1. This Writ Appeal has been filed by the appellants, being the writ petitioners, challenging the order of the learned single Judge by which the writ petition filed was dismissed.
2. The facts in brief:
The respondent No.1 is the Central Transmission Utility under the Ministry of Power and is engaged in the construction and maintenance of inter-state transmission system spread across the nation. One such work has been entrusted with the respondent No.1 towards the construction of 400 KV Double Circuit Transmission Line from Madurai to Tuticorin under the approval of Government of India.
3. The respondent No.1 is a deemed transmission licensee in the capacity of Central Transmission Utility as envisaged under Sections 38 and 40 of the Electricity Act, 2003 by the Government of India notification. The respondent No.1 becomes a deemed “transmission licensee” in accordance with Section 14 of “The Electricity Act, 2003”. Section 164 of “The Electricity Act, 2003” prescribes that the appropriate Government by order in writing may provide for the placing of electric lines or electrical plants for the transmission of electricity confer upon the 'Licensee' any of the powers which the Telegraph Authority possesses under the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885. Accordingly, in exercise of the powers conferred under section 164 of the Electricity Act, 2003, the Government of India has authorised the respondent No.1 to exercise all powers prescribed under the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885.
4. A survey was conducted in respect of the project in the year 2008 followed by the check survey works during 2009. The best techno economic route alignment was finalized in the year 2009. An objection was raised by the appellants dated 18.11.2010, stating that they are involved in the manufacturing of salt and gypsum engaging 100 persons and in view of the proposed laying and erection of towers and overhead lines there is every possibility of an electro magnetic induction. Hence, it is stated in the representation that the proposed electric towers will have to be realigned to avoid the power lines crossing over the lands of the appellants.
5. A reply was given on 21.12.2010 by the respondent No.1 stating that there will not be any electro magnetic induction and the lines will cross the salt pans alone. It has been further stated that the route has been finalized meticulously taking into consideration various factors including the relevant inconvenience of the persons who are likely to be affected. Thereafter, the petitioners have come forward to file the present Writ Petition seeking a writ of mandamus forbearing the respondents from entering into the petitioners' salt factory and erecting high tension transmission towers.
6. The learned single Judge after considering the entire case of the appellants as well as that of the respondents was pleased to dismiss the Writ Petition. Assailing the order of the learned Single Judge, the appellants being the writ petitioners have come forward to file this Writ Appeal.
7. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that the definition of the word 'post' does not include a 'tower' and therefore, the respondent No.1 does not have the power or the authority to enter into lands of the appellants and erect such a tower. It is submitted that the proposed alignment has been changed to suit the convenience of few and therefore, the entire action is arbitrary. According to the learned counsel for the appellants, the appellants are proposed to have a salt factory and in view of the proposed action the entire proposed factory would be affected. The power under Section 10 of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 is not available to the respondent No.1 and in any case in view of the objections raised, the matter ought to have been referred to the second respondent. The property of the appellants cannot be utilized to their detriments and the proposed action in erecting the towers amounting to acquisition, which is impermissible and in violation of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. The learned counsel further contended that in the absence of a consent obtained from the appellants, the respondent No.1 cannot enter into the lands belonging to them without permission. In support of his contention, the learned counsel has made reliance on the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in Arumugam v. State of Tamil Nadu - 2011(4) CTC 353 and submitted that the Court cannot include a word, which is omitted by the legislature. Hence, it is submitted that the Writ Appeal will have to be allowed.
8. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.1 submitted that the issue involved is no longer res-integra as this Court has repeatedly held that the power under Section 10 of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 is absolute. The learned counsel further submitted that the Writ Petition as filed is not maintainable in law and facts as there cannot be any prayer forbearing the lawful action on the part of the respondent No.1. It is further submitted that substantial work has been done and further action has been withheld because of the pendency of the Writ Appeal. Considering the overwhelming public interest involved, the Writ Appeal will have to be dismissed.
9. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel for the respondent No.1 has made reliance on the following decisions:
(1) B.P. & T. Product v. K.S.E. Board (FB) - AIR 1972 Kerala 47. (2) Nithyanandam, M. & 2 others v. The Chairman, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, Madras - 2 & 3 others - 1994 Writ L.R. 445. (3) A.M. Ismail v. Union of India - AIR 1995 Kerala 1. (4) E.Venkatesan v. Chairman, T.N. Electricity Board, Madras - AIR 1997 MADRAS 64.
(5) Unreported judgment in The Chairman, Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd., and another v. Vivasaya Vizhipunarvu Iyakkam and two others in Writ Appeal No.572 of 2001.
(6) Unreported common order in T. Narayanan v. Power grid Corporation (India) Limited in W.P. No.49172 of 2006 batch cases. (7) Unreported common judgment in Power Grid Corporation of India Limited and two others v. N.Nallamuthu Gounder in W.A. (MD) No.555 of 2007 batch cases. (8) Kerala State Electricity Board v. Livisha - (2007) 5 MLJ 589 (SC). (9) Unreported order in T.S.T.Kazhavi v. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board and 3 others in W.P.No.36566 of 2007.
(10) Unreported order in S.Muthusamy Gounder v. Power Grid Corporation of India Limited and 3 others in W.P.No.4000 of 2008.
(11) R.Kannan v. Power Grid Corpn. (India) Ltd., - (2008) 4 MLJ 892. (12) T.Narayanan v. Dist. Executive Magistrate-cum- Dist. - (2008) 4 MLJ 1024.
(13) Unreported Judgment in R.Kannan v. Power Grid Corporation (India) Limited and two others in Writ Appeal No.464 of 2008. (14) Unreported Judgment in R.Chellappan v. The District Collector, Karur District, Karur and two others in W.A.(MD) No.522 of 2008. (15)Ramakrishna Poultry (P) Ltd. v. R.Chellappan - (2009) 16 Supreme Court Cases 743.
(16) Unreported order in Dr.M.Ponnuswamy and another v. The Chairman, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, Chennai and three others in W.P.No.18367 of 2009. (17) Unreported order in R.P.Dharmalingam v. The Senior Engineer, Power Grid Corporation of India Limited in W.P.No.26335 of 2010. (18) Superintending Engineer, TNEB v. M.Sengu Vijay - (2011) 3 MLJ 625.
10. Nature of Relief:
As submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent No.1, the Writ Petition is not maintainable in law and on facts. The petitioners cannot seek a direction forbearing the respondent No.1 from entering into their lands, as such a power is vested in it under the provisions of the Electricity Act, 2003 read with Section 10 of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885. So long as the power is vested with the respondent No.1, a writ petition prohibiting the authority created under the statute from performing its lawful duty cannot be maintained. The relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India being discretionary and extra-ordinary it shall not be extended in such a case. Further, a decision made by the respondent No.1 based upon empirical data and material by men with experience shall not be put into scrutiny in a writ proceedings. More over, considering the object and purpose in the proposed work catering to the needs of the general public, this appeal deserves to be dismissed.
11. Definition of the word 'Post'.:
Section 3 of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 defines the word 'post' in the following manner:
“3. (5) “post” means a post, pole, standard, stay, strut or other above ground contrivance for carrying, suspending or supporting a telegraph line;” There is absolutely no substance in the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellants that the word 'post' does not include a 'tower', since the definition is rather exhaustive. While defining the word 'post', it has been specifically stated that it would also include other above ground contrivance for carrying, suspending or supporting a telegraph line.
12. It is one of the principles of interpretation of a provision that the general words which follow specific words will have to be read by applying the principle of ejusdem generis. The Act was introduced in the year 1885. Therefore, there would not have been any possibility to include the word 'tower' at that time since it is a subsequent scientific innovation. Considering the object and reasoning and the wider amplitude provided under the clause, by applying the principle of ejusdem generis, we have no doubt in our mind, the word tower would also form part of the definition of the word 'post'.
