Semantic Analysis by spaCy
Kailash Vs. Rajesh and anr.
Decided On : Jan-30-2008
Court : Madhya Pradesh
Notice (8): Undefined index: topics [APP/View/Case/meta.ctp, line 36]Code Context$shops2 = $shops['topics'];$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/meta.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'Kailash Vs. Rajesh and anr. Semantic Analysis', 'shops' => array( 'LAW' => array( (int) 0 => 'Section 4-A of Workmen's Compensation Act', (int) 1 => 'Section 4-A(3', (int) 2 => 'Section 4-A', (int) 3 => 'Section 4-A of the Act', (int) 4 => 'Section 4-A(1', (int) 5 => 'Section 4', (int) 6 => 'Section 4', (int) 7 => 'Section 4-A.' ), 'PERSON' => array( (int) 0 => 'N.K. Mody', (int) 1 => '1,14,367/-', (int) 2 => 'S.S. Chawla', (int) 3 => 'S.S. Chawla', (int) 4 => 'Mubasir Ahmed', (int) 5 => 'Anr', (int) 6 => 'Maghar Singh', (int) 7 => 'Jashwant Singh', (int) 8 => 'H.S. Rajpal', (int) 9 => 'Shrinivas Sabata', (int) 10 => 'Anr', (int) 11 => 'Kamal Agrawal', (int) 12 => 'Pratap Narain Singh', (int) 13 => 'Pratap Narain Singh's' ), 'DATE' => array( (int) 0 => '7.8.2006', (int) 1 => '10.7.1998', (int) 2 => '2007', (int) 3 => '1933', (int) 4 => 'one month', (int) 5 => '1997', (int) 6 => '30 of 1995', (int) 7 => 'one month', (int) 8 => '1976', (int) 9 => '7.8.2006', (int) 10 => '10.7.1998', (int) 11 => '18.11.1998', (int) 12 => '10.7.1998', (int) 13 => '18.11.1998', (int) 14 => 'four months', (int) 15 => '18.11.1998' ), 'ORG' => array( (int) 0 => 'Workmen's Compensation', (int) 1 => 'Labour Court', (int) 2 => 'W.C.N.F.', (int) 3 => 'Learned Counsel', (int) 4 => 'Hon'ble Apex Court', (int) 5 => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd.', (int) 6 => 'SC', (int) 7 => 'the Hon'ble Apex Court', (int) 8 => 'Court', (int) 9 => 'ACJ 517 (SC', (int) 10 => 'inter alia', (int) 11 => 'the High Court', (int) 12 => 'Learned Counsel', (int) 13 => 'Reliance', (int) 14 => 'Hon'ble Apex Court', (int) 15 => 'Pratap Narain Singh Deo', (int) 16 => 'FLR 92', (int) 17 => 'SC', (int) 18 => 'the Hon'ble Apex Court', (int) 19 => 'Ors', (int) 20 => 'Court', (int) 21 => 'the Hon'ble Apex Court', (int) 22 => 'National Insurance Co.', (int) 23 => 'Hon'ble Apex Court', (int) 24 => 'Ved Prakush Garg', (int) 25 => 'Court', (int) 26 => 'Court', (int) 27 => 'Light Motor Vehicle', (int) 28 => 'Heavy Motor Vehicle', (int) 29 => 'Court', (int) 30 => 'Court' ), 'CARDINAL' => array( (int) 0 => '46/99', (int) 1 => '2', (int) 2 => '30/1995.3', (int) 3 => '2', (int) 4 => '2', (int) 5 => '112', (int) 6 => '2', (int) 7 => '2', (int) 8 => '32', (int) 9 => 'four', (int) 10 => '534/2007', (int) 11 => '2', (int) 12 => '2', (int) 13 => '6.5.1999' ), 'PERCENT' => array( (int) 0 => '6%', (int) 1 => '6%', (int) 2 => '12%', (int) 3 => '12%', (int) 4 => '12%', (int) 5 => '6%', (int) 6 => '50%' ), 'GPE' => array( (int) 0 => 'p.a.', (int) 1 => 'p.a.', (int) 2 => 'p.a.', (int) 3 => 'p.a.', (int) 4 => 'Counsel', (int) 5 => 'M.A.', (int) 6 => 'Pratap Narain's', (int) 7 => 'p.a.' ), 'TIME' => array( (int) 0 => '15.9.1995 by Amendment Act' ), 'MONEY' => array( (int) 0 => '12 per cent', (int) 1 => '12 per cent' ), 'WORK_OF_ART' => array( (int) 0 => 'Swan Gali Bai' ), 'PRODUCT' => array( (int) 0 => 'Gnat' ) ), 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '511477', 'acts' => '', 'appealno' => '', 'appellant' => 'Kailash', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Kailash Vs. Rajesh and anr.', 'casenote' => ' - Section 2(f): [Dipak Misra, K.K. Lahoti & Rajendra Menon, JJ] Service Tax - Packaging and bottling of liquor whether amounts to manufacture within meaning of Section 2(f) of Central Excise Act 1944? Finance Act 932 of 1994), Section 65 (76 b) (as amended on 16.6.2005) - Held, The first limb of the inclusive definition of the manufacture under Section 2(f) of Central Excise Act has a very wide connotation. As the definition clause lays down an inclusive facet, the term manufacture has to be construed in a natural and plain manner and would include any process incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product. Keeping in view the context in which the term manufacture has been used, it would take in its fold incidental and ancillary process in the manufacture or finishing of any manufactured product. It does not leave any room for doubt that an allied process should be integral and inextricable part of manufacture of completeness and presentability of the manufactured product. Section 65(76b) of Finance Act used the words but it does not include. Thus it is a definition which has the inclusive as well as exclusive facet. By virtue of the same it may include certain things and exclude others. It is well settled principle of law that a definition is not to be read in isolation and has to read in context of phrase which it defines, releasing that function of a definition is to give precision and certainty to the word or phrase which would otherwise be vague and uncertain. Regard being had to the exclusionary fact in the Finance Act, though a limited one it would exclude the manufacturing process as defined under Section 2(f) of the 1944 Act. Keeping in view the aforesaid dictionary clauses and circulars issued by the C.B.E.C. it is quite luminescent that would manufacture has to be understood in a broader sense and not to be confined or restricted to the excisable product in the Act. It would include all processes which amount to manufacture whether or not the final product is an excisable product. In the process of manufacturing of country spirit, the over proof spirit which is not potable is reduced to issuable strength, which is potable. Colouring and flavouring agents are added at the time of maturation. Thereafter the liquor is supplied in sealed bottles to the retail contractors. This is the process of treatment given to over proof spirit in order to render it fit for human consumption in the form of country liquor. If the process is analysed there cannot be any scintilla of doubt that the process involves the manufacturing one under the provisions of Section 2(f) of Central Excise Act, 1944. As per the M.P. Country Spirits Rules as well as Clause 6 of the Tender Conditions it is mandatory for a distiller to supply country liquor in sealed bottles and not otherwise. Therefore, packaging and bottling of liquor come within the ambit and sweep of manufacture within the meaning of clause (f) of Section 2 Central Excise Act, 1944 in view of the definition contained in Section 65(76b) of the Finance Act especially keeping in view the exclusionary facet and further regard being had to the circular issued by Central Board of Excise and Customs.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Swan Gali Bai and Ors. v. Kamal Agrawal;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '2008-01-30', 'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => 'N.K. Mody, J.