Thomas P. Joseph, J.
1. Can the Railway Claims Tribunal (for short, 'the Tribunal') entertain a claim for compensation in respect of an untoward incident that occurred prior to the enactment of the Railway (Amendment) Act 28 of 1994 with effect from 1-8-1994 is the main issue arising for decision in these appeals. Parties are referred to as applicants and respondent as before the Tribunal for convenience.
2. Short facts necessary for consideration of these appeals are: Son of the applicants while travelling in Train No. 6002, Mangalore-Chennai Mail on 24-5-1991 fell down from the train near Thrikkodi Railway Station, sustained serious injuries and succumbed to it. Applicants filed application before the Tribunal in the year 1992 claiming compensation of Rs. 2,00,000/-. That application was dismissed by the Tribunal on 1 -3-1993 for want of jurisdiction since at that time, Tribunal had jurisdiction only to entertain application for compensation arising out of accident to trains. Applicants filed O.S. No. 12 of 1994 in the Sub Court, Quilandy on 30-3-1994 claiming compensation of Rs. 1,00,000/-. While the suit was pending in that court, Section 124A was introduced in the Railways Act, 1989 (for short, 'the Act') by the Railway Amendment Act 28 of 1994 with effect from 1-8-1994. Section 13(IA) was introduced in the Railway Claims Tribunal Act (for short, 'the Tribunal act') by the same Act also effect from 1 -8-1994. Learned Sub judge, Quilandy found that in view of that amendment, jurisdiction to entertain the claim is vested with the Tribunal and accordingly, transferred the case to 36 the Tribunal. Tribunal received the file on 19-9-2001. Respondent before the Tribunal contended that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the claim since the accident had occurred on 24-5-1991 and Section 124A of the Act and Section 13(IA) of the Tribunal Act were introduced only with effect from 1-8-1994 and hence the Tribunal could not entertain the claim. Tribunal recorded evidence, rejected the contention of the respondent and awarded Rs. 4,00,000/- as compensation with interest at the rate of 9% per annum from 19-9-2001, the dateon which case was registered in the Tribunal on transfer from the civil court. Respondent before the Tribunal is aggrieved and preferred M.F.A No. 157 of 2008. Claiming that the tribunal ought to have awarded interest at the rate of 12% from the date of accident or at least from the date of institution of the suit in the Sub Court, Quilandy, applicants have filed M.F.A. No. 125 of 2008.
3. It is contended by learned Counsel for respondent, Union of India that Tribunal went wrong in holding that it has jurisdiction to entertain the claim. Learned Counsel would contend that Sections 124A and 13(IA) were introduced in the respective Statutes only with effect from 1 -8-1994, amendment is only prospective and hence the Tribunal could not have entertained a claim in respect of an incident that occurred prior to the said amendment. Learned Counsel placed reliance on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, in Union of India v. Satish Patidar : AIR2003MP205 . According to learned Counsel for applicants the Tribunal could exercise jurisdiction even in respect of an untoward incident that occurred before 1-8-1994, the court where claim of the applicants was pending could only transfer the same to Tribunal, and placed reliance on the decision of a Division Bench of this Court, in Vijayasankar v. Union of India 1995 (2) KLT 408
4. On the question whether son of the applicants sustained injuries in an 'untoward incident' on the relevant day and succumbed to it, no challenge is made before us. The Tribunal on evidence was satisfied that it was an 'untoward incident' while the deceased was travelling in Train No; 6002 as he accidentally fell down from the train, sustained injuries and succumbed to it. We do not find reason to interfere with that finding.
5. Question is whether in relation to 'untoward incident' that occurred prior to 1-8-1994, Tribunal could exercise jurisdiction. To understand the rival contentions in that regard, it is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions.