13. Ejusdem generis is a Latin expression, which means 'of the same kind'. It would mean the words of similar class. The said principle is used when the subjects of enumeration consists of a class or category and when a Statute enumerates the specific words followed by general terms provided there is no intimation of legislative intent, then the general term will have to be understood in the light of the specific terms. It has been held in Maharashtra University of Health Sciences v. Satchikitsa Prasarak Mandal reported in (2010) 3 Supreme Court Cases 786 as follows:
“27. The Latin expression “ejusdem generis” which means “of the same kind or nature” is a principle of construction, meaning thereby when general words in a statutory text are flanked by restricted words, the meaning of the general words are taken to be restricted by implication with the meaning of the restricted words. This is a principle which arises “from the linguistic implication by which words having literally a wide meaning (when taken in isolation) are treated as reduced in scope by the verbal context”. It may be regarded as an instance of ellipsis, or reliance on implication. This principle is presumed to apply unless there is some contrary indication [see Glanville Williams, The Origins and Logical Implications of the Ejusdem Generis Rule, 7 Conv (NS) 119].”
14. The applicability of the rule of ejusdem generis is classically expressed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Siddeshwari Cotton Mills (P) Ltd., v. Union of India, (1989) 2 SCC 458 in the following manner: “12. The expression ejusdem generis - “of the same kind or nature” - signifies a principle of construction whereby words in a statute which are otherwise wide but are associated in the text with more limited words are, by implication, given a restricted operation and are limited to matters of the same class or genus as preceding them. If a list or string or family of genus-describing terms are followed by wider or residuary or sweeping-up words, then the verbal context and the linguistic implications of the preceding words limit the scope of such words.
13. In Statutory Interpretation Rupert Cross (p. 116) says: “The draftsman must be taken to have inserted the general words in case something which ought to have been included among the specifically enumerated items had been omitted....”
14. The principle underlying this approach to statutory construction is that the subsequent general words were only intended to guard against some accidental omission in the objects of the kind mentioned earlier and were not intended to extend to objects of a wholly different kind. This is a presumption and operates unless there is some contrary indication. But the preceding words or expressions of restricted meaning must be susceptible of the import that they represent a class. If no class can be found, ejusdem generis rule is not attracted and such broad construction as the subsequent words may admit will be favoured. As a learned author puts it:
“... if a class can be found, but the specific words exhaust the class, then rejection of the rule may be favoured because its adoption would make the general words unnecessary; if, however, the specific words do not exhaust the class, then adoption of the rule may be favoured because its rejection would make the specific words unnecessary.”2
15. Francis Bennion in his Statutory Construction (pp. 830-31) observed: “For the ejusdem generis principle to apply there must be a sufficient indication of a category that can properly be described as a class or genus, even though not specified as such in the enactment. Furthermore the genus must be narrower than the words it is said to regulate. The nature of the genus is gathered by implication from the express words which suggest it.... It is necessary to be able to formulate the genus; for if it cannot be formulated it does not exist. 'Unless you can find a category', said Farwell L.J., 'there is no room for the application of the ejusdem generis doctrine'.”
16. In S.S. Magnhild v. Mclntyre Bros. & Co.3 McCardie, J. said: (KB p. 330) “So far as I can see the only test seems to be whether the specified things which precede the general words can be placed under some common category. By this I understand that the specified things must possess some common and dominant feature.”
17. In Tribhuban Parkash Nayyar v. Union of India4 the Court said: (SCC p. 106, para 13 : SCR p. 740)
“... The rule reflects an attempt to reconcile incompatibility between the specific and general words, in view of the other rules of interpretation, that all words in a statute are given effect if possible, that a statute is to be construed as a whole and that no words in a statute are presumed to be superfluous....”
18. In U.P. SEB v. Hari Shanker5 it was observed: (SCC p. 30, para 15 : AIR p. 73)
“... The true scope of the rule of 'ejusdem generis' is that words of a general nature following specific and particular words should be construed as limited to things which are of the same nature as those specified. But the rule is one which has to be 'applied with caution and not pushed too far'. ...”
19. The preceding words in the statutory provision which, under this particular rule of construction, control and limit the meaning of the subsequent words must represent a genus or a family which admits of a number of species or members. If there is only one species it cannot supply the idea of a genus.” Therefore, applying the legal maxim ejusdem generis, particularly when there is no contra legislative intend together with the object and reasoning of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, we are of the view that the word 'post' would also include the 'tower' as well.