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">N.K. Mody, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Being aggrieved by the order dated 7.8.2006, passed by Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, Labour Court, Indore, in Case No. 46/99, W.C.N.F., whereby on account of injuries sustained by the appellant a sum of Rs. 1,14,367/-, has been awarded along with interest @ 6% p.a. from the dale of accident, the present appeal, has been filed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Short facts of the case are that the appellant filed a claim petition alleging that appellant sustained injuries on 10.7.1998, during the course of his employment. Claim petition filed by the appellant was contested by respondent No. 2 and was allowed along with interest from the dale of accident. Learned Counsel for the appellant submits that the interest has been awarded @ 6% p.a., while the interest ought to have been awarded @ 12% p.a., as per Section 4-A of Workmen's Compensation Act, which has been amended w.e.f. 15.9.1995 by Amendment Act, No. 30/1995.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Mr. S.S. Chawla, learned 'Counsel for respondent No. 2 submits that the appellant is entitle for the interest from the date of adjudication. Thus, the question involves in the appeal is that whether appellant is entitle for interest @ 12% p.a. and also from the date of accident or from the date of adjudication?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. S.S. Chawla, learned Counsel for respondent No. 2 placed reliance on a decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mubasir Ahmed and Anr. 2007 (112) FLR 1933 (SC), wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that 'Interest is payable under Section 4-A(3) if there is default in paying the compensation due under this Act within one month from the date it fell due. The question of liability under Section 4-A was dealt with by this Court in Maghar Singh v. Jashwant Singh : 1997 ACJ 517 (SC). By Amending Act, 30 of 1995, Section 4-A of the Act was amended, inter alia, fixing the minimum rate of interest to be simple interest at the rate of 12 per cent. In the instant case, the accident took place after the amendment and, therefore, the rate of 12 per cent as fixed by the High Court cannot be faulted. But the period as fixed by it is wrong. The starting point is on completion of one month from the date on which it fell due. Obviously, it cannot be the date of accident. Since no indication is there as when it becomes due, it has to be taken to be the date of adjudication of the claim. This appears to be so because Section 4-A(1) prescribes that compensation under Section 4 shall be paid as soon as it falls due. The compensation becomes due on the basis of adjudication of the claim made. The adjudication under Section 4 in some oases involves the assessment of loss of earning capacity by a qualified medical practitioner. Unless adjudication is done, question of compensation becoming due does not arise. The position becomes clearer on a reading of Sub-section (2) of Section 4-A. It provides that provisional payment to the extent of admitted liability has to be made when employer does not accept the liability for compensation to the extent claimed. The crucial expression is 'falls due'. Significantly, legislature has not used the expression 'from the date of accident'. Unless there is an adjudication, the question of an amount falling due does not arise.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Learned Counsel submits that in view of the aforesaid position of law the liability of respondent No. 2 insurance company for payment of interest is from the date when it was held that the respondent is liable for payment of compensation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Facing to this situation Mr. H.S. Rajpal, learned Counsel for tht: appellant submits that appellant is entitle for interest from the date of accident. Reliance was placed on a decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Shrinivas Sabata and Anr. 1976 (32) FLR 92 (SC), wherein four judges of the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that 'The employer therefore become liable to pay the compensation as soon as the aforesaid personal injury was caused to the workman by the accident, which admittedly arose out of and in the course of the employment.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the matter of Swan Gali Bai and Ors. v. Kamal Agrawal, in M.A. No. 534/2007, Division Bench of this Court had an occasion to take into consideration the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pratap Narain Singh (supra), and also in the matter of National Insurance Co. (supra). It was held by the Hon'ble Division Bench that the law laid down in the matter of Pratap Narain Singh's case the Hon'ble Apex Court was dealing with the issue of penalty and therefore, is not applicable to the concept of interest in as much as penalty is not payable by the insurer as per the decision rendered in the case of Ved Prakush Garg (supra). It was also held by the Hon'ble Division Bench that the decision rendered in Pratap Narain's case is distinguishable. In the present case the order passed by the learned Court below is dated 7.8.2006. Since the interest is payable @ 12% p.a., therefore, there was no justification on the part of learned Gnat below in awarding interest @ 6% p.a.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Since the learned Court below has awarded the interest from the date of application and the same has not been challenged by the respondent No. 2 by way of filing appeal or in shape of cross-objections, therefore, at this stage respondent No. 2 cannot be allowed to raise the objection that the interest was payable from the date of passing of the order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. From perusal of the record it is evident that the date of accident was 10.7.1998, while claim petition was filed on 6.5.1999. In his cross-examination appellant has admitted that appellant obtained the licence of heavy motor vehicle with effect from 18.11.1998 and prior to it appellant was having the licence of Light Motor Vehicle. This fact makes it clear that on the date of accident appellant was not possessing the valid driving licence for Heavy Motor Vehicle. It also makes clear that after the accident which took place on 10.7.1998, appellant was found fit for driving heavy motor vehicle on 18.11.1998, i.e. after four months of accident. It appears that this fact was not at all taken into consideration by the learned Court below while pausing the order in favour of appellant. Since the learned Court below has allowed the permanent disability @ 50% while computing the compensation and the appellant was found fit on 18.11.1998, when the licence of heavy motor vehicle was issued to him, therefore, appellant is not entitled to claim higher rate of interest. In view of this the appeal stands dismissed. