Usv Limited Vs. Ipca Laboratories Limited

Decided On : Jun-26-2002

Court : Chennai

Notice (8): Undefined index: topics [APP/View/Case/meta.ctp, line 36]
Code Context


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$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Usv Limited Vs. Ipca Laboratories Limited Semantic Analysis',
	'shops' => array(
		'LAW' => array(
			(int) 0 => 'Order XIV Rule 8',
			(int) 1 => 'Section 151 of Civil Procedure Code',
			(int) 2 => 'Section 12',
			(int) 3 => 'the THE LAW OF PASSING-OFF'
		),
		'NORP' => array(
			(int) 0 => 'J.1',
			(int) 1 => 'Pioneers',
			(int) 2 => 'Indian',
			(int) 3 => 'Hon'ble'
		),
		'PERSON' => array(
			(int) 0 => 'Order XXXIX Rules 1',
			(int) 1 => 'PIOZONE',
			(int) 2 => 'medicines.6',
			(int) 3 => 'P. Chidambaram',
			(int) 4 => 'Aristoc',
			(int) 5 => 'P. Chidambaram',
			(int) 6 => 'V. Patel',
			(int) 7 => 'Chetanbhat Shah',
			(int) 8 => 'Anr',
			(int) 9 => 'Christopher Wadlow',
			(int) 10 => 'p.3.06',
			(int) 11 => 'Glucovita',
			(int) 12 => 'Anr',
			(int) 13 => 'Gift Pack',
			(int) 14 => 'Anr',
			(int) 15 => 'P. Chidambaram',
			(int) 16 => 'B.N. Kirpal',
			(int) 17 => 'Bench',
			(int) 18 => 'P. Chidambaram',
			(int) 19 => 'Anr',
			(int) 20 => 'B.N. Kirpal',
			(int) 21 => 'McCarry',
			(int) 22 => 'Christopher Wadlow'
		),
		'CARDINAL' => array(
			(int) 0 => '2',
			(int) 1 => '297/-',
			(int) 2 => '28.7.2000',
			(int) 3 => '25.10.2000',
			(int) 4 => '15',
			(int) 5 => '30',
			(int) 6 => '18.12.2000',
			(int) 7 => '9,77,709',
			(int) 8 => '11.1.2001',
			(int) 9 => '1,17,97,000/-',
			(int) 10 => '15',
			(int) 11 => '30',
			(int) 12 => 'one',
			(int) 13 => 'four',
			(int) 14 => '80',
			(int) 15 => '271/-',
			(int) 16 => '292',
			(int) 17 => '373/-',
			(int) 18 => '450/-',
			(int) 19 => '1.47',
			(int) 20 => '1.92',
			(int) 21 => '3.61',
			(int) 22 => '4.73',
			(int) 23 => '3.89',
			(int) 24 => '15.1.2001',
			(int) 25 => '2.2.2001',
			(int) 26 => '21.5.2001',
			(int) 27 => '16.6.2001',
			(int) 28 => '22',
			(int) 29 => '7.5',
			(int) 30 => '10,05,000/-.5',
			(int) 31 => '15',
			(int) 32 => '30',
			(int) 33 => '26.7.2000',
			(int) 34 => '26.10.2000',
			(int) 35 => '2000.7',
			(int) 36 => '18.12.2000',
			(int) 37 => '11.1.2001',
			(int) 38 => '2.2.2001',
			(int) 39 => '15.1.2001',
			(int) 40 => '16.6.2001',
			(int) 41 => '22',
			(int) 42 => '1,17,97,000/-',
			(int) 43 => '7.5',
			(int) 44 => '6',
			(int) 45 => '7.5',
			(int) 46 => '22',
			(int) 47 => 'four',
			(int) 48 => '80',
			(int) 49 => 'two',
			(int) 50 => 'one',
			(int) 51 => 'two',
			(int) 52 => '2000',
			(int) 53 => '20',
			(int) 54 => '11',
			(int) 55 => '16.16',
			(int) 56 => '4.20',
			(int) 57 => '7.15',
			(int) 58 => '13',
			(int) 59 => '16',
			(int) 60 => 'two',
			(int) 61 => 'one',
			(int) 62 => 'one',
			(int) 63 => '2',
			(int) 64 => '242',
			(int) 65 => 'two',
			(int) 66 => '18',
			(int) 67 => 'two',
			(int) 68 => 'two',
			(int) 69 => 'more than 50',
			(int) 70 => 'one',
			(int) 71 => '18',
			(int) 72 => 'four',
			(int) 73 => '263',
			(int) 74 => '383',
			(int) 75 => 'one',
			(int) 76 => '15.45',
			(int) 77 => '797',
			(int) 78 => 'five'
		),
		'DATE' => array(
			(int) 0 => '2000-2001',
			(int) 1 => 'November, 2000',
			(int) 2 => 'November, 2000',
			(int) 3 => '16.1.2001',
			(int) 4 => 'January, 2001',
			(int) 5 => 'February, 2001 to January, 2002',
			(int) 6 => 'August',
			(int) 7 => '2000',
			(int) 8 => 'January, 2002',
			(int) 9 => 'August, 2001',
			(int) 10 => 'March',
			(int) 11 => '2002',
			(int) 12 => 'about January, 2001',
			(int) 13 => 'January, 2001',
			(int) 14 => 'about September, 2001',
			(int) 15 => 'March',
			(int) 16 => '2002',
			(int) 17 => 'September, 2001',
			(int) 18 => '1949',
			(int) 19 => '1996-97, 1997-98',
			(int) 20 => '1998-99',
			(int) 21 => '1999-2000',
			(int) 22 => '2000-2001',
			(int) 23 => '2001-2002',
			(int) 24 => 'annual',
			(int) 25 => '1996-97, 1997-98',
			(int) 26 => '1998-99',
			(int) 27 => '1999-2000',
			(int) 28 => '2000-2001',
			(int) 29 => 'May, 2000',
			(int) 30 => '29.3.2001',
			(int) 31 => '1959',
			(int) 32 => '1013232',
			(int) 33 => 'about August, 2001',
			(int) 34 => 'September, 2001',
			(int) 35 => 'September, 2001 to March, 2002',
			(int) 36 => 'September, 2001',
			(int) 37 => '12.6.2001',
			(int) 38 => 'November',
			(int) 39 => '16.1.2001',
			(int) 40 => 'January/February, 2001',
			(int) 41 => 'September, 2001',
			(int) 42 => 'October, 2001',
			(int) 43 => 'March',
			(int) 44 => '2002',
			(int) 45 => 'October, 2001',
			(int) 46 => 'the month of March, 2002',
			(int) 47 => 'February, 2001 to January, 2002',
			(int) 48 => 'September, 2001 to March, 2002',
			(int) 49 => 'August',
			(int) 50 => '2000',
			(int) 51 => 'January, 2002',
			(int) 52 => 'a period of',
			(int) 53 => 'one year',
			(int) 54 => '1938',
			(int) 55 => 'the last tour decades',
			(int) 56 => '2172',
			(int) 57 => '2000',
			(int) 58 => ''12',
			(int) 59 => ''14',
			(int) 60 => '1989',
			(int) 61 => '1989',
			(int) 62 => ''15',
			(int) 63 => '2000',
			(int) 64 => '1998',
			(int) 65 => ''16',
			(int) 66 => '1916',
			(int) 67 => '1998',
			(int) 68 => '2001',
			(int) 69 => 'nearly five months',
			(int) 70 => 'January, 2001',
			(int) 71 => 'one year',
			(int) 72 => 'nearly five months',
			(int) 73 => 'five months',
			(int) 74 => '1310',
			(int) 75 => '30 years',
			(int) 76 => '2001',
			(int) 77 => 'about a month',
			(int) 78 => 'six weeks',
			(int) 79 => 'a few days',
			(int) 80 => 'more than a few months',
			(int) 81 => 'about three months',
			(int) 82 => 'a month',
			(int) 83 => 'the month of March, 2002'
		),
		'ORG' => array(
			(int) 0 => 'Research and Development',
			(int) 1 => 'PIOZ',
			(int) 2 => 'the Trade Marks Registry',
			(int) 3 => 'the Food and Drug Administration',
			(int) 4 => 'Food and Drug Administration',
			(int) 5 => 'PIOZ',
			(int) 6 => 'International Regulatory Authorities',
			(int) 7 => 'the International Non-Proprietary',
			(int) 8 => 'Bio-Equivalence',
			(int) 9 => 'Drug Controller General of',
			(int) 10 => 'Food and Drug Administration',
			(int) 11 => 'the Trade and Merchandise Marks Rule',
			(int) 12 => 'the International Non-Proprietary',
			(int) 13 => 'PIO',
			(int) 14 => 'PIO',
			(int) 15 => 'PIOZULIN',
			(int) 16 => 'PIOGLAR',
			(int) 17 => 'PIOGLU',
			(int) 18 => 'PIONORM',
			(int) 19 => 'PIOLEM',
			(int) 20 => 'PIOLET',
			(int) 21 => 'PIOZIT',
			(int) 22 => 'Court',
			(int) 23 => 'PIOZ',
			(int) 24 => 'the Registrar of Trade Marks',
			(int) 25 => 'Registrar of Trade Marks',
			(int) 26 => 'PIOZ',
			(int) 27 => 'the Registrar of Trade Marks',
			(int) 28 => 'the Drug Controller General (',
			(int) 29 => 'Authority',
			(int) 30 => 'Food and Drug Administration',
			(int) 31 => 'Authority',
			(int) 32 => 'PIOZ',
			(int) 33 => 'Authorities',
			(int) 34 => 'Court',
			(int) 35 => 'xerox',
			(int) 36 => 'Pharmaceutical Products',
			(int) 37 => 'Food and Drug Administration',
			(int) 38 => 'PIOZ',
			(int) 39 => 'Drug Controller General',
			(int) 40 => 'Food and Drug Administration',
			(int) 41 => 'PIOZ',
			(int) 42 => 'PIOZ',
			(int) 43 => 'PIOZ',
			(int) 44 => 'PIOZ',
			(int) 45 => 'Court',
			(int) 46 => 'the Hon'ble Apex Court',
			(int) 47 => 'Cadila Health Care Ltd.',
			(int) 48 => 'Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd.',
			(int) 49 => 'the Apex Court',
			(int) 50 => 'Court',
			(int) 51 => 'Court',
			(int) 52 => 'Court',
			(int) 53 => 'Amritdham',
			(int) 54 => 'Dyechem',
			(int) 55 => 'AIR 2000',
			(int) 56 => 'AIR 2000 SC 2114 :',
			(int) 57 => 'works,(b',
			(int) 58 => 'Court',
			(int) 59 => 'the Hon'ble Apex Court',
			(int) 60 => 'Kerly (Ibid',
			(int) 61 => 'Court',
			(int) 62 => 'Mahendra Paper Mills Ltd.',
			(int) 63 => 'Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd.',
			(int) 64 => 'the Hon'ble Apex Court',
			(int) 65 => 'High Courts',
			(int) 66 => 'Court',
			(int) 67 => 'Court',
			(int) 68 => 'Com Products Refining Co.',
			(int) 69 => 'Shangrila Food Products Ltd.',
			(int) 70 => 'Court',
			(int) 71 => 'Amrit Soap Company',
			(int) 72 => 'New Punjab Soap Factory',
			(int) 73 => 'Court',
			(int) 74 => 'Indian Shaving Products Ltd.',
			(int) 75 => 'CLC',
			(int) 76 => 'Court',
			(int) 77 => 'Court',
			(int) 78 => 'Court',
			(int) 79 => 'Chemist',
			(int) 80 => 'PIOZ',
			(int) 81 => 'the Hon'ble Judges Doraiswamy Raju',
			(int) 82 => 'Brijesh Kumar',
			(int) 83 => 'Court',
			(int) 84 => 'PIOZ',
			(int) 85 => 'Court',
			(int) 86 => 'Horlick',
			(int) 87 => 'Sumerskill',
			(int) 88 => 'The Illustrated Official Journal (Patents) Supplement 1 and Corn Products Refining Co.',
			(int) 89 => 'Shangrila Food Products Ltd.',
			(int) 90 => 'Court',
			(int) 91 => 'Court',
			(int) 92 => 'Colgate Palmolive',
			(int) 93 => 'Hindustan Lever Ltd.',
			(int) 94 => 'Parle Products Limited v.',
			(int) 95 => 'Bakemans Industries Limited',
			(int) 96 => 'Court',
			(int) 97 => 'PIOZ',
			(int) 98 => 'Court',
			(int) 99 => 'Court',
			(int) 100 => 'PIO',
			(int) 101 => 'PIO',
			(int) 102 => 'PIO',
			(int) 103 => 'PIOZ',
			(int) 104 => 'PIO',
			(int) 105 => 'inter alia',
			(int) 106 => 'Court',
			(int) 107 => 'Ors',
			(int) 108 => 'Court',
			(int) 109 => 'Court',
			(int) 110 => 'Court',
			(int) 111 => 'Court',
			(int) 112 => 'Court',
			(int) 113 => 'Court',
			(int) 114 => 'India Stationery Products Co.',
			(int) 115 => 'Whitman v. Disney Productions',
			(int) 116 => 'the Circuit Court of Appeal',
			(int) 117 => 'Court',
			(int) 118 => 'Kcrly',
			(int) 119 => 'the Division Bench',
			(int) 120 => 'Delhi High Court',
			(int) 121 => 'follows:-'17',
			(int) 122 => 'Court',
			(int) 123 => 'Court',
			(int) 124 => 'Court',
			(int) 125 => 'Court'
		),
		'GPE' => array(
			(int) 0 => 'India',
			(int) 1 => 'India',
			(int) 2 => 'New Delhi',
			(int) 3 => 'India',
			(int) 4 => 'New Delhi',
			(int) 5 => 'India',
			(int) 6 => 'New Delhi',
			(int) 7 => 'India',
			(int) 8 => 'India',
			(int) 9 => 'India',
			(int) 10 => 'India',
			(int) 11 => 'New Delhi',
			(int) 12 => 'India',
			(int) 13 => 'New Delhi',
			(int) 14 => 'India',
			(int) 15 => 'New Delhi',
			(int) 16 => 'Mumbai',
			(int) 17 => 'India',
			(int) 18 => 'India',
			(int) 19 => 'New Delhi',
			(int) 20 => 'India',
			(int) 21 => 'New Delhi',
			(int) 22 => 'countries.10',
			(int) 23 => 'India',
			(int) 24 => 'England',
			(int) 25 => 'Mahendra',
			(int) 26 => 'Delhi',
			(int) 27 => 'BILLY',
			(int) 28 => 'Delhi',
			(int) 29 => 'Delhi',
			(int) 30 => 'India',
			(int) 31 => 'India',
			(int) 32 => 'Versa',
			(int) 33 => 'B.L.',
			(int) 34 => 'Delhi',
			(int) 35 => 'India',
			(int) 36 => 'U.S.A.'
		),
		'EVENT' => array(
			(int) 0 => 'PIOZED 15 and PIOZED 30',
			(int) 1 => 'Clause 5',
			(int) 2 => 'PIOZED 15 and PIOZED 30'
		),
		'PRODUCT' => array(
			(int) 0 => '30.5.2001',
			(int) 1 => '30.5.2001',
			(int) 2 => '183',
			(int) 3 => '797'
		),
		'FAC' => array(
			(int) 0 => 'Madras',
			(int) 1 => 'Madras',
			(int) 2 => 'Hindustan Pencils Pvt',
			(int) 3 => 'Madras'
		),
		'WORK_OF_ART' => array(
			(int) 0 => 'a Larger Bench of',
			(int) 1 => '1995 Edition'
		),
		'LANGUAGE' => array(
			(int) 0 => 'English',
			(int) 1 => 'English',
			(int) 2 => 'English',
			(int) 3 => 'English',
			(int) 4 => 'English'
		),
		'ORDINAL' => array(
			(int) 0 => 'first',
			(int) 1 => 'first'
		),
		'MONEY' => array(
			(int) 0 => 'two marks Gluvita',
			(int) 1 => 'two marks',
			(int) 2 => 'two marks'
		)
	),
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '834688',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51863/trade-and-merchandise-marks-act-1958-repealed-complete-act">Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958</a> - Sections 28 and 29; <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Order 39, Rules 1 and 2',
			'appealno' => 'Appln. No. 230 of 2002 in C.S. No. 234 of 2002',
			'appellant' => 'Usv Limited',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Usv Limited Vs. Ipca Laboratories Limited',
			'casenote' => 'Intellectual Property Rights - trade mark - Sections 28 and 29, of Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 and Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - suit for grant of ad-interim injunction restraining respondent from manufacturing or dealing directly or indirectly in medicinal preparations under trade mark PIOZED - delay in institution of suit by itself not sufficient defence to an action for interim injunction - submissions made by respondent not sustainable - applicant entitled to ad-interim injunction pending disposal of suit.