15. Interpretation of a word:
In order to understood the provisions contained in the Statute, one has to read the entire Statute as a whole. Interpretation depends upon the text and the context. The Court has to find out the intention from the words vis-a-vis the Act. When an interpretation leads to absurdity making the very act itself as redundant or otiose, then such an interpretation will have to be eschewed. The Court has to consider the circumstances under which the enactment has been made. Therefore, the real intention of the legislature will have to be seen by making a overall assessment of the entire provisions of the Act particularly with reference to its object and reasoning.
16. Justice Chinnappa Reddy in his own inimitable style, while considering the mode of interpretation of a provision in RBI v. Peerles General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd., 1987(1) SCC 424 has held as follows: “33. Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at, in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute- maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear different than when the statute is looked at without the glasses provided by the context. With these glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that every word has a place and everything is in its place.”
The said judgment has been quoted with approval in Zameer Ahmed Latiful Rehman Sheikh v. State of Maharashtra, 2010 (5) SCC 246 and in a recent pronouncement in Afjal Imam v. State of Bihar, (2011) 5 Supreme Court Cases 729.
17. Justice Frankin in Guiseppi v. Walling, 144F (2d) 608 (pp 620) has observed as follows:
“The necessary generality in the wordings of many statues, and ineptness of drafting in others frequently compels the Court, as best at they can to fill in the gaps, an activity which no matter how one may label it, is in part legislative. Thus the Courts in their way, as administrators, in their way perform the task of supplementing statues. In the case of Courts we call it “interpretation” or “filling the gaps” in the case of administrators we call it “delegation” or authority to supply the details.”
18. Justice G.P. Singh in Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 12th edition has observed as follows:
“... a statute must be read as a whole as words are to be understood in their context. Extension of this rule of context permits reference to other statutes in pari materia i.e. statues dealing with the same subject-matter or forming part of the same system.”
19. Considering the rule of interpretation, it has been held in Yahoo! Inc (Formerly 'Overture Service Inc.') v. Intellectual Property Appellate Board (DB), 2010(5) CTC 625 in the following manner:
“ 18. A literal interpretation is not the only way of interpretation. One has to consider the circumstances under which a provision of law has been made to find out the actual meaning. In this connection, the following passage in R.L.Arora v. State of U.P., AIR 1964 SC 1230 is extracted hereunder:
9. ... Further, a literal interpretation is not always the only interpretation of a provision in a statute and the court has to look at the setting in which the words are used and the circumstances in which the law came to be passed to decide whether there is something implicit behind the words actually used which would control the literal meaning of the words used in a provision of the statute. It is permissible to control the wide language used in a statute if that is possible by the setting in which the words are used and the intention of the law-making body which may be apparent from the circumstances in which the particular provision came to be made.”
The said ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court has been quoted with approval in Surjit Singh v. Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited, 2009 (16) SCC 722.
19. Craies in his book on Statue Law has observed as follows: “... It is the duty of Courts of justice to try to get at the real intention of the legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute to be construed' .. that in each case you must look to the subject-matter, consider the importance of the provision and the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured by the Act, and upon a review of the case in that aspect decide whether the enactment is what is called imperative or only directory.”
20. Oliver Wendell Holmes has stated thus:
“It is sometimes more important to emphasise the obvious than to elucidate the obscure.”
21. The said principles have also been approved in Jenary J.R. v. S.Rajeevan and Others,2010(5) SCC 798. In Special Land Acquisition Officer v. Kariogowda And Others, 2010 (5) SCC 708 it is held as follows:
“30. At the cost of some repetition, we may notice that the provisions of Sections 23 and 24 of the Act have been enacted by the legislature with certain objects in mind. The intention of the legislature is an important factor in relation to interpretation of statutes. The statute law and the case law go side by side and quite often the relationship between them is supplementary. In other words, interpretation is guided by the spirit of the enactment. Interpretation can be literal or functional. Literal interpretation would not look beyond litera legis, while functional interpretation may make some deviation to the letter of the law. Unless the law is logically defective and suffers from conceptual and inherent ambiguity, it should be given its literal meaning.
