Allahabad Court December 1969 Judgments
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Beni and ors. Vs. Radhia
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Dec-31-1969
Reported in: (1875)ILR1All560
Oldfield, J.1. It appears that one Jai Ram had four sons, Basawan, Mata Din, Jhau, and Ram Bakhsh. They are all deceased, Jhau having died in 18CJK, and Rain Bakhsh some sixteen years ago, leaving a, widow Dallo, who died in 1871, and a daughter, the defendant in this suit. The plaintiffs represent Mata Din. On the death of Dallo they sued in 1874 this defendant, the daughter of Ram Bakhsh, for the property now in suit, alleging that they wore the heirs of her deceased father, Ham Bakhsh, and of Dallo; that suit was dismissed. They now sue her for the same property, alleging that Jhau and Hani Bakhsh lived and held the property as joint property, and that Jhau succeeded to Hani Bakhsh, and they are his heirs. The defendant pleaded that the claim was barred with reference to the decision in the former suit, and that it was also barred by limitation, owing to the long adverse possession of Dallo and the defendant. Both Courts have decreed the claim; the lower Appellate Court has held tha...
Kali Charan and anr. Vs. Ahmad Shan Khan
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Dec-31-1969
Reported in: (1895)ILR17All48
Blair and Burkitt, JJ.1. This is a suit by the holders of a second mortgage duly registered to recover by sale of the mortgaged property principal and interest due to them upon a bond executed in their favour by the second defendant. The first defendant and sole respondent here is the purchaser from the second defendant of the equity of redemption, and a certain amount of the purchase money was left with the vendee for the payment of a mortgage debt due under a mortgage of older d ate than that of the plaintiffs. It must be taken to be the fact that the plaintiffs had knowledge of such prior incumbrance. The second defendant by his purchase became full owner of the hypothecated land, subject to plaintiffs' mortgage; that is to say, the equity of redemption had passed to him, and the further equity arising out of his payment of the money due under the prior mortgage by which it had become extinguished. By virtue of his equity of redemption he had become entitled to relieve the land of t...
Kishan Lal Vs. Garuruddhwaja Prasad Singh and ors.
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Dec-31-1969
Reported in: (1899)ILR21All238
Burkitt, J.1. This is an appeal by the plaintiff from a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Aligarh, partly dismissing the plaintiff's suit. The suit was one for sale on a mortgage of certain property executed by the defendant Garuruddhwaja Prasad Singh on February 28th 1893. Among the mortgaged properties, in addition to landed property, was one-half of a fort or kila at Baswan, which had belonged to the mortgagor. This fort had, previous to suit, been sold in execution of a money decree held by one Madhri Saran, and had been purchased by the defendant, Hub Lal. The Subordinate Judge has given the plaintiff a decree against the mortgagor, but dismissed the suit as against the mortgagor's minor son, Matmatangadhwaja Prasad Singh, and as against Hub Lal. The result of this decree is that in execution the plaintiff can proceed only against the father's (the mortgagor's) interest (presumably one-half) in the mortgaged property, other than the fort, and that the latter cannot be touched at ...
In Re: Reference by Board of Revenue, N.-w.P., Under Act I of 1879
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Dec-31-1969
Reported in: (1880)ILR2All654
Robert Stuart, C.J.1. The result of the very anxious consideration I have given to this reference is a conclusion altogether different from that arrived at by my colleagues and by the Board of Revenue. A very careful examination of the Stamp Act I of 1879 has satisfied me that there is nothing in its provisions or its schedules that applies to the penalty of Rs. 5,000 agreed to be paid in the event or events therein expressed, and the legal character of that penalty must be determined solely on legal principle, I agree with the Board that the document is not a lease as defined by the Stamp Act, but a mere agreement or memorandum of an agreement, the proper stamp-duty on which is eight annas, and the several clauses and articles which constitute this agreement constitute the primary obligation undertaken by the parties, the Rs. 5,000 being a mere penalty contingent on the non-performance cannot be anticipated or presumed. On the contrary the presumption, according to all recognised lega...
Gaya Parshad Vs. Bhup Singh and ors.
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Dec-31-1969
Reported in: (1875)ILR1All180
1. In our judgment the provisions of Section 6, Act VIII of 1859, are extended to miscellaneous proceedings, and inasmuch as we have this day held on a reference in the case of Harshankar Parshad that proceedings in execution fall within the term 'miscellaneous proceedings' in Section 38, we reply that the Judge had power to transfer the proceedings in the case out of which this reference arose....