 - T.N. ESTATES (ABOLITION & CONVERSION INTO RYOTWARI) ACT, 1948 [Act No. 26/1948]. Sections 5(2) & 67; [A.P. Shah, CJ, Mrs. Prabha Sridevan & P. Jyothimani, JJ] Suo motu revisional powers  Held, On a bare reading of the provisions of Section 5(2) of the Act, it is clear that the power conferred on the Director by Section 5(2) to cancel or revise any of the orders, acts or proceedings of the Settlement Officer is very wide. In the first place, the Director need not necessarily be moved by any party in that behalf, and the power could be exercised either on an application by an aggrieved person or suo motu. For example, if the Director comes to know that contrary to the scheme of the Act or due to misrepresentation or fraud played, a patta had been granted to a person under the relevant provisions of the Act, then to set right that mistake, the Director should be enabled to exercise his power so as to effectuate the scheme of the Act and to implement the purpose behind the Act. The fact that the rule making authority has prescribed procedure in exercise of the powers under Section 67 for making an application to the Director does not mean that the suo motu power which is explicit in Section 5(2) of the Act is in any way curtailed or taken away. Therefore, the contention of the respondent that making an application is sine qua non for invoking the power under Section 5(2) of the Act is not tenable. -- T.N. ESTATES (ABOLITION & 
CONVERSION INTO RYOTWARI) ACT, 1948.  
Sections 5(2) & 67; Suo motu revisional powers  Held, On a bare reading of the provisions of Section 5(2) of the Act, it is clear that the power conferred on the Director by Section 5(2) to cancel or revise any of the orders, acts or proceedings of the Settlement Officer is very wide. In the first place, the Director need not necessarily be moved by any party in that behalf, and the power could be exercised either on an application by an aggrieved person or suo motu. For example, if the Director comes to know that contrary to the scheme of the Act or due to misrepresentation or fraud played, a patta had been granted to a person under the relevant provisions of the Act, then to set right that mistake, the Director should be enabled to exercise his power so as to effectuate the scheme of the Act and to implement the purpose behind the Act. The fact that the rule making authority has prescribed procedure in exercise of the powers under Section 67 for making an application to the Director does not mean that the suo motu power which is explicit in Section 5(2) of the Act is in any way curtailed or taken away. Therefore, the contention of the respondent that making an application is sine qua non for invoking the power under Section 5(2) of the Act is not tenable. ',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Whitman v. Disney Productions;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'Sudhir Thatte, Manager-Legal and ;Constituted Attorney',
			'counseldef' => 'Director of the Defendant',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-06-26',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'P. Thangavel, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">P. Thangavel, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is an application filed under Order XIV Rule 8 of Original Side Rules read with Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2, and Section 151 of Civil Procedure Code to grant ad-interim injunction restraining the respondent and its distributors, stockists, servants, agents, retailers and representatives from in any manner manufacturing, selling, offering for sale, stocking, advertising or dealing directly or indirectly in medicinal preparations under the trade mark PIOZED or any other trade mark which is identical with and/or deceptively similar to the trade mark PIOZ of the applicant so as to pass off the respondent's preparations as and for the preparations of the applicant or in any other manner whatsoever connected with the applicant till the disposal of the suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The applicant is the plaintiff and has filed the suit against the respondent, who is the defendant for a permanent injunction restraining the respondent from passing off their medicinal preparations under the trade mark PIOZED as and for the applicant's medicinal preparations having the trade mark PIOZ and for other consequential relief. The applicant is carrying on the business as manufacturer and dealer of pharmaceutical and medicinal preparations and enjoys high reputation and goodwill because of the excellent quality and efficacy in preparation of the medicine. The turnover of the applicant company for 2000-2001 was more than Rs. 297/- crores. The medicine manufactured by the applicant company is not only sold in this country, but exported to many foreign countries also. The applicant is having large Research and Development facilities. The trademark of the applicant is PIOZ in respect of their PIOGLITAZONE preparation for the treatment of diabetes. The applicant got search report on 28.7.2000 and also another report on 25.10.2000 about the availability of trademark PIOZ through its Attorney for registration and thereafter distributed ADIB Internationals Reprints booklet amongst the Doctors all over India advertising therein its trademark PIOZ in November, 2000. The applicant applied for permission to manufacture the drugs PIOGLITAZONE HYDROCHLORIDE in Tablets form containing 15 mg and 30 mg to the Drugs Controller General (India), New Delhi, in November, 2000. On 18.12.2000 an application was made for registration of the trade mark PIOZ by the applicant with the Trade Marks Registry and it was numbered as 9,77,709 and the application is pending for registration. The Drugs Controller General (India), New Delhi granted permission for manufacture of the said tablets by its letter dated 11.1.2001. Permission was granted to the applicant for manufacture of PIOZ tablets by the Food and Drug Administration on 16.1.2001 on application made by the applicant company. The applicant placed orders for supply of foil and carton bearing the trade marks PIOZ in January, 2001, After getting the permission from the Drugs Controller General (India), New Delhi and licence from Food and Drug Administration, the applicant company has started manufacturing of the medicine in tablets under the trade mark PIOZ in strips and made it available for sale in market. The sale of the tablets prepared under the trade mark PIOZ during February, 2001 to January, 2002 was Rs. 5,98,35,000/-. The applicant has spent Rs. 1,17,97,000/- towards advertisement and promotional expenses relating to the trade mark PIOZ for a period from August, 2000 to January, 2002. The applicant came across the preparation of some medicine in a pack of 15 mg and 30 mg as that of the applicant for the same disease and ailment having the trade mark PIOZED in August, 2001 and marketed in March, 2002. The respondent was fully aware of the manufacturing of the above said tablets by the applicant and marketed in or about January, 2001 throughout India under the trade mark PIOZ. The respondent has no right to use deceptively similar trade mark PIOZED in manufacturing and marketing of such medicine while such medicine was manufactured and marketed by the applicant in its trade mark name PIOZ even in January, 2001. The use of the deceptively similar trade mark by the respondent amounts to passing off its preparation as and for the preparation of the applicant and made illegal gains on the applicant's reputation. Confusion and deception are bound to arise as both trade marks are deceptively similar and both the preparations will be offered for sale to the same class of consumers for the same indication and ailments. The applicant is the prior adopter and user of the trademark PIOZ and therefore the respondent should be restrained by means of ad-interim injunction from using the preparations bearing trade mark PIOZED to avoid common loss to the applicant due to the passing off of the respondent's preparation as and for the preparations of the applicant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The respondent resists the claim of the applicant on the following grounds:-The manufacture of the medicinal preparation having the trade mark PIOZED by the respondent was in or about September, 2001 and not in March, 2002 and the same should have been known to the applicant immediately thereafter. The application of the applicant suffers from gross delay, latches and acquiescence as the respondent has been openly and extensively selling the said medicine without any interruption since September, 2001. The respondent, one of the Pioneers of pharmaceutical industry in India, has been in existence from 1949 having multi jurisdictional and multi national business in the field of medicinal and pharmaceutical preparations for treatment of various ailments and disorders. The respondent has four manufacturing facilities to manufacture various products and possess several recognitions and certifications from various International Regulatory Authorities. The products of the respondent are not only sold in India, but also in 80 other countries. The respondent commands a formidable reputation and goodwill for providing efficacious and quality products meeting international standards of manufacturing and quality. The turnover of the respondent in 1996-97, 1997-98, 1998-99, 1999-2000, 2000-2001 and 2001-2002 are Rs. 271/- crores, Rs. 292 crores, Rs. 344/- crores, Rs. 373/- crores, Rs. 396/- crores and above Rs. 450/- crores respectively. The annual publicity and promotional expenditure with respect to its various products during 1996-97, 1997-98, 1998-99, 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 are Rs. 1.47 crores, Rs. 1.92 crores, Rs. 3.61 crores, Rs. 4.73 crores and Rs. 3.89 crores respectively. The respondent decided to manufacture and market medicinal for pharmaceutical preparations containing PIOGLITAZONE as its active ingredient under the trade mark PIOZED in May, 2000 and the trade mark was invented from the International Non-Proprietary name PIOGLITAZONE. The respondent made an application to the Drug Controller General of India, New Delhi for permission to conduct Bio-Equivalence study on 15.1.2001 and the permission was granted on 2.2.2001. An application made by the respondent to the said Drug Controller General of India, New Delhi for permission to market the molecule on 29.3.2001 and permission was granted on 21.5.2001. An application was made to Food and Drug Administration to formulate the preparation of medicine under the trademark PIOZED 15 and PIOZED 30 on 30.5.2001 and permission was granted on 16.6.2001. An application was filed for registration of the trade mark PIOZED on 31.5.2001 in respect of medicinal and pharmaceutical preparations in Clause 5 of the 4th Schedule to the Trade and Merchandise Marks Rule, 1959 and the application was numbered as 1013232. The medicinal and pharmaceutical preparations under the trade mark PIOZED containing PIOGLITAZONE as its active ingredient commenced manufacturing in or about August, 2001 and marketed for sale in September, 2001. The respondent has honestly and in a bona fide manner conceived and adopted the trade mark from the International Non-Proprietary name of the active ingredient i.e. PIOGLITAZONE. Because of its efficacious nature and characteristic thereof the said medicine was received well and accepted in the market. The medical profession has also-accepted the same and the sale of the medicine from September, 2001 to March, 2002 was to a tune of about Rs. 22 lakhs. The trade mark PIOZED was exclusively used by the respondent in respect of the preparation of PIOZED 15 and PIOZED 30 and the trade mark has acquired tremendous reputation and goodwill. The trade mark PIOZED was promoted by publication and distribution of product literature, distribution of sample of the goods, visual aids etc. A sum of Rs. 7.5 lakhs has been spent for promotion of the goods having trade mark PIOZED. The respondent has acquired valuable proprietary right in respect of the said trade mark PIOZED in relation to the medicinal and pharmaceutical preparation. By denying the averments made in the affidavit filed in support of the application by the applicant, the respondent states that the word PIO and/or PIOZ have been taken directly from the generic name of the drug PIOGLITAZONE and the word PIO and/or PIOZ are commonly used by several manufactures to market their preparations, viz., PIOZONE, PIOZULIN, PIOGLAR, PIOGLU, PIOGLIT, PIONORM, PIOLEM, PIOLET and PIOZIT. There is no confusion in sale of medicines on the ground of deception of trade mark since September, 2001 and the trade mark PIOZ is not phonetically and visually similar to the trade mark of the applicant PIOZ. The trade mark PIOZED is not deceptively similar to the trade mark PIOZ of the applicant. The applicant has not made out a prima facie case or balance convenience in his favour for grant of ad-interim injunction as prayed for in the application as the conduct of the applicant is mala fide to claim any equitable relief from the hands of this Court. The balance of convenience is only in favour of the respondent and the grant of ad-interim injunction in favour of the applicant will cause serious damage and irreparable injury both financially and otherwise to the trade and business of the respondent. No injury or damage is caused to the applicant by the respondent in manufacture of the medicine under the trade mark PIOZED by the respondent. It is on these grounds, the respondent has sought for dismissal of the application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The applicant is the plaintiff and the applicant has filed the suit against the respondent, who is the defendant for the reliefs, viz., perpetual injunction, restraining the defendant and its men or agents from in any manner manufacturing, selling, offering for sale, stocking, advertising directly or indirectly dealing in medicinal preparations under the trade mark PIOZED or any other trade mark which is identical with and/or deceptively similar to the trade mark PIOZ of the plaintiff so as to pass off the defendant's preparations as and for the preparations of the plaintiff or in any other manner whatsoever connected with the plaintiff, to deliver up for destruction to the plaintiff all the preparations, dyes, blocks, articles, literatures, leaflets, brochures, cartons, labels, papers and things bearing and containing the impugned trade mark PIOZED to an authorized representatives of the plaintiff for destruction, to render accounts of profits made by the defendant by use of the impugned trade mark PIOZED or any trade mark similar thereto and damages of Rs. 10,05,000/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Admittedly the applicant is manufacturing the medicinal preparations having trade mark name PIOZ while the respondent is manufacturing medicinal preparations under the trade mark name PIOZED. Both the applicant and the respondent are manufacturing medicines under the said trade names for diabetic. The fact also remains that the ingredient for manufacture of medicines by the applicant as well as by the respondent is PIOGLITAZONE. Both the applicant and the respondent are manufacturing tablets using the ingredient of PIOGLITAZONE containing 15 mg and 30 mg and marketing the same for the consumption of public. The medicine will be sold to the diabetic patients on prescription being given by the Doctors by the medical stores carrying on business in sale of medicines.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The applicant as well as the respondent are said to have obtained search report from private agency for selecting the trade mark after considering the trade marks already in existence with the Registrar of Trade Marks on 26.7.2000 and 15.5.2000 respectively. It is evident that there is no dispute between both parties that trade marks PIOZ or PIOZED were not registered with Registrar of Trade Marks by any manufacturer of medicines at the time of giving search report. It is also evident from the submission made on both sides that official report with regard to the trade mark PIOZ and PIOZED are said to have been obtained on 26.10.2000 and 12.6.2001 by the applicant and the respondent respectively. The fact also remains that a booklet was published with regard to the manufacture of medicine with trade mark name PIOZ by the applicant even in November, 2000.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Admittedly, application for registration of trade mark PIOZ and PIOZED were made by the applicant and the respondent on 18.12.2000 and 31.5.2001 respectively and the said applications are pending registration before the Registrar of Trade Marks. There is no dispute that the applicant and the respondent applied for the Drug Controller General (India), New Delhi for grant of permission to manufacture tablets referred to above and permission was granted by the said Authority to the applicant and the respondent on 11.1.2001 and 2.2.2001 respectively. Admittedly, applications were sent by the applicant and the respondent for permission to Food and Drug Administration on 15.1.2001 and 30.5.2001 and permission was accorded by the said Authority to the applicant on 16.1.2001 and 16.6.2001 respectively. Thereafter, the applicant manufactured the tablets under the trade mark name PIOZ and marketed the same in January/February, 2001, and it is evident from the perusal of the document produced on the side of the respondent itself.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The respondent after obtaining permission from the above said Authorities, started manufacturing of the above said tablets under the trade mark name PIOZED and marketed the said medicine at Mumbai in September, 2001 as seen from the copy of the bill produced before the Court and the marketing of such medicine was in October, 2001 as seen from the xerox copy of the document ORG-MARG RETAIL AUDIT for Pharmaceutical Products in India. According to the applicant, the sale of medicine under the trade mark PIOZED at Madras was only in March, 2002. No other documents has been produced on the side of the respondent to show that the medicine prepared under the trade mark name PIOZED was introduced at Madras even in October, 2001 instead of in the month of March, 2002. The facts referred to above would disclose that applying for registration of trade mark PIOZ, obtaining of permission for manufacture of medicine under the trade mark name PIOZ from the Drug Controller General (India), New Delhi and Food and Drug Administration and manufacturing and marketing of the medicine under the trade mark name PIOZ were done very much earlier to the applying for registration of trade mark PIOZED, obtaining permission from Drug Controller General (India), New Delhi and Food and Drug Administration and also manufacturing and marketing of the medicines under the trade mark name PIOZED by the respondent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. A perusal of the pleadings raised in the affidavit of the applicant and counter-affidavit of the respondent would disclose that the applicant had sold the medicine with trade mark name PIOZ for a sum of Rs. 5,98,35,000/- for the period from February, 2001 to January, 2002, while the respondent had sold the medicine manufactured under the trade mark name PIOZED for Rs. 22 lakhs only from September, 2001 to March, 2002. It is also evident from the pleadings of the applicant as well as the respondent that the applicant had spent for advertisement and promotional expenses a sum of Rs. 1,17,97,000/- for the period from August, 2000 to January, 2002 while the respondent had spent only a sum of Rs. 7.5 lakhs for such purposes during the relevant period. The admitted figures referred to above would disclose that the applicant had expended substantial amount for advertisement and promotional expenses for the sale of medicine under the trade mark name PIOZ and had also marketed and sold the said medicine for about Rs. 6 crores within a period of one year. If the amounts spent for advertisement and promotional expenses and the medicine manufactured under the trade mark name PIOZ and sold out by the applicant are compared with the advertisement and promotional expenses of Rs. 7.5 lakhs and sale of such medicine under the trade mark name PIOZED for Rs. 22 lakhs for the period referred to above, it would disclose that the applicant is the fore-runner in advertising and expending promotional expenses as well as marketing of the medicine under the trade mark name PIOZ when compared with the advertisement and promotional expenses as well as sale of the medicine under the trade mark name PIOZED by the respondent, in spite of the fact that the respondent is said to be marketing its medicine including of other medicines manufactured in four factories owned by it in abroad, viz., 80 countries.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The learned Senior Counsel Mr. P. Chidambaram has brought to the notice of this Court, the decision of a Larger Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd., , wherein the Hon'ble Judges of the Apex Court have held as follows, while considering the resemblance and pronouncing in English of the two words 'Aristoc' and 'Rysta':-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'.... Considering the way the words were pronounced in English, the one was likely to be mistaken for the other.... The answer to the question whether the sound of one word resembles too nearly the sound of another so as to bring the former within the limits of Section 12 of the Trade Marks Act, 1938, must nearly always depend on first impression, for obviously a person who is familiar with both words will neither be deceived nor confused. It is the person who only knows the one word and has perhaps an imperfect recollection of it who is likely to be deceived or confused. Little assistance, therefore, is to be obtained from a meticulous comparison of the two words, letter by letter and syllable by syllable, pronounced with the clarity to be expected from a teacher of elocution. The Court must be careful to make allowance for imperfect recollection and the effect of careless pronunciation and speech on the part not only of the person seeking to buy under the trade description, but also of the shop assistant ministering to that person's wants'..... As far as this Court is concerned, the decisions in the last tour decades have clearly laid down that what has to be seen in the case of a passing off action is the similarity between the competing marks and to determine whether there is likelihood of deception or causing confusion. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">. . .These observations appear to us to be contrary to the decision of this Court in Amritdham's case (supra) where it was observed that the products will be purchased by both villagers and town folk, literate as well as illiterate and the question has to be approached from the point of view of a man of average intelligence and imperfect recollection. A trade may relate to goods largely sold to illiterate or badly educated persons. The purchaser in India cannot be equated with a purchaser of goods in England. While we agree that in trade mark matters, it is necessary to go into the question of comparable strength, the decision on merits in Dyechem's case, AIR 2000 SCW 2172 : AIR 2000 SC 2114 : 2000 CLC 1338 : 2000 (20) PTC 297(SC) does not, in our opinion, lay down correct law and we hold accordingly. .... </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Broadly stated in an action for passing off on the basis of unregistered trade mark generally for deciding the question of deceptive similarity the following factors to be considered:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The nature of the marks i.e. whether the marks are word marks or label marks or composite marks, i.e. both words and label works,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) The degree of resembleness between the marks, phonetically similar and hence similar in idea.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) The nature of the goods in respect of which they are used as trade marks.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(d) The similarity in the nature, character and performance of the goods of the rival traders.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(e) The class of purchasers who are likely to buy the goods bearing the marks they require, on their education and intelligence and a degree of care they are likely to exercise in purchasing and/or using the goods.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(f) The mode of purchasing the goods or placing orders for the goods, and</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(g) Any other surrounding circumstances which may be relevant in the extent of dissimilarity between the competing marks.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Weightage to be given to each of the aforesaid factors depends upon facts of each case and the same weightage cannot be given to each factor in every case.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The learned Senior Counsel Mr. P. Chidambaram has also brought to the notice of this Court, the decision reported in Laxmikant V. Patel v. Chetanbhat Shah and Anr., wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'13. In an action for passing off it is usual, rather essential, to seek an injunction temporary or ad-interim. The principles for the grant of such injunction are the same as in the case of any other action against injury complained of. The plaintiff must prove a prima facie case, availability of balance of convenience in his favour and his suffering an irreparable injury in the absence of grant of injunction. According to Kerly (Ibid, para 16.16) passing off cases are often cases of deliberate and intentional misrepresentation, but it is well-settled that fraud is not a necessary element of the right of action, and the absence of an intention to deceive is not a defence though proof of fraudulent intention may materially assist a plaintiff in establishing probability of deception. Christopher Wadlow in Law of Passing Off (1995 Edition, at p.3.06) states that the plaintiff does not have to prove actual damage in order to succeed in an action for passing off. Likelihood of damage is sufficient. The same learned author states that the defendant's state of mind is wholly irrelevant to the existence of the cause of action for passing off (ibid, paras 4.20 and 7.15). As to how the injunction granted by the Court would shape depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Where a defendant has imitated or adopted that plaintiffs distinctive trade mark or business name, the order may be an absolute injunction that he would not use or carry on business under that name.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In Mahendra and Mahendra Paper Mills Ltd. v. Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd., , the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as follows: -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'15. This question has been considered by different High Courts and this Court in umpteen cases from time to time. On analysis of the principles laid down in the decisions, certain recognized parameters relating to the matter have emerged. Without intending to be exhaustive some of the principles which are accepted as well settled may be stated thus; that whether there is a likelihood of deception or confusion arising is a matter for decision by the Court, and no witness is entitled to say whether the mark is likely to deceive or to cause confusion; that all factors which are likely to create or allay deception or confusion must be considered in combination; that broadly speaking, factors creating confusion would be, for example, the nature of the market itself, the class of customers, the extent of the reputation, the trade channels, the existence of any connection in course of trade, and others. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. This Court, in the case of Com Products Refining Co. v. Shangrila Food Products Ltd., , observed that 'the question whether two competing marks are so similar as to be likely to deceive or cause confusion is one of first impression and it is for the court to decide it. The question has to be approached from the point of view of a man of average intelligence and imperfect recollection. To such a man the overall structural and phonetic similarity of the two marks Gluvita and Glucovita is likely to deceive or to cause confusion. In deciding whether two marks are so similar as to be likely to deceive or cause confusion the similarity of idea is a relevant consideration.' This Court further observed that in order that a trade mark may acquire a reputation among buyers, it is not necessary that they should know who the manufacturer of the goods is. It is no answer to an opposition to an application for registration to say that there is a number of marks having one or more common features which occur in the proposed mark unless it is proved that these marks had by user acquired a reputation in the market.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In Amrit Soap Company v. New Punjab Soap Factory, 1989 (2) A.L.R. 242 : 1989 (Suppl)(1) PTC166 (Delhi) it has been held as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'11. It was next submitted by counsel for the defendant that the plaintiff has no right to use the trade mark 'BILLY' and artistic wrapper as so many other parties who are referred to earlier were also using the same trade mark. This contention of the defendant is wholly devoid of any force. In this connection it is sufficient to say that under the law it is the right of two parties before the court which has to be determined and, as already discussed, the plaintiff being prior user has the better and legal right to seek relief from this Court.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. In Indian Shaving Products Ltd. and Anr. v. Gift Pack and Anr., 2000 CLC 183 (Delhi) : 1998 (18) PTC 698 (Delhi) while considering the trade mark used by several other persons/companies besides the defendant, it is held as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'...the said defence, that other persons are also using the said trade mark, is not available to the defendants. The Court is called upon to decide disputes in between the parties which are before it. ... What is to be seen by the Court is as to whether the plaintiff has acquired goodwill and reputation for his products. . . 'The allegation that some other manufacturers are also using the same trade mark is of no consequence as the Court is concerned with parties before it only.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'... the colour scheme and get up of the two products are entirely different... The plaintiff admittedly are not objecting to the colour scheme and get up of the jacket of the goods of the defendants. Their case is that the defendants have usurped their trade mark and as such they are likely to filch, their trade and cause loss and damage to their reputation as well as to their business. Thus the defence put forward by the defendants that the two products are dissimilar in their colour scheme and get up and dress material does not come to their rescue.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The pronouncing of the word PIOZ and PIOZED will be one and the same since 'ED' in PIOZED will have no sound effect at the time of pronouncing it, as rightly contended by the learned Senior Counsel Mr. P. Chidambaram. The prescription given by the Doctors for purchase of medicines PIOZ or PIOZED will be in scribbling and the spelling normally written by Doctors could not be read by common man, more particularly English knowing literates also. The Chemist in drug stores will also be in the same position to find a distinction between PIOZ and PIOZED scribbled by the Doctors in their prescription. If that is the position even for English knowing literates and chemist in drug stores, it need not be elaborated with regard to the illiterate persons who are taking treatment for the disease diabetic. It is relevant to point out that more than 50 to 60 per cent of the population in India are having diabetic and major percentage of the population is only illitertes and the point in dispute has to be viewed from the point of view of a man of average intelligence and imperfect recollection. It is relevant to point out that to such a man, the overall structural and phonetic similarity of two marks PIOZ and PIOZED is likely to deceive or will cause confusion. If the trade mark name of the respondent PIOZED is likely to deceive or cause confusion to such people referred to above, it is likely that the business and sale of the medicine prepared under the trade mark name PIOZ of the applicant will be affected and there is likelihood of damage caused to the applicant by using the trade mark name PIOZED by the respondent in manufacturing and selling of medicine under the trade mark name PIOZED. If the principles laid down by the Larger Bench consisting of the present Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India Mr. B.N. Kirpal, and the Hon'ble Judges Doraiswamy Raju and Brijesh Kumar, JJ. in referred to above is taken into consideration in the light of the facts of this case referred to above, this Court is of opinion that the trade mark name of the respondent PIOZED is deceptively similar and will also create confusion in the mind of the customers purchasing medicine of the applicant, who is manufacturing medicine under the trade mark name PIOZ and will also cause loss in the business thereby causing damage. The materials produced before this Court on the side of the applicant would disclose that the applicant has made out a prima facie case in his favour for grant of ad-interim injunction. The loss of reputation or damage to be caused to the business of the applicant cannot be compensated by money value. Since the reputation of an article is one thing and the reputation of a particular make is quite another, it is for the reputation of the make only the applicant is concerned with. In of the decisions reported in Horlick's Malted Milk Company v. Sumerskill, 1916 The Illustrated Official Journal (Patents) Supplement 1 and Corn Products Refining Co. v. Shangrila Food Products Ltd., , it was held that the reputation will attach only to trade mark of the goods purchased by the buyer who may not be interested in knowing about the manufacturer of the goods.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Regarding the balance of convenience, the Court must weigh one need against another and determine whether the balance of convenience lies. Interlocutory remedy is intended to preserve in status-quo, the rights of parties which may appear on a prima facie case while restraining the defendants from exercising what he considers his legal right which the plaintiff would like to prevent as it affects the plaintiffs right. The Court must put in to the scales the relevant consideration, viz., about the commencement of enterprises and carrying on business, etc. This view finds support from the decision reported in Colgate Palmolive (India) Ltd. v. Hindustan Lever Ltd. and Vice Versa, .</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. While considering the balance of convenience in Parle Products Limited v. Bakemans Industries Limited, 1998 (18) PTC 662, the learned single Judge of this Court has held that the damage to be sustained in the event of restraining the defendant by means of ad-interim injunction at the stage of application and ultimately the defendant succeeding in the suit after the trial and the damage to be sustained by the applicant by not granting ad-interim injunction at the stage of application and ultimately succeeding in the suit after trial have to be taken into consideration in granting ad-interim injunction. In this case as already pointed out that there will be no difference in pronouncing the words PIOZ and PIOZED in English and the word PIOZED is deceptively similar and will create confusion in the mind of the consumers of the medicine manufactured under the trade mark name PIOZ by the applicant. The trade mark name of the respondent is also phonetically similar. Even if the decisions referred to above are taken into consideration, the balance of convenience pending trial of the suit will be only in favour of the applicant. As already pointed out, the respondent is having four manufacturing industries in medicine and is also manufacturing several other medicines by having market in about SO countries in abroad. The fact of granting ad-interim injunction against the respondent in manufacturing the medicine under the trade mark name PIOZED, the respondent is not going to close down the factories or its business in medicine referred to above. The respondent can very well manufacture the very same medicine in some other name which is not offending the trade mark name of the applicant PIOZ. The question of getting its business damaged in view of the grant of injunction will not be there in the opinion of this Court. Therefore, this Court holds that the balance of convenience is also in favour of the applicant if the facts and circumstances of the case are taken into consideration.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent contends that 'PIO' in 'PIOZ' and 'PIO' in 'PIOZED' are generic word of 'PIOGLITAZONE' and therefore, the applicant cannot come forward with a suit for grant of injunction for passing off even if 'PIO' is taken from generic word 'PIOGLITAZONE'. The letter 'Z' has been added to find the trade mark name PIOZ by the applicant. The respondent has added 'ED' alongwith 'Z' annexed to 'PIO' to find its trade mark name 'PIOZED' of which 'ED' will suffer silence while pronouncing it. Therefore, the said contention raised by the learned counsel for the respondent cannot be sustained.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent, inter alia, contended that there is delay, laches and acquiescence in coming to the Court by the applicant to obtain an order of interim injunction against the respondent and therefore the ad-interim injunction relief sought for by the applicant against the respondent cannot be granted. In support of such contention the learned counsel appearing for the respondent placed reliance on the decision reported in B.L. and Co. and Ors. v. Pfizer Products Incl., 2001 PTC 797 (Delhi). In that case, the plaintiff did not take any action for nearly five months of the launching and manufacturing of the defendant's product, and in its own volition preferred not to enter the Indian market. The balance of convenience was in favour of the defendant and therefore ex parte order of injunction should not be granted according to the views of the Court. While coming to the conclusion the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court found that the single Judge of the Court has not taken into consideration of the fact that the appellant had alone launched the product, manufactured the same and marketed in the market in January, 2001 while the respondents product had neither been introduced, nor marketed nor sold by them. The Division Bench has also taken into consideration of the fact that the respondent had waited for one year and allowed the appellant to develop the trade mark and to obtain requisite permission for manufacture. The said Bench had also taken into consideration of the fact that after commencement of manufacture, the respondents did not take action for nearly five months and had approached the Court for the relief thereafter only. It is after taking into consideration of the above said fact, the Division Bench of the said Court has come to the conclusion that the delay of five months will disentitle the respondents in that appeal to get an order of ad-interim injunction. That is not the circumstances in this case. It is after knowing the marketing of the medicine PIOZED by the respondent, the applicant had immediately approached this Court for the relief sought for in this application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The learned Senior Counsel Mr. P. Chidambaram has also brought to the notice of this Court the decision reported in Hindustan Pencils Pvt. Ltd. v. India Stationery Products Co. and Anr., . In that case, the learned Judge, B.N. Kirpal, J. (as he then was), the present Hon'ble Chief Justice of India, has observed, while considering the submission of 'inoridinate delay, laches and acquiescence' as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Inordinate delay' would, therefore, be delay of such a long duration that the defendant could have come to the conclusion that the plaintiff has, possibly, abandoned his right to seek relief or to object to the defendant using the trade mark. 'Equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights'.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. It would appear that 'inordinate delay', which has never been defined by the Courts so far, would be, analogous or similar to 'laches'. In 'Whitman v. Disney Productions, 263 F2d 229 it was observed by the Circuit Court of Appeal in U.S.A. as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Mere passage of time cannot constitute laches, but if the passage of time can be shown to have lulled defendant into a false sense of security, and the defendant acts in reliance thereon, laches may, in the discretion of the trial Court, be found.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It would follow, logically, that delay by itself is not a sufficient defence to an action for interim injunciton, but delay coupled with prejudice caused to the defendant would amount to 'laches', as observed by McCarry at page 383 'Laches-delay X prejudice'. In this formula, it is the magnitude of the product of delay and prejudice which must be weighed, not the magnitude of solely the quantum of delay or prejudice alone. For example, in one case, a long delay coupled with even a slight amount of prejudice may suffice to prove an adequate defence of laches. Yet, in another case, a short delay coupled with a great amount of resulting prejudice to defendant may also suffice for laches'. It has been emphasized that it is for the defendant to show that there has been prejudice caused by reason of the delay and that it would be unfair to injunct the defendant from carrying out its activities.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. 'Laches' and 'Inorldinate delay', however, are not similar to 'acquiescence'. Acquiescence is a different concept which has been explained by Kcrly at page 1310, para 15.45 as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The classic case of acquiescence proper is where the proprietor, knowing of his rights and knowing that the infringer is ignorant of them, does something to encourage the infringer's misapprehension, with the result that the infringer acts upon his mistaken belief and so worsens his position. It seems clear that something less than that is needed to offer a defence, but how much less is not clear. The current tendency is to hold that a defence of acquiescence or laches may be set up whenever it is unconscionable for the plaintiff to deny anything that the (consciously or unconsciously) has allowed or encouraged the defendant to believe. Mere failure to sue, without some positive act of encouragement, is not in general enough to give a defence.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case cited above there was a delay of 30 years and while considering the said delay, the above said observation was made by His Lordship. But there is no such delay in this case to hold that there is any inordinate delay or laches or acquiescence as contended by the learned counsel for the applicant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24. Even in the decision relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent reported in 2001 PTC 797 cited already, it has been held by the Division Bench of Delhi High Court as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'17. As regards the delay in institution of the suit and its effect for the purpose of grant of ex parte restraint, the settled legal position is that while the delay in institution of a suit for an action for passing off may not be fatal, it is one of the important and relevant considerations before granting an ex parte/interlocutory injunction. Reference in this regard is invited to the THE LAW OF PASSING-OFF by Christopher Wadlow. Learned Author while dealing with the motions of interlocutory relevance has observed as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Delay in applying for interlocutory relief is a very serious matter. As a rule of thumb, delay of up to about a month, or perhaps six weeks, generally has no adverse effect on an inter partes application and delay of up to twice that period need not be fatal if it can be explained and the plaintiff's case is otherwise strong. On an ex parte application even delay of a few days can be critical. Unjustified delay of more than a few months is almost always fatal to the plaintiff's case, even though delay of this order has no effect on the plaintiff's right at trial.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The above observation in 'THE LAW OF PASSING-OFF' would show that even delay of about three months is not fatal to the plaintiff's case. This suit has been filed according to the applicant within a month from knowing about sale of medicine under the trade mark name PIOZED at Madras in the month of March, 2002. If the said facts are taken into consideration, this Court is of opinion that there is no delay or laches or acquiescence on the part of the applicant in coming to the Court seeking the relief to redress its grievances.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. The learned counsel for the respondent inter alia contended that the said trade mark has been used in five other medicine manufacturing companies and that the applicant had not chosen to initiate any action against them, but has chosen to take action against the respondent only in the suit. In view of the decisions already cited on this point, the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent cannot be sustained. The other submissions made by the learned counsel for the respondent are not germane to decide the issue in the interlocutory application, and therefore, requires no consideration from this Court in this matter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. In view of the foregoing reasons, this Court holds that the applicant is entitled to an order of ad-interim injunction pending disposal of the suit. Taking into consideration of the circumstances of the case, both parties are directed to bear their own costs.</p>',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2003(26)PTC21(Mad)',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'ipca Laboratories Limited',
			'sub' => 'Intellectual Property Rights ',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '834688'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Usv Limited Vs. Ipca Laboratories Limited Semantic Analysis'
$shops = array(
	'LAW' => array(
		(int) 0 => 'Order XIV Rule 8',
		(int) 1 => 'Section 151 of Civil Procedure Code',
		(int) 2 => 'Section 12',
		(int) 3 => 'the THE LAW OF PASSING-OFF'
	),
	'NORP' => array(
		(int) 0 => 'J.1',
		(int) 1 => 'Pioneers',
		(int) 2 => 'Indian',
		(int) 3 => 'Hon'ble'
	),
	'PERSON' => array(
		(int) 0 => 'Order XXXIX Rules 1',
		(int) 1 => 'PIOZONE',
		(int) 2 => 'medicines.6',
		(int) 3 => 'P. Chidambaram',
		(int) 4 => 'Aristoc',
		(int) 5 => 'P. Chidambaram',
		(int) 6 => 'V. Patel',
		(int) 7 => 'Chetanbhat Shah',
		(int) 8 => 'Anr',
		(int) 9 => 'Christopher Wadlow',
		(int) 10 => 'p.3.06',
		(int) 11 => 'Glucovita',
		(int) 12 => 'Anr',
		(int) 13 => 'Gift Pack',
		(int) 14 => 'Anr',
		(int) 15 => 'P. Chidambaram',
		(int) 16 => 'B.N. Kirpal',
		(int) 17 => 'Bench',
		(int) 18 => 'P. Chidambaram',
		(int) 19 => 'Anr',
		(int) 20 => 'B.N. Kirpal',
		(int) 21 => 'McCarry',
		(int) 22 => 'Christopher Wadlow'
	),
	'CARDINAL' => array(
		(int) 0 => '2',
		(int) 1 => '297/-',
		(int) 2 => '28.7.2000',
		(int) 3 => '25.10.2000',
		(int) 4 => '15',
		(int) 5 => '30',
		(int) 6 => '18.12.2000',
		(int) 7 => '9,77,709',
		(int) 8 => '11.1.2001',
		(int) 9 => '1,17,97,000/-',
		(int) 10 => '15',
		(int) 11 => '30',
		(int) 12 => 'one',
		(int) 13 => 'four',
		(int) 14 => '80',
		(int) 15 => '271/-',
		(int) 16 => '292',
		(int) 17 => '373/-',
		(int) 18 => '450/-',
		(int) 19 => '1.47',
		(int) 20 => '1.92',
		(int) 21 => '3.61',
		(int) 22 => '4.73',
		(int) 23 => '3.89',
		(int) 24 => '15.1.2001',
		(int) 25 => '2.2.2001',
		(int) 26 => '21.5.2001',
		(int) 27 => '16.6.2001',
		(int) 28 => '22',
		(int) 29 => '7.5',
		(int) 30 => '10,05,000/-.5',
		(int) 31 => '15',
		(int) 32 => '30',
		(int) 33 => '26.7.2000',
		(int) 34 => '26.10.2000',
		(int) 35 => '2000.7',
		(int) 36 => '18.12.2000',
		(int) 37 => '11.1.2001',
		(int) 38 => '2.2.2001',
		(int) 39 => '15.1.2001',
		(int) 40 => '16.6.2001',
		(int) 41 => '22',
		(int) 42 => '1,17,97,000/-',
		(int) 43 => '7.5',
		(int) 44 => '6',
		(int) 45 => '7.5',
		(int) 46 => '22',
		(int) 47 => 'four',
		(int) 48 => '80',
		(int) 49 => 'two',
		(int) 50 => 'one',
		(int) 51 => 'two',
		(int) 52 => '2000',
		(int) 53 => '20',
		(int) 54 => '11',
		(int) 55 => '16.16',
		(int) 56 => '4.20',
		(int) 57 => '7.15',
		(int) 58 => '13',
		(int) 59 => '16',
		(int) 60 => 'two',
		(int) 61 => 'one',
		(int) 62 => 'one',
		(int) 63 => '2',
		(int) 64 => '242',
		(int) 65 => 'two',
		(int) 66 => '18',
		(int) 67 => 'two',
		(int) 68 => 'two',
		(int) 69 => 'more than 50',
		(int) 70 => 'one',
		(int) 71 => '18',
		(int) 72 => 'four',
		(int) 73 => '263',
		(int) 74 => '383',
		(int) 75 => 'one',
		(int) 76 => '15.45',
		(int) 77 => '797',
		(int) 78 => 'five'
	),
	'DATE' => array(
		(int) 0 => '2000-2001',
		(int) 1 => 'November, 2000',
		(int) 2 => 'November, 2000',
		(int) 3 => '16.1.2001',
		(int) 4 => 'January, 2001',
		(int) 5 => 'February, 2001 to January, 2002',
		(int) 6 => 'August',
		(int) 7 => '2000',
		(int) 8 => 'January, 2002',
		(int) 9 => 'August, 2001',
		(int) 10 => 'March',
		(int) 11 => '2002',
		(int) 12 => 'about January, 2001',
		(int) 13 => 'January, 2001',
		(int) 14 => 'about September, 2001',
		(int) 15 => 'March',
		(int) 16 => '2002',
		(int) 17 => 'September, 2001',
		(int) 18 => '1949',
		(int) 19 => '1996-97, 1997-98',
		(int) 20 => '1998-99',
		(int) 21 => '1999-2000',
		(int) 22 => '2000-2001',
		(int) 23 => '2001-2002',
		(int) 24 => 'annual',
		(int) 25 => '1996-97, 1997-98',
		(int) 26 => '1998-99',
		(int) 27 => '1999-2000',
		(int) 28 => '2000-2001',
		(int) 29 => 'May, 2000',
		(int) 30 => '29.3.2001',
		(int) 31 => '1959',
		(int) 32 => '1013232',
		(int) 33 => 'about August, 2001',
		(int) 34 => 'September, 2001',
		(int) 35 => 'September, 2001 to March, 2002',
		(int) 36 => 'September, 2001',
		(int) 37 => '12.6.2001',
		(int) 38 => 'November',
		(int) 39 => '16.1.2001',
		(int) 40 => 'January/February, 2001',
		(int) 41 => 'September, 2001',
		(int) 42 => 'October, 2001',
		(int) 43 => 'March',
		(int) 44 => '2002',
		(int) 45 => 'October, 2001',
		(int) 46 => 'the month of March, 2002',
		(int) 47 => 'February, 2001 to January, 2002',
		(int) 48 => 'September, 2001 to March, 2002',
		(int) 49 => 'August',
		(int) 50 => '2000',
		(int) 51 => 'January, 2002',
		(int) 52 => 'a period of',
		(int) 53 => 'one year',
		(int) 54 => '1938',
		(int) 55 => 'the last tour decades',
		(int) 56 => '2172',
		(int) 57 => '2000',
		(int) 58 => ''12',
		(int) 59 => ''14',
		(int) 60 => '1989',
		(int) 61 => '1989',
		(int) 62 => ''15',
		(int) 63 => '2000',
		(int) 64 => '1998',
		(int) 65 => ''16',
		(int) 66 => '1916',
		(int) 67 => '1998',
		(int) 68 => '2001',
		(int) 69 => 'nearly five months',
		(int) 70 => 'January, 2001',
		(int) 71 => 'one year',
		(int) 72 => 'nearly five months',
		(int) 73 => 'five months',
		(int) 74 => '1310',
		(int) 75 => '30 years',
		(int) 76 => '2001',
		(int) 77 => 'about a month',
		(int) 78 => 'six weeks',
		(int) 79 => 'a few days',
		(int) 80 => 'more than a few months',
		(int) 81 => 'about three months',
		(int) 82 => 'a month',
		(int) 83 => 'the month of March, 2002'
	),
	'ORG' => array(
		(int) 0 => 'Research and Development',
		(int) 1 => 'PIOZ',
		(int) 2 => 'the Trade Marks Registry',
		(int) 3 => 'the Food and Drug Administration',
		(int) 4 => 'Food and Drug Administration',
		(int) 5 => 'PIOZ',
		(int) 6 => 'International Regulatory Authorities',
		(int) 7 => 'the International Non-Proprietary',
		(int) 8 => 'Bio-Equivalence',
		(int) 9 => 'Drug Controller General of',
		(int) 10 => 'Food and Drug Administration',
		(int) 11 => 'the Trade and Merchandise Marks Rule',
		(int) 12 => 'the International Non-Proprietary',
		(int) 13 => 'PIO',
		(int) 14 => 'PIO',
		(int) 15 => 'PIOZULIN',
		(int) 16 => 'PIOGLAR',
		(int) 17 => 'PIOGLU',
		(int) 18 => 'PIONORM',
		(int) 19 => 'PIOLEM',
		(int) 20 => 'PIOLET',
		(int) 21 => 'PIOZIT',
		(int) 22 => 'Court',
		(int) 23 => 'PIOZ',
		(int) 24 => 'the Registrar of Trade Marks',
		(int) 25 => 'Registrar of Trade Marks',
		(int) 26 => 'PIOZ',
		(int) 27 => 'the Registrar of Trade Marks',
		(int) 28 => 'the Drug Controller General (',
		(int) 29 => 'Authority',
		(int) 30 => 'Food and Drug Administration',
		(int) 31 => 'Authority',
		(int) 32 => 'PIOZ',
		(int) 33 => 'Authorities',
		(int) 34 => 'Court',
		(int) 35 => 'xerox',
		(int) 36 => 'Pharmaceutical Products',
		(int) 37 => 'Food and Drug Administration',
		(int) 38 => 'PIOZ',
		(int) 39 => 'Drug Controller General',
		(int) 40 => 'Food and Drug Administration',
		(int) 41 => 'PIOZ',
		(int) 42 => 'PIOZ',
		(int) 43 => 'PIOZ',
		(int) 44 => 'PIOZ',
		(int) 45 => 'Court',
		(int) 46 => 'the Hon'ble Apex Court',
		(int) 47 => 'Cadila Health Care Ltd.',
		(int) 48 => 'Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd.',
		(int) 49 => 'the Apex Court',
		(int) 50 => 'Court',
		(int) 51 => 'Court',
		(int) 52 => 'Court',
		(int) 53 => 'Amritdham',
		(int) 54 => 'Dyechem',
		(int) 55 => 'AIR 2000',
		(int) 56 => 'AIR 2000 SC 2114 :',
		(int) 57 => 'works,(b',
		(int) 58 => 'Court',
		(int) 59 => 'the Hon'ble Apex Court',
		(int) 60 => 'Kerly (Ibid',
		(int) 61 => 'Court',
		(int) 62 => 'Mahendra Paper Mills Ltd.',
		(int) 63 => 'Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd.',
		(int) 64 => 'the Hon'ble Apex Court',
		(int) 65 => 'High Courts',
		(int) 66 => 'Court',
		(int) 67 => 'Court',
		(int) 68 => 'Com Products Refining Co.',
		(int) 69 => 'Shangrila Food Products Ltd.',
		(int) 70 => 'Court',
		(int) 71 => 'Amrit Soap Company',
		(int) 72 => 'New Punjab Soap Factory',
		(int) 73 => 'Court',
		(int) 74 => 'Indian Shaving Products Ltd.',
		(int) 75 => 'CLC',
		(int) 76 => 'Court',
		(int) 77 => 'Court',
		(int) 78 => 'Court',
		(int) 79 => 'Chemist',
		(int) 80 => 'PIOZ',
		(int) 81 => 'the Hon'ble Judges Doraiswamy Raju',
		(int) 82 => 'Brijesh Kumar',
		(int) 83 => 'Court',
		(int) 84 => 'PIOZ',
		(int) 85 => 'Court',
		(int) 86 => 'Horlick',
		(int) 87 => 'Sumerskill',
		(int) 88 => 'The Illustrated Official Journal (Patents) Supplement 1 and Corn Products Refining Co.',
		(int) 89 => 'Shangrila Food Products Ltd.',
		(int) 90 => 'Court',
		(int) 91 => 'Court',
		(int) 92 => 'Colgate Palmolive',
		(int) 93 => 'Hindustan Lever Ltd.',
		(int) 94 => 'Parle Products Limited v.',
		(int) 95 => 'Bakemans Industries Limited',
		(int) 96 => 'Court',
		(int) 97 => 'PIOZ',
		(int) 98 => 'Court',
		(int) 99 => 'Court',
		(int) 100 => 'PIO',
		(int) 101 => 'PIO',
		(int) 102 => 'PIO',
		(int) 103 => 'PIOZ',
		(int) 104 => 'PIO',
		(int) 105 => 'inter alia',
		(int) 106 => 'Court',
		(int) 107 => 'Ors',
		(int) 108 => 'Court',
		(int) 109 => 'Court',
		(int) 110 => 'Court',
		(int) 111 => 'Court',
		(int) 112 => 'Court',
		(int) 113 => 'Court',
		(int) 114 => 'India Stationery Products Co.',
		(int) 115 => 'Whitman v. Disney Productions',
		(int) 116 => 'the Circuit Court of Appeal',
		(int) 117 => 'Court',
		(int) 118 => 'Kcrly',
		(int) 119 => 'the Division Bench',
		(int) 120 => 'Delhi High Court',
		(int) 121 => 'follows:-'17',
		(int) 122 => 'Court',
		(int) 123 => 'Court',
		(int) 124 => 'Court',
		(int) 125 => 'Court'
	),
	'GPE' => array(
		(int) 0 => 'India',
		(int) 1 => 'India',
		(int) 2 => 'New Delhi',
		(int) 3 => 'India',
		(int) 4 => 'New Delhi',
		(int) 5 => 'India',
		(int) 6 => 'New Delhi',
		(int) 7 => 'India',
		(int) 8 => 'India',
		(int) 9 => 'India',
		(int) 10 => 'India',
		(int) 11 => 'New Delhi',
		(int) 12 => 'India',
		(int) 13 => 'New Delhi',
		(int) 14 => 'India',
		(int) 15 => 'New Delhi',
		(int) 16 => 'Mumbai',
		(int) 17 => 'India',
		(int) 18 => 'India',
		(int) 19 => 'New Delhi',
		(int) 20 => 'India',
		(int) 21 => 'New Delhi',
		(int) 22 => 'countries.10',
		(int) 23 => 'India',
		(int) 24 => 'England',
		(int) 25 => 'Mahendra',
		(int) 26 => 'Delhi',
		(int) 27 => 'BILLY',
		(int) 28 => 'Delhi',
		(int) 29 => 'Delhi',
		(int) 30 => 'India',
		(int) 31 => 'India',
		(int) 32 => 'Versa',
		(int) 33 => 'B.L.',
		(int) 34 => 'Delhi',
		(int) 35 => 'India',
		(int) 36 => 'U.S.A.'
	),
	'EVENT' => array(
		(int) 0 => 'PIOZED 15 and PIOZED 30',
		(int) 1 => 'Clause 5',
		(int) 2 => 'PIOZED 15 and PIOZED 30'
	),
	'PRODUCT' => array(
		(int) 0 => '30.5.2001',
		(int) 1 => '30.5.2001',
		(int) 2 => '183',
		(int) 3 => '797'
	),
	'FAC' => array(
		(int) 0 => 'Madras',
		(int) 1 => 'Madras',
		(int) 2 => 'Hindustan Pencils Pvt',
		(int) 3 => 'Madras'
	),
	'WORK_OF_ART' => array(
		(int) 0 => 'a Larger Bench of',
		(int) 1 => '1995 Edition'
	),
	'LANGUAGE' => array(
		(int) 0 => 'English',
		(int) 1 => 'English',
		(int) 2 => 'English',
		(int) 3 => 'English',
		(int) 4 => 'English'
	),
	'ORDINAL' => array(
		(int) 0 => 'first',
		(int) 1 => 'first'
	),
	'MONEY' => array(
		(int) 0 => 'two marks Gluvita',
		(int) 1 => 'two marks',
		(int) 2 => 'two marks'
	)
)
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '834688',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51863/trade-and-merchandise-marks-act-1958-repealed-complete-act">Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958</a> - Sections 28 and 29; <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Order 39, Rules 1 and 2',
		'appealno' => 'Appln. No. 230 of 2002 in C.S. No. 234 of 2002',
		'appellant' => 'Usv Limited',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Usv Limited Vs. Ipca Laboratories Limited',
		'casenote' => 'Intellectual Property Rights - trade mark - Sections 28 and 29, of Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 and Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - suit for grant of ad-interim injunction restraining respondent from manufacturing or dealing directly or indirectly in medicinal preparations under trade mark PIOZED - delay in institution of suit by itself not sufficient defence to an action for interim injunction - submissions made by respondent not sustainable - applicant entitled to ad-interim injunction pending disposal of suit.