31. The principle of construction of law is stated by Holmes, J. as under: “You construe a particular clause or expression by construing the whole instrument and any dominant purposes that it may express. In fact, intention is a residuary clause intended to gather up whatever other aids there may be to interpretation besides the particular words and the dictionary.”
20. Justice K.Jaganatha Shetty in Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama, (1990) 1 SCC 277 observed in the following manner: “16. The paramount object in statutory interpretation is to discover what the legislature intended. This intention is primarily to be ascertained from the text of enactment in question. That does not mean the text is to be construed merely as a piece of prose, without reference to its nature or purpose. A statute is neither a literary text nor a divine revelation.” Therefore, considering the ratio laid down above, we are of the considered view that the respondent No.1 has got every power and authority to erect the tower.
21. Purposive Interpretation:
It is trite law that if the Court is convinced the purpose for which the enactment has been made, then such interpretation which would make the provision workable will have to be given. Further, a construction of Statute must sub- serve the tests of justice and reasoning in order to achieve the objects and the Court will have to read into the objects. It has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in N.Kannadasan v. Ajoy Khose, (2009) 7 Supreme Court Cases 1, while dealing with purposive interpretation in the following manner: “55. Construction of a statute, as is well known, must subserve the tests of justice and reason. It is a well-settled principle of law that in a given case with a view to give complete and effective meaning to a statutory provision, some words can be read into; some words can be subtracted. Provisions of a statute can be read down (although sparingly and rarely).
56. In Carew and Co. Ltd. v. Union of India8 Krishna Iyer, J. opined: (SCC p. 802, para 21)
“21. The law is not 'a brooding omnipotence in the sky' but a pragmatic instrument of social order. It is an operational art controlling economic life, and interpretative effort must be imbued with the statutory purpose. No doubt, grammar is a good guide to meaning but a bad master to dictate. Notwithstanding the traditional view that grammatical construction is the golden rule, Justice Frankfurter used words of practical wisdom when he observed##: (US p. 138) 'There is no surer way to misread a document than to read it literally.' “
57. Yet again, in K.P. Varghese v. ITO9 the strict literal reading of a statute was avoided as by reason thereof several vital considerations, which must always be borne in mind, would be ignored, stating: (SCC p. 180, para 5) “5. The task of interpretation of a statutory enactment is not a mechanical task. It is more than a mere reading of mathematical formulae because few words possess the precision of mathematical symbols. It is an attempt to discover the intent of the legislature from the language used by it and it must always be remembered that language is at best an imperfect instrument for the expression of human thought and as pointed out by Lord Denning, it would be idle to expect every statutory provision to be 'drafted with divine prescience and perfect clarity'. We can do no better than repeat the famous words of Judge Learned Hand when he said:
'... it is true that the words used, even in their literal sense, are the primary and ordinarily the most reliable, source of interpreting the meaning of any writing: be it a statute, a contract or anything else. But it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning.'
* * *
'... the meaning of a sentence may be more than that of the separate words, as a melody is more than the notes, and no degree of particularity can ever obviate recourse to the setting in which all appear, and which all collectively create.' “
In the aforementioned case, therefore, some words were read into and the plain and natural construction was not given.
58. In Bhudan Singh v. Nabi Bux10 this Court held: (SCC p. 485, para 9) “9. The object of every legislation is to advance public welfare. In other words as observed by Crawford in his book on Statutory Constructions that the entire legislative process is influenced by considerations of justice and reason. Justice and reason constitute the great general legislative intent in every piece of legislation. Consequently where the suggested construction operates harshly, ridiculously or in any other manner contrary to prevailing conceptions of justice and reason, in most instance, it would seem that the apparent or suggested meaning of the statute, was not the one intended by the lawmakers. In the absence of some other indication that the harsh or ridiculous effect was actually intended by the legislature, there is little reason to believe that it represents the legislative intent.