6. Section 124A of the Act reads thus:
Compensation of account of untoward incident:- When in the course of working a railway an untoward incident occurs, then whether or not there has been any wrongful act, neglect or default on the part of the railway administration such as would entitle a passenger who has been injured or the dependent of a passenger who had been killed to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, the railway administration contained in any other law, be liable to pay compensation to such extent as may be prescribed and to that extent only for loss occasioned by the death of or injury to, a passenger as a such untoward incident:
Section 13 of the Tribunal Act states:
Jurisdiction, powers and authority of Claims Tribunal,- (1) The Claims Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, all such jurisdiction, powers and authority as were exercisable immediately before that day by any civil court or a Claims Commissioner appointed under the provisions of the Railways Act.
(a) relating to the responsibility of the railway administration as carries under chapter Vii of the Railways Act in respect of claims for-
(i) compensation for loss, destruction, damage, deterioration or non-delivery of animals or goods entrusted to a railway administration for carriage by railway:
(ii) compensation payable under Section 82A of the Railways Act or the rules made thereunder; and
(b) in respect of the claims for refund of fares or part thereof or for refund of any freight paid in respect of animals or goods entrusted to a railway administration to be carried by railway.
(IA) The Claims Tribunal shall also exercise, on and from the date of commencement of the provisions of Section 124A of the Railways Act, 1989 (24 of 1989), all such jurisdiction, powers and authority as were exercisable immediately before of claims for compensation now payable by the railway administration under Section 124A of the said Act or the rules made thereunder.
(2) The provisions of me Railways Act, 1989 (24 of 1989) and the rules made thereunder shall, so for as may be, be applicable to the inquiring into or determining, any claims by the Claims Tribunal under this Act.
Section 24 of the Tribunal Act provides as under:
Transfer of pending cases-(1) Every suit, claim or other legal proceeding (other than an appeal) pending before any court, Claims Commissioner or other authority immediately before the appointed day, or as the case may be, the date of commencement of the provisions of Sub-section (IA) of Section 13 being a suit, claim or proceeding the cause of action whereon it is based is such that it would have been, if it had arisen after the appointed day, or as the case may be, the date of commencement of the provisions of Sub-section (IA) of Section 13 within the jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal, shall stand transferred on that day or, as the case may be, date to the Claims Tribunal.
(2) Where any suit, claim or other legal proceeding stands transferred from any court, Claims Commissioner or other authority to the Claims Tribunal under Sub-section (1)
(a) the Court, Claims Commissioner or other authority shall, as soon as may be after such transfer, forward the records of such suit, claim or other legal proceedings to the Claims Tribunal;
(b) the Claims tribunal may, on receipts of such records, proceed to deal with such suit, claim or other legal proceeding, so far as may be, in the same manner as an application, from the stage which was reached before such transfer or from any earlier stage or de noco as the Claims tribunal may deem fir.
Sections 124A and 13(IA) were introduced by Act 28 of 1994 with effect from 1-8-1994. The words 'or, as the case may be, the date of commencement of me provisions of Sub-section (IA) of Section 13 occurring in Section 24 of the Tribunal Act were also introduced by that amendment.