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '[2008(117)FLR736]', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Rajesh and anr.', 'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '511477' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Kailash Vs. Rajesh and anr. Semantic Analysis' $shops = array( 'LAW' => array( (int) 0 => 'Section 4-A of Workmen's Compensation Act', (int) 1 => 'Section 4-A(3', (int) 2 => 'Section 4-A', (int) 3 => 'Section 4-A of the Act', (int) 4 => 'Section 4-A(1', (int) 5 => 'Section 4', (int) 6 => 'Section 4', (int) 7 => 'Section 4-A.' ), 'PERSON' => array( (int) 0 => 'N.K. Mody', (int) 1 => '1,14,367/-', (int) 2 => 'S.S. Chawla', (int) 3 => 'S.S. Chawla', (int) 4 => 'Mubasir Ahmed', (int) 5 => 'Anr', (int) 6 => 'Maghar Singh', (int) 7 => 'Jashwant Singh', (int) 8 => 'H.S. Rajpal', (int) 9 => 'Shrinivas Sabata', (int) 10 => 'Anr', (int) 11 => 'Kamal Agrawal', (int) 12 => 'Pratap Narain Singh', (int) 13 => 'Pratap Narain Singh's' ), 'DATE' => array( (int) 0 => '7.8.2006', (int) 1 => '10.7.1998', (int) 2 => '2007', (int) 3 => '1933', (int) 4 => 'one month', (int) 5 => '1997', (int) 6 => '30 of 1995', (int) 7 => 'one month', (int) 8 => '1976', (int) 9 => '7.8.2006', (int) 10 => '10.7.1998', (int) 11 => '18.11.1998', (int) 12 => '10.7.1998', (int) 13 => '18.11.1998', (int) 14 => 'four months', (int) 15 => '18.11.1998' ), 'ORG' => array( (int) 0 => 'Workmen's Compensation', (int) 1 => 'Labour Court', (int) 2 => 'W.C.N.F.', (int) 3 => 'Learned Counsel', (int) 4 => 'Hon'ble Apex Court', (int) 5 => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd.', (int) 6 => 'SC', (int) 7 => 'the Hon'ble Apex Court', (int) 8 => 'Court', (int) 9 => 'ACJ 517 (SC', (int) 10 => 'inter alia', (int) 11 => 'the High Court', (int) 12 => 'Learned Counsel', (int) 13 => 'Reliance', (int) 14 => 'Hon'ble Apex Court', (int) 15 => 'Pratap Narain Singh Deo', (int) 16 => 'FLR 92', (int) 17 => 'SC', (int) 18 => 'the Hon'ble Apex Court', (int) 19 => 'Ors', (int) 20 => 'Court', (int) 21 => 'the Hon'ble Apex Court', (int) 22 => 'National Insurance Co.', (int) 23 => 'Hon'ble Apex Court', (int) 24 => 'Ved Prakush Garg', (int) 25 => 'Court', (int) 26 => 'Court', (int) 27 => 'Light Motor Vehicle', (int) 28 => 'Heavy Motor Vehicle', (int) 29 => 'Court', (int) 30 => 'Court' ), 'CARDINAL' => array( (int) 0 => '46/99', (int) 1 => '2', (int) 2 => '30/1995.3', (int) 3 => '2', (int) 4 => '2', (int) 5 => '112', (int) 6 => '2', (int) 7 => '2', (int) 8 => '32', (int) 9 => 'four', (int) 10 => '534/2007', (int) 11 => '2', (int) 12 => '2', (int) 13 => '6.5.1999' ), 'PERCENT' => array( (int) 0 => '6%', (int) 1 => '6%', (int) 2 => '12%', (int) 3 => '12%', (int) 4 => '12%', (int) 5 => '6%', (int) 6 => '50%' ), 'GPE' => array( (int) 0 => 'p.a.', (int) 1 => 'p.a.', (int) 2 => 'p.a.', (int) 3 => 'p.a.', (int) 4 => 'Counsel', (int) 5 => 'M.A.', (int) 6 => 'Pratap Narain's', (int) 7 => 'p.a.' ), 'TIME' => array( (int) 0 => '15.9.1995 by Amendment Act' ), 'MONEY' => array( (int) 0 => '12 per cent', (int) 1 => '12 per cent' ), 'WORK_OF_ART' => array( (int) 0 => 'Swan Gali Bai' ), 'PRODUCT' => array( (int) 0 => 'Gnat' ) ) $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '511477', 'acts' => '', 'appealno' => '', 'appellant' => 'Kailash', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Kailash Vs. Rajesh and anr.', 'casenote' => ' - Section 2(f): [Dipak Misra, K.K. Lahoti & Rajendra Menon, JJ] Service Tax - Packaging and bottling of liquor whether amounts to manufacture within meaning of Section 2(f) of Central Excise Act 1944? Finance Act 932 of 1994), Section 65 (76 b) (as amended on 16.6.2005) - Held, The first limb of the inclusive definition of the manufacture under Section 2(f) of Central Excise Act has a very wide connotation. As the definition clause lays down an inclusive facet, the term manufacture has to be construed in a natural and plain manner and would include any process incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product. Keeping in view the context in which the term manufacture has been used, it would take in its fold incidental and ancillary process in the manufacture or finishing of any manufactured product. It does not leave any room for doubt that an allied process should be integral and inextricable part of manufacture of completeness and presentability of the manufactured product. Section 65(76b) of Finance Act used the words but it does not include. Thus it is a definition which has the inclusive as well as exclusive facet. By virtue of the same it may include certain things and exclude others. It is well settled principle of law that a definition is not to be read in isolation and has to read in context of phrase which it defines, releasing that function of a definition is to give precision and certainty to the word or phrase which would otherwise be vague and uncertain. Regard being had to the exclusionary fact in the Finance Act, though a limited one it would exclude the manufacturing process as defined under Section 2(f) of the 1944 Act. Keeping in view the aforesaid dictionary clauses and circulars issued by the C.B.E.C. it is quite luminescent that would manufacture has to be understood in a broader sense and not to be confined or restricted to the excisable product in the Act. It would include all processes which amount to manufacture whether or not the final product is an excisable product. In the process of manufacturing of country spirit, the over proof spirit which is not potable is reduced to issuable strength, which is potable. Colouring and flavouring agents are added at the time of maturation. Thereafter the liquor is supplied in sealed bottles to the retail contractors. This is the process of treatment given to over proof spirit in order to render it fit for human consumption in the form of country liquor. If the process is analysed there cannot be any scintilla of doubt that the process involves the manufacturing one under the provisions of Section 2(f) of Central Excise Act, 1944. As per the M.P. Country Spirits Rules as well as Clause 6 of the Tender Conditions it is mandatory for a distiller to supply country liquor in sealed bottles and not otherwise. Therefore, packaging and bottling of liquor come within the ambit and sweep of manufacture within the meaning of clause (f) of Section 2 Central Excise Act, 1944 in view of the definition contained in Section 65(76b) of the Finance Act especially keeping in view the exclusionary facet and further regard being had to the circular issued by Central Board of Excise and Customs.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Swan Gali Bai and Ors. v. Kamal Agrawal;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '2008-01-30', 'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => 'N.K. Mody, J.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">N.K. Mody, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Being aggrieved by the order dated 7.8.2006, passed by Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, Labour Court, Indore, in Case No. 46/99, W.C.N.F., whereby on account of injuries sustained by the appellant a sum of Rs. 1,14,367/-, has been awarded along with interest @ 6% p.a. from the dale of accident, the present appeal, has been filed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Short facts of the case are that the appellant filed a claim petition alleging that appellant sustained injuries on 10.7.1998, during the course of his employment. Claim petition filed by the appellant was contested by respondent No. 2 and was allowed along with interest from the dale of accident. Learned Counsel for the appellant submits that the interest has been awarded @ 6% p.a., while the interest ought to have been awarded @ 12% p.a., as per Section 4-A of Workmen's Compensation Act, which has been amended w.e.f. 15.9.1995 by Amendment Act, No. 30/1995.