn by Gudar Singh, and which has been filed in support of an application to transfer the case to some other Magistrate. No explanation has been offered, and no denial made that such words were used, on the part of the Magistrate concerned. Under these circumstances, there having been an opportunity for the making of an explanation or a denial, I am forced to conclude that the Magistrate concerned did threaten Gudar Singh that he would be dealt with severely and sent to jail if he did not admit his guilt and...
In Re: Reference by Board of Revenue, N.-w.P., Under Act I of 1879
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Dec-31-1969
Reported in: (1880)ILR2All664
Robert Stuart, C.J.1. I concur in the view taken by the Board of Revenue on all the questions submitted to us by this reference. I would point out, however, that it is scarcely correct to describe an instrument of partition as 'the final order for effecting a partition passed by any Revenue Authority.' By Section 3. Clause (11), an instrument of partition is defined to be 'any instrument whereby co-owners of any property divide or agree to divide such property severally, and includes also a final order for effecting a partition passed by any Revenue Authority.' So that there must be in the first place the recorded act of partition or division by the co-owners or their agreement or contract to make it, and the ' final order' which follows is simply the fiat of the Revenue Authority sanctioning the partition by means of which the partition becomes a completed act, and there can of course be no effectual partition until this is done. And such must also be taken to be the meaning of Sectio...
Sikandar Begam Vs. Ahmad-ud-dIn Khan
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Dec-31-1969
Reported in: (1896)ILR18All256
Banerji and Aikman, JJ.1. This appeal is similar to First Appeal No. 101 of 1894, which we have decided to-day. It has arisen out of a suit brought by Sikandar Begam, the assignee of Sughra Begam, plaintiff in the suit in First Appeal No. 101. By an instrument dated the 17th of June 1893, Sughra Begam assigned to Sikandar Begam one-half of the amount of her dower, and also a half share of the property which she claimed to have inherited from her deceased husband Mumtaz Husain Khan. Sikandar Begam by virtue of her assignment claimed Rs. 4,000 on account of Sughra Begam's dower, and an eighth share of the estate said to have been left by Mumtaz Husain Khan. Ahmad-ud-din, the appellant here, denied that Sughra Begam was married to Mumtaz Husain Khan; he raised other objections to the claim, which have been repeated in this appeal. As for the objection that Sughra Begam was not the wife of Mumtaz Husain Khan, we hold, for reasons given in our judgment in First Appeal No. 101 of 1894, that ...
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