 - T.N. ESTATES (ABOLITION & CONVERSION INTO RYOTWARI) ACT, 1948 [Act No. 26/1948]. Sections 5(2) & 67; [A.P. Shah, CJ, Mrs. Prabha Sridevan & P. Jyothimani, JJ] Suo motu revisional powers  Held, On a bare reading of the provisions of Section 5(2) of the Act, it is clear that the power conferred on the Director by Section 5(2) to cancel or revise any of the orders, acts or proceedings of the Settlement Officer is very wide. In the first place, the Director need not necessarily be moved by any party in that behalf, and the power could be exercised either on an application by an aggrieved person or suo motu. For example, if the Director comes to know that contrary to the scheme of the Act or due to misrepresentation or fraud played, a patta had been granted to a person under the relevant provisions of the Act, then to set right that mistake, the Director should be enabled to exercise his power so as to effectuate the scheme of the Act and to implement the purpose behind the Act. The fact that the rule making authority has prescribed procedure in exercise of the powers under Section 67 for making an application to the Director does not mean that the suo motu power which is explicit in Section 5(2) of the Act is in any way curtailed or taken away. Therefore, the contention of the respondent that making an application is sine qua non for invoking the power under Section 5(2) of the Act is not tenable. -- T.N. ESTATES (ABOLITION & 
CONVERSION INTO RYOTWARI) ACT, 1948.  
Sections 5(2) & 67; Suo motu revisional powers  Held, On a bare reading of the provisions of Section 5(2) of the Act, it is clear that the power conferred on the Director by Section 5(2) to cancel or revise any of the orders, acts or proceedings of the Settlement Officer is very wide. In the first place, the Director need not necessarily be moved by any party in that behalf, and the power could be exercised either on an application by an aggrieved person or suo motu. For example, if the Director comes to know that contrary to the scheme of the Act or due to misrepresentation or fraud played, a patta had been granted to a person under the relevant provisions of the Act, then to set right that mistake, the Director should be enabled to exercise his power so as to effectuate the scheme of the Act and to implement the purpose behind the Act. The fact that the rule making authority has prescribed procedure in exercise of the powers under Section 67 for making an application to the Director does not mean that the suo motu power which is explicit in Section 5(2) of the Act is in any way curtailed or taken away. Therefore, the contention of the respondent that making an application is sine qua non for invoking the power under Section 5(2) of the Act is not tenable. ',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Whitman v. Disney Productions;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'Sudhir Thatte, Manager-Legal and ;Constituted Attorney',
		'counseldef' => 'Director of the Defendant',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2002-06-26',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'P. Thangavel, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">P. Thangavel, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is an application filed under Order XIV Rule 8 of Original Side Rules read with Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2, and Section 151 of Civil Procedure Code to grant ad-interim injunction restraining the respondent and its distributors, stockists, servants, agents, retailers and representatives from in any manner manufacturing, selling, offering for sale, stocking, advertising or dealing directly or indirectly in medicinal preparations under the trade mark PIOZED or any other trade mark which is identical with and/or deceptively similar to the trade mark PIOZ of the applicant so as to pass off the respondent's preparations as and for the preparations of the applicant or in any other manner whatsoever connected with the applicant till the disposal of the suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The applicant is the plaintiff and has filed the suit against the respondent, who is the defendant for a permanent injunction restraining the respondent from passing off their medicinal preparations under the trade mark PIOZED as and for the applicant's medicinal preparations having the trade mark PIOZ and for other consequential relief. The applicant is carrying on the business as manufacturer and dealer of pharmaceutical and medicinal preparations and enjoys high reputation and goodwill because of the excellent quality and efficacy in preparation of the medicine. The turnover of the applicant company for 2000-2001 was more than Rs. 297/- crores. The medicine manufactured by the applicant company is not only sold in this country, but exported to many foreign countries also. The applicant is having large Research and Development facilities. The trademark of the applicant is PIOZ in respect of their PIOGLITAZONE preparation for the treatment of diabetes. The applicant got search report on 28.7.2000 and also another report on 25.10.2000 about the availability of trademark PIOZ through its Attorney for registration and thereafter distributed ADIB Internationals Reprints booklet amongst the Doctors all over India advertising therein its trademark PIOZ in November, 2000. The applicant applied for permission to manufacture the drugs PIOGLITAZONE HYDROCHLORIDE in Tablets form containing 15 mg and 30 mg to the Drugs Controller General (India), New Delhi, in November, 2000. On 18.12.2000 an application was made for registration of the trade mark PIOZ by the applicant with the Trade Marks Registry and it was numbered as 9,77,709 and the application is pending for registration. The Drugs Controller General (India), New Delhi granted permission for manufacture of the said tablets by its letter dated 11.1.2001. Permission was granted to the applicant for manufacture of PIOZ tablets by the Food and Drug Administration on 16.1.2001 on application made by the applicant company. The applicant placed orders for supply of foil and carton bearing the trade marks PIOZ in January, 2001, After getting the permission from the Drugs Controller General (India), New Delhi and licence from Food and Drug Administration, the applicant company has started manufacturing of the medicine in tablets under the trade mark PIOZ in strips and made it available for sale in market. The sale of the tablets prepared under the trade mark PIOZ during February, 2001 to January, 2002 was Rs. 5,98,35,000/-. The applicant has spent Rs. 1,17,97,000/- towards advertisement and promotional expenses relating to the trade mark PIOZ for a period from August, 2000 to January, 2002. The applicant came across the preparation of some medicine in a pack of 15 mg and 30 mg as that of the applicant for the same disease and ailment having the trade mark PIOZED in August, 2001 and marketed in March, 2002. The respondent was fully aware of the manufacturing of the above said tablets by the applicant and marketed in or about January, 2001 throughout India under the trade mark PIOZ. The respondent has no right to use deceptively similar trade mark PIOZED in manufacturing and marketing of such medicine while such medicine was manufactured and marketed by the applicant in its trade mark name PIOZ even in January, 2001. The use of the deceptively similar trade mark by the respondent amounts to passing off its preparation as and for the preparation of the applicant and made illegal gains on the applicant's reputation. Confusion and deception are bound to arise as both trade marks are deceptively similar and both the preparations will be offered for sale to the same class of consumers for the same indication and ailments. The applicant is the prior adopter and user of the trademark PIOZ and therefore the respondent should be restrained by means of ad-interim injunction from using the preparations bearing trade mark PIOZED to avoid common loss to the applicant due to the passing off of the respondent's preparation as and for the preparations of the applicant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The respondent resists the claim of the applicant on the following grounds:-The manufacture of the medicinal preparation having the trade mark PIOZED by the respondent was in or about September, 2001 and not in March, 2002 and the same should have been known to the applicant immediately thereafter. The application of the applicant suffers from gross delay, latches and acquiescence as the respondent has been openly and extensively selling the said medicine without any interruption since September, 2001. The respondent, one of the Pioneers of pharmaceutical industry in India, has been in existence from 1949 having multi jurisdictional and multi national business in the field of medicinal and pharmaceutical preparations for treatment of various ailments and disorders. The respondent has four manufacturing facilities to manufacture various products and possess several recognitions and certifications from various International Regulatory Authorities. The products of the respondent are not only sold in India, but also in 80 other countries. The respondent commands a formidable reputation and goodwill for providing efficacious and quality products meeting international standards of manufacturing and quality. The turnover of the respondent in 1996-97, 1997-98, 1998-99, 1999-2000, 2000-2001 and 2001-2002 are Rs. 271/- crores, Rs. 292 crores, Rs. 344/- crores, Rs. 373/- crores, Rs. 396/- crores and above Rs. 450/- crores respectively. The annual publicity and promotional expenditure with respect to its various products during 1996-97, 1997-98, 1998-99, 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 are Rs. 1.47 crores, Rs. 1.92 crores, Rs. 3.61 crores, Rs. 4.73 crores and Rs. 3.89 crores respectively. The respondent decided to manufacture and market medicinal for pharmaceutical preparations containing PIOGLITAZONE as its active ingredient under the trade mark PIOZED in May, 2000 and the trade mark was invented from the International Non-Proprietary name PIOGLITAZONE. The respondent made an application to the Drug Controller General of India, New Delhi for permission to conduct Bio-Equivalence study on 15.1.2001 and the permission was granted on 2.2.2001. An application made by the respondent to the said Drug Controller General of India, New Delhi for permission to market the molecule on 29.3.2001 and permission was granted on 21.5.2001. An application was made to Food and Drug Administration to formulate the preparation of medicine under the trademark PIOZED 15 and PIOZED 30 on 30.5.2001 and permission was granted on 16.6.2001. An application was filed for registration of the trade mark PIOZED on 31.5.2001 in respect of medicinal and pharmaceutical preparations in Clause 5 of the 4th Schedule to the Trade and Merchandise Marks Rule, 1959 and the application was numbered as 1013232. The medicinal and pharmaceutical preparations under the trade mark PIOZED containing PIOGLITAZONE as its active ingredient commenced manufacturing in or about August, 2001 and marketed for sale in September, 2001. The respondent has honestly and in a bona fide manner conceived and adopted the trade mark from the International Non-Proprietary name of the active ingredient i.e. PIOGLITAZONE. Because of its efficacious nature and characteristic thereof the said medicine was received well and accepted in the market. The medical profession has also-accepted the same and the sale of the medicine from September, 2001 to March, 2002 was to a tune of about Rs. 22 lakhs. The trade mark PIOZED was exclusively used by the respondent in respect of the preparation of PIOZED 15 and PIOZED 30 and the trade mark has acquired tremendous reputation and goodwill. The trade mark PIOZED was promoted by publication and distribution of product literature, distribution of sample of the goods, visual aids etc. A sum of Rs. 7.5 lakhs has been spent for promotion of the goods having trade mark PIOZED. The respondent has acquired valuable proprietary right in respect of the said trade mark PIOZED in relation to the medicinal and pharmaceutical preparation. By denying the averments made in the affidavit filed in support of the application by the applicant, the respondent states that the word PIO and/or PIOZ have been taken directly from the generic name of the drug PIOGLITAZONE and the word PIO and/or PIOZ are commonly used by several manufactures to market their preparations, viz., PIOZONE, PIOZULIN, PIOGLAR, PIOGLU, PIOGLIT, PIONORM, PIOLEM, PIOLET and PIOZIT. There is no confusion in sale of medicines on the ground of deception of trade mark since September, 2001 and the trade mark PIOZ is not phonetically and visually similar to the trade mark of the applicant PIOZ. The trade mark PIOZED is not deceptively similar to the trade mark PIOZ of the applicant. The applicant has not made out a prima facie case or balance convenience in his favour for grant of ad-interim injunction as prayed for in the application as the conduct of the applicant is mala fide to claim any equitable relief from the hands of this Court. The balance of convenience is only in favour of the respondent and the grant of ad-interim injunction in favour of the applicant will cause serious damage and irreparable injury both financially and otherwise to the trade and business of the respondent. No injury or damage is caused to the applicant by the respondent in manufacture of the medicine under the trade mark PIOZED by the respondent. It is on these grounds, the respondent has sought for dismissal of the application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The applicant is the plaintiff and the applicant has filed the suit against the respondent, who is the defendant for the reliefs, viz., perpetual injunction, restraining the defendant and its men or agents from in any manner manufacturing, selling, offering for sale, stocking, advertising directly or indirectly dealing in medicinal preparations under the trade mark PIOZED or any other trade mark which is identical with and/or deceptively similar to the trade mark PIOZ of the plaintiff so as to pass off the defendant's preparations as and for the preparations of the plaintiff or in any other manner whatsoever connected with the plaintiff, to deliver up for destruction to the plaintiff all the preparations, dyes, blocks, articles, literatures, leaflets, brochures, cartons, labels, papers and things bearing and containing the impugned trade mark PIOZED to an authorized representatives of the plaintiff for destruction, to render accounts of profits made by the defendant by use of the impugned trade mark PIOZED or any trade mark similar thereto and damages of Rs. 10,05,000/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Admittedly the applicant is manufacturing the medicinal preparations having trade mark name PIOZ while the respondent is manufacturing medicinal preparations under the trade mark name PIOZED. Both the applicant and the respondent are manufacturing medicines under the said trade names for diabetic. The fact also remains that the ingredient for manufacture of medicines by the applicant as well as by the respondent is PIOGLITAZONE. Both the applicant and the respondent are manufacturing tablets using the ingredient of PIOGLITAZONE containing 15 mg and 30 mg and marketing the same for the consumption of public. The medicine will be sold to the diabetic patients on prescription being given by the Doctors by the medical stores carrying on business in sale of medicines.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The applicant as well as the respondent are said to have obtained search report from private agency for selecting the trade mark after considering the trade marks already in existence with the Registrar of Trade Marks on 26.7.2000 and 15.5.2000 respectively. It is evident that there is no dispute between both parties that trade marks PIOZ or PIOZED were not registered with Registrar of Trade Marks by any manufacturer of medicines at the time of giving search report. It is also evident from the submission made on both sides that official report with regard to the trade mark PIOZ and PIOZED are said to have been obtained on 26.10.2000 and 12.6.2001 by the applicant and the respondent respectively. The fact also remains that a booklet was published with regard to the manufacture of medicine with trade mark name PIOZ by the applicant even in November, 2000.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Admittedly, application for registration of trade mark PIOZ and PIOZED were made by the applicant and the respondent on 18.12.2000 and 31.5.2001 respectively and the said applications are pending registration before the Registrar of Trade Marks. There is no dispute that the applicant and the respondent applied for the Drug Controller General (India), New Delhi for grant of permission to manufacture tablets referred to above and permission was granted by the said Authority to the applicant and the respondent on 11.1.2001 and 2.2.2001 respectively. Admittedly, applications were sent by the applicant and the respondent for permission to Food and Drug Administration on 15.1.2001 and 30.5.2001 and permission was accorded by the said Authority to the applicant on 16.1.2001 and 16.6.2001 respectively. Thereafter, the applicant manufactured the tablets under the trade mark name PIOZ and marketed the same in January/February, 2001, and it is evident from the perusal of the document produced on the side of the respondent itself.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The respondent after obtaining permission from the above said Authorities, started manufacturing of the above said tablets under the trade mark name PIOZED and marketed the said medicine at Mumbai in September, 2001 as seen from the copy of the bill produced before the Court and the marketing of such medicine was in October, 2001 as seen from the xerox copy of the document ORG-MARG RETAIL AUDIT for Pharmaceutical Products in India. According to the applicant, the sale of medicine under the trade mark PIOZED at Madras was only in March, 2002. No other documents has been produced on the side of the respondent to show that the medicine prepared under the trade mark name PIOZED was introduced at Madras even in October, 2001 instead of in the month of March, 2002. The facts referred to above would disclose that applying for registration of trade mark PIOZ, obtaining of permission for manufacture of medicine under the trade mark name PIOZ from the Drug Controller General (India), New Delhi and Food and Drug Administration and manufacturing and marketing of the medicine under the trade mark name PIOZ were done very much earlier to the applying for registration of trade mark PIOZED, obtaining permission from Drug Controller General (India), New Delhi and Food and Drug Administration and also manufacturing and marketing of the medicines under the trade mark name PIOZED by the respondent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. A perusal of the pleadings raised in the affidavit of the applicant and counter-affidavit of the respondent would disclose that the applicant had sold the medicine with trade mark name PIOZ for a sum of Rs. 5,98,35,000/- for the period from February, 2001 to January, 2002, while the respondent had sold the medicine manufactured under the trade mark name PIOZED for Rs. 22 lakhs only from September, 2001 to March, 2002. It is also evident from the pleadings of the applicant as well as the respondent that the applicant had spent for advertisement and promotional expenses a sum of Rs. 1,17,97,000/- for the period from August, 2000 to January, 2002 while the respondent had spent only a sum of Rs. 7.5 lakhs for such purposes during the relevant period. The admitted figures referred to above would disclose that the applicant had expended substantial amount for advertisement and promotional expenses for the sale of medicine under the trade mark name PIOZ and had also marketed and sold the said medicine for about Rs. 6 crores within a period of one year. If the amounts spent for advertisement and promotional expenses and the medicine manufactured under the trade mark name PIOZ and sold out by the applicant are compared with the advertisement and promotional expenses of Rs. 7.5 lakhs and sale of such medicine under the trade mark name PIOZED for Rs. 22 lakhs for the period referred to above, it would disclose that the applicant is the fore-runner in advertising and expending promotional expenses as well as marketing of the medicine under the trade mark name PIOZ when compared with the advertisement and promotional expenses as well as sale of the medicine under the trade mark name PIOZED by the respondent, in spite of the fact that the respondent is said to be marketing its medicine including of other medicines manufactured in four factories owned by it in abroad, viz., 80 countries.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The learned Senior Counsel Mr. P. Chidambaram has brought to the notice of this Court, the decision of a Larger Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd., , wherein the Hon'ble Judges of the Apex Court have held as follows, while considering the resemblance and pronouncing in English of the two words 'Aristoc' and 'Rysta':-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'.... Considering the way the words were pronounced in English, the one was likely to be mistaken for the other.... The answer to the question whether the sound of one word resembles too nearly the sound of another so as to bring the former within the limits of Section 12 of the Trade Marks Act, 1938, must nearly always depend on first impression, for obviously a person who is familiar with both words will neither be deceived nor confused. It is the person who only knows the one word and has perhaps an imperfect recollection of it who is likely to be deceived or confused. Little assistance, therefore, is to be obtained from a meticulous comparison of the two words, letter by letter and syllable by syllable, pronounced with the clarity to be expected from a teacher of elocution. The Court must be careful to make allowance for imperfect recollection and the effect of careless pronunciation and speech on the part not only of the person seeking to buy under the trade description, but also of the shop assistant ministering to that person's wants'..... As far as this Court is concerned, the decisions in the last tour decades have clearly laid down that what has to be seen in the case of a passing off action is the similarity between the competing marks and to determine whether there is likelihood of deception or causing confusion. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">. . .These observations appear to us to be contrary to the decision of this Court in Amritdham's case (supra) where it was observed that the products will be purchased by both villagers and town folk, literate as well as illiterate and the question has to be approached from the point of view of a man of average intelligence and imperfect recollection. A trade may relate to goods largely sold to illiterate or badly educated persons. The purchaser in India cannot be equated with a purchaser of goods in England. While we agree that in trade mark matters, it is necessary to go into the question of comparable strength, the decision on merits in Dyechem's case, AIR 2000 SCW 2172 : AIR 2000 SC 2114 : 2000 CLC 1338 : 2000 (20) PTC 297(SC) does not, in our opinion, lay down correct law and we hold accordingly. .... </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Broadly stated in an action for passing off on the basis of unregistered trade mark generally for deciding the question of deceptive similarity the following factors to be considered:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The nature of the marks i.e. whether the marks are word marks or label marks or composite marks, i.e. both words and label works,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) The degree of resembleness between the marks, phonetically similar and hence similar in idea.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) The nature of the goods in respect of which they are used as trade marks.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(d) The similarity in the nature, character and performance of the goods of the rival traders.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(e) The class of purchasers who are likely to buy the goods bearing the marks they require, on their education and intelligence and a degree of care they are likely to exercise in purchasing and/or using the goods.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(f) The mode of purchasing the goods or placing orders for the goods, and</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(g) Any other surrounding circumstances which may be relevant in the extent of dissimilarity between the competing marks.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Weightage to be given to each of the aforesaid factors depends upon facts of each case and the same weightage cannot be given to each factor in every case.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The learned Senior Counsel Mr. P. Chidambaram has also brought to the notice of this Court, the decision reported in Laxmikant V. Patel v. Chetanbhat Shah and Anr., wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'13. In an action for passing off it is usual, rather essential, to seek an injunction temporary or ad-interim. The principles for the grant of such injunction are the same as in the case of any other action against injury complained of. The plaintiff must prove a prima facie case, availability of balance of convenience in his favour and his suffering an irreparable injury in the absence of grant of injunction. According to Kerly (Ibid, para 16.16) passing off cases are often cases of deliberate and intentional misrepresentation, but it is well-settled that fraud is not a necessary element of the right of action, and the absence of an intention to deceive is not a defence though proof of fraudulent intention may materially assist a plaintiff in establishing probability of deception. Christopher Wadlow in Law of Passing Off (1995 Edition, at p.3.06) states that the plaintiff does not have to prove actual damage in order to succeed in an action for passing off. Likelihood of damage is sufficient. The same learned author states that the defendant's state of mind is wholly irrelevant to the existence of the cause of action for passing off (ibid, paras 4.20 and 7.15). As to how the injunction granted by the Court would shape depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Where a defendant has imitated or adopted that plaintiffs distinctive trade mark or business name, the order may be an absolute injunction that he would not use or carry on business under that name.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In Mahendra and Mahendra Paper Mills Ltd. v. Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd., , the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as follows: -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'15. This question has been considered by different High Courts and this Court in umpteen cases from time to time. On analysis of the principles laid down in the decisions, certain recognized parameters relating to the matter have emerged. Without intending to be exhaustive some of the principles which are accepted as well settled may be stated thus; that whether there is a likelihood of deception or confusion arising is a matter for decision by the Court, and no witness is entitled to say whether the mark is likely to deceive or to cause confusion; that all factors which are likely to create or allay deception or confusion must be considered in combination; that broadly speaking, factors creating confusion would be, for example, the nature of the market itself, the class of customers, the extent of the reputation, the trade channels, the existence of any connection in course of trade, and others. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. This Court, in the case of Com Products Refining Co. v. Shangrila Food Products Ltd., , observed that 'the question whether two competing marks are so similar as to be likely to deceive or cause confusion is one of first impression and it is for the court to decide it. The question has to be approached from the point of view of a man of average intelligence and imperfect recollection. To such a man the overall structural and phonetic similarity of the two marks Gluvita and Glucovita is likely to deceive or to cause confusion. In deciding whether two marks are so similar as to be likely to deceive or cause confusion the similarity of idea is a relevant consideration.' This Court further observed that in order that a trade mark may acquire a reputation among buyers, it is not necessary that they should know who the manufacturer of the goods is. It is no answer to an opposition to an application for registration to say that there is a number of marks having one or more common features which occur in the proposed mark unless it is proved that these marks had by user acquired a reputation in the market.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In Amrit Soap Company v. New Punjab Soap Factory, 1989 (2) A.L.R. 242 : 1989 (Suppl)(1) PTC166 (Delhi) it has been held as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'11. It was next submitted by counsel for the defendant that the plaintiff has no right to use the trade mark 'BILLY' and artistic wrapper as so many other parties who are referred to earlier were also using the same trade mark. This contention of the defendant is wholly devoid of any force. In this connection it is sufficient to say that under the law it is the right of two parties before the court which has to be determined and, as already discussed, the plaintiff being prior user has the better and legal right to seek relief from this Court.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. In Indian Shaving Products Ltd. and Anr. v. Gift Pack and Anr., 2000 CLC 183 (Delhi) : 1998 (18) PTC 698 (Delhi) while considering the trade mark used by several other persons/companies besides the defendant, it is held as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'...the said defence, that other persons are also using the said trade mark, is not available to the defendants. The Court is called upon to decide disputes in between the parties which are before it. ... What is to be seen by the Court is as to whether the plaintiff has acquired goodwill and reputation for his products. . . 'The allegation that some other manufacturers are also using the same trade mark is of no consequence as the Court is concerned with parties before it only.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'... the colour scheme and get up of the two products are entirely different... The plaintiff admittedly are not objecting to the colour scheme and get up of the jacket of the goods of the defendants. Their case is that the defendants have usurped their trade mark and as such they are likely to filch, their trade and cause loss and damage to their reputation as well as to their business. Thus the defence put forward by the defendants that the two products are dissimilar in their colour scheme and get up and dress material does not come to their rescue.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The pronouncing of the word PIOZ and PIOZED will be one and the same since 'ED' in PIOZED will have no sound effect at the time of pronouncing it, as rightly contended by the learned Senior Counsel Mr. P. Chidambaram. The prescription given by the Doctors for purchase of medicines PIOZ or PIOZED will be in scribbling and the spelling normally written by Doctors could not be read by common man, more particularly English knowing literates also. The Chemist in drug stores will also be in the same position to find a distinction between PIOZ and PIOZED scribbled by the Doctors in their prescription. If that is the position even for English knowing literates and chemist in drug stores, it need not be elaborated with regard to the illiterate persons who are taking treatment for the disease diabetic. It is relevant to point out that more than 50 to 60 per cent of the population in India are having diabetic and major percentage of the population is only illitertes and the point in dispute has to be viewed from the point of view of a man of average intelligence and imperfect recollection. It is relevant to point out that to such a man, the overall structural and phonetic similarity of two marks PIOZ and PIOZED is likely to deceive or will cause confusion. If the trade mark name of the respondent PIOZED is likely to deceive or cause confusion to such people referred to above, it is likely that the business and sale of the medicine prepared under the trade mark name PIOZ of the applicant will be affected and there is likelihood of damage caused to the applicant by using the trade mark name PIOZED by the respondent in manufacturing and selling of medicine under the trade mark name PIOZED. If the principles laid down by the Larger Bench consisting of the present Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India Mr. B.N. Kirpal, and the Hon'ble Judges Doraiswamy Raju and Brijesh Kumar, JJ. in referred to above is taken into consideration in the light of the facts of this case referred to above, this Court is of opinion that the trade mark name of the respondent PIOZED is deceptively similar and will also create confusion in the mind of the customers purchasing medicine of the applicant, who is manufacturing medicine under the trade mark name PIOZ and will also cause loss in the business thereby causing damage. The materials produced before this Court on the side of the applicant would disclose that the applicant has made out a prima facie case in his favour for grant of ad-interim injunction. The loss of reputation or damage to be caused to the business of the applicant cannot be compensated by money value. Since the reputation of an article is one thing and the reputation of a particular make is quite another, it is for the reputation of the make only the applicant is concerned with. In of the decisions reported in Horlick's Malted Milk Company v. Sumerskill, 1916 The Illustrated Official Journal (Patents) Supplement 1 and Corn Products Refining Co. v. Shangrila Food Products Ltd., , it was held that the reputation will attach only to trade mark of the goods purchased by the buyer who may not be interested in knowing about the manufacturer of the goods.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Regarding the balance of convenience, the Court must weigh one need against another and determine whether the balance of convenience lies. Interlocutory remedy is intended to preserve in status-quo, the rights of parties which may appear on a prima facie case while restraining the defendants from exercising what he considers his legal right which the plaintiff would like to prevent as it affects the plaintiffs right. The Court must put in to the scales the relevant consideration, viz., about the commencement of enterprises and carrying on business, etc. This view finds support from the decision reported in Colgate Palmolive (India) Ltd. v. Hindustan Lever Ltd. and Vice Versa, .</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. While considering the balance of convenience in Parle Products Limited v. Bakemans Industries Limited, 1998 (18) PTC 662, the learned single Judge of this Court has held that the damage to be sustained in the event of restraining the defendant by means of ad-interim injunction at the stage of application and ultimately the defendant succeeding in the suit after the trial and the damage to be sustained by the applicant by not granting ad-interim injunction at the stage of application and ultimately succeeding in the suit after trial have to be taken into consideration in granting ad-interim injunction. In this case as already pointed out that there will be no difference in pronouncing the words PIOZ and PIOZED in English and the word PIOZED is deceptively similar and will create confusion in the mind of the consumers of the medicine manufactured under the trade mark name PIOZ by the applicant. The trade mark name of the respondent is also phonetically similar. Even if the decisions referred to above are taken into consideration, the balance of convenience pending trial of the suit will be only in favour of the applicant. As already pointed out, the respondent is having four manufacturing industries in medicine and is also manufacturing several other medicines by having market in about SO countries in abroad. The fact of granting ad-interim injunction against the respondent in manufacturing the medicine under the trade mark name PIOZED, the respondent is not going to close down the factories or its business in medicine referred to above. The respondent can very well manufacture the very same medicine in some other name which is not offending the trade mark name of the applicant PIOZ. The question of getting its business damaged in view of the grant of injunction will not be there in the opinion of this Court. Therefore, this Court holds that the balance of convenience is also in favour of the applicant if the facts and circumstances of the case are taken into consideration.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent contends that 'PIO' in 'PIOZ' and 'PIO' in 'PIOZED' are generic word of 'PIOGLITAZONE' and therefore, the applicant cannot come forward with a suit for grant of injunction for passing off even if 'PIO' is taken from generic word 'PIOGLITAZONE'. The letter 'Z' has been added to find the trade mark name PIOZ by the applicant. The respondent has added 'ED' alongwith 'Z' annexed to 'PIO' to find its trade mark name 'PIOZED' of which 'ED' will suffer silence while pronouncing it. Therefore, the said contention raised by the learned counsel for the respondent cannot be sustained.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent, inter alia, contended that there is delay, laches and acquiescence in coming to the Court by the applicant to obtain an order of interim injunction against the respondent and therefore the ad-interim injunction relief sought for by the applicant against the respondent cannot be granted. In support of such contention the learned counsel appearing for the respondent placed reliance on the decision reported in B.L. and Co. and Ors. v. Pfizer Products Incl., 2001 PTC 797 (Delhi). In that case, the plaintiff did not take any action for nearly five months of the launching and manufacturing of the defendant's product, and in its own volition preferred not to enter the Indian market. The balance of convenience was in favour of the defendant and therefore ex parte order of injunction should not be granted according to the views of the Court. While coming to the conclusion the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court found that the single Judge of the Court has not taken into consideration of the fact that the appellant had alone launched the product, manufactured the same and marketed in the market in January, 2001 while the respondents product had neither been introduced, nor marketed nor sold by them. The Division Bench has also taken into consideration of the fact that the respondent had waited for one year and allowed the appellant to develop the trade mark and to obtain requisite permission for manufacture. The said Bench had also taken into consideration of the fact that after commencement of manufacture, the respondents did not take action for nearly five months and had approached the Court for the relief thereafter only. It is after taking into consideration of the above said fact, the Division Bench of the said Court has come to the conclusion that the delay of five months will disentitle the respondents in that appeal to get an order of ad-interim injunction. That is not the circumstances in this case. It is after knowing the marketing of the medicine PIOZED by the respondent, the applicant had immediately approached this Court for the relief sought for in this application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The learned Senior Counsel Mr. P. Chidambaram has also brought to the notice of this Court the decision reported in Hindustan Pencils Pvt. Ltd. v. India Stationery Products Co. and Anr., . In that case, the learned Judge, B.N. Kirpal, J. (as he then was), the present Hon'ble Chief Justice of India, has observed, while considering the submission of 'inoridinate delay, laches and acquiescence' as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Inordinate delay' would, therefore, be delay of such a long duration that the defendant could have come to the conclusion that the plaintiff has, possibly, abandoned his right to seek relief or to object to the defendant using the trade mark. 'Equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights'.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. It would appear that 'inordinate delay', which has never been defined by the Courts so far, would be, analogous or similar to 'laches'. In 'Whitman v. Disney Productions, 263 F2d 229 it was observed by the Circuit Court of Appeal in U.S.A. as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Mere passage of time cannot constitute laches, but if the passage of time can be shown to have lulled defendant into a false sense of security, and the defendant acts in reliance thereon, laches may, in the discretion of the trial Court, be found.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It would follow, logically, that delay by itself is not a sufficient defence to an action for interim injunciton, but delay coupled with prejudice caused to the defendant would amount to 'laches', as observed by McCarry at page 383 'Laches-delay X prejudice'. In this formula, it is the magnitude of the product of delay and prejudice which must be weighed, not the magnitude of solely the quantum of delay or prejudice alone. For example, in one case, a long delay coupled with even a slight amount of prejudice may suffice to prove an adequate defence of laches. Yet, in another case, a short delay coupled with a great amount of resulting prejudice to defendant may also suffice for laches'. It has been emphasized that it is for the defendant to show that there has been prejudice caused by reason of the delay and that it would be unfair to injunct the defendant from carrying out its activities.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. 'Laches' and 'Inorldinate delay', however, are not similar to 'acquiescence'. Acquiescence is a different concept which has been explained by Kcrly at page 1310, para 15.45 as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The classic case of acquiescence proper is where the proprietor, knowing of his rights and knowing that the infringer is ignorant of them, does something to encourage the infringer's misapprehension, with the result that the infringer acts upon his mistaken belief and so worsens his position. It seems clear that something less than that is needed to offer a defence, but how much less is not clear. The current tendency is to hold that a defence of acquiescence or laches may be set up whenever it is unconscionable for the plaintiff to deny anything that the (consciously or unconsciously) has allowed or encouraged the defendant to believe. Mere failure to sue, without some positive act of encouragement, is not in general enough to give a defence.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case cited above there was a delay of 30 years and while considering the said delay, the above said observation was made by His Lordship. But there is no such delay in this case to hold that there is any inordinate delay or laches or acquiescence as contended by the learned counsel for the applicant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24. Even in the decision relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent reported in 2001 PTC 797 cited already, it has been held by the Division Bench of Delhi High Court as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'17. As regards the delay in institution of the suit and its effect for the purpose of grant of ex parte restraint, the settled legal position is that while the delay in institution of a suit for an action for passing off may not be fatal, it is one of the important and relevant considerations before granting an ex parte/interlocutory injunction. Reference in this regard is invited to the THE LAW OF PASSING-OFF by Christopher Wadlow. Learned Author while dealing with the motions of interlocutory relevance has observed as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Delay in applying for interlocutory relief is a very serious matter. As a rule of thumb, delay of up to about a month, or perhaps six weeks, generally has no adverse effect on an inter partes application and delay of up to twice that period need not be fatal if it can be explained and the plaintiff's case is otherwise strong. On an ex parte application even delay of a few days can be critical. Unjustified delay of more than a few months is almost always fatal to the plaintiff's case, even though delay of this order has no effect on the plaintiff's right at trial.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The above observation in 'THE LAW OF PASSING-OFF' would show that even delay of about three months is not fatal to the plaintiff's case. This suit has been filed according to the applicant within a month from knowing about sale of medicine under the trade mark name PIOZED at Madras in the month of March, 2002. If the said facts are taken into consideration, this Court is of opinion that there is no delay or laches or acquiescence on the part of the applicant in coming to the Court seeking the relief to redress its grievances.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. The learned counsel for the respondent inter alia contended that the said trade mark has been used in five other medicine manufacturing companies and that the applicant had not chosen to initiate any action against them, but has chosen to take action against the respondent only in the suit. In view of the decisions already cited on this point, the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent cannot be sustained. The other submissions made by the learned counsel for the respondent are not germane to decide the issue in the interlocutory application, and therefore, requires no consideration from this Court in this matter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. In view of the foregoing reasons, this Court holds that the applicant is entitled to an order of ad-interim injunction pending disposal of the suit. Taking into consideration of the circumstances of the case, both parties are directed to bear their own costs.</p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '2003(26)PTC21(Mad)',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'ipca Laboratories Limited',
		'sub' => 'Intellectual Property Rights ',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
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View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

