Allahabad Court March 1923 Judgments
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Bandhu Ram and anr. Vs. Ram Kishun Sonar and anr.
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Mar-16-1923
Reported in: AIR1923All535; 73Ind.Cas.1010
1. The Plaintiffs in the four suits which have given rise to these appeals are the sons of Jangli Sonar who was impleaded as the third defendant. The suits were brought to set aside four transactions of sale carried out by Jangli in favour of the other defendants to the suits on the allegation, among others, that there was no legal necessity for them.2. The Court of first instance decreed the claims subject to payment of certain sums which in its opinion were binding debts for which the plaintiffs were liable. The lower Appellate Court, though differing from the First Court in respect of some of its findings, affirmed the decrees in all four suits. It is argued in second appeal that on the findings arrived at by the District Judge he ought to have held that all four transfers were for legal necessity and ought, in consequence, to have dismissed the suits.3. The four sale-deeds were for a total consideration of Rs. 4,799-15-0, made up of the following items:(a) Rs. 4,100 left for paymen...
Bhupal Singh and ors. Vs. Girdhari Singh and anr. and Shamli Singh
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Mar-15-1923
Reported in: (1923)ILR45All456
Muhammad Rafiq and Lindsay, JJ.1. This second appeal arises out of a pre-emption suit. The question before us is whether the lower appellate court had a right to extend the time for payment into court of the pre-emption money.2. It appears that the plaintiffs were given a decree for preemption, by which they were required to pay a sum of Rs. 800 info court within a period of thirty days from the decision of the first court's decree. That decree was passed three days before the courts closed for the long vacation, so that we have it that the plaintiffs had really only a period of three days lo deposit the money.3. An application was made after the vacation for the reception of the money by the court. The application was declined (sic) the ground that the court had no authority to extend the one.4. The plaintiffs appealed to the District Judge. In the memorandum of appeal as presented, the only ground taken was that the price which had been fixed by the court below was excessive. It seem...
Deo Inder Singh and ors. Vs. Khushi Ram
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Mar-15-1923
Reported in: AIR1923All536; 76Ind.Cas.375
1. This is an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, asking this Court to extend the time for presentation of an application for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council.2. The first question which we have to consider is whether Section 5 can apply to a case of this kind. The language of the section as it now stands is very clear. It is to the effect that time for presenting an appeal, or an application for leave to appeal may be extended under the provisions of this section for sufficient reasons. The present application is clearly an application for leave to appeal. Article 179 of Schedule I of the Limitation Act describes the application as an application for leave to appeal to His Majesty, and prescribes a limitation if ninety days as the Article stands amended under Act XXVI of 1920. The application being an application for leave to appeal, it clearly comes within the purview of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. We have next to consider whether sufficient reason has be...
Girdhari Singh and anr. Vs. Bhupal Singh and ors.
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Mar-15-1923
Reported in: AIR1923All516; 74Ind.Cas.745
1. This second appeal arises out of a pre-emption suit. The question before us is whether the lower Appellate Court had a right to extend the time for payment into Court of the preemption-money. 2. It appears that the appellants were given a decree for pre-emption by which they were required to pay a sum of Rs. 800 into Court within a period of thirty days from the gate of the first Court's decree. That decree was passed three days before the Courts closed for the long vacation, so that we have it that the plaintiffs had really only a period of three days to deposit the money.3. An application was made after the vacation for the reception of the money by the Court. The application was declined on the ground that the Court had no authority to extend the time.4. The plaintiffs appealed to the District Judge. In the Memorandum of Appeal, as presented, the only ground, taken was that the price which had been fixed by the Court below was excessive. It seems, however, that at a later stage t...
Bindhiachal Rai and anr. Vs. Sita Ram Misir and anr.
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Mar-13-1923
Reported in: AIR1924All292; 74Ind.Cas.21
1. We think that, having-regard to the fact that the final decree of November 1915 contained no provision for payment of the balance and for the recovery of such balance from the debtor, the mortgagee was driven to make an application under Order XXXIV, Rule 6. The position no doubt was a difficult one but we think that we ought to look at the substance, and an application under Order XXXIV, Rule 6, was in substance an application for a personal decree of the balance which had been ascertained as a result of the realisation by the sale. That amount could got be finally ascertained until the sale had been confirmed. The view that the Court by, law took on the matter of limitation, therefore, was right and the view that our Stamp Reporter took that this was a regular appeal was also right. The appeal is dismissed with costs including, in this Court fees on the higher scale.2. We exempt the respondent from any liability under which he may otherwise be for payment of the deficiency in the ...
Kali DIn Vs. Rampat and anr.
