Allahabad Court February 1908 Judgments
Ram Saran Das Vs. Narpat and anr.
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Feb-07-1908
Reported in: (1908)ILR30All162
John Stanley, C.J. and William Burkitt, J.1. We are of opinion that the learned District Judge rightly decided the appeal before him. From a perusal of the mortgage which has given rise to this suit it appears to us that the only reasonable inference to be drawn from it is that the intention of the parties was to provide for the realization of the mortgage debt from the property itself and not inertly from its usufruct. The deed in fact was of the nature of a simple mortgage, as well as of a usufructuary mortgage. The case in fact resembles more that of Jafar Husen v. Ranjit Singh (1898) I.L.R. All. 4 than that of Kashi Ram v. Sardar Singh (1905) I.L.R. 28 All. 157. In the first mentioned of these cases the Court came to the conclusion that the intention of the parties was that the debt was realizable by sale of the mortgaged property, whereas in the other case, this Bench was of opinion that the mortgage in said was merely a usufructuary mortgage. For these reasons we dismiss the appe...
Tag this Judgment!Khubi Ram and anr. Vs. Tikam Singh and anr.
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Feb-07-1908
Reported in: (1908)ILR30All163
John Stanley, C.J. and William Burkitt, J.1. The suit out of which this appeal has arisen was brought by the plaintiffs, who are two of the co-sharers of a village, to have a lease executed by the lambardar of the village in favour of the defendants set aside. The defendants are also co sharers of this village. The lambardar and the other co-sharers were all made parties to the suit. The lease was for a term of seven years, and it is alleged and has been proved that it was made at an inadequate rent.2. The Court below set it aside on, amongst other grounds, the ground that a lease by a lambardar for a term of seven years under ordinary circumstances could not be supported. This is a rule which has been acted upon by this Court for a number of years, and was followed by a Bench of this Court in the case of Chattray v. Nawala (1906) I.L.R. 29 All. 20. In that case a Bench, of which one of us was a member, held that it was reasonable that a manager should have power to make temporary lett...
Tag this Judgment!Sundar Deo Vs. Bhagwan Das and ors.
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Feb-07-1908
Reported in: (1908)ILR30All165
George Knox and Aikman, JJ.1. The appellant in this second appeal was plaintiff in the Court of first instance. According to the plaint his grandfather left the plaintiff at the time of his death a minor and not fit to manage his affairs, and therefore he appointed Babu Kishan Dat an agent and made over all the jewelry and property to him in trust for the plaintiff. The plaintiff attained majority, but allowed the defendant to continue in possession of the aforesaid property on his behalf. He subsequently found out that a considerable portion of the property had been pawned by Kishan Dat through Lachhmi Nandan, another of the respondents and brother-in-law of Kishan Dat, to the other three respondents. Kishan Dat and Lachhmi Nandan have been prosecuted and convicted of embezzlement with regard to the said property. The ornaments had during the criminal trial been deposited in the Criminal Court. This suit was brought under the direction of that Court to declare the plaintiff's right to...
Tag this Judgment!In Re: Sheikh Ali Ahmad
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Feb-06-1908
Reported in: 1Ind.Cas.209
ORDERAikman, J.1. This is a reference under Section 5 of the Court Fees Act, 1870.2. The question for decision is as to the proper fee leviable on an application for review of judgment presented on or after the 90th day from the date of the decree, when the application refers only to a portion of the decree. Article 4, Schedule I, of the Act provides that the fee leviable on an application for review of judgment presented on or after the 90th day from the date of the decree is the fee leviable on the plaint or memorandum of appeal.' I have had the advantage of hearing the question argued by the learned Vakil for the applicant and by the learned Government Advocate as representing the Crown. The Act, it will be seen, draws no distinction between applications for review of judgment when the application affects the whole of the decree or only a portion thereof. No doubt the leading principle of the Act is that the amount of the Court fee bears relation to the amount of relief sought, but ...
Tag this Judgment!Panna Lal Vs. Emperor
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Feb-05-1908
Reported in: 2Ind.Cas.192
Griffin, J.1. This is an application for revision of an order of the Cantonment Magistrate of Jhansi, convicting the applicant, Panna Lal on two charges under the Excise Act, one under Section 21 and the other under Section 51.2. The facts which form the basis of the first charge are that Panna Lal, who holds no license under the Excise Act, had received an order from the Secretary of the Jhansi Club, for some methylated spirits. Panna Lal obtained the methylated spirits from another shop and sent it from there on to the Club, without making' any profit in the transaction. Under the particular circumstances of the case it is difficult to call this transaction a sale. I, therefore, set aside the conviction and sentence under the first charge.3. The second charge against the applicant, which was amply proved, was that he had purchased at a Court sale a quantity of wines and spirits knowing that he had no license for possession or sale of such liquor. I am unable to interfere with the ord...
Tag this Judgment!Negi Puran Singh Vs. Bahadur Singh
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Feb-03-1908
Reported in: (1908)ILR30All151
Banerji and Richards, JJ.1. This appeal arises out of a suit brought under the provisions of Section 525 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the filing of an award made by an arbitrator appointed without the intervention of a Court. The parties referred their disputes to the arbitration of an arbitrator on the 25th of January 1904. The arbitrator made his award on the 20th of October 1904. Objections were raised on behalf of the appellant in regard to the award, which were overruled, and the Court ordered the award to be filed and made a decree in accordance with it. From this decree the present appeal has been preferred. A preliminary objection is taken on behalf of the respondent to the effect that no appeal lies. In our judgment this objection must prevail. Section 526 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that if no ground such as is mentioned or referred to in Section 520 or Section 521 be shown against the award, the Court shall order it to be filed, and such award shall take ef...
Tag this Judgment!Jafri Khanum Vs. Fahmida Khanum
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Feb-01-1908
Reported in: (1908)ILR30All153
John Stanley, C.J. and William Burkitt, J.1. We think that the decision of the lower appellate Court is correct. It appears to be well settled law that a Muhammadan testator, governed, as in this case, by the Shia School of law, cannot make a valid bequest of all his property to one of his heirs to the exclusion of the other heirs, without the consent of all the heirs obtained subsequent to his death. The legacy in this case included all the testator's property, both movable and immovable, and from the will it appears that he intended to exclude one of his daughters from participation in his estate. The Sunni School agree in holding that a bequest in favour of an heir is invalid, but according to the Shia law it would seem that a testator can leave a legacy to one of his heirs so long as that legacy does not exceed one-third of his estate, and that such a legacy would be valid without the consent of the other heirs. Where, however, the legacy exceeds one-third of the estate, it will no...
Tag this Judgment!Abdul Jalil Vs. Humera Bibi and ors.
Court: Allahabad
Decided on: Feb-01-1908
Reported in: 2Ind.Cas.463
1. This is an appeal from an order of the learned Subordinate Judge of Jaunpur directing the appellant, who was one of several defendants in a suit brought by the respondent Musammat Alia Bibi, to appear in person in his Court. The learned advocate for the respondents takes a preliminary objection that no appeal lies. The only sections of the Code of Civil Procedure which authorise a Court to order attendance for party in person are Sections 36, 66 and 120. The order appealed against does not state under which of these section it is passed. It appears to us that it cannot possibly be an order either under Section 36 or 66. It is clear from the terms of the order that the learned Subordinate Judge considered that he was acting under the Code of Civil Procedure. We are of opinion, therefore, that although he does not quote any section, he must be deemed to have been acting under Section 120 of the Code. We do not think that the mere omission to quote the section under which he acted 'wou...
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