Allahabad Court December 1969 Judgments
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Musammat Jagesri Kuar Vs. Ram Nath Bhagat and anr.
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Dec-31-1969
Reported in: (1875)ILR1All371
1. We are of opinion that the present suit is maintainable. The Lords of the Privy Council* expressly except the case of a suit brought by a Hindu reversioner from the operation of the general rule.2. The appeal is decreed and the suit remanded under Section 351 for trial. Costs of the appeal to abide and follow the result.---------------------------------Foot Note------------------------------------* Strimathoo Moothoo Vijia Bagoonadah Ranee Kolandapuree Natchiar alias Kattama Natchiar v. Dorasinga Tevar alias Gowry Vallaba Tevar 15 B.L.R. 83.The portion of that Judgment o their Lordships referred to here was as follows:The arguments now under consideration are founded on the right of a reversioner to bring a suit to restrain a widow or other Hindu female in possession from acts of waste, although his interest during her life is future and contingent. Suits of the kind form a very special class and have been entertained by the Courts ex-necessitate rei....
Ram Dai Vs. Chamaili Rani
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Dec-31-1969
Reported in: (1875)ILR1All552
Robert Stuart, C.J.1. It appears to me that the meaning of the words 'distinct subjects' in Section 17 q. v. supra 1 All. P. 552 of Act VII of 1870 is shown with sufficient clearness in that section itself, when it states that 'the plaint or memorandum of appeal shall be chargeable with the aggregate amount of the fees to which the plaints or memoranda of appeal in suits embracing separately each of such subjects would be liable under this Act.' This, I think, can only mean that the two or more distinct subjects are to be so chargeable as being distinct causes of action. The words 'plaints or memoranda of appeal in suits' in the section show this to my mind conclusively, and it is not enough that the distinct subjects should be merely separate and distinct matters embraced in the claim.2. But, on the other hand, I am of opinion that this interpretation of Section 17 of the Court Fees' Act does not in the least degree affect the correctness of the calculation submitted by the office in ...
Ganga Dei Vs. Sher Singh
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Dec-31-1969
Reported in: (1895)ILR17All51
Blair, J.1. This is an application to this Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. In a civil suit before a Subordinate Judge for a sum largely in excess of 5,000 rupees certain interrogatories were alleged to have been falsely answered, or not properly answered, or not answered at all within the meaning of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned Subordinate Judge who beard the suit granted sanction for the prosecution of the present applicant in terms which it is irrelevant here to discuss. Against that order the present applicant appealed to the District Judge. The learned District Judge rejected the appeal upon the ground that he had no jurisdiction to hear it. That order was based upon the impression that, the amount in dispute in the civil suit being such that an appeal in the civil suit was outside his jurisdiction, the learned Judge's Court was not the Court to which an appeal from the Subordinate Judge ordinarily lay within the meaning of Section 195 of the Code ...
Muhammad Suleman Khan Vs. Muhammad Yar Khan and ors.
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Dec-31-1969
Reported in: (1895)ILR17All39
John Edge, Kt., C.J. and Banerji, J.1. This is a somewhat peculiar case. The respondents in this appeal from an order on an application in the execution of a decree obtained in the Civil Court on the 24th of December 1878, a decree, which was affirmed in this Court in 1882, in a suit for possession of property. In 1883, on an application to execute that decree, possession was delivered to these respondents. In 1884 this Court held, on appeal from the order putting the respondents in possession, that the decree as it stood was incapable of execution. The decree in question was the decree in appeal of this Court. In 1884 an application was presented to this Court, for the amendment of the decree by bringing it into accordance with the judgment. That application was refused in 1884. In 1885 these respondents applied to the Court below to amend the decree. On that application an order to amend was made by the lower Court in 1885, but that order was set aside on appeal to this Court in 1889...
Maratib Ali Vs. Abdul Hakim and ors.
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Dec-31-1969
Reported in: (1875)ILR1All567
ORDER1. The second plea is overruled because it was admitted that the existence of the right of pre-emption was entered in the record as a matter of agreement and not of custom, and on these averments the suit has been tried and the issues fully investigated; but the validity of the first plea must be admitted. The claim based on the wajib-ul-arz did not exclude a claim under Muhammadan law. The lower Appellate Court must determine whether the appellant had, under the Muhammadan law, the right of pre-emption, and secondly, if he had the right, whether he duly performed the conditions which, under the Muhammadan law, are essential to the validity of the right, namely, the immediate expression of his intention to purchase an immediate demand....