59. This Court in Atma Ram Mittal v. Ishwar Singh Punia11 held: (SCC p. 289, para 9)
“9. Judicial time and energy is more often than not consumed in finding what is the intention of Parliament or in other words, the will of the people. Blackstone tells us that the fairest and most rational method to interpret the will of the legislator is by exploring his intentions at the time when the law was made, by signs most natural and probable. And these signs are either the words, the context, the subject-matter, the effects and consequence, or the spirit and reason of the law. See Commentaries on the Laws of England (facsimile of 1st Edn. of 1765, University of Chicago Press, 1979, Vol. 1, p. 59).” (emphasis in original)
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60. In High Court of Gujarat v. Gujarat Kishan Mazdoor Panchayat12 this Court noticed: (SCC pp. 733-34, paras 33 & 38)
“33. In United Bank of India v. Abhijit Tea Co. (P) Ltd.13 this Court noticed: (SCC p. 366, para 25)
'25. In regard to purposive interpretation, Justice Frankfurter observed as follows:
“Legislation has an aim, it seeks to obviate some mischief, to supply an inadequacy, to effect a change of policy, to formulate a plan of Government. That aim, that policy is not drawn, like nitrogen, out of the air; it is evidenced in the language of the statute, as read in the light of other external manifestations of purpose [Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Columbia LR 527, at p. 538 (1947)].”
(emphasis in original)
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38. In The Interpretation and Application of Statutes by Reed Dickerson, the author at p. 135 has discussed the subject while dealing with the importance of context of the statute in the following terms:
'... The essence of the language is to reflect, express, and perhaps even affect the conceptual matrix of established ideas and values that identifies the culture to which it belongs. For this reason, language has been called “conceptual map of human experience”.' “
61. In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Nusli Neville Wadia14 this Court held: (SCC p. 297, para 52)
“52. Barak in his exhaustive work on 'Purposive Construction' explains various meanings attributed to the term 'purpose'. It would be in the fitness of discussion to refer to Purposive Construction in Barak's words: 'Hart and Sachs also appear to treat “purpose” as a subjective concept. I say “appear” because, although Hart and Sachs claim that the interpreter should imagine himself or herself in the legislator's shoes, they introduce two elements of objectivity: First, the interpreter should assume that the legislature is composed of reasonable people seeking to achieve reasonable goals in a reasonable manner; and second, the interpreter should accept the non- rebuttable presumption that members of the legislative body sought to fulfil their constitutional duties in good faith. This formulation allows the interpreter to inquire not into the subjective intent of the author, but rather the intent the author would have had, had he or she acted reasonably.' [Aharon Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law, (2007) at p. 87.]”
62. In Union of India v. Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd.15 this Court held that the principles of purposive construction may be employed for making an exemption notification a workable one.
63. We may notice that in R. (Quintavalle) v. Secy. of State for Health16, the House of Lords stated the law as under: (WLR pp. 697 & 702, paras 8 & 21) “8. The basic task of the court is to ascertain and give effect to the true meaning of what Parliament has said in the enactment to be construed. But that is not to say that attention should be confined and a literal interpretation given to the particular provisions which give rise to difficulty. Such an approach not only encourages immense prolixity in drafting, since the draftsman will feel obliged to provide expressly for every contingency which may possibly arise. It may also (under the banner of loyalty to the will of Parliament) lead to the frustration of that will, because undue concentration on the minutiae of the enactment may lead the court to neglect the purpose which Parliament intended to achieve when it enacted the statute. Every statute other than a pure consolidating statute is, after all, enacted to make some change, or address some problem, or remove some blemish, or effect some improvement in the national life. The court's task, within the permissible bounds of interpretation, is to give effect to Parliament's purpose. So the controversial provisions should be read in the context of the statute as a whole, and the statute as a whole should be read in the historical context of the situation which led to its enactment. * * *
21. The pendulum has swung towards purposive methods of construction. This change was not initiated by the teleological approach of European Community jurisprudence, and the influence of European legal culture generally, but it has been accelerated by European ideas: see, however, a classic early statement of the purposive approach by Lord Blackburn in River Wear Commrs. v. William Adamson17, AC at p. 763. In any event, nowadays the shift towards purposive interpretation is not in doubt.”