Warning (2): Invalid argument supplied for foreach() [APP/View/Case/meta.ctp, line 39]
Code Context
//$shops = $shops['entities'];

foreach ($shops2 as $key => $val) {
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/meta.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Usv Limited Vs. Ipca Laboratories Limited Semantic Analysis',
	'shops' => array(
		'LAW' => array(
			(int) 0 => 'Order XIV Rule 8',
			(int) 1 => 'Section 151 of Civil Procedure Code',
			(int) 2 => 'Section 12',
			(int) 3 => 'the THE LAW OF PASSING-OFF'
		),
		'NORP' => array(
			(int) 0 => 'J.1',
			(int) 1 => 'Pioneers',
			(int) 2 => 'Indian',
			(int) 3 => 'Hon'ble'
		),
		'PERSON' => array(
			(int) 0 => 'Order XXXIX Rules 1',
			(int) 1 => 'PIOZONE',
			(int) 2 => 'medicines.6',
			(int) 3 => 'P. Chidambaram',
			(int) 4 => 'Aristoc',
			(int) 5 => 'P. Chidambaram',
			(int) 6 => 'V. Patel',
			(int) 7 => 'Chetanbhat Shah',
			(int) 8 => 'Anr',
			(int) 9 => 'Christopher Wadlow',
			(int) 10 => 'p.3.06',
			(int) 11 => 'Glucovita',
			(int) 12 => 'Anr',
			(int) 13 => 'Gift Pack',
			(int) 14 => 'Anr',
			(int) 15 => 'P. Chidambaram',
			(int) 16 => 'B.N. Kirpal',
			(int) 17 => 'Bench',
			(int) 18 => 'P. Chidambaram',
			(int) 19 => 'Anr',
			(int) 20 => 'B.N. Kirpal',
			(int) 21 => 'McCarry',
			(int) 22 => 'Christopher Wadlow'
		),
		'CARDINAL' => array(
			(int) 0 => '2',
			(int) 1 => '297/-',
			(int) 2 => '28.7.2000',
			(int) 3 => '25.10.2000',
			(int) 4 => '15',
			(int) 5 => '30',
			(int) 6 => '18.12.2000',
			(int) 7 => '9,77,709',
			(int) 8 => '11.1.2001',
			(int) 9 => '1,17,97,000/-',
			(int) 10 => '15',
			(int) 11 => '30',
			(int) 12 => 'one',
			(int) 13 => 'four',
			(int) 14 => '80',
			(int) 15 => '271/-',
			(int) 16 => '292',
			(int) 17 => '373/-',
			(int) 18 => '450/-',
			(int) 19 => '1.47',
			(int) 20 => '1.92',
			(int) 21 => '3.61',
			(int) 22 => '4.73',
			(int) 23 => '3.89',
			(int) 24 => '15.1.2001',
			(int) 25 => '2.2.2001',
			(int) 26 => '21.5.2001',
			(int) 27 => '16.6.2001',
			(int) 28 => '22',
			(int) 29 => '7.5',
			(int) 30 => '10,05,000/-.5',
			(int) 31 => '15',
			(int) 32 => '30',
			(int) 33 => '26.7.2000',
			(int) 34 => '26.10.2000',
			(int) 35 => '2000.7',
			(int) 36 => '18.12.2000',
			(int) 37 => '11.1.2001',
			(int) 38 => '2.2.2001',
			(int) 39 => '15.1.2001',
			(int) 40 => '16.6.2001',
			(int) 41 => '22',
			(int) 42 => '1,17,97,000/-',
			(int) 43 => '7.5',
			(int) 44 => '6',
			(int) 45 => '7.5',
			(int) 46 => '22',
			(int) 47 => 'four',
			(int) 48 => '80',
			(int) 49 => 'two',
			(int) 50 => 'one',
			(int) 51 => 'two',
			(int) 52 => '2000',
			(int) 53 => '20',
			(int) 54 => '11',
			(int) 55 => '16.16',
			(int) 56 => '4.20',
			(int) 57 => '7.15',
			(int) 58 => '13',
			(int) 59 => '16',
			(int) 60 => 'two',
			(int) 61 => 'one',
			(int) 62 => 'one',
			(int) 63 => '2',
			(int) 64 => '242',
			(int) 65 => 'two',
			(int) 66 => '18',
			(int) 67 => 'two',
			(int) 68 => 'two',
			(int) 69 => 'more than 50',
			(int) 70 => 'one',
			(int) 71 => '18',
			(int) 72 => 'four',
			(int) 73 => '263',
			(int) 74 => '383',
			(int) 75 => 'one',
			(int) 76 => '15.45',
			(int) 77 => '797',
			(int) 78 => 'five'
		),
		'DATE' => array(
			(int) 0 => '2000-2001',
			(int) 1 => 'November, 2000',
			(int) 2 => 'November, 2000',
			(int) 3 => '16.1.2001',
			(int) 4 => 'January, 2001',
			(int) 5 => 'February, 2001 to January, 2002',
			(int) 6 => 'August',
			(int) 7 => '2000',
			(int) 8 => 'January, 2002',
			(int) 9 => 'August, 2001',
			(int) 10 => 'March',
			(int) 11 => '2002',
			(int) 12 => 'about January, 2001',
			(int) 13 => 'January, 2001',
			(int) 14 => 'about September, 2001',
			(int) 15 => 'March',
			(int) 16 => '2002',
			(int) 17 => 'September, 2001',
			(int) 18 => '1949',
			(int) 19 => '1996-97, 1997-98',
			(int) 20 => '1998-99',
			(int) 21 => '1999-2000',
			(int) 22 => '2000-2001',
			(int) 23 => '2001-2002',
			(int) 24 => 'annual',
			(int) 25 => '1996-97, 1997-98',
			(int) 26 => '1998-99',
			(int) 27 => '1999-2000',
			(int) 28 => '2000-2001',
			(int) 29 => 'May, 2000',
			(int) 30 => '29.3.2001',
			(int) 31 => '1959',
			(int) 32 => '1013232',
			(int) 33 => 'about August, 2001',
			(int) 34 => 'September, 2001',
			(int) 35 => 'September, 2001 to March, 2002',
			(int) 36 => 'September, 2001',
			(int) 37 => '12.6.2001',
			(int) 38 => 'November',
			(int) 39 => '16.1.2001',
			(int) 40 => 'January/February, 2001',
			(int) 41 => 'September, 2001',
			(int) 42 => 'October, 2001',
			(int) 43 => 'March',
			(int) 44 => '2002',
			(int) 45 => 'October, 2001',
			(int) 46 => 'the month of March, 2002',
			(int) 47 => 'February, 2001 to January, 2002',
			(int) 48 => 'September, 2001 to March, 2002',
			(int) 49 => 'August',
			(int) 50 => '2000',
			(int) 51 => 'January, 2002',
			(int) 52 => 'a period of',
			(int) 53 => 'one year',
			(int) 54 => '1938',
			(int) 55 => 'the last tour decades',
			(int) 56 => '2172',
			(int) 57 => '2000',
			(int) 58 => ''12',
			(int) 59 => ''14',
			(int) 60 => '1989',
			(int) 61 => '1989',
			(int) 62 => ''15',
			(int) 63 => '2000',
			(int) 64 => '1998',
			(int) 65 => ''16',
			(int) 66 => '1916',
			(int) 67 => '1998',
			(int) 68 => '2001',
			(int) 69 => 'nearly five months',
			(int) 70 => 'January, 2001',
			(int) 71 => 'one year',
			(int) 72 => 'nearly five months',
			(int) 73 => 'five months',
			(int) 74 => '1310',
			(int) 75 => '30 years',
			(int) 76 => '2001',
			(int) 77 => 'about a month',
			(int) 78 => 'six weeks',
			(int) 79 => 'a few days',
			(int) 80 => 'more than a few months',
			(int) 81 => 'about three months',
			(int) 82 => 'a month',
			(int) 83 => 'the month of March, 2002'
		),
		'ORG' => array(
			(int) 0 => 'Research and Development',
			(int) 1 => 'PIOZ',
			(int) 2 => 'the Trade Marks Registry',
			(int) 3 => 'the Food and Drug Administration',
			(int) 4 => 'Food and Drug Administration',
			(int) 5 => 'PIOZ',
			(int) 6 => 'International Regulatory Authorities',
			(int) 7 => 'the International Non-Proprietary',
			(int) 8 => 'Bio-Equivalence',
			(int) 9 => 'Drug Controller General of',
			(int) 10 => 'Food and Drug Administration',
			(int) 11 => 'the Trade and Merchandise Marks Rule',
			(int) 12 => 'the International Non-Proprietary',
			(int) 13 => 'PIO',
			(int) 14 => 'PIO',
			(int) 15 => 'PIOZULIN',
			(int) 16 => 'PIOGLAR',
			(int) 17 => 'PIOGLU',
			(int) 18 => 'PIONORM',
			(int) 19 => 'PIOLEM',
			(int) 20 => 'PIOLET',
			(int) 21 => 'PIOZIT',
			(int) 22 => 'Court',
			(int) 23 => 'PIOZ',
			(int) 24 => 'the Registrar of Trade Marks',
			(int) 25 => 'Registrar of Trade Marks',
			(int) 26 => 'PIOZ',
			(int) 27 => 'the Registrar of Trade Marks',
			(int) 28 => 'the Drug Controller General (',
			(int) 29 => 'Authority',
			(int) 30 => 'Food and Drug Administration',
			(int) 31 => 'Authority',
			(int) 32 => 'PIOZ',
			(int) 33 => 'Authorities',
			(int) 34 => 'Court',
			(int) 35 => 'xerox',
			(int) 36 => 'Pharmaceutical Products',
			(int) 37 => 'Food and Drug Administration',
			(int) 38 => 'PIOZ',
			(int) 39 => 'Drug Controller General',
			(int) 40 => 'Food and Drug Administration',
			(int) 41 => 'PIOZ',
			(int) 42 => 'PIOZ',
			(int) 43 => 'PIOZ',
			(int) 44 => 'PIOZ',
			(int) 45 => 'Court',
			(int) 46 => 'the Hon'ble Apex Court',
			(int) 47 => 'Cadila Health Care Ltd.',
			(int) 48 => 'Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd.',
			(int) 49 => 'the Apex Court',
			(int) 50 => 'Court',
			(int) 51 => 'Court',
			(int) 52 => 'Court',
			(int) 53 => 'Amritdham',
			(int) 54 => 'Dyechem',
			(int) 55 => 'AIR 2000',
			(int) 56 => 'AIR 2000 SC 2114 :',
			(int) 57 => 'works,(b',
			(int) 58 => 'Court',
			(int) 59 => 'the Hon'ble Apex Court',
			(int) 60 => 'Kerly (Ibid',
			(int) 61 => 'Court',
			(int) 62 => 'Mahendra Paper Mills Ltd.',
			(int) 63 => 'Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd.',
			(int) 64 => 'the Hon'ble Apex Court',
			(int) 65 => 'High Courts',
			(int) 66 => 'Court',
			(int) 67 => 'Court',
			(int) 68 => 'Com Products Refining Co.',
			(int) 69 => 'Shangrila Food Products Ltd.',
			(int) 70 => 'Court',
			(int) 71 => 'Amrit Soap Company',
			(int) 72 => 'New Punjab Soap Factory',
			(int) 73 => 'Court',
			(int) 74 => 'Indian Shaving Products Ltd.',
			(int) 75 => 'CLC',
			(int) 76 => 'Court',
			(int) 77 => 'Court',
			(int) 78 => 'Court',
			(int) 79 => 'Chemist',
			(int) 80 => 'PIOZ',
			(int) 81 => 'the Hon'ble Judges Doraiswamy Raju',
			(int) 82 => 'Brijesh Kumar',
			(int) 83 => 'Court',
			(int) 84 => 'PIOZ',
			(int) 85 => 'Court',
			(int) 86 => 'Horlick',
			(int) 87 => 'Sumerskill',
			(int) 88 => 'The Illustrated Official Journal (Patents) Supplement 1 and Corn Products Refining Co.',
			(int) 89 => 'Shangrila Food Products Ltd.',
			(int) 90 => 'Court',
			(int) 91 => 'Court',
			(int) 92 => 'Colgate Palmolive',
			(int) 93 => 'Hindustan Lever Ltd.',
			(int) 94 => 'Parle Products Limited v.',
			(int) 95 => 'Bakemans Industries Limited',
			(int) 96 => 'Court',
			(int) 97 => 'PIOZ',
			(int) 98 => 'Court',
			(int) 99 => 'Court',
			(int) 100 => 'PIO',
			(int) 101 => 'PIO',
			(int) 102 => 'PIO',
			(int) 103 => 'PIOZ',
			(int) 104 => 'PIO',
			(int) 105 => 'inter alia',
			(int) 106 => 'Court',
			(int) 107 => 'Ors',
			(int) 108 => 'Court',
			(int) 109 => 'Court',
			(int) 110 => 'Court',
			(int) 111 => 'Court',
			(int) 112 => 'Court',
			(int) 113 => 'Court',
			(int) 114 => 'India Stationery Products Co.',
			(int) 115 => 'Whitman v. Disney Productions',
			(int) 116 => 'the Circuit Court of Appeal',
			(int) 117 => 'Court',
			(int) 118 => 'Kcrly',
			(int) 119 => 'the Division Bench',
			(int) 120 => 'Delhi High Court',
			(int) 121 => 'follows:-'17',
			(int) 122 => 'Court',
			(int) 123 => 'Court',
			(int) 124 => 'Court',
			(int) 125 => 'Court'
		),
		'GPE' => array(
			(int) 0 => 'India',
			(int) 1 => 'India',
			(int) 2 => 'New Delhi',
			(int) 3 => 'India',
			(int) 4 => 'New Delhi',
			(int) 5 => 'India',
			(int) 6 => 'New Delhi',
			(int) 7 => 'India',
			(int) 8 => 'India',
			(int) 9 => 'India',
			(int) 10 => 'India',
			(int) 11 => 'New Delhi',
			(int) 12 => 'India',
			(int) 13 => 'New Delhi',
			(int) 14 => 'India',
			(int) 15 => 'New Delhi',
			(int) 16 => 'Mumbai',
			(int) 17 => 'India',
			(int) 18 => 'India',
			(int) 19 => 'New Delhi',
			(int) 20 => 'India',
			(int) 21 => 'New Delhi',
			(int) 22 => 'countries.10',
			(int) 23 => 'India',
			(int) 24 => 'England',
			(int) 25 => 'Mahendra',
			(int) 26 => 'Delhi',
			(int) 27 => 'BILLY',
			(int) 28 => 'Delhi',
			(int) 29 => 'Delhi',
			(int) 30 => 'India',
			(int) 31 => 'India',
			(int) 32 => 'Versa',
			(int) 33 => 'B.L.',
			(int) 34 => 'Delhi',
			(int) 35 => 'India',
			(int) 36 => 'U.S.A.'
		),
		'EVENT' => array(
			(int) 0 => 'PIOZED 15 and PIOZED 30',
			(int) 1 => 'Clause 5',
			(int) 2 => 'PIOZED 15 and PIOZED 30'
		),
		'PRODUCT' => array(
			(int) 0 => '30.5.2001',
			(int) 1 => '30.5.2001',
			(int) 2 => '183',
			(int) 3 => '797'
		),
		'FAC' => array(
			(int) 0 => 'Madras',
			(int) 1 => 'Madras',
			(int) 2 => 'Hindustan Pencils Pvt',
			(int) 3 => 'Madras'
		),
		'WORK_OF_ART' => array(
			(int) 0 => 'a Larger Bench of',
			(int) 1 => '1995 Edition'
		),
		'LANGUAGE' => array(
			(int) 0 => 'English',
			(int) 1 => 'English',
			(int) 2 => 'English',
			(int) 3 => 'English',
			(int) 4 => 'English'
		),
		'ORDINAL' => array(
			(int) 0 => 'first',
			(int) 1 => 'first'
		),
		'MONEY' => array(
			(int) 0 => 'two marks Gluvita',
			(int) 1 => 'two marks',
			(int) 2 => 'two marks'
		)
	),
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '834688',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51863/trade-and-merchandise-marks-act-1958-repealed-complete-act">Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958</a> - Sections 28 and 29; <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Order 39, Rules 1 and 2',
			'appealno' => 'Appln. No. 230 of 2002 in C.S. No. 234 of 2002',
			'appellant' => 'Usv Limited',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Usv Limited Vs. Ipca Laboratories Limited',
			'casenote' => 'Intellectual Property Rights - trade mark - Sections 28 and 29, of Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 and Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - suit for grant of ad-interim injunction restraining respondent from manufacturing or dealing directly or indirectly in medicinal preparations under trade mark PIOZED - delay in institution of suit by itself not sufficient defence to an action for interim injunction - submissions made by respondent not sustainable - applicant entitled to ad-interim injunction pending disposal of suit.


