A.K. Ganguly, C.J.
1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties including the learned Counsel for the writ petitioner.
2. The facts of the case can be briefly stated as follows:
The appellant, who was the second respondent in the writ petition, filed on 01.07.2002 a complaint before the Tamil Nadu State Human Rights Commission (hereinafter referred to as the 'Commission') alleging that the first respondent herein acted in violation of the human rights of the appellant by physically assaulting him and using filthy language against him without any reason and thus preventing the appellant from recovering his gold ornaments from one M.M.Rangaswamy of Lakshmi Gold Bankers and his agents. We are not going into the merits of those allegations. When such a complaint was filed on 01.07.2002 before the Commission in respect of an incident which took place on 28.02.2002, it was filed very much within one year. On the said complaint being filed, the Commission issued summons on 16.4.2003 and hearing took place before the Commission on 13.05.2003. On 13.05.2003, hearing was adjourned and before further hearing could took place on the adjourned date, a writ petition was filed by the first respondent and a stay was granted by this Hon'ble Court on 16th July, 2003. Thereafter, the writ petition was heard by the learned Judge and by the impugned judgment, the learned Judge was pleased to quash the complaint and allowed the writ petition. Against the said judgment, this appeal has been filed.
3. In the judgment of the writ court, the learned Judge construed the provisions of Section 36(2) of The Protection of Human Rights Act, 1995 (hereinafter referred to as the 'said Act'). The said provision of Section 36(2) of the said Act is set out below.
36. Matters not subject to jurisdiction of the Commission:
(1) ...
(2) The Commission or the State Commission shall not inquire into any matter after the expiry of one year from the date on which the act constituting violation of human rights is alleged to have been committed.
4. Construing the said provision, the learned Judge of the writ court, by considering the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Paramjit Kaur v. State of Punjab and Ors. : 1999CriLJ456 , held that the provision of Section 36(2) of the said Act is mandatory and creates a judicial bar on the Commission in taking up the enquiry of a matter after the period of one year from the date the act constituting the violation of right is alleged to have been committed. The learned Judge also held that there is no provision in the said Act for extending the said period of limitation and only in extra-ordinary circumstances, the complaint can be enquired into after the period of one year, but the learned Judge held that in the instant case there are no extra-ordinary circumstances, for which the Commission can conduct enquiry beyond the period of one year, and as such quashed the proceedings.
5. In this matter, we have appointed Mr. Raja Kalifulla, learned Government Pleader, as amicus curiae, and the learned Government Pleader has fairly assisted the Court.
6. We are unable to accept the aforesaid reasoning of the learned Judge in construing the provisions of Section 36(2) of the said Act for the following reasons.
7. The rationale behind the enactment of the said Act appears from its Statement of Objects and Reasons. From the said Statement of Objects and Reasons, it appears that India is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adopted by the General Assembly of United Nations on 16th December, 1966, and the human rights embodied in the aforesaid international covenants are substantially protected by our National Charter. A growing and abiding concern for Human Rights was felt in this country and abroad in view of changed social realities and the emerging trends in the nature of rights. It was therefore decided to have a law devising efficient and effective method to protect Human Rights and with the same purpose, the said Act was enacted. The Preamble of the said Act also voices the same concern, and it runs as follows:
An Act to provide for the Constitution of a National Human Rights Commission, State Human Rights Commissions in States and Human Rights Courts for better protection of human rights and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.
8. In consonance with the above objectives as manifest in the Statement of Objects and Reasons, and the Preamble of the said Act, the definition of Human Rights under Section 2(d) of the said Act is in very wide terms. Section 2(d) is worded as under:
Human Rights means the rights relating to life, liberty, equality and dignity of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution or embodied in the International Covenants and enforceable by Courts in India:
9. Therefore, any interpretation of Section 36(2) of the said Act must be guided by the governing ideas in enacting the law. So, unless a contrary indication is clearly expressed in the statute, an interpretation which furthers the underlying concept of protecting human rights must be preferred to the one which frustrates it. Going by those principles, we find that in this case, the Commission, after taking the petitioner's complaint on file, in other words after taking cognizance of the said complaint, issued summons. These facts have also been noted by the learned Judge in paragraph-3 of the judgment under appeal. It is stated that the case was taken on file in Case No. 3950 of 2002/SS by the Commission and then summons were issued by the Commission by order dated 16.4.2003 asking the parties to appear before the Commission on 13.05.2003.
10. In the context of these facts, the question is what should be the interpretation of Section 36(2) of the said Act. There are two decisions of the Supreme Court which have been cited.