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Mr. S.S. Chawla, learned 'Counsel for respondent No. 2 submits that the appellant is entitle for the interest from the date of adjudication. Thus, the question involves in the appeal is that whether appellant is entitle for interest @ 12% p.a. and also from the date of accident or from the date of adjudication?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. S.S. Chawla, learned Counsel for respondent No. 2 placed reliance on a decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mubasir Ahmed and Anr. 2007 (112) FLR 1933 (SC), wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that 'Interest is payable under Section 4-A(3) if there is default in paying the compensation due under this Act within one month from the date it fell due. The question of liability under Section 4-A was dealt with by this Court in Maghar Singh v. Jashwant Singh : 1997 ACJ 517 (SC). By Amending Act, 30 of 1995, Section 4-A of the Act was amended, inter alia, fixing the minimum rate of interest to be simple interest at the rate of 12 per cent. In the instant case, the accident took place after the amendment and, therefore, the rate of 12 per cent as fixed by the High Court cannot be faulted. But the period as fixed by it is wrong. The starting point is on completion of one month from the date on which it fell due. Obviously, it cannot be the date of accident. Since no indication is there as when it becomes due, it has to be taken to be the date of adjudication of the claim. This appears to be so because Section 4-A(1) prescribes that compensation under Section 4 shall be paid as soon as it falls due. The compensation becomes due on the basis of adjudication of the claim made. The adjudication under Section 4 in some oases involves the assessment of loss of earning capacity by a qualified medical practitioner. Unless adjudication is done, question of compensation becoming due does not arise. The position becomes clearer on a reading of Sub-section (2) of Section 4-A. It provides that provisional payment to the extent of admitted liability has to be made when employer does not accept the liability for compensation to the extent claimed. The crucial expression is 'falls due'. Significantly, legislature has not used the expression 'from the date of accident'. Unless there is an adjudication, the question of an amount falling due does not arise.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Learned Counsel submits that in view of the aforesaid position of law the liability of respondent No. 2 insurance company for payment of interest is from the date when it was held that the respondent is liable for payment of compensation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Facing to this situation Mr. H.S. Rajpal, learned Counsel for tht: appellant submits that appellant is entitle for interest from the date of accident. Reliance was placed on a decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Shrinivas Sabata and Anr. 1976 (32) FLR 92 (SC), wherein four judges of the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that 'The employer therefore become liable to pay the compensation as soon as the aforesaid personal injury was caused to the workman by the accident, which admittedly arose out of and in the course of the employment.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the matter of Swan Gali Bai and Ors. v. Kamal Agrawal, in M.A. No. 534/2007, Division Bench of this Court had an occasion to take into consideration the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pratap Narain Singh (supra), and also in the matter of National Insurance Co. (supra). It was held by the Hon'ble Division Bench that the law laid down in the matter of Pratap Narain Singh's case the Hon'ble Apex Court was dealing with the issue of penalty and therefore, is not applicable to the concept of interest in as much as penalty is not payable by the insurer as per the decision rendered in the case of Ved Prakush Garg (supra). It was also held by the Hon'ble Division Bench that the decision rendered in Pratap Narain's case is distinguishable. In the present case the order passed by the learned Court below is dated 7.8.2006. Since the interest is payable @ 12% p.a., therefore, there was no justification on the part of learned Gnat below in awarding interest @ 6% p.a.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Since the learned Court below has awarded the interest from the date of application and the same has not been challenged by the respondent No. 2 by way of filing appeal or in shape of cross-objections, therefore, at this stage respondent No. 2 cannot be allowed to raise the objection that the interest was payable from the date of passing of the order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. From perusal of the record it is evident that the date of accident was 10.7.1998, while claim petition was filed on 6.5.1999. In his cross-examination appellant has admitted that appellant obtained the licence of heavy motor vehicle with effect from 18.11.1998 and prior to it appellant was having the licence of Light Motor Vehicle. This fact makes it clear that on the date of accident appellant was not possessing the valid driving licence for Heavy Motor Vehicle. It also makes clear that after the accident which took place on 10.7.1998, appellant was found fit for driving heavy motor vehicle on 18.11.1998, i.e. after four months of accident. It appears that this fact was not at all taken into consideration by the learned Court below while pausing the order in favour of appellant. Since the learned Court below has allowed the permanent disability @ 50% while computing the compensation and the appellant was found fit on 18.11.1998, when the licence of heavy motor vehicle was issued to him, therefore, appellant is not entitled to claim higher rate of interest. In view of this the appeal stands dismissed. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '[2008(117)FLR736]', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Rajesh and anr.', 'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $args = array( (int) 0 => '511477' ) $pattern = '/\(((0[1-9]|[12][0-9]|3[01])[.](0[1-9]|1[012])[.](17|18|19|20)[0-9]{2}).*\)/'include - APP/View/Case/meta.ctp, line 36 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