Manog Dat Vs. Lachmi NaraIn and anr.
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Dec-31-1969
Reported in: (1885)ILR7All291
W. Comer Petheram, C.J.1. The plaintiff sued to enforce a right of pre-emption, and his right in the village was acquired on the 3rd September 1881, by purchase and not by inheritance. He was not an old co-sharer, and, as regards the merits, there is no reason why he should succeed, not being such a co-sharer, unless he can show a preferential claim to the defendants. The question which arises is, whether the defendants had acquired rights in the village before the 3rd September 1881. We are of opinion that they had, for the first interest which they acquired was on the 1st September 1881, when they entered into an agreement with the female defendant that, in consideration of their bringing an action for recovery of her share, they should have a moiety. She thus by that agreement transferred, on the 1st September 1881, one-half of what she was to get to them. The present defendants found funds for the two suits, which eventually were compromised, the Musammat getting a less share than ...
In Re: Reference Under Act No. 1 of 1879 (Indian Stamp Act), Section 4 ...
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Dec-31-1969
Reported in: (1895)ILR17All55
John Edge, Kt., C.J., Knox and Banerji, JJ.1. This is a reference by the Munsif of Saharanpur under Section 49 of the Indian Stamp Act of 1879. The question is whether a document produced before him at the trial was chargeable with duty as a lease or was chargeable with duty as a mortgage-deed. There was a further question submitted to us, namely, in case the document was a lease and also a mortgage-deed, did it fall within paragraph 2 of Section 7 of the Indian Stamp Act, that is, was it chargeable with duty only as a mortgage-deed, that being the higher duty2. The document in question was stamped as a lease. The document in question was a document by which the zamindar leased certain land in his village to some cultivators at a rent of Rs. 365 per annum in cash and of certain cart-loads of straw and of grass, valued by the Munsif at Rs. 10 per annum, for eight years, as zamindari dues. The lessees by the deed hypothecated certain other property belonging co them for the purpose of se...
Ganga Dai Vs. Lyell
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Dec-31-1969
Reported in: (1875)ILR1All60
Turner, Spankie and Oldfield, JJ.1. There is, it must be admitted, no direct evidence to show the immediate cause of the explosion. Two out of three gentlemen examined as experts deposed that the powder could not have exploded spontaneously; the third, while admitting that in his experience he had never known the compound explode without friction or percussion, deposed that, assuming it proved that prior to the explosion the box had not suffered violence of any sort, he should attribute the explosion to 'chemical action having arisen between the ingredients constituting the detonating powder.' This answer is not elucidated by any further explanation. The coolie who had brought the box to the station deposed that it had not fallen or received a shock from the time he received it up to the time be placed it inside the counter, and that 'no one kicked at the box, for nobody went that way,' by which we understand him to mean that no one entered the passage in or near winch ho had placed th...
Kadri Begam Vs. Abdul Majid Khan
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Dec-31-1969
Reported in: (1898)ILR20All245
John Edge, C.J. and Burkitt, J.1. In this suit Musammat Kadri Begam sues her son, Abdul Majid Khan, on an award, to obtain a decree for sale. The facts of the case are somewhat peculiar. The plaintiff was the wife of one Nawab Rashid Khan, who was the owner of the property sought to be sold. He assigned the property to his wife, the plaintiff, in satisfaction of dower due by him to her, and she during his minority made a gift of the property to the defendant. When the defendant came of age he showed a disposition to be extravagant, and thereupon the father, mother and son agreed that an arbitrator should determine what provision should be made for the family. Now the arbitrator made an award, and upon that award this suit has been brought. He awarded that Rs. 600 yearly should be paid out of the property in question to the father and-mother, and ordered that the payment should be made 'ta haiyat walidain ' which has been translated 'to the term of the lives of the two parents.' Nawab R...
Harihar Dat Vs. Sheo Prasad and ors.
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Dec-31-1969
Reported in: (1885)ILR7All41
Mahmood, J.1. It is a general rule of pre-emption that any act or omission on the part of a duly authorized agent or manager of the pre-emptor has the same effect upon pre-emption as if such actor omission had been made by the pre-emptor himself. The refusal of Kantika to purchase the property now in suit therefore debars the plaintiff from maintaining the present suit. The appeal is dismissed with costs....
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