Allahabad Court December 1969 Judgments
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Nur Ali Vs. Zahur
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Dec-31-1969
Reported in: (1880)ILR2All99
Turner, J.1. The parties are Muhammadans, and under the law administered here they can claim pre-emption on all sales of property made between the members of their creed, when the property is of the description to which by their law pre-emption attaches. It is contended that to the property in suit pre-emption does not attach, and passages are cited from the Hedaya and other works (see Baillie's Digest of Muhammadan law, pp. 473, 474, 475) to show that, when a house is sold apart from land, pre-emption does not attach, and it is argued that, inasmuch as the seller had no right in the land, all he could sell was the house.2. In fact and in law this contention appears erroneous. The seller not. only sold the materials of the house, but such interest as he possessed as an occupier of the soil. The house was sold as a house to be inhabited on the spot with the same right of occupation as the seller had enjoyed.3. The text on which the appellant relies applies to the sale of the materials o...
Gajendar Singh Vs. Sardar Singh and anr.
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Dec-31-1969
Reported in: (1896)ILR18All176
John Edge, Kt., C.J. and Burkitt, J.1. This is a first appeal from a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Moradabad dismissing the plaintiff's quit. The plaintiff, to put the case shortly, brought his suit against his cousin Sardar Singh, Musammat Mewa Kuar, the step grandmother of Sardar Singh, and Musammat Sundar, who was the kept woman of Baldeo Singh, the grandfather of Sardar Singh. He sought possession of the property mentioned in the plaint on the ground that the family to which he and Baldeo Singh, the grandfather of the defendant Sardar Singh, belonged was a joint Hindu family, and on the further ground that the property in question was the joint property of that family, of which family, if it was a joint family, he was the sole surviving male member. He sought to have it decided that certain gifts, a will and an agreement mentioned in the plaint, which were made by Baldeo Singh, were void as against him, the plaintiff. The defence to the suit was that all the descendants of one...
Nanda Rai and anr. Vs. Raghunandan Singh
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Dec-31-1969
Reported in: (1885)ILR7All282
Oldfield, J.1. Whether or not the previous executions of the decree by some sharers for their shares were strictly allowable, they were allowed, and no objections at the time were taken to them, and they must be held to be good for the purpose of keeping the decree alive. The judgment-debtor cannot now take exception to them as not being applications to enforce the decree within the meaning of the Limitation Act. The principle of the decision of the Privy Council in Mungul Prasad Dichit v. Grija Kant Lahiri I.L.R. 8 Cal. 51 : L.R. 8 Ind. Ap. 123 governs this case. The judgment-debtor cannot now object to the execution of the decree by the appellants for their shares. The orders of the Courts below are set aside, and the case remanded to the first Court for disposal. Costs to follow the result....
Sharf-ud-dIn Khan Vs. Fatehyab Khan
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Dec-31-1969
Reported in: (1898)ILR20All208
John Edge, C.J. and Burkitt J.1. This appeal arises out of an assessment of mesne profits. The appellant complains, firstly, that he was deprived of the benefit of evidence in the suit which was on the record in the High Court at the time when the mesne profits were being assessed. In order to support that ground, it would be necessary to show that the evidence he desired to have was material. He has not taken the trouble to procure the production of that record here, and he has failed to prove that one word oi that evidence was material. He also complains that in taking the account for mesne profits he was allowed an insufficient sum for expenses. His claim for expenses was made up of, amongst other things, a claim for the salary of two karindas. That portion of the claim alone would have brought the expenses on the amount collected to something near 12 per cent., an allowance which we could never sanction in favour of a wrong-doer. It would be excessive in any case. However, his main...
Mughla Begam and ors. Vs. Bans Bahadur Singh and ors.
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Dec-31-1969
Reported in: (1880)ILR2All604
Robert Stuart, C.J.1. In my opinion our answers to these two references ought to be in the affirmative. I have looked into the records for the terms of the surety-bonds in both cases, and I find that in one the bond absolutely secures the costs of the Privy Council to the extent of Rs. 4,000, and in the other case the surety-bond is not limited to the costs of the Privy Council appeal, but covers the whole decree appealed against, including the decretal amount of Rs. 11,853-7-10 and the costs. The legal question, however, is the same in both references, and must be answered in the same way.2. The sections of the Code of Procedure to be considered areSections 610 and 253. Section 610 provides that:-- 'Whoever desires to enforce or to obtain execution of any order of Her Majesty in Council shall apply by petition, accompanied by a certified copy of the decree or order made in appeal and sought to be enforced or executed, to the Court from which the appeal to Her Majesty was preferred. Su...