11. The first one was rendered in the case of Paramjit Kaur v. State of Punjab and Ors. : 1999CriLJ456 . In that case, the learned Judges of the Supreme Court gave certain directions to the Commission on a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution to examine the complaints about violation of human rights in Punjab as disclosed on a CBI report. A question arose whether in view of the provisions under Section 36(2) of the said Act the Commission can enquire into the matter. The Commission by its order overruled the objection. Thereafter, the order of the Commission was challenged before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court upheld the stand of the Commission and held that when the Supreme Court in exercise of the plentitude of its jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution asked the National Human Rights Commission to deal with certain matters, and therefore all the authorities are bound by those directions and have to act in aid of the Supreme Court and the National Human Rights Commission is no exception. The Commission would therefore act 'Sui juris' pursuant to the direction of the Supreme Court and not under the Act, and as such the Hon'ble Supreme Court gave the Commission a free hand and held it is not circumscribed by any conditions. Strictly speaking, the ratio in Paramjit Kaur is not applicable to the facts of this case. In that case, the Commission was directed under the orders of the Hon'ble Supreme Court passed in an Article 32 proceeding.
12. The judgment in N.C. Dhoundial v. Union of India, : AIR2004SC1272 was cited by the learned Counsel for the first respondent in order to urge that in that case Section 36(2) of the said Act has been construed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court to hold that the said section provides a jurisdictional bar on the Commission to enquire into any allegation one year after it has been committed. The learned Counsel also relied on the observation of the Supreme Court in N.C. Dhoundial and argued that the said Act does not contain any provision for extending the period of limitation.
13. Looking to the facts in Dhoundial, we find that in that case, the complaint was lodged after a period of more than four years. The complaint was that one Ashok Kumar Sinha was allegedly wrongfully detained from 25.3.1994 to 3.4.1994 and harsh treatment was meted out to him which aggravated his disease which he was suffering from. But a complaint about violation of his human rights out of the same incident was made before the National Human Rights Commission by Sinha on 19.8.1998. Therefore, the complaint was filed almost four years four months after the alleged incident of unlawful detention. On those facts, the learned Judges of the Supreme Court construed Section 36(2) of the said Act and held that the Commission has no jurisdiction to enquire into the allegation of alleged violation of human rights, since the complaint was lodged more than four years after the incident of alleged wrongful detention. So the ratio in Dhoundial is not attracted here. It is pertinent to note that in Dhoundial case the Hon'ble Supreme Court itself has stated in paragraph 17 that one year period for taking up the enquiry into the complaint, therefore, came to an end by 03.04.1995 since the detention of the complaint ended on 3.4.1994. So it is clear that within one year of the occurrence, the complaint could be preferred before the Commission.
14. In the instant case, the complaint has been lodged by the appellant with the Commission within about four months from the date of the alleged act of violation of human rights. But thereafter the Commission took some time in acting on the complaint. It cannot be said that in view of Section 36(2) of the said Act the Commission is powerless to do so in this case even though complaint was lodged by the appellant before it within four months of the alleged incident.
15. It appears that under Section 13 of the said Act, the Commission has been given power to enquire into the complaints and in doing so, it also shall have powers of the Civil Court to try a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure in certain matters and one of that is summoning and enforcing the attendance of witnesses. Therefore, once the complaint is lodged with the Commission, the time the Commission will take to enquire into the allegations by issuing summons does not depend on the person lodging the complaint. The complainant cannot monitor the proceedings of the Commission. May be in a case of gross delay or negligence on the part of the Commission, the complainant can ask for a Mandamus. Normally the action of the Commission depends upon the pending business before it and some times the Commission is having large pendency of complaints, as is the experience of this Court and Courts all over the Country. In matters of violation of human rights many complaints are now filed before the Commission. So, if we accept the interpretation which has been given by the learned Judge of the writ court on Section 36(2) of the said Act then in most of the cases the Commission will not be able to enquire in respect of complaints made before it within a period of one year from the alleged incident of violation of human rights and the entire provisions of the Act will become a dead letter.
16. It is well settled as a canon of construction that by an interpretative process Court cannot reach a conclusion which makes it impossible for remedies given under the law to be worked out. Any interpretation which is unjust or absurd must be eschewed and the Court must adopt principles of reasonable and harmonious construction in consonance with the avowed statutory purpose. This is known as purposive interpretation. The construction put on Section 36(2) of the said Act by the learned Judge of the writ court makes the whole Act unworkable. Such an interpretation cannot be upheld.