Warning (2): Invalid argument supplied for foreach() [APP/View/Case/meta.ctp, line 39]Code Context//$shops = $shops['entities'];foreach ($shops2 as $key => $val) {$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/meta.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'Kailash Vs. Rajesh and anr. Semantic Analysis', 'shops' => array( 'LAW' => array( (int) 0 => 'Section 4-A of Workmen's Compensation Act', (int) 1 => 'Section 4-A(3', (int) 2 => 'Section 4-A', (int) 3 => 'Section 4-A of the Act', (int) 4 => 'Section 4-A(1', (int) 5 => 'Section 4', (int) 6 => 'Section 4', (int) 7 => 'Section 4-A.' ), 'PERSON' => array( (int) 0 => 'N.K. Mody', (int) 1 => '1,14,367/-', (int) 2 => 'S.S. Chawla', (int) 3 => 'S.S. Chawla', (int) 4 => 'Mubasir Ahmed', (int) 5 => 'Anr', (int) 6 => 'Maghar Singh', (int) 7 => 'Jashwant Singh', (int) 8 => 'H.S. Rajpal', (int) 9 => 'Shrinivas Sabata', (int) 10 => 'Anr', (int) 11 => 'Kamal Agrawal', (int) 12 => 'Pratap Narain Singh', (int) 13 => 'Pratap Narain Singh's' ), 'DATE' => array( (int) 0 => '7.8.2006', (int) 1 => '10.7.1998', (int) 2 => '2007', (int) 3 => '1933', (int) 4 => 'one month', (int) 5 => '1997', (int) 6 => '30 of 1995', (int) 7 => 'one month', (int) 8 => '1976', (int) 9 => '7.8.2006', (int) 10 => '10.7.1998', (int) 11 => '18.11.1998', (int) 12 => '10.7.1998', (int) 13 => '18.11.1998', (int) 14 => 'four months', (int) 15 => '18.11.1998' ), 'ORG' => array( (int) 0 => 'Workmen's Compensation', (int) 1 => 'Labour Court', (int) 2 => 'W.C.N.F.', (int) 3 => 'Learned Counsel', (int) 4 => 'Hon'ble Apex Court', (int) 5 => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd.', (int) 6 => 'SC', (int) 7 => 'the Hon'ble Apex Court', (int) 8 => 'Court', (int) 9 => 'ACJ 517 (SC', (int) 10 => 'inter alia', (int) 11 => 'the High Court', (int) 12 => 'Learned Counsel', (int) 13 => 'Reliance', (int) 14 => 'Hon'ble Apex Court', (int) 15 => 'Pratap Narain Singh Deo', (int) 16 => 'FLR 92', (int) 17 => 'SC', (int) 18 => 'the Hon'ble Apex Court', (int) 19 => 'Ors', (int) 20 => 'Court', (int) 21 => 'the Hon'ble Apex Court', (int) 22 => 'National Insurance Co.', (int) 23 => 'Hon'ble Apex Court', (int) 24 => 'Ved Prakush Garg', (int) 25 => 'Court', (int) 26 => 'Court', (int) 27 => 'Light Motor Vehicle', (int) 28 => 'Heavy Motor Vehicle', (int) 29 => 'Court', (int) 30 => 'Court' ), 'CARDINAL' => array( (int) 0 => '46/99', (int) 1 => '2', (int) 2 => '30/1995.3', (int) 3 => '2', (int) 4 => '2', (int) 5 => '112', (int) 6 => '2', (int) 7 => '2', (int) 8 => '32', (int) 9 => 'four', (int) 10 => '534/2007', (int) 11 => '2', (int) 12 => '2', (int) 13 => '6.5.1999' ), 'PERCENT' => array( (int) 0 => '6%', (int) 1 => '6%', (int) 2 => '12%', (int) 3 => '12%', (int) 4 => '12%', (int) 5 => '6%', (int) 6 => '50%' ), 'GPE' => array( (int) 0 => 'p.a.', (int) 1 => 'p.a.', (int) 2 => 'p.a.', (int) 3 => 'p.a.', (int) 4 => 'Counsel', (int) 5 => 'M.A.', (int) 6 => 'Pratap Narain's', (int) 7 => 'p.a.' ), 'TIME' => array( (int) 0 => '15.9.1995 by Amendment Act' ), 'MONEY' => array( (int) 0 => '12 per cent', (int) 1 => '12 per cent' ), 'WORK_OF_ART' => array( (int) 0 => 'Swan Gali Bai' ), 'PRODUCT' => array( (int) 0 => 'Gnat' ) ), 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '511477', 'acts' => '', 'appealno' => '', 'appellant' => 'Kailash', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Kailash Vs. Rajesh and anr.', 'casenote' => ' - Section 2(f): [Dipak Misra, K.K. Lahoti & Rajendra Menon, JJ] Service Tax - Packaging and bottling of liquor whether amounts to manufacture within meaning of Section 2(f) of Central Excise Act 1944? Finance Act 932 of 1994), Section 65 (76 b) (as amended on 16.6.2005) - Held, The first limb of the inclusive definition of the manufacture under Section 2(f) of Central Excise Act has a very wide connotation. As the definition clause lays down an inclusive facet, the term manufacture has to be construed in a natural and plain manner and would include any process incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product. Keeping in view the context in which the term manufacture has been used, it would take in its fold incidental and ancillary process in the manufacture or finishing of any manufactured product. It does not leave any room for doubt that an allied process should be integral and inextricable part of manufacture of completeness and presentability of the manufactured product. Section 65(76b) of Finance Act used the words but it does not include. Thus it is a definition which has the inclusive as well as exclusive facet. By virtue of the same it may include certain things and exclude others. It is well settled principle of law that a definition is not to be read in isolation and has to read in context of phrase which it defines, releasing that function of a definition is to give precision and certainty to the word or phrase which would otherwise be vague and uncertain. Regard being had to the exclusionary fact in the Finance Act, though a limited one it would exclude the manufacturing process as defined under Section 2(f) of the 1944 Act. Keeping in view the aforesaid dictionary clauses and circulars issued by the C.B.E.C. it is quite luminescent that would manufacture has to be understood in a broader sense and not to be confined or restricted to the excisable product in the Act. It would include all processes which amount to manufacture whether or not the final product is an excisable product. In the process of manufacturing of country spirit, the over proof spirit which is not potable is reduced to issuable strength, which is potable. Colouring and flavouring agents are added at the time of maturation. Thereafter the liquor is supplied in sealed bottles to the retail contractors. This is the process of treatment given to over proof spirit in order to render it fit for human consumption in the form of country liquor. If the process is analysed there cannot be any scintilla of doubt that the process involves the manufacturing one under the provisions of Section 2(f) of Central Excise Act, 1944. As per the M.P. Country Spirits Rules as well as Clause 6 of the Tender Conditions it is mandatory for a distiller to supply country liquor in sealed bottles and not otherwise. Therefore, packaging and bottling of liquor come within the ambit and sweep of manufacture within the meaning of clause (f) of Section 2 Central Excise Act, 1944 in view of the definition contained in Section 65(76b) of the Finance Act especially keeping in view the exclusionary facet and further regard being had to the circular issued by Central Board of Excise and Customs.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Swan Gali Bai and Ors. v. Kamal Agrawal;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '2008-01-30', 'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => 'N.K. Mody, J.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">N.K. Mody, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Being aggrieved by the order dated 7.8.2006, passed by Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, Labour Court, Indore, in Case No. 46/99, W.C.N.F., whereby on account of injuries sustained by the appellant a sum of Rs. 1,14,367/-, has been awarded along with interest @ 6% p.a. from the dale of accident, the present appeal, has been filed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Short facts of the case are that the appellant filed a claim petition alleging that appellant sustained injuries on 10.7.1998, during the course of his employment. Claim petition filed by the appellant was contested by respondent No. 2 and was allowed along with interest from the dale of accident. Learned Counsel for the appellant submits that the interest has been awarded @ 6% p.a., while the interest ought to have been awarded @ 12% p.a., as per Section 4-A of Workmen's Compensation Act, which has been amended w.e.f. 15.9.1995 by Amendment Act, No. 30/1995.