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Mar-12-1923
Reported in: AIR1923All534; 73Ind.Cas.953
1. These are two connected appeals arising out of the same judgment. The plaintiff is a co-sharer in the village. The first defendant was the Lambardar. The first defendant granted a perpetual lease of 20 bighas of laud to the second defendant Kali Din, who is the appellant before us. The plaintiff brought a suit in the Civil Court for the cancellation of this lease on the ground that it was beyond the powers of the Lambardar to execute. He also sued for the ejectment of the defendant from 5 bighas of laud which he, the plaintiff, claimed as his khudkasht. The defendant pleaded that the lease was a good and valid lease. His contention was that not only was it within the power of the Lambardar but that it was executed with the consent of all the co-sharers, This was in substance a plea that the defendant was the tenant of the whole proprietary body including the plaintiff. Under these circumstances, the Trial Court could have, under Section 202 of the Tenancy Act, directed the defendant...
Jagarnath Singh Vs. Moti Lal and ors.
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Mar-12-1923
Reported in: 73Ind.Cas.958
1. Moti Lal and others, plaintiffs, obtained a simple money-decree against Jatan Singh. He died, and the plaintiffs decree-holders applied to attach certain property in the possession of Jagannath Singh claiming that Jatan Singh was the uncle of Jagannath Singh and that they formed a joint Hindu family. Various objections were taken by Jagannath Singh under Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code. The Trial Court held that Jatan Singh was the uncle of Jagannath Singh but said that as the decree was clearly a personal degree, and was not passed against Jatan as the katta of a joint family, there was no obligation on Jagannath Singh to pay Jatan Singh's debt, and that the property was not liable to attachment and sale. The decree-holders appealed and the learned Subordinate Judge held that, under Section 53 of the Civil Procedure Code, the words 'or their descendant' included a nephew and, therefore, reversed the finding of the Trial Court and remanded the case for trial of the other issu...
Jagannath Singh Vs. Moti Lal and ors.
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Mar-12-1923
Reported in: AIR1923All539; (1923)ILR45All455
Walsh and Ryves, JJ.1. Moti Lal and others, plaintiffs, obtained a simple money decree against Jatan Singh. He died, and the' plaintiffs decree-holders applied to attach certain property in the possession of Jagannath Singh, claiming that Jatan Singh was the uncle of Jagannath Singh and that they formed a joint Hindu family. Various objections were taken by Jagannath Singh under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The trial court held that Jatan Singh was the uncle of Jagannath Singh, but said that, as the decree was clearly a personal decree and was not passed against Jatan as the karla of a joint family, there was no obligation on Jagannath Singh to pay Jatan Singh's debt and that the property was not liable to attachment and sale. The decree-holders appealed, and the learned Subordinate Judge held that under Section 53 of the Code of Civil Procedure the words 'or their descendant included a nephew, and, therefore, reversed the finding, of the trial court and remanded the case...
Kanhaiya Singh and anr. Vs. Tirmal Singh
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Mar-09-1923
Reported in: (1923)ILR45All535
Pramada Charan Banerji and Gokul Prasad, JJ.1. In our judgment no appeal lies in this case under Section 10 of the Letters Patent. An appeal preferred to this Court was dismissed by a learned Judge. An application was made to have that order set aside and that application was treated as an application for review of judgment. The learned Judge rejected the application for review and from his order rejecting the application for review of judgment this appeal under the Letters Patent has been preferred, in Order XLVII, Rule 7, of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is provided that no appeal lies from an order rejecting an application for review of judgment and under Order XLIII, Rule 1, there is no provision for an appeal from an order rejecting such an application. Therefore, according to the Code of Civil Procedure, the order complained of in the present case is unappealable. It is contended that Section 10 of the Letters Patent is wide enough to allow an appeal in a case of this kind. The...
Tirmal Singh Vs. Kanhaiya Singh and anr.
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Mar-09-1923
Reported in: AIR1923All356; 84Ind.Cas.585
1. In our judgment no appeal lies in this case under Section 10 of the Letters Patent. An appeal preferred to this Court was dismissed by a learned Judge. An application was made to have that order set aside and that application was treated as an application for review of judgment. The learned. Judge rejected the application for review and from his order rejecting the application for review of judgment this appeal under the Letters Patent has been preferred. In Order XLVII, Rule 7, of the C.P.C. it is provided that no appeal lies from an order rejecting an application for review of judgment and under Order XLIII, Rule 1, there is no provision for an appeal from an order rejecting such an application. Therefore, according to the C.P.C. the order complained of in the present case is unappealable. It is contended that Section 10 of the Letters Patent is wide enough to allow an appeal in a case of this kind. The whole question of appeals under the Letters Patent was considered by the Full ...
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