 - T.N. ESTATES (ABOLITION & CONVERSION INTO RYOTWARI) ACT, 1948 [Act No. 26/1948]. Sections 5(2) & 67; [A.P. Shah, CJ, Mrs. Prabha Sridevan & P. Jyothimani, JJ] Suo motu revisional powers  Held, On a bare reading of the provisions of Section 5(2) of the Act, it is clear that the power conferred on the Director by Section 5(2) to cancel or revise any of the orders, acts or proceedings of the Settlement Officer is very wide. In the first place, the Director need not necessarily be moved by any party in that behalf, and the power could be exercised either on an application by an aggrieved person or suo motu. For example, if the Director comes to know that contrary to the scheme of the Act or due to misrepresentation or fraud played, a patta had been granted to a person under the relevant provisions of the Act, then to set right that mistake, the Director should be enabled to exercise his power so as to effectuate the scheme of the Act and to implement the purpose behind the Act. The fact that the rule making authority has prescribed procedure in exercise of the powers under Section 67 for making an application to the Director does not mean that the suo motu power which is explicit in Section 5(2) of the Act is in any way curtailed or taken away. Therefore, the contention of the respondent that making an application is sine qua non for invoking the power under Section 5(2) of the Act is not tenable. -- T.N. ESTATES (ABOLITION & 
CONVERSION INTO RYOTWARI) ACT, 1948.  
Sections 5(2) & 67; Suo motu revisional powers  Held, On a bare reading of the provisions of Section 5(2) of the Act, it is clear that the power conferred on the Director by Section 5(2) to cancel or revise any of the orders, acts or proceedings of the Settlement Officer is very wide. In the first place, the Director need not necessarily be moved by any party in that behalf, and the power could be exercised either on an application by an aggrieved person or suo motu. For example, if the Director comes to know that contrary to the scheme of the Act or due to misrepresentation or fraud played, a patta had been granted to a person under the relevant provisions of the Act, then to set right that mistake, the Director should be enabled to exercise his power so as to effectuate the scheme of the Act and to implement the purpose behind the Act. The fact that the rule making authority has prescribed procedure in exercise of the powers under Section 67 for making an application to the Director does not mean that the suo motu power which is explicit in Section 5(2) of the Act is in any way curtailed or taken away. Therefore, the contention of the respondent that making an application is sine qua non for invoking the power under Section 5(2) of the Act is not tenable. ',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Whitman v. Disney Productions;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'Sudhir Thatte, Manager-Legal and ;Constituted Attorney',
			'counseldef' => 'Director of the Defendant',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-06-26',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'P. Thangavel, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">P. Thangavel, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is an application filed under Order XIV Rule 8 of Original Side Rules read with Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2, and Section 151 of Civil Procedure Code to grant ad-interim injunction restraining the respondent and its distributors, stockists, servants, agents, retailers and representatives from in any manner manufacturing, selling, offering for sale, stocking, advertising or dealing directly or indirectly in medicinal preparations under the trade mark PIOZED or any other trade mark which is identical with and/or deceptively similar to the trade mark PIOZ of the applicant so as to pass off the respondent's preparations as and for the preparations of the applicant or in any other manner whatsoever connected with the applicant till the disposal of the suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The applicant is the plaintiff and has filed the suit against the respondent, who is the defendant for a permanent injunction restraining the respondent from passing off their medicinal preparations under the trade mark PIOZED as and for the applicant's medicinal preparations having the trade mark PIOZ and for other consequential relief. The applicant is carrying on the business as manufacturer and dealer of pharmaceutical and medicinal preparations and enjoys high reputation and goodwill because of the excellent quality and efficacy in preparation of the medicine. The turnover of the applicant company for 2000-2001 was more than Rs. 297/- crores. The medicine manufactured by the applicant company is not only sold in this country, but exported to many foreign countries also. The applicant is having large Research and Development facilities. The trademark of the applicant is PIOZ in respect of their PIOGLITAZONE preparation for the treatment of diabetes. The applicant got search report on 28.7.2000 and also another report on 25.10.2000 about the availability of trademark PIOZ through its Attorney for registration and thereafter distributed ADIB Internationals Reprints booklet amongst the Doctors all over India advertising therein its trademark PIOZ in November, 2000. The applicant applied for permission to manufacture the drugs PIOGLITAZONE HYDROCHLORIDE in Tablets form containing 15 mg and 30 mg to the Drugs Controller General (India), New Delhi, in November, 2000. On 18.12.2000 an application was made for registration of the trade mark PIOZ by the applicant with the Trade Marks Registry and it was numbered as 9,77,709 and the application is pending for registration. The Drugs Controller General (India), New Delhi granted permission for manufacture of the said tablets by its letter dated 11.1.2001. Permission was granted to the applicant for manufacture of PIOZ tablets by the Food and Drug Administration on 16.1.2001 on application made by the applicant company. The applicant placed orders for supply of foil and carton bearing the trade marks PIOZ in January, 2001, After getting the permission from the Drugs Controller General (India), New Delhi and licence from Food and Drug Administration, the applicant company has started manufacturing of the medicine in tablets under the trade mark PIOZ in strips and made it available for sale in market. The sale of the tablets prepared under the trade mark PIOZ during February, 2001 to January, 2002 was Rs. 5,98,35,000/-. The applicant has spent Rs. 1,17,97,000/- towards advertisement and promotional expenses relating to the trade mark PIOZ for a period from August, 2000 to January, 2002. The applicant came across the preparation of some medicine in a pack of 15 mg and 30 mg as that of the applicant for the same disease and ailment having the trade mark PIOZED in August, 2001 and marketed in March, 2002. The respondent was fully aware of the manufacturing of the above said tablets by the applicant and marketed in or about January, 2001 throughout India under the trade mark PIOZ. The respondent has no right to use deceptively similar trade mark PIOZED in manufacturing and marketing of such medicine while such medicine was manufactured and marketed by the applicant in its trade mark name PIOZ even in January, 2001. The use of the deceptively similar trade mark by the respondent amounts to passing off its preparation as and for the preparation of the applicant and made illegal gains on the applicant's reputation. Confusion and deception are bound to arise as both trade marks are deceptively similar and both the preparations will be offered for sale to the same class of consumers for the same indication and ailments. The applicant is the prior adopter and user of the trademark PIOZ and therefore the respondent should be restrained by means of ad-interim injunction from using the preparations bearing trade mark PIOZED to avoid common loss to the applicant due to the passing off of the respondent's preparation as and for the preparations of the applicant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The respondent resists the claim of the applicant on the following grounds:-The manufacture of the medicinal preparation having the trade mark PIOZED by the respondent was in or about September, 2001 and not in March, 2002 and the same should have been known to the applicant immediately thereafter. The application of the applicant suffers from gross delay, latches and acquiescence as the respondent has been openly and extensively selling the said medicine without any interruption since September, 2001. The respondent, one of the Pioneers of pharmaceutical industry in India, has been in existence from 1949 having multi jurisdictional and multi national business in the field of medicinal and pharmaceutical preparations for treatment of various ailments and disorders. The respondent has four manufacturing facilities to manufacture various products and possess several recognitions and certifications from various International Regulatory Authorities. The products of the respondent are not only sold in India, but also in 80 other countries. The respondent commands a formidable reputation and goodwill for providing efficacious and quality products meeting international standards of manufacturing and quality. The turnover of the respondent in 1996-97, 1997-98, 1998-99, 1999-2000, 2000-2001 and 2001-2002 are Rs. 271/- crores, Rs. 292 crores, Rs. 344/- crores, Rs. 373/- crores, Rs. 396/- crores and above Rs. 450/- crores respectively. The annual publicity and promotional expenditure with respect to its various products during 1996-97, 1997-98, 1998-99, 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 are Rs. 1.47 crores, Rs. 1.92 crores, Rs. 3.61 crores, Rs. 4.73 crores and Rs. 3.89 crores respectively. The respondent decided to manufacture and market medicinal for pharmaceutical preparations containing PIOGLITAZONE as its active ingredient under the trade mark PIOZED in May, 2000 and the trade mark was invented from the International Non-Proprietary name PIOGLITAZONE. The respondent made an application to the Drug Controller General of India, New Delhi for permission to conduct Bio-Equivalence study on 15.1.2001 and the permission was granted on 2.2.2001. An application made by the respondent to the said Drug Controller General of India, New Delhi for permission to market the molecule on 29.3.2001 and permission was granted on 21.5.2001. An application was made to Food and Drug Administration to formulate the preparation of medicine under the trademark PIOZED 15 and PIOZED 30 on 30.5.2001 and permission was granted on 16.6.2001. An application was filed for registration of the trade mark PIOZED on 31.5.2001 in respect of medicinal and pharmaceutical preparations in Clause 5 of the 4th Schedule to the Trade and Merchandise Marks Rule, 1959 and the application was numbered as 1013232. The medicinal and pharmaceutical preparations under the trade mark PIOZED containing PIOGLITAZONE as its active ingredient commenced manufacturing in or about August, 2001 and marketed for sale in September, 2001. The respondent has honestly and in a bona fide manner conceived and adopted the trade mark from the International Non-Proprietary name of the active ingredient i.e. PIOGLITAZONE. Because of its efficacious nature and characteristic thereof the said medicine was received well and accepted in the market. The medical profession has also-accepted the same and the sale of the medicine from September, 2001 to March, 2002 was to a tune of about Rs. 22 lakhs. The trade mark PIOZED was exclusively used by the respondent in respect of the preparation of PIOZED 15 and PIOZED 30 and the trade mark has acquired tremendous reputation and goodwill. The trade mark PIOZED was promoted by publication and distribution of product literature, distribution of sample of the goods, visual aids etc. A sum of Rs. 7.5 lakhs has been spent for promotion of the goods having trade mark PIOZED. The respondent has acquired valuable proprietary right in respect of the said trade mark PIOZED in relation to the medicinal and pharmaceutical preparation. By denying the averments made in the affidavit filed in support of the application by the applicant, the respondent states that the word PIO and/or PIOZ have been taken directly from the generic name of the drug PIOGLITAZONE and the word PIO and/or PIOZ are commonly used by several manufactures to market their preparations, viz., PIOZONE, PIOZULIN, PIOGLAR, PIOGLU, PIOGLIT, PIONORM, PIOLEM, PIOLET and PIOZIT. There is no confusion in sale of medicines on the ground of deception of trade mark since September, 2001 and the trade mark PIOZ is not phonetically and visually similar to the trade mark of the applicant PIOZ. The trade mark PIOZED is not deceptively similar to the trade mark PIOZ of the applicant. The applicant has not made out a prima facie case or balance convenience in his favour for grant of ad-interim injunction as prayed for in the application as the conduct of the applicant is mala fide to claim any equitable relief from the hands of this Court. The balance of convenience is only in favour of the respondent and the grant of ad-interim injunction in favour of the applicant will cause serious damage and irreparable injury both financially and otherwise to the trade and business of the respondent. No injury or damage is caused to the applicant by the respondent in manufacture of the medicine under the trade mark PIOZED by the respondent. It is on these grounds, the respondent has sought for dismissal of the application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The applicant is the plaintiff and the applicant has filed the suit against the respondent, who is the defendant for the reliefs, viz., perpetual injunction, restraining the defendant and its men or agents from in any manner manufacturing, selling, offering for sale, stocking, advertising directly or indirectly dealing in medicinal preparations under the trade mark PIOZED or any other trade mark which is identical with and/or deceptively similar to the trade mark PIOZ of the plaintiff so as to pass off the defendant's preparations as and for the preparations of the plaintiff or in any other manner whatsoever connected with the plaintiff, to deliver up for destruction to the plaintiff all the preparations, dyes, blocks, articles, literatures, leaflets, brochures, cartons, labels, papers and things bearing and containing the impugned trade mark PIOZED to an authorized representatives of the plaintiff for destruction, to render accounts of profits made by the defendant by use of the impugned trade mark PIOZED or any trade mark similar thereto and damages of Rs. 10,05,000/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Admittedly the applicant is manufacturing the medicinal preparations having trade mark name PIOZ while the respondent is manufacturing medicinal preparations under the trade mark name PIOZED. Both the applicant and the respondent are manufacturing medicines under the said trade names for diabetic. The fact also remains that the ingredient for manufacture of medicines by the applicant as well as by the respondent is PIOGLITAZONE. Both the applicant and the respondent are manufacturing tablets using the ingredient of PIOGLITAZONE containing 15 mg and 30 mg and marketing the same for the consumption of public. The medicine will be sold to the diabetic patients on prescription being given by the Doctors by the medical stores carrying on business in sale of medicines.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The applicant as well as the respondent are said to have obtained search report from private agency for selecting the trade mark after considering the trade marks already in existence with the Registrar of Trade Marks on 26.7.2000 and 15.5.2000 respectively. It is evident that there is no dispute between both parties that trade marks PIOZ or PIOZED were not registered with Registrar of Trade Marks by any manufacturer of medicines at the time of giving search report. It is also evident from the submission made on both sides that official report with regard to the trade mark PIOZ and PIOZED are said to have been obtained on 26.10.2000 and 12.6.2001 by the applicant and the respondent respectively. The fact also remains that a booklet was published with regard to the manufacture of medicine with trade mark name PIOZ by the applicant even in November, 2000.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Admittedly, application for registration of trade mark PIOZ and PIOZED were made by the applicant and the respondent on 18.12.2000 and 31.5.2001 respectively and the said applications are pending registration before the Registrar of Trade Marks. There is no dispute that the applicant and the respondent applied for the Drug Controller General (India), New Delhi for grant of permission to manufacture tablets referred to above and permission was granted by the said Authority to the applicant and the respondent on 11.1.2001 and 2.2.2001 respectively. Admittedly, applications were sent by the applicant and the respondent for permission to Food and Drug Administration on 15.1.2001 and 30.5.2001 and permission was accorded by the said Authority to the applicant on 16.1.2001 and 16.6.2001 respectively. Thereafter, the applicant manufactured the tablets under the trade mark name PIOZ and marketed the same in January/February, 2001, and it is evident from the perusal of the document produced on the side of the respondent itself.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The respondent after obtaining permission from the above said Authorities, started manufacturing of the above said tablets under the trade mark name PIOZED and marketed the said medicine at Mumbai in September, 2001 as seen from the copy of the bill produced before the Court and the marketing of such medicine was in October, 2001 as seen from the xerox copy of the document ORG-MARG RETAIL AUDIT for Pharmaceutical Products in India. According to the applicant, the sale of medicine under the trade mark PIOZED at Madras was only in March, 2002. No other documents has been produced on the side of the respondent to show that the medicine prepared under the trade mark name PIOZED was introduced at Madras even in October, 2001 instead of in the month of March, 2002. The facts referred to above would disclose that applying for registration of trade mark PIOZ, obtaining of permission for manufacture of medicine under the trade mark name PIOZ from the Drug Controller General (India), New Delhi and Food and Drug Administration and manufacturing and marketing of the medicine under the trade mark name PIOZ were done very much earlier to the applying for registration of trade mark PIOZED, obtaining permission from Drug Controller General (India), New Delhi and Food and Drug Administration and also manufacturing and marketing of the medicines under the trade mark name PIOZED by the respondent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. A perusal of the pleadings raised in the affidavit of the applicant and counter-affidavit of the respondent would disclose that the applicant had sold the medicine with trade mark name PIOZ for a sum of Rs. 5,98,35,000/- for the period from February, 2001 to January, 2002, while the respondent had sold the medicine manufactured under the trade mark name PIOZED for Rs. 22 lakhs only from September, 2001 to March, 2002. It is also evident from the pleadings of the applicant as well as the respondent that the applicant had spent for advertisement and promotional expenses a sum of Rs. 1,17,97,000/- for the period from August, 2000 to January, 2002 while the respondent had spent only a sum of Rs. 7.5 lakhs for such purposes during the relevant period. The admitted figures referred to above would disclose that the applicant had expended substantial amount for advertisement and promotional expenses for the sale of medicine under the trade mark name PIOZ and had also marketed and sold the said medicine for about Rs. 6 crores within a period of one year. If the amounts spent for advertisement and promotional expenses and the medicine manufactured under the trade mark name PIOZ and sold out by the applicant are compared with the advertisement and promotional expenses of Rs. 7.5 lakhs and sale of such medicine under the trade mark name PIOZED for Rs. 22 lakhs for the period referred to above, it would disclose that the applicant is the fore-runner in advertising and expending promotional expenses as well as marketing of the medicine under the trade mark name PIOZ when compared with the advertisement and promotional expenses as well as sale of the medicine under the trade mark name PIOZED by the respondent, in spite of the fact that the respondent is said to be marketing its medicine including of other medicines manufactured in four factories owned by it in abroad, viz., 80 countries.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The learned Senior Counsel Mr. P. Chidambaram has brought to the notice of this Court, the decision of a Larger Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd., , wherein the Hon'ble Judges of the Apex Court have held as follows, while considering the resemblance and pronouncing in English of the two words 'Aristoc' and 'Rysta':-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'.... Considering the way the words were pronounced in English, the one was likely to be mistaken for the other.... The answer to the question whether the sound of one word resembles too nearly the sound of another so as to bring the former within the limits of Section 12 of the Trade Marks Act, 1938, must nearly always depend on first impression, for obviously a person who is familiar with both words will neither be deceived nor confused. It is the person who only knows the one word and has perhaps an imperfect recollection of it who is likely to be deceived or confused. Little assistance, therefore, is to be obtained from a meticulous comparison of the two words, letter by letter and syllable by syllable, pronounced with the clarity to be expected from a teacher of elocution. The Court must be careful to make allowance for imperfect recollection and the effect of careless pronunciation and speech on the part not only of the person seeking to buy under the trade description, but also of the shop assistant ministering to that person's wants'..... As far as this Court is concerned, the decisions in the last tour decades have clearly laid down that what has to be seen in the case of a passing off action is the similarity between the competing marks and to determine whether there is likelihood of deception or causing confusion. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">. . .These observations appear to us to be contrary to the decision of this Court in Amritdham's case (supra) where it was observed that the products will be purchased by both villagers and town folk, literate as well as illiterate and the question has to be approached from the point of view of a man of average intelligence and imperfect recollection. A trade may relate to goods largely sold to illiterate or badly educated persons. The purchaser in India cannot be equated with a purchaser of goods in England. While we agree that in trade mark matters, it is necessary to go into the question of comparable strength, the decision on merits in Dyechem's case, AIR 2000 SCW 2172 : AIR 2000 SC 2114 : 2000 CLC 1338 : 2000 (20) PTC 297(SC) does not, in our opinion, lay down correct law and we hold accordingly. .... </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Broadly stated in an action for passing off on the basis of unregistered trade mark generally for deciding the question of deceptive similarity the following factors to be considered:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The nature of the marks i.e. whether the marks are word marks or label marks or composite marks, i.e. both words and label works,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) The degree of resembleness between the marks, phonetically similar and hence similar in idea.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) The nature of the goods in respect of which they are used as trade marks.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(d) The similarity in the nature, character and performance of the goods of the rival traders.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(e) The class of purchasers who are likely to buy the goods bearing the marks they require, on their education and intelligence and a degree of care they are likely to exercise in purchasing and/or using the goods.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(f) The mode of purchasing the goods or placing orders for the goods, and</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(g) Any other surrounding circumstances which may be relevant in the extent of dissimilarity between the competing marks.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Weightage to be given to each of the aforesaid factors depends upon facts of each case and the same weightage cannot be given to each factor in every case.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The learned Senior Counsel Mr. P. Chidambaram has also brought to the notice of this Court, the decision reported in Laxmikant V. Patel v. Chetanbhat Shah and Anr., wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'13. In an action for passing off it is usual, rather essential, to seek an injunction temporary or ad-interim. The principles for the grant of such injunction are the same as in the case of any other action against injury complained of. The plaintiff must prove a prima facie case, availability of balance of convenience in his favour and his suffering an irreparable injury in the absence of grant of injunction. According to Kerly (Ibid, para 16.16) passing off cases are often cases of deliberate and intentional misrepresentation, but it is well-settled that fraud is not a necessary element of the right of action, and the absence of an intention to deceive is not a defence though proof of fraudulent intention may materially assist a plaintiff in establishing probability of deception. Christopher Wadlow in Law of Passing Off (1995 Edition, at p.3.06) states that the plaintiff does not have to prove actual damage in order to succeed in an action for passing off. Likelihood of damage is sufficient. The same learned author states that the defendant's state of mind is wholly irrelevant to the existence of the cause of action for passing off (ibid, paras 4.20 and 7.15). As to how the injunction granted by the Court would shape depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Where a defendant has imitated or adopted that plaintiffs distinctive trade mark or business name, the order may be an absolute injunction that he would not use or carry on business under that name.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In Mahendra and Mahendra Paper Mills Ltd. v. Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd., , the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as follows: -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'15. This question has been considered by different High Courts and this Court in umpteen cases from time to time. On analysis of the principles laid down in the decisions, certain recognized parameters relating to the matter have emerged. Without intending to be exhaustive some of the principles which are accepted as well settled may be stated thus; that whether there is a likelihood of deception or confusion arising is a matter for decision by the Court, and no witness is entitled to say whether the mark is likely to deceive or to cause confusion; that all factors which are likely to create or allay deception or confusion must be considered in combination; that broadly speaking, factors creating confusion would be, for example, the nature of the market itself, the class of customers, the extent of the reputation, the trade channels, the existence of any connection in course of trade, and others. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. This Court, in the case of Com Products Refining Co. v. Shangrila Food Products Ltd., , observed that 'the question whether two competing marks are so similar as to be likely to deceive or cause confusion is one of first impression and it is for the court to decide it. The question has to be approached from the point of view of a man of average intelligence and imperfect recollection. To such a man the overall structural and phonetic similarity of the two marks Gluvita and Glucovita is likely to deceive or to cause confusion. In deciding whether two marks are so similar as to be likely to deceive or cause confusion the similarity of idea is a relevant consideration.' This Court further observed that in order that a trade mark may acquire a reputation among buyers, it is not necessary that they should know who the manufacturer of the goods is. It is no answer to an opposition to an application for registration to say that there is a number of marks having one or more common features which occur in the proposed mark unless it is proved that these marks had by user acquired a reputation in the market.