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Mr. S.S. Chawla, learned 'Counsel for respondent No. 2 submits that the appellant is entitle for the interest from the date of adjudication. Thus, the question involves in the appeal is that whether appellant is entitle for interest @ 12% p.a. and also from the date of accident or from the date of adjudication?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. S.S. Chawla, learned Counsel for respondent No. 2 placed reliance on a decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mubasir Ahmed and Anr. 2007 (112) FLR 1933 (SC), wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that 'Interest is payable under Section 4-A(3) if there is default in paying the compensation due under this Act within one month from the date it fell due. The question of liability under Section 4-A was dealt with by this Court in Maghar Singh v. Jashwant Singh : 1997 ACJ 517 (SC). By Amending Act, 30 of 1995, Section 4-A of the Act was amended, inter alia, fixing the minimum rate of interest to be simple interest at the rate of 12 per cent. In the instant case, the accident took place after the amendment and, therefore, the rate of 12 per cent as fixed by the High Court cannot be faulted. But the period as fixed by it is wrong. The starting point is on completion of one month from the date on which it fell due. Obviously, it cannot be the date of accident. Since no indication is there as when it becomes due, it has to be taken to be the date of adjudication of the claim. This appears to be so because Section 4-A(1) prescribes that compensation under Section 4 shall be paid as soon as it falls due. The compensation becomes due on the basis of adjudication of the claim made. The adjudication under Section 4 in some oases involves the assessment of loss of earning capacity by a qualified medical practitioner. Unless adjudication is done, question of compensation becoming due does not arise. The position becomes clearer on a reading of Sub-section (2) of Section 4-A. It provides that provisional payment to the extent of admitted liability has to be made when employer does not accept the liability for compensation to the extent claimed. The crucial expression is 'falls due'. Significantly, legislature has not used the expression 'from the date of accident'. Unless there is an adjudication, the question of an amount falling due does not arise.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Learned Counsel submits that in view of the aforesaid position of law the liability of respondent No. 2 insurance company for payment of interest is from the date when it was held that the respondent is liable for payment of compensation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Facing to this situation Mr. H.S. Rajpal, learned Counsel for tht: appellant submits that appellant is entitle for interest from the date of accident. Reliance was placed on a decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Shrinivas Sabata and Anr. 1976 (32) FLR 92 (SC), wherein four judges of the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that 'The employer therefore become liable to pay the compensation as soon as the aforesaid personal injury was caused to the workman by the accident, which admittedly arose out of and in the course of the employment.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the matter of Swan Gali Bai and Ors. v. Kamal Agrawal, in M.A. No. 534/2007, Division Bench of this Court had an occasion to take into consideration the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pratap Narain Singh (supra), and also in the matter of National Insurance Co. (supra). It was held by the Hon'ble Division Bench that the law laid down in the matter of Pratap Narain Singh's case the Hon'ble Apex Court was dealing with the issue of penalty and therefore, is not applicable to the concept of interest in as much as penalty is not payable by the insurer as per the decision rendered in the case of Ved Prakush Garg (supra). It was also held by the Hon'ble Division Bench that the decision rendered in Pratap Narain's case is distinguishable. In the present case the order passed by the learned Court below is dated 7.8.2006. Since the interest is payable @ 12% p.a., therefore, there was no justification on the part of learned Gnat below in awarding interest @ 6% p.a.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Since the learned Court below has awarded the interest from the date of application and the same has not been challenged by the respondent No. 2 by way of filing appeal or in shape of cross-objections, therefore, at this stage respondent No. 2 cannot be allowed to raise the objection that the interest was payable from the date of passing of the order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. From perusal of the record it is evident that the date of accident was 10.7.1998, while claim petition was filed on 6.5.1999. In his cross-examination appellant has admitted that appellant obtained the licence of heavy motor vehicle with effect from 18.11.1998 and prior to it appellant was having the licence of Light Motor Vehicle. This fact makes it clear that on the date of accident appellant was not possessing the valid driving licence for Heavy Motor Vehicle. It also makes clear that after the accident which took place on 10.7.1998, appellant was found fit for driving heavy motor vehicle on 18.11.1998, i.e. after four months of accident. It appears that this fact was not at all taken into consideration by the learned Court below while pausing the order in favour of appellant. Since the learned Court below has allowed the permanent disability @ 50% while computing the compensation and the appellant was found fit on 18.11.1998, when the licence of heavy motor vehicle was issued to him, therefore, appellant is not entitled to claim higher rate of interest. In view of this the appeal stands dismissed. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '[2008(117)FLR736]', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Rajesh and anr.', 'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '511477' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Kailash Vs. Rajesh and anr. Semantic Analysis' $shops = array( 'LAW' => array( (int) 0 => 'Section 4-A of Workmen's Compensation Act', (int) 1 => 'Section 4-A(3', (int) 2 => 'Section 4-A', (int) 3 => 'Section 4-A of the Act', (int) 4 => 'Section 4-A(1', (int) 5 => 'Section 4', (int) 6 => 'Section 4', (int) 7 => 'Section 4-A.' ), 'PERSON' => array( (int) 0 => 'N.K. Mody', (int) 1 => '1,14,367/-', (int) 2 => 'S.S. Chawla', (int) 3 => 'S.S. Chawla', (int) 4 => 'Mubasir Ahmed', (int) 5 => 'Anr', (int) 6 => 'Maghar Singh', (int) 7 => 'Jashwant Singh', (int) 8 => 'H.S. Rajpal', (int) 9 => 'Shrinivas Sabata', (int) 10 => 'Anr', (int) 11 => 'Kamal Agrawal', (int) 12 => 'Pratap Narain Singh', (int) 13 => 'Pratap Narain Singh's' ), 'DATE' => array( (int) 0 => '7.8.2006', (int) 1 => '10.7.1998', (int) 2 => '2007', (int) 3 => '1933', (int) 4 => 'one month', (int) 5 => '1997', (int) 6 => '30 of 