Gulab Rai Vs. Mangli Lal
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Dec-31-1969
Reported in: (1885)ILR7All42
Mahmood, J.1. This is an application under Section 622 of the Civil Procedure Code, for revision of an order of the District Judge rejecting an appeal as barred by limitation. The learned Pandit who has appeared on behalf of the opposite party has raised a preliminary objection that the order of the District Judge was a 'decree' within the meaning of Section 2 of the Civil Procedure Code; that it was appealable, and could not, therefore, be made the subject of revision.2. There can be no doubt that 'an order rejecting a plaint' is treated by the Code as a 'decree,' under the express words of Section 2, and the learned Pandit contends, that with reference to the provisions of the last paragraph of Section 582, the word ' plaint,' as used in Section 2, must be understood to include memorandum of appeal. He further contends that the first part of the definition of 'decree ' given in Section 2 is sufficiently broad to include orders such as the one now under consideration.3. On the other h...
Roshan Singh Vs. Balwant Singh
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Dec-31-1969
Reported in: (1896)ILR18All253
Banerji and Aikman, JJ.1. The plaintiff brought the suit in which this appeal has arisen to redeem a mortgage. The facts, so far as it is necessary to state them, are briefly these: The Husain estate, which originally belonged to Baja Mittar Singh, descended to his grandson Raja Narain Singh, and was mortgaged by Raja Narain Singh to the predecessor in title of the defendant. Raja Mittar Singh had a son, Kuar Sanwant Singh, whose son was Kuar Indarjit Singh. The plaintiff's father Bhoj Singh, it is alleged, was the illegitimate son of Indarjit Singh, although the plaintiff does not admit the fact of illegitimacy. After the death of Raja Narain Singh the estate was in the possession of his widows. The last of the widows having died, the plaintiff brought the present suit on the ground that he was entitled to the estate. Another ground of his claim, as alleged in his plaint, was that, even if his father Bhoj Singh was illegitimate, he, Bhoj Singh, had a right of maintenance for which the...
Queen-empress Vs. Nihal
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Dec-31-1969
Reported in: (1887)ILR9All348
Straight, J.1. The case, decided by me, of Queen-Empress v. Bandhu. I. L. R., 8 All., 51, was determined after very full and careful discussion and prolonged consideration. Munshi Kashi Prasad in that case was good enough to lay before me all the information that was obtainable in reference to the practice and procedure among the Hindus in the matter of dedication or setting loose these bulls upon the death of a relative, and from that information it was placed beyond doubt that, as understood among men of that religion, the person letting loose the animal, by the act of so doing, surrendered and abandoned all proprietary rights therein. My brother Brodhurst in the case of Queen-Empress v. Jamura, Weekly Notes, 1884, p. 87, obviously adopted this view, which I hold to correctly represent the real condition of things. This being the case, I am not disposed in any shape to depart from my ruling referred to by me, or to modify the opinion I then expressed. This application for revision, t...
Wilayat Ali Khan Vs. Abdus Salam and ors.
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Dec-31-1969
Reported in: (1897)ILR19All256
John Edge, Kt., C.J. and Knox, J.1. The plaintiff in pre-emption paid into Court the amount to satisfy the pre-emptive price and costs, but he appealed to the High Court against the amount decreed. An ingenious creditor of the plaintiff presented an application for the attachment of part of the money paid into Court, and, extraordinary to say, he found a Judge who made an order on his application allowing it. Thereupon the amount which he claimed, amounting to Rs. 1,243, was paid out of Court, neither the defendants nor the plaintiff consenting. The plaintiff's appeal was dismissed. He thereupon demanded possession. He was met with the objection that there was not enough money in Court to pay the decretal amount. That was quite true, but it was not the plaintiff's fault. He had complied with the law. It was the fault of the Judge who allowed anyone except the defendant in the suit to draw any part of the money out of Court. The plaintiff appealed to this Court, and our brother Aikman, ...
In Re: Lachman and anr.
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Dec-31-1969
Reported in: (1900)ILR22All267
Aikman, J.1. An order was issued to the applicants by a duly empowered Magistrate, directing them under the provisions of Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to remove an unlawful obstruction from a road which wag said to be a public road, or to appear within a time fixed and move to have the order set aside. The applicants put in a petition, in which they denied that there ever was a road as asserted by the other side. Had they adhered to this position, and had the Magistrate, without considering whether the applicants' plea was or was not a bond fide claim of right, passed the order complained against, it would have been a case for interference in revision. But instead of adopting this course the applicants asked the Magistrate to appoint a jury, that being the third alternative given by Section 135 of the Code. The Magistrate nominated the two men named by the applicants, namely, Bachu Lal and Ganesh Prasad Narain. He also appointed two men whose names were supplied by the...
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