Therefore on the principle of reading down and purposive interpretation we are of the view that the word 'tower' forms part of the word 'post' as stipulated under Section 3 of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885.
22. Scope of Sections 10 and 16 of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885: The power under Section 10 of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 is rather wide and extensive. While exercising the power, it is not necessary for the respondent No.1 to put the individuals, who owned the land on notice. Admittedly, the respondent No.1 has got power under Sections 10 and 16 of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885. Such a power has been conferred upon the respondent No.1 in public interest. The exercise of the said power by erecting the towers with overhead lines would not amount to an acquisition. It is true that such an action would diminish the value of the property of an individual, but at the same time it cannot be termed as an acquisition. Since Section 16 of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 provides mechanism of compensation, the appellants can have no grievance.
23. Section 16 of the Indian Telegraph Act provides for a mechanism by which the respondent No.1 can approach the second respondent, if there is an obstruction or resistance. It is not necessary that in each and every case the respondent No.1 will have to approach the second respondent whenever there is an objection. The word objection has got a different connotation than the words resistance or obstruction. A resistance or obstruction would mean preventing the statutory body from carrying out the public duty. Whereas an objection is merely a form of protest. Further, under Section 16 of the Indian Telegraph Act, the respondent No.2 has got no power to go into the merits of the case and find out as to whether the alignment proposed is correct or not and there is any possibility of realignment. The prescription of Section 16 of the Indian Telegraph Act is very specific to provide aid to the respondent No.1 to perform its statutory duty. Considering the scope of Section 10 of the Indian Telegraph Act vis-a-vis Section 16 of the Indian Telegraph Act, it has been held by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Scindia Potteries v. Purolator India Ltd., AIR 1980 Delhi 157 as follows:
“9. .. The exercise of power under Section 10 is not conditional on compliance with the provisions of Section 16(1) of the Act. The power given under Sec. 10 is absolute. It is only when there is a resistance or obstruction in the exercise of that power that the occasion to approach the District Magistrate arises. If there is no resistance or obstruction, there is no occasion for the telegraph authority to approach the District Magistrate. The alleged oral protest relied upon by the appellant appears to us to be a made up story. Two telegraph poles were affixed on the appellants' property in February, 1974. The telephone lines and connections were thereafter given from time to time. Till the landlord-tenant dispute arose between the appellant and M/s.Purolator India Ltd., no objection was raised by the appellant. No doubt in April, 1978 the appellant gave notice to the telegraph authority under Sections 17 and 19A of the Act and may be that the telephone connections in May, 1978 can be treated as the ones objected to but then Sections 17 and 19A have a different purport. The resistance and obstruction envisaged by Section 16(1) of the Act is different. This will be clear on a reading of sub-section (1) of Section 16 of the Act. It is for the purpose of Section 188 I.P.C. that an application is to be given under Section 16(1) of the Act to the District Magistrate. Section 188, I.P.C. makes the disobedience of an order duly promulgated by the public servant an offence. Section 16 is really in aid of the discharge of statutory duty and exercise of statutory power postulated by Section 10.” We are in respectful agreement with the ratio laid down therein.
24. The learned counsel for the appellants made reliance upon the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in Arumugam v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2001 (4) CTC 353. We are afraid that the said case has no relevance to the present case on hand. The Full Bench of this Court was dealing with a conscious omission made by the legislature touching upon Article 21 of the Constitution of India, whereas considering the object behind the Indian Telegraph Act and the Electricity Act, 2003, and in view of the power available under Section 10 of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 the respondent No.1 has got every jurisdiction to erect the towers.
25. The other contentions of the learned counsel for the appellants also do not deserve any consideration. As discussed above, this Court cannot go into the decision made based upon a thorough research and investigation by respondent No.1. There is no material to hold that the respondent No.1 has acted arbitrarily. Hence, in the light of the discussions made above, we do not find any reason to interfere with the order of the learned Single Judge.
26. Accordingly, the Writ Appeal is dismissed. Consequently, connected M.P.(MD) No.1 of 2011 is dismissed and M.P.(MD) No.2 of 2011 is closed. No costs.