1995', (int) 7 => 'one month', (int) 8 => '1976', (int) 9 => '7.8.2006', (int) 10 => '10.7.1998', (int) 11 => '18.11.1998', (int) 12 => '10.7.1998', (int) 13 => '18.11.1998', (int) 14 => 'four months', (int) 15 => '18.11.1998' ), 'ORG' => array( (int) 0 => 'Workmen's Compensation', (int) 1 => 'Labour Court', (int) 2 => 'W.C.N.F.', (int) 3 => 'Learned Counsel', (int) 4 => 'Hon'ble Apex Court', (int) 5 => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd.', (int) 6 => 'SC', (int) 7 => 'the Hon'ble Apex Court', (int) 8 => 'Court', (int) 9 => 'ACJ 517 (SC', (int) 10 => 'inter alia', (int) 11 => 'the High Court', (int) 12 => 'Learned Counsel', (int) 13 => 'Reliance', (int) 14 => 'Hon'ble Apex Court', (int) 15 => 'Pratap Narain Singh Deo', (int) 16 => 'FLR 92', (int) 17 => 'SC', (int) 18 => 'the Hon'ble Apex Court', (int) 19 => 'Ors', (int) 20 => 'Court', (int) 21 => 'the Hon'ble Apex Court', (int) 22 => 'National Insurance Co.', (int) 23 => 'Hon'ble Apex Court', (int) 24 => 'Ved Prakush Garg', (int) 25 => 'Court', (int) 26 => 'Court', (int) 27 => 'Light Motor Vehicle', (int) 28 => 'Heavy Motor Vehicle', (int) 29 => 'Court', (int) 30 => 'Court' ), 'CARDINAL' => array( (int) 0 => '46/99', (int) 1 => '2', (int) 2 => '30/1995.3', (int) 3 => '2', (int) 4 => '2', (int) 5 => '112', (int) 6 => '2', (int) 7 => '2', (int) 8 => '32', (int) 9 => 'four', (int) 10 => '534/2007', (int) 11 => '2', (int) 12 => '2', (int) 13 => '6.5.1999' ), 'PERCENT' => array( (int) 0 => '6%', (int) 1 => '6%', (int) 2 => '12%', (int) 3 => '12%', (int) 4 => '12%', (int) 5 => '6%', (int) 6 => '50%' ), 'GPE' => array( (int) 0 => 'p.a.', (int) 1 => 'p.a.', (int) 2 => 'p.a.', (int) 3 => 'p.a.', (int) 4 => 'Counsel', (int) 5 => 'M.A.', (int) 6 => 'Pratap Narain's', (int) 7 => 'p.a.' ), 'TIME' => array( (int) 0 => '15.9.1995 by Amendment Act' ), 'MONEY' => array( (int) 0 => '12 per cent', (int) 1 => '12 per cent' ), 'WORK_OF_ART' => array( (int) 0 => 'Swan Gali Bai' ), 'PRODUCT' => array( (int) 0 => 'Gnat' ) ) $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '511477', 'acts' => '', 'appealno' => '', 'appellant' => 'Kailash', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Kailash Vs. Rajesh and anr.', 'casenote' => ' - Section 2(f): [Dipak Misra, K.K. Lahoti & Rajendra Menon, JJ] Service Tax - Packaging and bottling of liquor whether amounts to manufacture within meaning of Section 2(f) of Central Excise Act 1944? Finance Act 932 of 1994), Section 65 (76 b) (as amended on 16.6.2005) - Held, The first limb of the inclusive definition of the manufacture under Section 2(f) of Central Excise Act has a very wide connotation. As the definition clause lays down an inclusive facet, the term manufacture has to be construed in a natural and plain manner and would include any process incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product. Keeping in view the context in which the term manufacture has been used, it would take in its fold incidental and ancillary process in the manufacture or finishing of any manufactured product. It does not leave any room for doubt that an allied process should be integral and inextricable part of manufacture of completeness and presentability of the manufactured product. Section 65(76b) of Finance Act used the words but it does not include. Thus it is a definition which has the inclusive as well as exclusive facet. By virtue of the same it may include certain things and exclude others. It is well settled principle of law that a definition is not to be read in isolation and has to read in context of phrase which it defines, releasing that function of a definition is to give precision and certainty to the word or phrase which would otherwise be vague and uncertain. Regard being had to the exclusionary fact in the Finance Act, though a limited one it would exclude the manufacturing process as defined under Section 2(f) of the 1944 Act. Keeping in view the aforesaid dictionary clauses and circulars issued by the C.B.E.C. it is quite luminescent that would manufacture has to be understood in a broader sense and not to be confined or restricted to the excisable product in the Act. It would include all processes which amount to manufacture whether or not the final product is an excisable product. In the process of manufacturing of country spirit, the over proof spirit which is not potable is reduced to issuable strength, which is potable. Colouring and flavouring agents are added at the time of maturation. Thereafter the liquor is supplied in sealed bottles to the retail contractors. This is the process of treatment given to over proof spirit in order to render it fit for human consumption in the form of country liquor. If the process is analysed there cannot be any scintilla of doubt that the process involves the manufacturing one under the provisions of Section 2(f) of Central Excise Act, 1944. As per the M.P. Country Spirits Rules as well as Clause 6 of the Tender Conditions it is mandatory for a distiller to supply country liquor in sealed bottles and not otherwise. Therefore, packaging and bottling of liquor come within the ambit and sweep of manufacture within the meaning of clause (f) of Section 2 Central Excise Act, 1944 in view of the definition contained in Section 65(76b) of the Finance Act especially keeping in view the exclusionary facet and further regard being had to the circular issued by Central Board of Excise and Customs.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Swan Gali Bai and Ors. v. Kamal Agrawal;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '2008-01-30', 'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => 'N.K. Mody, J.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">N.K. Mody, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Being aggrieved by the order dated 7.8.2006, passed by Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, Labour Court, Indore, in Case No. 46/99, W.C.N.F., whereby on account of injuries sustained by the appellant a sum of Rs. 1,14,367/-, has been awarded along with interest @ 6% p.a. from the dale of accident, the present appeal, has been filed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Short facts of the case are that the appellant filed a claim petition alleging that appellant sustained injuries on 10.7.1998, during the course of his employment. Claim petition filed by the appellant was contested by respondent No. 2 and was allowed along with interest from the dale of accident. Learned Counsel for the appellant submits that the interest has been awarded @ 6% p.a., while the interest ought to have been awarded @ 12% p.a., as per Section 4-A of Workmen's Compensation Act, which has been amended w.e.f. 15.9.1995 by Amendment Act, No. 30/1995.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Mr. S.S. Chawla, learned 'Counsel for respondent No. 2 submits that the appellant is entitle for the interest from the date of adjudication. Thus, the question involves in the appeal is that whether appellant is entitle for interest @ 12% p.a. and also from the date of accident or from the date of adjudication?