In Re: Barkat
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Dec-31-1969
Reported in: (1897)ILR19All200
Blair, J.1. This is a petition for the revision of an order of the Sessions Judge of Ghazipur, directing the prosecution of the applicant for an offence under Section 193 of the Indian Penal code. The applicant had been put upon his trial before a Magistrate of the first class for an offence constituted by Section 323 of the Indian Penal Code. He had been convicted and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 25, or, in default of such payment, to be imprisoned for three months. Application was made by him to the Sessions Judge to revise this sentence and conviction. This application was to some extent based upon the allegation that the Magistrate, who tried the case, had refused to summon Witnesses whom the applicant desired to call in his defence. That allegation in the petition was supported by an affidavit sworn by the applicant. The Sessions Judge found that the allegations of that affidavit were false to the knowledge of its maker, and therefore made the order now sought to be revised.2. M...
Ghasiram Vs. Mussammat Nuraj Begam
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Dec-31-1969
Reported in: (1875)ILR1All31
1. It has been argued, it is doubtful from the language of the honourable the Chief Justice, whether, under Section 353 *, Civil Procedure Code, he intended to frame and remit issues for trial, or under Section 355 merely to direct the Court below to take further evidence. We think it unnecessary to determine this point, because we are of opinion that in either view this appeal cannot be entertained.2. There has been no judgment in the sense in which we construe that term in Clause 10 of the Letters Patent. There must be such a judgment on the part of all the learned and honourable Judges who may constitute a Bench as disposes of the suit on appeal before it. The learned Chief Justice has as yet recorded no such judgment, and to enable the Bench to do so, he has considered it necessary to obtain further materials.3. Under the circumstances, we reject the appeal, and as the respondents have appeared, with costs. When the evidence is *[Section 353:-When the evidence upon the record of t...
Arjun Singh Vs. Sarfaraz Singh
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Dec-31-1969
Reported in: (1888)ILR10All182
Mahmood, J.1. The facts of this case are these: One Ram Kant Misr was the owner of a five annas 6 pies share, which he sold under a sale-deed dated Pus badi 12, 1290 fasli (1883) to Ganga Mahton and Har Bakhsh Mahton. Upon this sale two pre-emptive suits were instituted, one by Arjun and the other by Sarfaraz. Both suits were decreed on the 16th August 1884 which decrees were upheld in appeal on the 31st October 1885. The effect of those decrees was that whilst the pre-emptor Arjun was held entitled to pre-empt a three annas share in lien of Rs. 1,308-9-0, the rival pre-emptor Sarfaraz was held entitled to pre-empt the remaining 2 annas 6 pies share oh payment of Rs. 1,090-7-0. But it was provided in both the decrees that in case of default of either of the pre-emptors to pay in the amount above specified within a period of thirty days, the other pre-emptor would be entitled to pre-empt the remaining portion of the share decreed to the other pre-emptor on payment of the price thereof w...
The Bank of Bengal Vs. Cohen
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Dec-31-1969
Reported in: (1880)ILR2All598
Spankie, J.1. The liability of appellant under ordinary circumstances is not denied, and it may be said that his entire case stands or falls with the allegation that the railway receipt which accompanied the bill was not to be parted with to Cohen Brothers until they had paid the amount of the bill, and it is urged that the Bank did part with the receipt before the bill had been discharged and therefore the appellant was no longer liable. It is admitted by appellant in his third plea that the determination of this point was the true issue in the suit.2. I did not understand that it was seriously contended that appellant was not at liberty to offer evidence of the agreement or understanding set up by him But I am disposed to hold that the oral agreement set up is not one that contradicts, varies, adds to, or subtracts from, the terms of the contract, and that both provisos 2 and 3 of Section 92 * of the Evidence Act might apply to his case.3. I do not, however, think that it is necessar...
Mehrbano Vs. Nadir Ali and anr.
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Dec-31-1969
Reported in: (1900)ILR22All212
Blair and Burkitt, JJ.1. In this case the contending parties are practically the first and second mortgagees or their representatives. The first mortgagee, who is represented by the plaintiffs-respondents, sued upon his mortgages, obtained decrees for sale, and in execution purchased the mortgaged property. To his suit he did not make the puisne mortgagee a party, as he was bound to do under the provisions of Section 85 of the Transfer of Property Act. The puisne mortgagee, who is represented by the defendant-appellant, in his turn instituted a suit upon his mortgage: he did not make the latter a party to his suit. The puisne mortgagee obtained a decree for sale, and has now put up and advertised the mortgaged property for sale. Thereupon the plaintiffs, the representatives of the prior incumbrancer, have instituted this suit, in which they ask for a declaration that that property is not liable to be sold in execution of the decree held by the defendant puisne mortgagee. A decree has b...
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