7. A reading of Section 13-(IA) of the Tribunal Act shows that it confers power on the Tribunal to exercise all such jurisdiction, powers and authority as were exercisable immediately before the appointed day by any civil court of Claims Commissioner relating to matters specified in Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 13(1), Section 15 the Tribunal act States that 'on and from the, appointed day, no Court or other authority shall have, or be entitled to exercise any jurisdiction, powers or authority in relation to the matters referred to in Sub-section (1) and (IA) of Section 13'. Going by Section 15 of the Tribunal Act it is clear that on and from the appointed day (i.e., 1-8-1994) the Civil Court or other authority ceased to. have jurisdiction, power or authority in relation to any matter referred to in Sub-section (1) and (IA) of Section 13 of the Tribunal Act. Sub-section (IA) of Section 13 introduced by amendment is clear that it empowers the Tribunal to exercise' also' all the powers which were till 1-8-1994 exercisable by the civil court in respect of claims for compensation 'now' payable by the Railway Administration. Section 13, it is not in dispute, conferred jurisdiction, power and authority on the Tribunal to entertain claims in respect of an 'untoward incident' from 1-8-1994 onwards. The expression 'also' occurring in Sub-section (IA), in our view is a clear indication that power was conferred on the tribunal with respect to incidents that occurred prior to 1-8-1994 and which till then were exercisable by the civil court. The presence of the words 'in respect of claims for compensation now payable by the railway administration under Section 124A' reinforces our view that the power conferred on the Tribunal under Sub-section (IA) of Section 13 is to deal with claims for compensation arising from incidents which that occurred prior to 1-8-1994 to be brought within the purview of the Tribunal, there was no necessity to introduce Sub-section (IA) in Section 13 specifically using the expressions 'also' and 'now' as above stated, and barring the civil court or any other authority from dealing with such matters on and from 1-8-1994. It is pertinent to note from Section 15 of the Tribunal Act that it expressly ousts jurisdiction of civil court or other authority even with respect to matters regarding which power is conferred on the Tribunal under Sub-section (IA) of Section 13 of the Tribunal Act. The Parliament by the very same Act 28 of 1994 incorporated the words 'or, as the case may be, the date of commencement of the provisions of Sub-section (IA) of Section 13' in Section 24 of the Tribunal Act to make it clear that even in respect of matters pending before the civil court or other authority, such court or other authority shall cease to have jurisdiction by virtue of Section 15 of the Tribunal Act referred above and the civil court or other authority therefore was to transfer such matters to the Tribunal. It is not disputed that until 1-8-1994 civil court had jurisdiction to entertain claims for compensation on the principle on the principle laid down in Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330 for personal injury or death arising in the course of use of train which is now brought within 'Untoward incident' under Section 124A of the Act.
8. Now we shall refer to the decisions relied by the counsel on either side. In Satish Patidar's Case, High Court of Madhya Pradesh took the view that amending Act (Act 28 of 1994) created a new obligation on Railways and that it could not be given a restrospective effect unless such a construction follows from express words or by necessary implication. According to the Division Bench, words used in Section 124A of the Act or in the amending Act did not indicate that Parliament intended to apply the section with retrospective effect and it is not for the court to invent something which it does not find within the words of the Act when the words used in the statute or section are not open to diverse meaning which did not call for any interpretation. That was a case where incident occurred on 14-7-1992 and after enactment of Act 28 of 1994 with effect from 1-8-1994, application was filed claiming compensation under Section 124A of the Act, on 5-8-1996. A request was made to condone the delay in filling the application. Tribunal allowed the application and found that it had jurisdiction to decide the application. Division Bench held that Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the application since the incident has occurred prior to 1-8-1994. This decision, no doubt supports contention of the appellant.
9. In Vijayasankar's Case a Division Bench of this Court has taken a different view. In that case, accident occurred on 26-7-1988. A claim for compensation was made under Section 124 of the Act. Tribunal passed the impugned order on 11-10-1991. It took the view that the fall of the injured from the train was not due to any 'accident to a train' as envisaged in Section 124 of the Act and hence it had no jurisdiction to entertain the claim. Claimant preferred appeal before this Court. It is while so, that Act 28 of 1994 was enacted. Division Bench took note of the amended Section 124A of the Act and Sub-section (IA) of Section 13 of the Tribunal Act introduced by the amendment. Honourable K.T. Thomas, J (as His Lordship then was) speaking for the Division Bench said, after referring to Section 124A of the Act, Sub-section (IA) of Section 13 and Sections 14 and 24 of the Tribunal Act introduced or amended by the amending Act, thus:
In this context it is profitable to refer to Section 24 of the Claims Tribunal Act also. As per that provision every suit pending before any court immediately before the appointed day or on the date of commencement of the provisions of Sub-section (1-A) of Section 13 'being a suit...the cause of action whereon it is based, is such that it would have been, if it had arisen after the appointed day or as the case may be, the date of commencement of the provisions of Sub-section (1-A) of Section 13 within the jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal' shall stand transferred to the Claims Tribunal. When Section 13(1-A) is read along with Section 24 it is clear that Parliament has transplanted the civil court jurisdiction regarding all claims for compensation (relating to trains) with Claims Tribunals from 1 -8-1994 onwards. Even cases which could be held in civil courts before the date could be entertained only by the Claims Tribunal. Similarly those cases which were in fact filed before civil courts prior to the date could only be dealt with by the Claims Tribunal after the date. It cannot, therefore, be contended that Claims Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain the present claim of the appellant.