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. S.S. Chawla, learned Counsel for respondent No. 2 placed reliance on a decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mubasir Ahmed and Anr. 2007 (112) FLR 1933 (SC), wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that 'Interest is payable under Section 4-A(3) if there is default in paying the compensation due under this Act within one month from the date it fell due. The question of liability under Section 4-A was dealt with by this Court in Maghar Singh v. Jashwant Singh : 1997 ACJ 517 (SC). By Amending Act, 30 of 1995, Section 4-A of the Act was amended, inter alia, fixing the minimum rate of interest to be simple interest at the rate of 12 per cent. In the instant case, the accident took place after the amendment and, therefore, the rate of 12 per cent as fixed by the High Court cannot be faulted. But the period as fixed by it is wrong. The starting point is on completion of one month from the date on which it fell due. Obviously, it cannot be the date of accident. Since no indication is there as when it becomes due, it has to be taken to be the date of adjudication of the claim. This appears to be so because Section 4-A(1) prescribes that compensation under Section 4 shall be paid as soon as it falls due. The compensation becomes due on the basis of adjudication of the claim made. The adjudication under Section 4 in some oases involves the assessment of loss of earning capacity by a qualified medical practitioner. Unless adjudication is done, question of compensation becoming due does not arise. The position becomes clearer on a reading of Sub-section (2) of Section 4-A. It provides that provisional payment to the extent of admitted liability has to be made when employer does not accept the liability for compensation to the extent claimed. The crucial expression is 'falls due'. Significantly, legislature has not used the expression 'from the date of accident'. Unless there is an adjudication, the question of an amount falling due does not arise.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Learned Counsel submits that in view of the aforesaid position of law the liability of respondent No. 2 insurance company for payment of interest is from the date when it was held that the respondent is liable for payment of compensation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Facing to this situation Mr. H.S. Rajpal, learned Counsel for tht: appellant submits that appellant is entitle for interest from the date of accident. Reliance was placed on a decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Shrinivas Sabata and Anr. 1976 (32) FLR 92 (SC), wherein four judges of the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that 'The employer therefore become liable to pay the compensation as soon as the aforesaid personal injury was caused to the workman by the accident, which admittedly arose out of and in the course of the employment.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the matter of Swan Gali Bai and Ors. v. Kamal Agrawal, in M.A. No. 534/2007, Division Bench of this Court had an occasion to take into consideration the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pratap Narain Singh (supra), and also in the matter of National Insurance Co. (supra). It was held by the Hon'ble Division Bench that the law laid down in the matter of Pratap Narain Singh's case the Hon'ble Apex Court was dealing with the issue of penalty and therefore, is not applicable to the concept of interest in as much as penalty is not payable by the insurer as per the decision rendered in the case of Ved Prakush Garg (supra). It was also held by the Hon'ble Division Bench that the decision rendered in Pratap Narain's case is distinguishable. In the present case the order passed by the learned Court below is dated 7.8.2006. Since the interest is payable @ 12% p.a., therefore, there was no justification on the part of learned Gnat below in awarding interest @ 6% p.a.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Since the learned Court below has awarded the interest from the date of application and the same has not been challenged by the respondent No. 2 by way of filing appeal or in shape of cross-objections, therefore, at this stage respondent No. 2 cannot be allowed to raise the objection that the interest was payable from the date of passing of the order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. From perusal of the record it is evident that the date of accident was 10.7.1998, while claim petition was filed on 6.5.1999. In his cross-examination appellant has admitted that appellant obtained the licence of heavy motor vehicle with effect from 18.11.1998 and prior to it appellant was having the licence of Light Motor Vehicle. This fact makes it clear that on the date of accident appellant was not possessing the valid driving licence for Heavy Motor Vehicle. It also makes clear that after the accident which took place on 10.7.1998, appellant was found fit for driving heavy motor vehicle on 18.11.1998, i.e. after four months of accident. It appears that this fact was not at all taken into consideration by the learned Court below while pausing the order in favour of appellant. Since the learned Court below has allowed the permanent disability @ 50% while computing the compensation and the appellant was found fit on 18.11.1998, when the licence of heavy motor vehicle was issued to him, therefore, appellant is not entitled to claim higher rate of interest. In view of this the appeal stands dismissed. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '[2008(117)FLR736]', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Rajesh and anr.', 'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $args = array( (int) 0 => '511477' ) $pattern = '/\(((0[1-9]|[12][0-9]|3[01])[.](0[1-9]|1[012])[.](17|18|19|20)[0-9]{2}).*\)/' $shops2 = nullinclude - APP/View/Case/meta.ctp, line 39 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
LAW: Section 4-A of Workmen's Compensation Act, Section 4-A(3, Section 4-A, Section 4-A of the Act, Section 4-A(1, Section 4, Section 4, Section 4-A.
PERSON: N.K. Mody, 1,14,367/-, S.S. Chawla, S.S. Chawla, Mubasir Ahmed, Anr, Maghar Singh, Jashwant Singh, H.S. Rajpal, Shrinivas Sabata, Anr, Kamal Agrawal, Pratap Narain Singh, Pratap Narain Singh's
DATE: 7.8.2006, 10.7.1998, 2007, 1933, one month, 1997, 30 of 1995, one month, 1976, 7.8.2006, 10.7.1998, 18.11.1998, 10.7.1998, 18.11.1998, four months, 18.11.1998
ORG: Workmen's Compensation, Labour Court, W.C.N.F., Learned Counsel, Hon'ble Apex Court, National Insurance Co. Ltd., SC, the Hon'ble Apex Court, Court, ACJ 517 (SC, inter alia, the High Court, Learned Counsel, Reliance, Hon'ble Apex Court, Pratap Narain Singh Deo, FLR 92, SC, the Hon'ble Apex Court, Ors, Court, the Hon'ble Apex Court, National Insurance Co., Hon'ble Apex Court, Ved Prakush Garg, Court, Court, Light Motor Vehicle, Heavy Motor Vehicle, Court, Court
CARDINAL: 46/99, 2, 30/1995.3, 2, 2, 112, 2, 2, 32, four, 534/2007, 2, 2, 6.5.1999
PERCENT: 6%, 6%, 12%, 12%, 12%, 6%, 50%
GPE: p.a., p.a., p.a., p.a., Counsel, M.A., Pratap Narain's, p.a.
TIME: 15.9.1995 by Amendment Act
MONEY: 12 per cent, 12 per cent
WORK_OF_ART: Swan Gali Bai
PRODUCT: Gnat