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In Amrit Soap Company v. New Punjab Soap Factory, 1989 (2) A.L.R. 242 : 1989 (Suppl)(1) PTC166 (Delhi) it has been held as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'11. It was next submitted by counsel for the defendant that the plaintiff has no right to use the trade mark 'BILLY' and artistic wrapper as so many other parties who are referred to earlier were also using the same trade mark. This contention of the defendant is wholly devoid of any force. In this connection it is sufficient to say that under the law it is the right of two parties before the court which has to be determined and, as already discussed, the plaintiff being prior user has the better and legal right to seek relief from this Court.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. In Indian Shaving Products Ltd. and Anr. v. Gift Pack and Anr., 2000 CLC 183 (Delhi) : 1998 (18) PTC 698 (Delhi) while considering the trade mark used by several other persons/companies besides the defendant, it is held as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'...the said defence, that other persons are also using the said trade mark, is not available to the defendants. The Court is called upon to decide disputes in between the parties which are before it. ... What is to be seen by the Court is as to whether the plaintiff has acquired goodwill and reputation for his products. . . 'The allegation that some other manufacturers are also using the same trade mark is of no consequence as the Court is concerned with parties before it only.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'... the colour scheme and get up of the two products are entirely different... The plaintiff admittedly are not objecting to the colour scheme and get up of the jacket of the goods of the defendants. Their case is that the defendants have usurped their trade mark and as such they are likely to filch, their trade and cause loss and damage to their reputation as well as to their business. Thus the defence put forward by the defendants that the two products are dissimilar in their colour scheme and get up and dress material does not come to their rescue.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The pronouncing of the word PIOZ and PIOZED will be one and the same since 'ED' in PIOZED will have no sound effect at the time of pronouncing it, as rightly contended by the learned Senior Counsel Mr. P. Chidambaram. The prescription given by the Doctors for purchase of medicines PIOZ or PIOZED will be in scribbling and the spelling normally written by Doctors could not be read by common man, more particularly English knowing literates also. The Chemist in drug stores will also be in the same position to find a distinction between PIOZ and PIOZED scribbled by the Doctors in their prescription. If that is the position even for English knowing literates and chemist in drug stores, it need not be elaborated with regard to the illiterate persons who are taking treatment for the disease diabetic. It is relevant to point out that more than 50 to 60 per cent of the population in India are having diabetic and major percentage of the population is only illitertes and the point in dispute has to be viewed from the point of view of a man of average intelligence and imperfect recollection. It is relevant to point out that to such a man, the overall structural and phonetic similarity of two marks PIOZ and PIOZED is likely to deceive or will cause confusion. If the trade mark name of the respondent PIOZED is likely to deceive or cause confusion to such people referred to above, it is likely that the business and sale of the medicine prepared under the trade mark name PIOZ of the applicant will be affected and there is likelihood of damage caused to the applicant by using the trade mark name PIOZED by the respondent in manufacturing and selling of medicine under the trade mark name PIOZED. If the principles laid down by the Larger Bench consisting of the present Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India Mr. B.N. Kirpal, and the Hon'ble Judges Doraiswamy Raju and Brijesh Kumar, JJ. in referred to above is taken into consideration in the light of the facts of this case referred to above, this Court is of opinion that the trade mark name of the respondent PIOZED is deceptively similar and will also create confusion in the mind of the customers purchasing medicine of the applicant, who is manufacturing medicine under the trade mark name PIOZ and will also cause loss in the business thereby causing damage. The materials produced before this Court on the side of the applicant would disclose that the applicant has made out a prima facie case in his favour for grant of ad-interim injunction. The loss of reputation or damage to be caused to the business of the applicant cannot be compensated by money value. Since the reputation of an article is one thing and the reputation of a particular make is quite another, it is for the reputation of the make only the applicant is concerned with. In of the decisions reported in Horlick's Malted Milk Company v. Sumerskill, 1916 The Illustrated Official Journal (Patents) Supplement 1 and Corn Products Refining Co. v. Shangrila Food Products Ltd., , it was held that the reputation will attach only to trade mark of the goods purchased by the buyer who may not be interested in knowing about the manufacturer of the goods.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Regarding the balance of convenience, the Court must weigh one need against another and determine whether the balance of convenience lies. Interlocutory remedy is intended to preserve in status-quo, the rights of parties which may appear on a prima facie case while restraining the defendants from exercising what he considers his legal right which the plaintiff would like to prevent as it affects the plaintiffs right. The Court must put in to the scales the relevant consideration, viz., about the commencement of enterprises and carrying on business, etc. This view finds support from the decision reported in Colgate Palmolive (India) Ltd. v. Hindustan Lever Ltd. and Vice Versa, .</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. While considering the balance of convenience in Parle Products Limited v. Bakemans Industries Limited, 1998 (18) PTC 662, the learned single Judge of this Court has held that the damage to be sustained in the event of restraining the defendant by means of ad-interim injunction at the stage of application and ultimately the defendant succeeding in the suit after the trial and the damage to be sustained by the applicant by not granting ad-interim injunction at the stage of application and ultimately succeeding in the suit after trial have to be taken into consideration in granting ad-interim injunction. In this case as already pointed out that there will be no difference in pronouncing the words PIOZ and PIOZED in English and the word PIOZED is deceptively similar and will create confusion in the mind of the consumers of the medicine manufactured under the trade mark name PIOZ by the applicant. The trade mark name of the respondent is also phonetically similar. Even if the decisions referred to above are taken into consideration, the balance of convenience pending trial of the suit will be only in favour of the applicant. As already pointed out, the respondent is having four manufacturing industries in medicine and is also manufacturing several other medicines by having market in about SO countries in abroad. The fact of granting ad-interim injunction against the respondent in manufacturing the medicine under the trade mark name PIOZED, the respondent is not going to close down the factories or its business in medicine referred to above. The respondent can very well manufacture the very same medicine in some other name which is not offending the trade mark name of the applicant PIOZ. The question of getting its business damaged in view of the grant of injunction will not be there in the opinion of this Court. Therefore, this Court holds that the balance of convenience is also in favour of the applicant if the facts and circumstances of the case are taken into consideration.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent contends that 'PIO' in 'PIOZ' and 'PIO' in 'PIOZED' are generic word of 'PIOGLITAZONE' and therefore, the applicant cannot come forward with a suit for grant of injunction for passing off even if 'PIO' is taken from generic word 'PIOGLITAZONE'. The letter 'Z' has been added to find the trade mark name PIOZ by the applicant. The respondent has added 'ED' alongwith 'Z' annexed to 'PIO' to find its trade mark name 'PIOZED' of which 'ED' will suffer silence while pronouncing it. Therefore, the said contention raised by the learned counsel for the respondent cannot be sustained.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent, inter alia, contended that there is delay, laches and acquiescence in coming to the Court by the applicant to obtain an order of interim injunction against the respondent and therefore the ad-interim injunction relief sought for by the applicant against the respondent cannot be granted. In support of such contention the learned counsel appearing for the respondent placed reliance on the decision reported in B.L. and Co. and Ors. v. Pfizer Products Incl., 2001 PTC 797 (Delhi). In that case, the plaintiff did not take any action for nearly five months of the launching and manufacturing of the defendant's product, and in its own volition preferred not to enter the Indian market. The balance of convenience was in favour of the defendant and therefore ex parte order of injunction should not be granted according to the views of the Court. While coming to the conclusion the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court found that the single Judge of the Court has not taken into consideration of the fact that the appellant had alone launched the product, manufactured the same and marketed in the market in January, 2001 while the respondents product had neither been introduced, nor marketed nor sold by them. The Division Bench has also taken into consideration of the fact that the respondent had waited for one year and allowed the appellant to develop the trade mark and to obtain requisite permission for manufacture. The said Bench had also taken into consideration of the fact that after commencement of manufacture, the respondents did not take action for nearly five months and had approached the Court for the relief thereafter only. It is after taking into consideration of the above said fact, the Division Bench of the said Court has come to the conclusion that the delay of five months will disentitle the respondents in that appeal to get an order of ad-interim injunction. That is not the circumstances in this case. It is after knowing the marketing of the medicine PIOZED by the respondent, the applicant had immediately approached this Court for the relief sought for in this application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The learned Senior Counsel Mr. P. Chidambaram has also brought to the notice of this Court the decision reported in Hindustan Pencils Pvt. Ltd. v. India Stationery Products Co. and Anr., . In that case, the learned Judge, B.N. Kirpal, J. (as he then was), the present Hon'ble Chief Justice of India, has observed, while considering the submission of 'inoridinate delay, laches and acquiescence' as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Inordinate delay' would, therefore, be delay of such a long duration that the defendant could have come to the conclusion that the plaintiff has, possibly, abandoned his right to seek relief or to object to the defendant using the trade mark. 'Equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights'.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. It would appear that 'inordinate delay', which has never been defined by the Courts so far, would be, analogous or similar to 'laches'. In 'Whitman v. Disney Productions, 263 F2d 229 it was observed by the Circuit Court of Appeal in U.S.A. as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Mere passage of time cannot constitute laches, but if the passage of time can be shown to have lulled defendant into a false sense of security, and the defendant acts in reliance thereon, laches may, in the discretion of the trial Court, be found.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It would follow, logically, that delay by itself is not a sufficient defence to an action for interim injunciton, but delay coupled with prejudice caused to the defendant would amount to 'laches', as observed by McCarry at page 383 'Laches-delay X prejudice'. In this formula, it is the magnitude of the product of delay and prejudice which must be weighed, not the magnitude of solely the quantum of delay or prejudice alone. For example, in one case, a long delay coupled with even a slight amount of prejudice may suffice to prove an adequate defence of laches. Yet, in another case, a short delay coupled with a great amount of resulting prejudice to defendant may also suffice for laches'. It has been emphasized that it is for the defendant to show that there has been prejudice caused by reason of the delay and that it would be unfair to injunct the defendant from carrying out its activities.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. 'Laches' and 'Inorldinate delay', however, are not similar to 'acquiescence'. Acquiescence is a different concept which has been explained by Kcrly at page 1310, para 15.45 as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The classic case of acquiescence proper is where the proprietor, knowing of his rights and knowing that the infringer is ignorant of them, does something to encourage the infringer's misapprehension, with the result that the infringer acts upon his mistaken belief and so worsens his position. It seems clear that something less than that is needed to offer a defence, but how much less is not clear. The current tendency is to hold that a defence of acquiescence or laches may be set up whenever it is unconscionable for the plaintiff to deny anything that the (consciously or unconsciously) has allowed or encouraged the defendant to believe. Mere failure to sue, without some positive act of encouragement, is not in general enough to give a defence.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case cited above there was a delay of 30 years and while considering the said delay, the above said observation was made by His Lordship. But there is no such delay in this case to hold that there is any inordinate delay or laches or acquiescence as contended by the learned counsel for the applicant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24. Even in the decision relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent reported in 2001 PTC 797 cited already, it has been held by the Division Bench of Delhi High Court as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'17. As regards the delay in institution of the suit and its effect for the purpose of grant of ex parte restraint, the settled legal position is that while the delay in institution of a suit for an action for passing off may not be fatal, it is one of the important and relevant considerations before granting an ex parte/interlocutory injunction. Reference in this regard is invited to the THE LAW OF PASSING-OFF by Christopher Wadlow. Learned Author while dealing with the motions of interlocutory relevance has observed as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Delay in applying for interlocutory relief is a very serious matter. As a rule of thumb, delay of up to about a month, or perhaps six weeks, generally has no adverse effect on an inter partes application and delay of up to twice that period need not be fatal if it can be explained and the plaintiff's case is otherwise strong. On an ex parte application even delay of a few days can be critical. Unjustified delay of more than a few months is almost always fatal to the plaintiff's case, even though delay of this order has no effect on the plaintiff's right at trial.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The above observation in 'THE LAW OF PASSING-OFF' would show that even delay of about three months is not fatal to the plaintiff's case. This suit has been filed according to the applicant within a month from knowing about sale of medicine under the trade mark name PIOZED at Madras in the month of March, 2002. If the said facts are taken into consideration, this Court is of opinion that there is no delay or laches or acquiescence on the part of the applicant in coming to the Court seeking the relief to redress its grievances.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. The learned counsel for the respondent inter alia contended that the said trade mark has been used in five other medicine manufacturing companies and that the applicant had not chosen to initiate any action against them, but has chosen to take action against the respondent only in the suit. In view of the decisions already cited on this point, the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent cannot be sustained. The other submissions made by the learned counsel for the respondent are not germane to decide the issue in the interlocutory application, and therefore, requires no consideration from this Court in this matter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. In view of the foregoing reasons, this Court holds that the applicant is entitled to an order of ad-interim injunction pending disposal of the suit. Taking into consideration of the circumstances of the case, both parties are directed to bear their own costs.</p>',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2003(26)PTC21(Mad)',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'ipca Laboratories Limited',
			'sub' => 'Intellectual Property Rights ',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '834688'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Usv Limited Vs. Ipca Laboratories Limited Semantic Analysis'
$shops = array(
	'LAW' => array(
		(int) 0 => 'Order XIV Rule 8',
		(int) 1 => 'Section 151 of Civil Procedure Code',
		(int) 2 => 'Section 12',
		(int) 3 => 'the THE LAW OF PASSING-OFF'
	),
	'NORP' => array(
		(int) 0 => 'J.1',
		(int) 1 => 'Pioneers',
		(int) 2 => 'Indian',
		(int) 3 => 'Hon'ble'
	),
	'PERSON' => array(
		(int) 0 => 'Order XXXIX Rules 1',
		(int) 1 => 'PIOZONE',
		(int) 2 => 'medicines.6',
		(int) 3 => 'P. Chidambaram',
		(int) 4 => 'Aristoc',
		(int) 5 => 'P. Chidambaram',
		(int) 6 => 'V. Patel',
		(int) 7 => 'Chetanbhat Shah',
		(int) 8 => 'Anr',
		(int) 9 => 'Christopher Wadlow',
		(int) 10 => 'p.3.06',
		(int) 11 => 'Glucovita',
		(int) 12 => 'Anr',
		(int) 13 => 'Gift Pack',
		(int) 14 => 'Anr',
		(int) 15 => 'P. Chidambaram',
		(int) 16 => 'B.N. Kirpal',
		(int) 17 => 'Bench',
		(int) 18 => 'P. Chidambaram',
		(int) 19 => 'Anr',
		(int) 20 => 'B.N. Kirpal',
		(int) 21 => 'McCarry',
		(int) 22 => 'Christopher Wadlow'
	),
	'CARDINAL' => array(
		(int) 0 => '2',
		(int) 1 => '297/-',
		(int) 2 => '28.7.2000',
		(int) 3 => '25.10.2000',
		(int) 4 => '15',
		(int) 5 => '30',
		(int) 6 => '18.12.2000',
		(int) 7 => '9,77,709',
		(int) 8 => '11.1.2001',
		(int) 9 => '1,17,97,000/-',
		(int) 10 => '15',
		(int) 11 => '30',
		(int) 12 => 'one',
		(int) 13 => 'four',
		(int) 14 => '80',
		(int) 15 => '271/-',
		(int) 16 => '292',
		(int) 17 => '373/-',
		(int) 18 => '450/-',
		(int) 19 => '1.47',
		(int) 20 => '1.92',
		(int) 21 => '3.61',
		(int) 22 => '4.73',
		(int) 23 => '3.89',
		(int) 24 => '15.1.2001',
		(int) 25 => '2.2.2001',
		(int) 26 => '21.5.2001',
		(int) 27 => '16.6.2001',
		(int) 28 => '22',
		(int) 29 => '7.5',
		(int) 30 => '10,05,000/-.5',
		(int) 31 => '15',
		(int) 32 => '30',
		(int) 33 => '26.7.2000',
		(int) 34 => '26.10.2000',
		(int) 35 => '2000.7',
		(int) 36 => '18.12.2000',
		(int) 37 => '11.1.2001',
		(int) 38 => '2.2.2001',
		(int) 39 => '15.1.2001',
		(int) 40 => '16.6.2001',
		(int) 41 => '22',
		(int) 42 => '1,17,97,000/-',
		(int) 43 => '7.5',
		(int) 44 => '6',
		(int) 45 => '7.5',
		(int) 46 => '22',
		(int) 47 => 'four',
		(int) 48 => '80',
		(int) 49 => 'two',
		(int) 50 => 'one',
		(int) 51 => 'two',
		(int) 52 => '2000',
		(int) 53 => '20',
		(int) 54 => '11',
		(int) 55 => '16.16',
		(int) 56 => '4.20',
		(int) 57 => '7.15',
		(int) 58 => '13',
		(int) 59 => '16',
		(int) 60 => 'two',
		(int) 61 => 'one',
		(int) 62 => 'one',
		(int) 63 => '2',
		(int) 64 => '242',
		(int) 65 => 'two',
		(int) 66 => '18',
		(int) 67 => 'two',
		(int) 68 => 'two',
		(int) 69 => 'more than 50',
		(int) 70 => 'one',
		(int) 71 => '18',
		(int) 72 => 'four',
		(int) 73 => '263',
		(int) 74 => '383',
		(int) 75 => 'one',
		(int) 76 => '15.45',
		(int) 77 => '797',
		(int) 78 => 'five'
	),
	'DATE' => array(
		(int) 0 => '2000-2001',
		(int) 1 => 'November, 2000',
		(int) 2 => 'November, 2000',
		(int) 3 => '16.1.2001',
		(int) 4 => 'January, 2001',
		(int) 5 => 'February, 2001 to January, 2002',
		(int) 6 => 'August',
		(int) 7 => '2000',
		(int) 8 => 'January, 2002',
		(int) 9 => 'August, 2001',
		(int) 10 => 'March',
		(int) 11 => '2002',
		(int) 12 => 'about January, 2001',
		(int) 13 => 'January, 2001',
		(int) 14 => 'about September, 2001',
		(int) 15 => 'March',
		(int) 16 => '2002',
		(int) 17 => 'September, 2001',
		(int) 18 => '1949',
		(int) 19 => '1996-97, 1997-98',
		(int) 20 => '1998-99',
		(int) 21 => '1999-2000',
		(int) 22 => '2000-2001',
		(int) 23 => '2001-2002',
		(int) 24 => 'annual',
		(int) 25 => '1996-97, 1997-98',
		(int) 26 => '1998-99',
		(int) 27 => '1999-2000',
		(int) 28 => '2000-2001',
		(int) 29 => 'May, 2000',
		(int) 30 => '29.3.2001',
		(int) 31 => '1959',
		(int) 32 => '1013232',
		(int) 33 => 'about August, 2001',
		(int) 34 => 'September, 2001',
		(int) 35 => 'September, 2001 to March, 2002',
		(int) 36 => 'September, 2001',
		(int) 37 => '12.6.2001',
		(int) 38 => 'November',
		(int) 39 => '16.1.2001',
		(int) 40 => 'January/February, 2001',
		(int) 41 => 'September, 2001',
		(int) 42 => 'October, 2001',
		(int) 43 => 'March',
		(int) 44 => '2002',
		(int) 45 => 'October, 2001',
		(int) 46 => 'the month of March, 2002',
		(int) 47 => 'February, 2001 to January, 2002',
		(int) 48 => 'September, 2001 to March, 2002',
		(int) 49 => 'August',
		(int) 50 => '2000',
		(int) 51 => 'January, 2002',
		(int) 52 => 'a period of',
		(int) 53 => 'one year',
		(int) 54 => '1938',
		(int) 55 => 'the last tour decades',
		(int) 56 => '2172',
		(int) 57 => '2000',
		(int) 58 => ''12',
		(int) 59 => ''14',
		(int) 60 => '1989',
		(int) 61 => '1989',
		(int) 62 => ''15',
		(int) 63 => '2000',
		(int) 64 => '1998',
		(int) 65 => ''16',
		(int) 66 => '1916',
		(int) 67 => '1998',
		(int) 68 => '2001',
		(int) 69 => 'nearly five months',
		(int) 70 => 'January, 2001',
		(int) 71 => 'one year',
		(int) 72 => 'nearly five months',
		(int) 73 => 'five months',
		(int) 74 => '1310',
		(int) 75 => '30 years',
		(int) 76 => '2001',
		(int) 77 => 'about a month',
		(int) 78 => 'six weeks',
		(int) 79 => 'a few days',
		(int) 80 => 'more than a few months',
		(int) 81 => 'about three months',
		(int) 82 => 'a month',
		(int) 83 => 'the month of March, 2002'
	),
	'ORG' => array(
		(int) 0 => 'Research and Development',
		(int) 1 => 'PIOZ',
		(int) 2 => 'the Trade Marks Registry',
		(int) 3 => 'the Food and Drug Administration',
		(int) 4 => 'Food and Drug Administration',
		(int) 5 => 'PIOZ',
		(int) 6 => 'International Regulatory Authorities',
		(int) 7 => 'the International Non-Proprietary',
		(int) 8 => 'Bio-Equivalence',
		(int) 9 => 'Drug Controller General of',
		(int) 10 => 'Food and Drug Administration',
		(int) 11 => 'the Trade and Merchandise Marks Rule',
		(int) 12 => 'the International Non-Proprietary',
		(int) 13 => 'PIO',
		(int) 14 => 'PIO',
		(int) 15 => 'PIOZULIN',
		(int) 16 => 'PIOGLAR',
		(int) 17 => 'PIOGLU',
		(int) 18 => 'PIONORM',
		(int) 19 => 'PIOLEM',
		(int) 20 => 'PIOLET',
		(int) 21 => 'PIOZIT',
		(int) 22 => 'Court',
		(int) 23 => 'PIOZ',
		(int) 24 => 'the Registrar of Trade Marks',
		(int) 25 => 'Registrar of Trade Marks',
		(int) 26 => 'PIOZ',
		(int) 27 => 'the Registrar of Trade Marks',
		(int) 28 => 'the Drug Controller General (',
		(int) 29 => 'Authority',
		(int) 30 => 'Food and Drug Administration',
		(int) 31 => 'Authority',
		(int) 32 => 'PIOZ',
		(int) 33 => 'Authorities',
		(int) 34 => 'Court',
		(int) 35 => 'xerox',
		(int) 36 => 'Pharmaceutical Products',
		(int) 37 => 'Food and Drug Administration',
		(int) 38 => 'PIOZ',
		(int) 39 => 'Drug Controller General',
		(int) 40 => 'Food and Drug Administration',
		(int) 41 => 'PIOZ',
		(int) 42 => 'PIOZ',
		(int) 43 => 'PIOZ',
		(int) 44 => 'PIOZ',
		(int) 45 => 'Court',
		(int) 46 => 'the Hon'ble Apex Court',
		(int) 47 => 'Cadila Health Care Ltd.',
		(int) 48 => 'Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd.',
		(int) 49 => 'the Apex Court',
		(int) 50 => 'Court',
		(int) 51 => 'Court',
		(int) 52 => 'Court',
		(int) 53 => 'Amritdham',
		(int) 54 => 'Dyechem',
		(int) 55 => 'AIR 2000',
		(int) 56 => 'AIR 2000 SC 2114 :',
		(int) 57 => 'works,(b',
		(int) 58 => 'Court',
		(int) 59 => 'the Hon'ble Apex Court',
		(int) 60 => 'Kerly (Ibid',
		(int) 61 => 'Court',
		(int) 62 => 'Mahendra Paper Mills Ltd.',
		(int) 63 => 'Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd.',
		(int) 64 => 'the Hon'ble Apex Court',
		(int) 65 => 'High Courts',
		(int) 66 => 'Court',
		(int) 67 => 'Court',
		(int) 68 => 'Com Products Refining Co.',
		(int) 69 => 'Shangrila Food Products Ltd.',
		(int) 70 => 'Court',
		(int) 71 => 'Amrit Soap Company',
		(int) 72 => 'New Punjab Soap Factory',
		(int) 73 => 'Court',
		(int) 74 => 'Indian Shaving Products Ltd.',
		(int) 75 => 'CLC',
		(int) 76 => 'Court',
		(int) 77 => 'Court',
		(int) 78 => 'Court',
		(int) 79 => 'Chemist',
		(int) 80 => 'PIOZ',
		(int) 81 => 'the Hon'ble Judges Doraiswamy Raju',
		(int) 82 => 'Brijesh Kumar',
		(int) 83 => 'Court',
		(int) 84 => 'PIOZ',
		(int) 85 => 'Court',
		(int) 86 => 'Horlick',
		(int) 87 => 'Sumerskill',
		(int) 88 => 'The Illustrated Official Journal (Patents) Supplement 1 and Corn Products Refining Co.',
		(int) 89 => 'Shangrila Food Products Ltd.',
		(int) 90 => 'Court',
		(int) 91 => 'Court',
		(int) 92 => 'Colgate Palmolive',
		(int) 93 => 'Hindustan Lever Ltd.',
		(int) 94 => 'Parle Products Limited v.',
		(int) 95 => 'Bakemans Industries Limited',
		(int) 96 => 'Court',
		(int) 97 => 'PIOZ',
		(int) 98 => 'Court',
		(int) 99 => 'Court',
		(int) 100 => 'PIO',
		(int) 101 => 'PIO',
		(int) 102 => 'PIO',
		(int) 103 => 'PIOZ',
		(int) 104 => 'PIO',
		(int) 105 => 'inter alia',
		(int) 106 => 'Court',
		(int) 107 => 'Ors',
		(int) 108 => 'Court',
		(int) 109 => 'Court',
		(int) 110 => 'Court',
		(int) 111 => 'Court',
		(int) 112 => 'Court',
		(int) 113 => 'Court',
		(int) 114 => 'India Stationery Products Co.',
		(int) 115 => 'Whitman v. Disney Productions',
		(int) 116 => 'the Circuit Court of Appeal',
		(int) 117 => 'Court',
		(int) 118 => 'Kcrly',
		(int) 119 => 'the Division Bench',
		(int) 120 => 'Delhi High Court',
		(int) 121 => 'follows:-'17',
		(int) 122 => 'Court',
		(int) 123 => 'Court',
		(int) 124 => 'Court',
		(int) 125 => 'Court'
	),
	'GPE' => array(
		(int) 0 => 'India',
		(int) 1 => 'India',
		(int) 2 => 'New Delhi',
		(int) 3 => 'India',
		(int) 4 => 'New Delhi',
		(int) 5 => 'India',
		(int) 6 => 'New Delhi',
		(int) 7 => 'India',
		(int) 8 => 'India',
		(int) 9 => 'India',
		(int) 10 => 'India',
		(int) 11 => 'New Delhi',
		(int) 12 => 'India',
		(int) 13 => 'New Delhi',
		(int) 14 => 'India',
		(int) 15 => 'New Delhi',
		(int) 16 => 'Mumbai',
		(int) 17 => 'India',
		(int) 18 => 'India',
		(int) 19 => 'New Delhi',
		(int) 20 => 'India',
		(int) 21 => 'New Delhi',
		(int) 22 => 'countries.10',
		(int) 23 => 'India',
		(int) 24 => 'England',
		(int) 25 => 'Mahendra',
		(int) 26 => 'Delhi',
		(int) 27 => 'BILLY',
		(int) 28 => 'Delhi',
		(int) 29 => 'Delhi',
		(int) 30 => 'India',
		(int) 31 => 'India',
		(int) 32 => 'Versa',
		(int) 33 => 'B.L.',
		(int) 34 => 'Delhi',
		(int) 35 => 'India',
		(int) 36 => 'U.S.A.'
	),
	'EVENT' => array(
		(int) 0 => 'PIOZED 15 and PIOZED 30',
		(int) 1 => 'Clause 5',
		(int) 2 => 'PIOZED 15 and PIOZED 30'
	),
	'PRODUCT' => array(
		(int) 0 => '30.5.2001',
		(int) 1 => '30.5.2001',
		(int) 2 => '183',
		(int) 3 => '797'
	),
	'FAC' => array(
		(int) 0 => 'Madras',
		(int) 1 => 'Madras',
		(int) 2 => 'Hindustan Pencils Pvt',
		(int) 3 => 'Madras'
	),
	'WORK_OF_ART' => array(
		(int) 0 => 'a Larger Bench of',
		(int) 1 => '1995 Edition'
	),
	'LANGUAGE' => array(
		(int) 0 => 'English',
		(int) 1 => 'English',
		(int) 2 => 'English',
		(int) 3 => 'English',
		(int) 4 => 'English'
	),
	'ORDINAL' => array(
		(int) 0 => 'first',
		(int) 1 => 'first'
	),
	'MONEY' => array(
		(int) 0 => 'two marks Gluvita',
		(int) 1 => 'two marks',
		(int) 2 => 'two marks'
	)
)
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '834688',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51863/trade-and-merchandise-marks-act-1958-repealed-complete-act">Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958</a> - Sections 28 and 29; <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Order 39, Rules 1 and 2',
		'appealno' => 'Appln. No. 230 of 2002 in C.S. No. 234 of 2002',
		'appellant' => 'Usv Limited',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Usv Limited Vs. Ipca Laboratories Limited',
		'casenote' => 'Intellectual Property Rights - trade mark - Sections 28 and 29, of Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 and Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - suit for grant of ad-interim injunction restraining respondent from manufacturing or dealing directly or indirectly in medicinal preparations under trade mark PIOZED - delay in institution of suit by itself not sufficient defence to an action for interim injunction - submissions made by respondent not sustainable - applicant entitled to ad-interim injunction pending disposal of suit.