10. Learned Counsel for the respondent pointed out that in Paragraph 15 of the decision in Satish Patidar's case, Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court declined to endorse the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court in Vijayasankar's case. According to learned Counsel, decision in Vijayasankar's case requires reconsideration. But we note that the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court has observed in paragraph 28(3) of the judgment that 'therefore claimants could have filed the case only on the basis of common law alleging the negligence of the railways before the Civil Court and in such an eventuality after amendment the case would have been liable to be transferred to the Claims Tribunal'. We are inclined to think for reasons stated above that in considering whether provisions introduced by Act 28 of 1994 applied to an incident that occurred prior to 1-8-1994, it makes no much difference whether in respect of that incident a claim had already been made before civil court except, that if already made, civil court had to transfer the claim to the Tribunal concerned. With great respect, we are unable to accept tine view taken in Statish Patidar's case. We are of the view that law on the point has been correctly laid down in Vijayasankar's case. We therefore hold that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to entertain the claim in respect of an 'untoward incident' that occurred prior to the enactment of Act 28 of 1994 with effect from 1-8-1994. Learned Sub Judge has rightly transferred the claim to the Tribunal.
11. A further contention is raised on behalf of respondent that in the suit before the Sub Court, applicants had limited their claim for compensation to Rs. 1,00,000/- but Tribunal awarded Rs. 4,00,000/-. We note from paragraphs 21 and 22 of the impugned judgment that the claim petition was allowed to be amended suitably. Tribunal has stated reasons, relying on binding authorities for awarding compensation of Rs. 4,00,000/ -. In Rathi Menon v. Union of India AIR 2001 SC 1335 the Apex Court pointed out that tribunal has to determine the amount of compensation as on date of such determination as provisions of the Act is meant to afford just and reasonable compensation to the victims. The mere fact that when claim was made before the civil court, applicants who were permitted to sue as indigent persons had limited the claim to Rs. 1,00,000/- considering the huge court fee payable by them though later, cannot disentitle them, as rightly found by the Tribunal to get the amount fixed by the Act. We find no merit in the contention raised by the respondent.
12. In M.F. A. No. 125 of 2008, challenge is to the rate and the date from which interest was awarded. Tribunal awarded interest at the rate of 9% from 19-9-2001 on which day the case file was received in the office of the Tribunal from the Sub Court, Quilandy. According to the applicants they are entitled to get 12% interest from the date of accident or at least from the date of institution of the suit in the Sub Court, Quilandy. We have considered the contention raised by the applicants in that regard. We are of the view that rate of interest to be awarded is a matter within the discretion of the Tribunal, of course to be exercised judicially and taking into account all relevant factors. Tribunal has exercised that discretion and fixed the rate of interest at 9%. It is not shown that discretion was exercised illegally or abitrarilly so as to call for interference in appeal.
13. So far as date from which interest is awarded is concerned, Tribunal has stated reasons for confining it from the date on which records of the case was received in its office. The date on which records were received in its office was deemed to be the date of application and accordingly interest was awarded. We note that in Rathi Menon's case referred supra, Apex Court awarded interest only from date of order passed by the Tribunal. We are not inclined to think that discretion exercised by the Tribunal in awarding interest from the day above referred is arbitrary or illegal requiring interference in appeal.
14. Above discussion leads us to the conclusion that challenge to the award of the Tribunal at the instance of both parties must fail.
15. Resultantly, these appeals fail and are accordingly dismissed. Parties are directed to bear their respective costs in the appeals.