17. Reference in this connection may be made to the well known treatise of Crawford on Statutory Construction. (1940, Saint Louis, Thomas Law Book Company). At page 299-300 of the book. The learned author has formulated:
Similarly, if the construction is absurd, ridiculous or viciously unjust, it should not be accepted
The learned author has further emphasized at page 299 as follows:
If the basic legislative intent is to promote or advance the people's standards of justice and propriety, then it is surely proper for the courts to be concerned with such intent. All laws should, as a result, be construed with reference to this intent
18. In this connection, reference may be made to a somewhat similar provisions in Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 on the question of limitation. Section 20 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, which provides for limitation, runs as follows:
Limitation for actions for contempt: - No Court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed
19. Considering the said section, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Om Prakash Jaiswal v. D.K. Mittal reported in : 2000CriLJ1700 held that proceedings can be said to have been initiated under Section 20 of the Act only when the Court forms an opinion by application of mind that a prima facie case for initiation of proceedings is made out and issue notice to the alleged contemnor to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt. Mere filing of contempt petition and issuance of notice calling upon the alleged contemnor to show cause why contempt proceedings be not initiated against him would not amount to initiation of contempt proceedings for the purpose of Section 20.
20. Later on, a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors. reported in 2001 5 Sup 763 came to hold that the Supreme Court in Om Prakash Jaiswal took too narrow a view of Section 20 and if that view is taken then it is going to cause hardship and will perpetrate injustice. The relevant observations, on the principle of purposive construction which have been made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 42 at page 779 of the report, are set out below:
The decision in Om Prakash Jaiswal case to the effect that initiation of proceedings under Section 20 can only be said to have occurred when the court formed the prima facie opinion that contempt has been committed and issued notice to the contemner to show cause why it should not be punished, is taking too narrow a view of Section 20 which does not seem to be warranted and is not only going to cause hardship but would perpetrate injustice. A provision like Section 20 has to be interpreted having regard to the realities of the situation. For instance, in a case where a contempt of a subordinate court is committed, a report is prepared whether on an application to court or otherwise, and reference made by the subordinate court to the High Court. It is only thereafter that a High Court can take further action under Section 15. In the process, more often than not, a period of one year elapses. If the interpretation of Section 20 put in Om Prakash Jaiswal case is correct, it would mean that notwithstanding both the subordinate court and the High Court being prima facie satisfied that contempt has been committed the High Court would become powerless to take any action. On the other hand, if the filing of an application before the subordinate court or the High Court, making of a reference by a subordinate court on its own motion or the filing of an application before an Advocate-General for permission to initiate contempt proceedings is regarded as initiation by the court for the purposes of Section 20, then such an interpretation would not impinge on or stultify the power of the High Court to punish for contempt which power, dehors the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is enshrined in Article 215 of the Constitution. Such an interpretation of Section 20 would harmonise that section with the powers of the courts to punish for contempt which is recognised by the Constitution.
21. In the present case the provision of Article 215 is not attracted. But from the definition of Human Rights it is clear that Human Rights defined under the said Act encompasses right to life, liberty, equality and dignity of individual guaranteed by the Constitution. Therefore, the Human Rights Commission has to perform very important functions in protecting fundamental rights of the complainant. And the Commission has been set up for that purpose.
22. This Court is therefore of the opinion if a petition is filed by an aggrieved person before the Commission within one year from the date of incident, the period must stop running. The filing of the petition by an aggrieved person before the Commission shall be construed as initiation of the proceedings before the Commission. Same view has been expressed in Pallav Seth on the interpretation of Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Please see the observations in paragraph-40 at page 779 of the report and they are as under:
In other words, the beginning of the action prescribed for taking cognizance of criminal contempt under Section 15 would be initiating the proceedings for contempt and the subsequent action taken thereon of refusal or issuance of a notice or punishment thereafter are only steps following or succeeding to such initiation. Similarly, in the case of a civil contempt filing of an application drawing the attention of the Court is necessary for further steps to be taken under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
22. For the reasons aforesaid, we are constrained to set aside the judgment given by the learned Judge of the writ court.
23. We hold that the complaint, which was filed by the appellant immediately after four months from the date of incident before the State Commission, is filed within time and within the period of limitation prescribed under Section 36(2) of the said Act. The Commission was therefore within its right by issuing summons and conducting hearing on the same. We, therefore, direct the Commission to proceed in the matter in accordance with law. The appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment is quashed. No costs.