 - T.N. ESTATES (ABOLITION & CONVERSION INTO RYOTWARI) ACT, 1948 [Act No. 26/1948]. Sections 5(2) & 67; [A.P. Shah, CJ, Mrs. Prabha Sridevan & P. Jyothimani, JJ] Suo motu revisional powers  Held, On a bare reading of the provisions of Section 5(2) of the Act, it is clear that the power conferred on the Director by Section 5(2) to cancel or revise any of the orders, acts or proceedings of the Settlement Officer is very wide. In the first place, the Director need not necessarily be moved by any party in that behalf, and the power could be exercised either on an application by an aggrieved person or suo motu. For example, if the Director comes to know that contrary to the scheme of the Act or due to misrepresentation or fraud played, a patta had been granted to a person under the relevant provisions of the Act, then to set right that mistake, the Director should be enabled to exercise his power so as to effectuate the scheme of the Act and to implement the purpose behind the Act. The fact that the rule making authority has prescribed procedure in exercise of the powers under Section 67 for making an application to the Director does not mean that the suo motu power which is explicit in Section 5(2) of the Act is in any way curtailed or taken away. Therefore, the contention of the respondent that making an application is sine qua non for invoking the power under Section 5(2) of the Act is not tenable. -- T.N. ESTATES (ABOLITION & 
CONVERSION INTO RYOTWARI) ACT, 1948.  
Sections 5(2) & 67; Suo motu revisional powers  Held, On a bare reading of the provisions of Section 5(2) of the Act, it is clear that the power conferred on the Director by Section 5(2) to cancel or revise any of the orders, acts or proceedings of the Settlement Officer is very wide. In the first place, the Director need not necessarily be moved by any party in that behalf, and the power could be exercised either on an application by an aggrieved person or suo motu. For example, if the Director comes to know that contrary to the scheme of the Act or due to misrepresentation or fraud played, a patta had been granted to a person under the relevant provisions of the Act, then to set right that mistake, the Director should be enabled to exercise his power so as to effectuate the scheme of the Act and to implement the purpose behind the Act. The fact that the rule making authority has prescribed procedure in exercise of the powers under Section 67 for making an application to the Director does not mean that the suo motu power which is explicit in Section 5(2) of the Act is in any way curtailed or taken away. Therefore, the contention of the respondent that making an application is sine qua non for invoking the power under Section 5(2) of the Act is not tenable. ',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Whitman v. Disney Productions;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'Sudhir Thatte, Manager-Legal and ;Constituted Attorney',
		'counseldef' => 'Director of the Defendant',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2002-06-26',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'P. Thangavel, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">P. Thangavel, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is an application filed under Order XIV Rule 8 of Original Side Rules read with Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2, and Section 151 of Civil Procedure Code to grant ad-interim injunction restraining the respondent and its distributors, stockists, servants, agents, retailers and representatives from in any manner manufacturing, selling, offering for sale, stocking, advertising or dealing directly or indirectly in medicinal preparations under the trade mark PIOZED or any other trade mark which is identical with and/or deceptively similar to the trade mark PIOZ of the applicant so as to pass off the respondent's preparations as and for the preparations of the applicant or in any other manner whatsoever connected with the applicant till the disposal of the suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The applicant is the plaintiff and has filed the suit against the respondent, who is the defendant for a permanent injunction restraining the respondent from passing off their medicinal preparations under the trade mark PIOZED as and for the applicant's medicinal preparations having the trade mark PIOZ and for other consequential relief. The applicant is carrying on the business as manufacturer and dealer of pharmaceutical and medicinal preparations and enjoys high reputation and goodwill because of the excellent quality and efficacy in preparation of the medicine. The turnover of the applicant company for 2000-2001 was more than Rs. 297/- crores. The medicine manufactured by the applicant company is not only sold in this country, but exported to many foreign countries also. The applicant is having large Research and Development facilities. The trademark of the applicant is PIOZ in respect of their PIOGLITAZONE preparation for the treatment of diabetes. The applicant got search report on 28.7.2000 and also another report on 25.10.2000 about the availability of trademark PIOZ through its Attorney for registration and thereafter distributed ADIB Internationals Reprints booklet amongst the Doctors all over India advertising therein its trademark PIOZ in November, 2000. The applicant applied for permission to manufacture the drugs PIOGLITAZONE HYDROCHLORIDE in Tablets form containing 15 mg and 30 mg to the Drugs Controller General (India), New Delhi, in November, 2000. On 18.12.2000 an application was made for registration of the trade mark PIOZ by the applicant with the Trade Marks Registry and it was numbered as 9,77,709 and the application is pending for registration. The Drugs Controller General (India), New Delhi granted permission for manufacture of the said tablets by its letter dated 11.1.2001. Permission was granted to the applicant for manufacture of PIOZ tablets by the Food and Drug Administration on 16.1.2001 on application made by the applicant company. The applicant placed orders for supply of foil and carton bearing the trade marks PIOZ in January, 2001, After getting the permission from the Drugs Controller General (India), New Delhi and licence from Food and Drug Administration, the applicant company has started manufacturing of the medicine in tablets under the trade mark PIOZ in strips and made it available for sale in market. The sale of the tablets prepared under the trade mark PIOZ during February, 2001 to January, 2002 was Rs. 5,98,35,000/-. The applicant has spent Rs. 1,17,97,000/- towards advertisement and promotional expenses relating to the trade mark PIOZ for a period from August, 2000 to January, 2002. The applicant came across the preparation of some medicine in a pack of 15 mg and 30 mg as that of the applicant for the same disease and ailment having the trade mark PIOZED in August, 2001 and marketed in March, 2002. The respondent was fully aware of the manufacturing of the above said tablets by the applicant and marketed in or about January, 2001 throughout India under the trade mark PIOZ. The respondent has no right to use deceptively similar trade mark PIOZED in manufacturing and marketing of such medicine while such medicine was manufactured and marketed by the applicant in its trade mark name PIOZ even in January, 2001. The use of the deceptively similar trade mark by the respondent amounts to passing off its preparation as and for the preparation of the applicant and made illegal gains on the applicant's reputation. Confusion and deception are bound to arise as both trade marks are deceptively similar and both the preparations will be offered for sale to the same class of consumers for the same indication and ailments. The applicant is the prior adopter and user of the trademark PIOZ and therefore the respondent should be restrained by means of ad-interim injunction from using the preparations bearing trade mark PIOZED to avoid common loss to the applicant due to the passing off of the respondent's preparation as and for the preparations of the applicant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The respondent resists the claim of the applicant on the following grounds:-The manufacture of the medicinal preparation having the trade mark PIOZED by the respondent was in or about September, 2001 and not in March, 2002 and the same should have been known to the applicant immediately thereafter. The application of the applicant suffers from gross delay, latches and acquiescence as the respondent has been openly and extensively selling the said medicine without any interruption since September, 2001. The respondent, one of the Pioneers of pharmaceutical industry in India, has been in existence from 1949 having multi jurisdictional and multi national business in the field of medicinal and pharmaceutical preparations for treatment of various ailments and disorders. The respondent has four manufacturing facilities to manufacture various products and possess several recognitions and certifications from various International Regulatory Authorities. The products of the respondent are not only sold in India, but also in 80 other countries. The respondent commands a formidable reputation and goodwill for providing efficacious and quality products meeting international standards of manufacturing and quality. The turnover of the respondent in 1996-97, 1997-98, 1998-99, 1999-2000, 2000-2001 and 2001-2002 are Rs. 271/- crores, Rs. 292 crores, Rs. 344/- crores, Rs. 373/- crores, Rs. 396/- crores and above Rs. 450/- crores respectively. The annual publicity and promotional expenditure with respect to its various products during 1996-97, 1997-98, 1998-99, 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 are Rs. 1.47 crores, Rs. 1.92 crores, Rs. 3.61 crores, Rs. 4.73 crores and Rs. 3.89 crores respectively. The respondent decided to manufacture and market medicinal for pharmaceutical preparations containing PIOGLITAZONE as its active ingredient under the trade mark PIOZED in May, 2000 and the trade mark was invented from the International Non-Proprietary name PIOGLITAZONE. The respondent made an application to the Drug Controller General of India, New Delhi for permission to conduct Bio-Equivalence study on 15.1.2001 and the permission was granted on 2.2.2001. An application made by the respondent to the said Drug Controller General of India, New Delhi for permission to market the molecule on 29.3.2001 and permission was granted on 21.5.2001. An application was made to Food and Drug Administration to formulate the preparation of medicine under the trademark PIOZED 15 and PIOZED 30 on 30.5.2001 and permission was granted on 16.6.2001. An application was filed for registration of the trade mark PIOZED on 31.5.2001 in respect of medicinal and pharmaceutical preparations in Clause 5 of the 4th Schedule to the Trade and Merchandise Marks Rule, 1959 and the application was numbered as 1013232. The medicinal and pharmaceutical preparations under the trade mark PIOZED containing PIOGLITAZONE as its active ingredient commenced manufacturing in or about August, 2001 and marketed for sale in September, 2001. The respondent has honestly and in a bona fide manner conceived and adopted the trade mark from the International Non-Proprietary name of the active ingredient i.e. PIOGLITAZONE. Because of its efficacious nature and characteristic thereof the said medicine was received well and accepted in the market. The medical profession has also-accepted the same and the sale of the medicine from September, 2001 to March, 2002 was to a tune of about Rs. 22 lakhs. The trade mark PIOZED was exclusively used by the respondent in respect of the preparation of PIOZED 15 and PIOZED 30 and the trade mark has acquired tremendous reputation and goodwill. The trade mark PIOZED was promoted by publication and distribution of product literature, distribution of sample of the goods, visual aids etc. A sum of Rs. 7.5 lakhs has been spent for promotion of the goods having trade mark PIOZED. The respondent has acquired valuable proprietary right in respect of the said trade mark PIOZED in relation to the medicinal and pharmaceutical preparation. By denying the averments made in the affidavit filed in support of the application by the applicant, the respondent states that the word PIO and/or PIOZ have been taken directly from the generic name of the drug PIOGLITAZONE and the word PIO and/or PIOZ are commonly used by several manufactures to market their preparations, viz., PIOZONE, PIOZULIN, PIOGLAR, PIOGLU, PIOGLIT, PIONORM, PIOLEM, PIOLET and PIOZIT. There is no confusion in sale of medicines on the ground of deception of trade mark since September, 2001 and the trade mark PIOZ is not phonetically and visually similar to the trade mark of the applicant PIOZ. The trade mark PIOZED is not deceptively similar to the trade mark PIOZ of the applicant. The applicant has not made out a prima facie case or balance convenience in his favour for grant of ad-interim injunction as prayed for in the application as the conduct of the applicant is mala fide to claim any equitable relief from the hands of this Court. The balance of convenience is only in favour of the respondent and the grant of ad-interim injunction in favour of the applicant will cause serious damage and irreparable injury both financially and otherwise to the trade and business of the respondent. No injury or damage is caused to the applicant by the respondent in manufacture of the medicine under the trade mark PIOZED by the respondent. It is on these grounds, the respondent has sought for dismissal of the application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The applicant is the plaintiff and the applicant has filed the suit against the respondent, who is the defendant for the reliefs, viz., perpetual injunction, restraining the defendant and its men or agents from in any manner manufacturing, selling, offering for sale, stocking, advertising directly or indirectly dealing in medicinal preparations under the trade mark PIOZED or any other trade mark which is identical with and/or deceptively similar to the trade mark PIOZ of the plaintiff so as to pass off the defendant's preparations as and for the preparations of the plaintiff or in any other manner whatsoever connected with the plaintiff, to deliver up for destruction to the plaintiff all the preparations, dyes, blocks, articles, literatures, leaflets, brochures, cartons, labels, papers and things bearing and containing the impugned trade mark PIOZED to an authorized representatives of the plaintiff for destruction, to render accounts of profits made by the defendant by use of the impugned trade mark PIOZED or any trade mark similar thereto and damages of Rs. 10,05,000/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Admittedly the applicant is manufacturing the medicinal preparations having trade mark name PIOZ while the respondent is manufacturing medicinal preparations under the trade mark name PIOZED. Both the applicant and the respondent are manufacturing medicines under the said trade names for diabetic. The fact also remains that the ingredient for manufacture of medicines by the applicant as well as by the respondent is PIOGLITAZONE. Both the applicant and the respondent are manufacturing tablets using the ingredient of PIOGLITAZONE containing 15 mg and 30 mg and marketing the same for the consumption of public. The medicine will be sold to the diabetic patients on prescription being given by the Doctors by the medical stores carrying on business in sale of medicines.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The applicant as well as the respondent are said to have obtained search report from private agency for selecting the trade mark after considering the trade marks already in existence with the Registrar of Trade Marks on 26.7.2000 and 15.5.2000 respectively. It is evident that there is no dispute between both parties that trade marks PIOZ or PIOZED were not registered with Registrar of Trade Marks by any manufacturer of medicines at the time of giving search report. It is also evident from the submission made on both sides that official report with regard to the trade mark PIOZ and PIOZED are said to have been obtained on 26.10.2000 and 12.6.2001 by the applicant and the respondent respectively. The fact also remains that a booklet was published with regard to the manufacture of medicine with trade mark name PIOZ by the applicant even in November, 2000.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Admittedly, application for registration of trade mark PIOZ and PIOZED were made by the applicant and the respondent on 18.12.2000 and 31.5.2001 respectively and the said applications are pending registration before the Registrar of Trade Marks. There is no dispute that the applicant and the respondent applied for the Drug Controller General (India), New Delhi for grant of permission to manufacture tablets referred to above and permission was granted by the said Authority to the applicant and the respondent on 11.1.2001 and 2.2.2001 respectively. Admittedly, applications were sent by the applicant and the respondent for permission to Food and Drug Administration on 15.1.2001 and 30.5.2001 and permission was accorded by the said Authority to the applicant on 16.1.2001 and 16.6.2001 respectively. Thereafter, the applicant manufactured the tablets under the trade mark name PIOZ and marketed the same in January/February, 2001, and it is evident from the perusal of the document produced on the side of the respondent itself.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The respondent after obtaining permission from the above said Authorities, started manufacturing of the above said tablets under the trade mark name PIOZED and marketed the said medicine at Mumbai in September, 2001 as seen from the copy of the bill produced before the Court and the marketing of such medicine was in October, 2001 as seen from the xerox copy of the document ORG-MARG RETAIL AUDIT for Pharmaceutical Products in India. According to the applicant, the sale of medicine under the trade mark PIOZED at Madras was only in March, 2002. No other documents has been produced on the side of the respondent to show that the medicine prepared under the trade mark name PIOZED was introduced at Madras even in October, 2001 instead of in the month of March, 2002. The facts referred to above would disclose that applying for registration of trade mark PIOZ, obtaining of permission for manufacture of medicine under the trade mark name PIOZ from the Drug Controller General (India), New Delhi and Food and Drug Administration and manufacturing and marketing of the medicine under the trade mark name PIOZ were done very much earlier to the applying for registration of trade mark PIOZED, obtaining permission from Drug Controller General (India), New Delhi and Food and Drug Administration and also manufacturing and marketing of the medicines under the trade mark name PIOZED by the respondent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. A perusal of the pleadings raised in the affidavit of the applicant and counter-affidavit of the respondent would disclose that the applicant had sold the medicine with trade mark name PIOZ for a sum of Rs. 5,98,35,000/- for the period from February, 2001 to January, 2002, while the respondent had sold the medicine manufactured under the trade mark name PIOZED for Rs. 22 lakhs only from September, 2001 to March, 2002. It is also evident from the pleadings of the applicant as well as the respondent that the applicant had spent for advertisement and promotional expenses a sum of Rs. 1,17,97,000/- for the period from August, 2000 to January, 2002 while the respondent had spent only a sum of Rs. 7.5 lakhs for such purposes during the relevant period. The admitted figures referred to above would disclose that the applicant had expended substantial amount for advertisement and promotional expenses for the sale of medicine under the trade mark name PIOZ and had also marketed and sold the said medicine for about Rs. 6 crores within a period of one year. If the amounts spent for advertisement and promotional expenses and the medicine manufactured under the trade mark name PIOZ and sold out by the applicant are compared with the advertisement and promotional expenses of Rs. 7.5 lakhs and sale of such medicine under the trade mark name PIOZED for Rs. 22 lakhs for the period referred to above, it would disclose that the applicant is the fore-runner in advertising and expending promotional expenses as well as marketing of the medicine under the trade mark name PIOZ when compared with the advertisement and promotional expenses as well as sale of the medicine under the trade mark name PIOZED by the respondent, in spite of the fact that the respondent is said to be marketing its medicine including of other medicines manufactured in four factories owned by it in abroad, viz., 80 countries.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The learned Senior Counsel Mr. P. Chidambaram has brought to the notice of this Court, the decision of a Larger Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd., , wherein the Hon'ble Judges of the Apex Court have held as follows, while considering the resemblance and pronouncing in English of the two words 'Aristoc' and 'Rysta':-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'.... Considering the way the words were pronounced in English, the one was likely to be mistaken for the other.... The answer to the question whether the sound of one word resembles too nearly the sound of another so as to bring the former within the limits of Section 12 of the Trade Marks Act, 1938, must nearly always depend on first impression, for obviously a person who is familiar with both words will neither be deceived nor confused. It is the person who only knows the one word and has perhaps an imperfect recollection of it who is likely to be deceived or confused. Little assistance, therefore, is to be obtained from a meticulous comparison of the two words, letter by letter and syllable by syllable, pronounced with the clarity to be expected from a teacher of elocution. The Court must be careful to make allowance for imperfect recollection and the effect of careless pronunciation and speech on the part not only of the person seeking to buy under the trade description, but also of the shop assistant ministering to that person's wants'..... As far as this Court is concerned, the decisions in the last tour decades have clearly laid down that what has to be seen in the case of a passing off action is the similarity between the competing marks and to determine whether there is likelihood of deception or causing confusion. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">. . .These observations appear to us to be contrary to the decision of this Court in Amritdham's case (supra) where it was observed that the products will be purchased by both villagers and town folk, literate as well as illiterate and the question has to be approached from the point of view of a man of average intelligence and imperfect recollection. A trade may relate to goods largely sold to illiterate or badly educated persons. The purchaser in India cannot be equated with a purchaser of goods in England. While we agree that in trade mark matters, it is necessary to go into the question of comparable strength, the decision on merits in Dyechem's case, AIR 2000 SCW 2172 : AIR 2000 SC 2114 : 2000 CLC 1338 : 2000 (20) PTC 297(SC) does not, in our opinion, lay down correct law and we hold accordingly. .... </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Broadly stated in an action for passing off on the basis of unregistered trade mark generally for deciding the question of deceptive similarity the following factors to be considered:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The nature of the marks i.e. whether the marks are word marks or label marks or composite marks, i.e. both words and label works,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) The degree of resembleness between the marks, phonetically similar and hence similar in idea.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) The nature of the goods in respect of which they are used as trade marks.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(d) The similarity in the nature, character and performance of the goods of the rival traders.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(e) The class of purchasers who are likely to buy the goods bearing the marks they require, on their education and intelligence and a degree of care they are likely to exercise in purchasing and/or using the goods.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(f) The mode of purchasing the goods or placing orders for the goods, and</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(g) Any other surrounding circumstances which may be relevant in the extent of dissimilarity between the competing marks.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Weightage to be given to each of the aforesaid factors depends upon facts of each case and the same weightage cannot be given to each factor in every case.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The learned Senior Counsel Mr. P. Chidambaram has also brought to the notice of this Court, the decision reported in Laxmikant V. Patel v. Chetanbhat Shah and Anr., wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'13. In an action for passing off it is usual, rather essential, to seek an injunction temporary or ad-interim. The principles for the grant of such injunction are the same as in the case of any other action against injury complained of. The plaintiff must prove a prima facie case, availability of balance of convenience in his favour and his suffering an irreparable injury in the absence of grant of injunction. According to Kerly (Ibid, para 16.16) passing off cases are often cases of deliberate and intentional misrepresentation, but it is well-settled that fraud is not a necessary element of the right of action, and the absence of an intention to deceive is not a defence though proof of fraudulent intention may materially assist a plaintiff in establishing probability of deception. Christopher Wadlow in Law of Passing Off (1995 Edition, at p.3.06) states that the plaintiff does not have to prove actual damage in order to succeed in an action for passing off. Likelihood of damage is sufficient. The same learned author states that the defendant's state of mind is wholly irrelevant to the existence of the cause of action for passing off (ibid, paras 4.20 and 7.15). As to how the injunction granted by the Court would shape depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Where a defendant has imitated or adopted that plaintiffs distinctive trade mark or business name, the order may be an absolute injunction that he would not use or carry on business under that name.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In Mahendra and Mahendra Paper Mills Ltd. v. Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd., , the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as follows: -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'15. This question has been considered by different High Courts and this Court in umpteen cases from time to time. On analysis of the principles laid down in the decisions, certain recognized parameters relating to the matter have emerged. Without intending to be exhaustive some of the principles which are accepted as well settled may be stated thus; that whether there is a likelihood of deception or confusion arising is a matter for decision by the Court, and no witness is entitled to say whether the mark is likely to deceive or to cause confusion; that all factors which are likely to create or allay deception or confusion must be considered in combination; that broadly speaking, factors creating confusion would be, for example, the nature of the market itself, the class of customers, the extent of the reputation, the trade channels, the existence of any connection in course of trade, and others. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. This Court, in the case of Com Products Refining Co. v. Shangrila Food Products Ltd., , observed that 'the question whether two competing marks are so similar as to be likely to deceive or cause confusion is one of first impression and it is for the court to decide it. The question has to be approached from the point of view of a man of average intelligence and imperfect recollection. To such a man the overall structural and phonetic similarity of the two marks Gluvita and Glucovita is likely to deceive or to cause confusion. In deciding whether two marks are so similar as to be likely to deceive or cause confusion the similarity of idea is a relevant consideration.' This Court further observed that in order that a trade mark may acquire a reputation among buyers, it is not necessary that they should know who the manufacturer of the goods is. It is no answer to an opposition to an application for registration to say that there is a number of marks having one or more common features which occur in the proposed mark unless it is proved that these marks had by user acquired a reputation in the market.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In Amrit Soap Company v. New Punjab Soap Factory, 1989 (2) A.L.R. 242 : 1989 (Suppl)(1) PTC166 (Delhi) it has been held as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'11. It was next submitted by counsel for the defendant that the plaintiff has no right to use the trade mark 'BILLY' and artistic wrapper as so many other parties who are referred to earlier were also using the same trade mark. This contention of the defendant is wholly devoid of any force. In this connection it is sufficient to say that under the law it is the right of two parties before the court which has to be determined and, as already discussed, the plaintiff being prior user has the better and legal right to seek relief from this Court.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. In Indian Shaving Products Ltd. and Anr. v. Gift Pack and Anr., 2000 CLC 183 (Delhi) : 1998 (18) PTC 698 (Delhi) while considering the trade mark used by several other persons/companies besides the defendant, it is held as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'...the said defence, that other persons are also using the said trade mark, is not available to the defendants. The Court is called upon to decide disputes in between the parties which are before it. ... What is to be seen by the Court is as to whether the plaintiff has acquired goodwill and reputation for his products. . . 'The allegation that some other manufacturers are also using the same trade mark is of no consequence as the Court is concerned with parties before it only.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'... the colour scheme and get up of the two products are entirely different... The plaintiff admittedly are not objecting to the colour scheme and get up of the jacket of the goods of the defendants. Their case is that the defendants have usurped their trade mark and as such they are likely to filch, their trade and cause loss and damage to their reputation as well as to their business. Thus the defence put forward by the defendants that the two products are dissimilar in their colour scheme and get up and dress material does not come to their rescue.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The pronouncing of the word PIOZ and PIOZED will be one and the same since 'ED' in PIOZED will have no sound effect at the time of pronouncing it, as rightly contended by the learned Senior Counsel Mr. P. Chidambaram. The prescription given by the Doctors for purchase of medicines PIOZ or PIOZED will be in scribbling and the spelling normally written by Doctors could not be read by common man, more particularly English knowing literates also. The Chemist in drug stores will also be in the same position to find a distinction between PIOZ and PIOZED scribbled by the Doctors in their prescription. If that is the position even for English knowing literates and chemist in drug stores, it need not be elaborated with regard to the illiterate persons who are taking treatment for the disease diabetic. It is relevant to point out that more than 50 to 60 per cent of the population in India are having diabetic and major percentage of the population is only illitertes and the point in dispute has to be viewed from the point of view of a man of average intelligence and imperfect recollection. It is relevant to point out that to such a man, the overall structural and phonetic similarity of two marks PIOZ and PIOZED is likely to deceive or will cause confusion. If the trade mark name of the respondent PIOZED is likely to deceive or cause confusion to such people referred to above, it is likely that the business and sale of the medicine prepared under the trade mark name PIOZ of the applicant will be affected and there is likelihood of damage caused to the applicant by using the trade mark name PIOZED by the respondent in manufacturing and selling of medicine under the trade mark name PIOZED. If the principles laid down by the Larger Bench consisting of the present Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India Mr. B.N. Kirpal, and the Hon'ble Judges Doraiswamy Raju and Brijesh Kumar, JJ. in referred to above is taken into consideration in the light of the facts of this case referred to above, this Court is of opinion that the trade mark name of the respondent PIOZED is deceptively similar and will also create confusion in the mind of the customers purchasing medicine of the applicant, who is manufacturing medicine under the trade mark name PIOZ and will also cause loss in the business thereby causing damage. The materials produced before this Court on the side of the applicant would disclose that the applicant has made out a prima facie case in his favour for grant of ad-interim injunction. The loss of reputation or damage to be caused to the business of the applicant cannot be compensated by money value. Since the reputation of an article is one thing and the reputation of a particular make is quite another, it is for the reputation of the make only the applicant is concerned with. In of the decisions reported in Horlick's Malted Milk Company v. Sumerskill, 1916 The Illustrated Official Journal (Patents) Supplement 1 and Corn Products Refining Co. v. Shangrila Food Products Ltd., , it was held that the reputation will attach only to trade mark of the goods purchased by the buyer who may not be interested in knowing about the manufacturer of the goods.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Regarding the balance of convenience, the Court must weigh one need against another and determine whether the balance of convenience lies. Interlocutory remedy is intended to preserve in status-quo, the rights of parties which may appear on a prima facie case while restraining the defendants from exercising what he considers his legal right which the plaintiff would like to prevent as it affects the plaintiffs right. The Court must put in to the scales the relevant consideration, viz., about the commencement of enterprises and carrying on business, etc. This view finds support from the decision reported in Colgate Palmolive (India) Ltd. v. Hindustan Lever Ltd. and Vice Versa, .</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. While considering the balance of convenience in Parle Products Limited v. Bakemans Industries Limited, 1998 (18) PTC 662, the learned single Judge of this Court has held that the damage to be sustained in the event of restraining the defendant by means of ad-interim injunction at the stage of application and ultimately the defendant succeeding in the suit after the trial and the damage to be sustained by the applicant by not granting ad-interim injunction at the stage of application and ultimately succeeding in the suit after trial have to be taken into consideration in granting ad-interim injunction. In this case as already pointed out that there will be no difference in pronouncing the words PIOZ and PIOZED in English and the word PIOZED is deceptively similar and will create confusion in the mind of the consumers of the medicine manufactured under the trade mark name PIOZ by the applicant. The trade mark name of the respondent is also phonetically similar. Even if the decisions referred to above are taken into consideration, the balance of convenience pending trial of the suit will be only in favour of the applicant. As already pointed out, the respondent is having four manufacturing industries in medicine and is also manufacturing several other medicines by having market in about SO countries in abroad. The fact of granting ad-interim injunction against the respondent in manufacturing the medicine under the trade mark name PIOZED, the respondent is not going to close down the factories or its business in medicine referred to above. The respondent can very well manufacture the very same medicine in some other name which is not offending the trade mark name of the applicant PIOZ. The question of getting its business damaged in view of the grant of injunction will not be there in the opinion of this Court. Therefore, this Court holds that the balance of convenience is also in favour of the applicant if the facts and circumstances of the case are taken into consideration.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent contends that 'PIO' in 'PIOZ' and 'PIO' in 'PIOZED' are generic word of 'PIOGLITAZONE' and therefore, the applicant cannot come forward with a suit for grant of injunction for passing off even if 'PIO' is taken from generic word 'PIOGLITAZONE'. The letter 'Z' has been added to find the trade mark name PIOZ by the applicant. The respondent has added 'ED' alongwith 'Z' annexed to 'PIO' to find its trade mark name 'PIOZED' of which 'ED' will suffer silence while pronouncing it. Therefore, the said contention raised by the learned counsel for the respondent cannot be sustained.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent, inter alia, contended that there is delay, laches and acquiescence in coming to the Court by the applicant to obtain an order of interim injunction against the respondent and therefore the ad-interim injunction relief sought for by the applicant against the respondent cannot be granted. In support of such contention the learned counsel appearing for the respondent placed reliance on the decision reported in B.L. and Co. and Ors. v. Pfizer Products Incl., 2001 PTC 797 (Delhi). In that case, the plaintiff did not take any action for nearly five months of the launching and manufacturing of the defendant's product, and in its own volition preferred not to enter the Indian market. The balance of convenience was in favour of the defendant and therefore ex parte order of injunction should not be granted according to the views of the Court. While coming to the conclusion the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court found that the single Judge of the Court has not taken into consideration of the fact that the appellant had alone launched the product, manufactured the same and marketed in the market in January, 2001 while the respondents product had neither been introduced, nor marketed nor sold by them. The Division Bench has also taken into consideration of the fact that the respondent had waited for one year and allowed the appellant to develop the trade mark and to obtain requisite permission for manufacture. The said Bench had also taken into consideration of the fact that after commencement of manufacture, the respondents did not take action for nearly five months and had approached the Court for the relief thereafter only. It is after taking into consideration of the above said fact, the Division Bench of the said Court has come to the conclusion that the delay of five months will disentitle the respondents in that appeal to get an order of ad-interim injunction. That is not the circumstances in this case. It is after knowing the marketing of the medicine PIOZED by the respondent, the applicant had immediately approached this Court for the relief sought for in this application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The learned Senior Counsel Mr. P. Chidambaram has also brought to the notice of this Court the decision reported in Hindustan Pencils Pvt. Ltd. v. India Stationery Products Co. and Anr., . In that case, the learned Judge, B.N. Kirpal, J. (as he then was), the present Hon'ble Chief Justice of India, has observed, while considering the submission of 'inoridinate delay, laches and acquiescence' as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Inordinate delay' would, therefore, be delay of such a long duration that the defendant could have come to the conclusion that the plaintiff has, possibly, abandoned his right to seek relief or to object to the defendant using the trade mark. 'Equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights'.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. It would appear that 'inordinate delay', which has never been defined by the Courts so far, would be, analogous or similar to 'laches'. In 'Whitman v. Disney Productions, 263 F2d 229 it was observed by the Circuit Court of Appeal in U.S.A. as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Mere passage of time cannot constitute laches, but if the passage of time can be shown to have lulled defendant into a false sense of security, and the defendant acts in reliance thereon, laches may, in the discretion of the trial Court, be found.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It would follow, logically, that delay by itself is not a sufficient defence to an action for interim injunciton, but delay coupled with prejudice caused to the defendant would amount to 'laches', as observed by McCarry at page 383 'Laches-delay X prejudice'. In this formula, it is the magnitude of the product of delay and prejudice which must be weighed, not the magnitude of solely the quantum of delay or prejudice alone. For example, in one case, a long delay coupled with even a slight amount of prejudice may suffice to prove an adequate defence of laches. Yet, in another case, a short delay coupled with a great amount of resulting prejudice to defendant may also suffice for laches'. It has been emphasized that it is for the defendant to show that there has been prejudice caused by reason of the delay and that it would be unfair to injunct the defendant from carrying out its activities.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. 'Laches' and 'Inorldinate delay', however, are not similar to 'acquiescence'. Acquiescence is a different concept which has been explained by Kcrly at page 1310, para 15.45 as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The classic case of acquiescence proper is where the proprietor, knowing of his rights and knowing that the infringer is ignorant of them, does something to encourage the infringer's misapprehension, with the result that the infringer acts upon his mistaken belief and so worsens his position. It seems clear that something less than that is needed to offer a defence, but how much less is not clear. The current tendency is to hold that a defence of acquiescence or laches may be set up whenever it is unconscionable for the plaintiff to deny anything that the (consciously or unconsciously) has allowed or encouraged the defendant to believe. Mere failure to sue, without some positive act of encouragement, is not in general enough to give a defence.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case cited above there was a delay of 30 years and while considering the said delay, the above said observation was made by His Lordship. But there is no such delay in this case to hold that there is any inordinate delay or laches or acquiescence as contended by the learned counsel for the applicant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24. Even in the decision relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent reported in 2001 PTC 797 cited already, it has been held by the Division Bench of Delhi High Court as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'17. As regards the delay in institution of the suit and its effect for the purpose of grant of ex parte restraint, the settled legal position is that while the delay in institution of a suit for an action for passing off may not be fatal, it is one of the important and relevant considerations before granting an ex parte/interlocutory injunction. Reference in this regard is invited to the THE LAW OF PASSING-OFF by Christopher Wadlow. Learned Author while dealing with the motions of interlocutory relevance has observed as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Delay in applying for interlocutory relief is a very serious matter. As a rule of thumb, delay of up to about a month, or perhaps six weeks, generally has no adverse effect on an inter partes application and delay of up to twice that period need not be fatal if it can be explained and the plaintiff's case is otherwise strong. On an ex parte application even delay of a few days can be critical. Unjustified delay of more than a few months is almost always fatal to the plaintiff's case, even though delay of this order has no effect on the plaintiff's right at trial.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The above observation in 'THE LAW OF PASSING-OFF' would show that even delay of about three months is not fatal to the plaintiff's case. This suit has been filed according to the applicant within a month from knowing about sale of medicine under the trade mark name PIOZED at Madras in the month of March, 2002. If the said facts are taken into consideration, this Court is of opinion that there is no delay or laches or acquiescence on the part of the applicant in coming to the Court seeking the relief to redress its grievances.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. The learned counsel for the respondent inter alia contended that the said trade mark has been used in five other medicine manufacturing companies and that the applicant had not chosen to initiate any action against them, but has chosen to take action against the respondent only in the suit. In view of the decisions already cited on this point, the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent cannot be sustained. The other submissions made by the learned counsel for the respondent are not germane to decide the issue in the interlocutory application, and therefore, requires no consideration from this Court in this matter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. In view of the foregoing reasons, this Court holds that the applicant is entitled to an order of ad-interim injunction pending disposal of the suit. Taking into consideration of the circumstances of the case, both parties are directed to bear their own costs.</p>',
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LAW: Order XIV Rule 8, Section 151 of Civil Procedure Code, Section 12, the THE LAW OF PASSING-OFF

NORP: J.1, Pioneers, Indian, Hon'ble

PERSON: Order XXXIX Rules 1, PIOZONE, medicines.6, P. Chidambaram, Aristoc, P. Chidambaram, V. Patel, Chetanbhat Shah, Anr, Christopher Wadlow, p.3.06, Glucovita, Anr, Gift Pack, Anr, P. Chidambaram, B.N. Kirpal, Bench, P. Chidambaram, Anr, B.N. Kirpal, McCarry, Christopher Wadlow

CARDINAL: 2, 297/-, 28.7.2000, 25.10.2000, 15, 30, 18.12.2000, 9,77,709, 11.1.2001, 1,17,97,000/-, 15, 30, one, four, 80, 271/-, 292, 373/-, 450/-, 1.47, 1.92, 3.61, 4.73, 3.89, 15.1.2001, 2.2.2001, 21.5.2001, 16.6.2001, 22, 7.5, 10,05,000/-.5, 15, 30, 26.7.2000, 26.10.2000, 2000.7, 18.12.2000, 11.1.2001, 2.2.2001, 15.1.2001, 16.6.2001, 22, 1,17,97,000/-, 7.5, 6, 7.5, 22, four, 80, two, one, two, 2000, 20, 11, 16.16, 4.20, 7.15, 13, 16, two, one, one, 2, 242, two, 18, two, two, more than 50, one, 18, four, 263, 383, one, 15.45, 797, five

DATE: 2000-2001, November, 2000, November, 2000, 16.1.2001, January, 2001, February, 2001 to January, 2002, August, 2000, January, 2002, August, 2001, March, 2002, about January, 2001, January, 2001, about September, 2001, March, 2002, September, 2001, 1949, 1996-97, 1997-98, 1998-99, 1999-2000, 2000-2001, 2001-2002, annual, 1996-97, 1997-98, 1998-99, 1999-2000, 2000-2001, May, 2000, 29.3.2001, 1959, 1013232, about August, 2001, September, 2001, September, 2001 to March, 2002, September, 2001, 12.6.2001, November, 16.1.2001, January/February, 2001, September, 2001, October, 2001, March, 2002, October, 2001, the month of March, 2002, February, 2001 to January, 2002, September, 2001 to March, 2002, August, 2000, January, 2002, a period of, one year, 1938, the last tour decades, 2172, 2000, '12, '14, 1989, 1989, '15, 2000, 1998, '16, 1916, 1998, 2001, nearly five months, January, 2001, one year, nearly five months, five months, 1310, 30 years, 2001, about a month, six weeks, a few days, more than a few months, about three months, a month, the month of March, 2002

ORG: Research and Development, PIOZ, the Trade Marks Registry, the Food and Drug Administration, Food and Drug Administration, PIOZ, International Regulatory Authorities, the International Non-Proprietary, Bio-Equivalence, Drug Controller General of, Food and Drug Administration, the Trade and Merchandise Marks Rule, the International Non-Proprietary, PIO, PIO, PIOZULIN, PIOGLAR, PIOGLU, PIONORM, PIOLEM, PIOLET, PIOZIT, Court, PIOZ, the Registrar of Trade Marks, Registrar of Trade Marks, PIOZ, the Registrar of Trade Marks, the Drug Controller General (, Authority, Food and Drug Administration, Authority, PIOZ, Authorities, Court, xerox, Pharmaceutical Products, Food and Drug Administration, PIOZ, Drug Controller General, Food and Drug Administration, PIOZ, PIOZ, PIOZ, PIOZ, Court, the Hon'ble Apex Court, Cadila Health Care Ltd., Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd., the Apex Court, Court, Court, Court, Amritdham, Dyechem, AIR 2000, AIR 2000 SC 2114 :, works,(b, Court, the Hon'ble Apex Court, Kerly (Ibid, Court, Mahendra Paper Mills Ltd., Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd., the Hon'ble Apex Court, High Courts, Court, Court, Com Products Refining Co., Shangrila Food Products Ltd., Court, Amrit Soap Company, New Punjab Soap Factory, Court, Indian Shaving Products Ltd., CLC, Court, Court, Court, Chemist, PIOZ, the Hon'ble Judges Doraiswamy Raju, Brijesh Kumar, Court, PIOZ, Court, Horlick, Sumerskill, The Illustrated Official Journal (Patents) Supplement 1 and Corn Products Refining Co., Shangrila Food Products Ltd., Court, Court, Colgate Palmolive, Hindustan Lever Ltd., Parle Products Limited v., Bakemans Industries Limited, Court, PIOZ, Court, Court, PIO, PIO, PIO, PIOZ, PIO, inter alia, Court, Ors, Court, Court, Court, Court, Court, Court, India Stationery Products Co., Whitman v. Disney Productions, the Circuit Court of Appeal, Court, Kcrly, the Division Bench, Delhi High Court, follows:-'17, Court, Court, Court, Court

GPE: India, India, New Delhi, India, New Delhi, India, New Delhi, India, India, India, India, New Delhi, India, New Delhi, India, New Delhi, Mumbai, India, India, New Delhi, India, New Delhi, countries.10, India, England, Mahendra, Delhi, BILLY, Delhi, Delhi, India, India, Versa, B.L., Delhi, India, U.S.A.

EVENT: PIOZED 15 and PIOZED 30, Clause 5, PIOZED 15 and PIOZED 30

PRODUCT: 30.5.2001, 30.5.2001, 183, 797

FAC: Madras, Madras, Hindustan Pencils Pvt, Madras

WORK_OF_ART: a Larger Bench of, 1995 Edition

LANGUAGE: English, English, English, English, English

ORDINAL: first, first

MONEY: two marks Gluvita, two marks, two marks