Ranganathan, J.
1. These are three appeals under section 269H(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), from orders passed by Income-tax Appellate Tribunal under section 269G of the said Act. The short but difficult question that has come up for our consideration is as to whether the Tribunal was right in holding that it has no power to condone the delay in the filing of an appeal before it under section 269G, where the appeal as well as the application for condensation of delay in the filing of the appeal have been presented beyond the period mentioned in section 269G(1).
2. A brief factual background may be given. In ITSA Nos. 4 and 5 of 1976, on March 29, 1975, the Competent Authority (as defined in section 269A(b) of the Act) passed two orders under section 269F(6) for the acquisition of two equal moities of a property in Greater Kailash, New Delhi. These orders were served on the appellants on April 3, 1975. The above moities had been transferred by Shri Satya Pal Nayyar and Shri Yash Pal Nayyar in favor of Shri Deen Dayal Goel and Bhagwati Devi, respectively, under registered instruments dated July 27, 1974, for a stated consideration of Rs. 49,000. In the opinion of the Competent Authority, these transfers were vitiated by reason of the provisions contained in section 269C read with section 269F(6) of the Act and, hence, the acquisition orders. Each of the transferees preferred an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal under section 269G of the Act. The appeals were filed on July 9, 1975, and were beyond the time prescribed under section 269G(1) by fifty-seven days. Applications for condensation of delay were filed but these also were filed beyond the period mentioned in section 269G(1) and though the Tribunal found that there was sufficient cause for the delay in the filing of the appeals, it took the view that it had no power to condone the delay and dismissed the appeals accordingly. The appellants have preferred ITSA Nos. 4 and 5 to this court from the orders of the Tribunal.
3. In respect of ITSA No. 6 of 1976, there is only a small difference in material facts. Here, the order under section 269F(6) was passed on May 31, 1974, and was served on the party concerned on June 5, 1974. This was in respect of a transfer of a plot in Punjabi Bagh for an apparent consideration of Rs. 35,000 by two registered sale deeds dated December 29, 1972, and January 1, 1973. An appeal was preferred on July 19, 1974, and was prima facie time-barred. The appellant made an application on February 5, 1975, for condensation of delay in filing the appeal but the Tribunal did not go into this question since it was of the opinion that it had no power to condone the delay in the presentation of the appeal unless the application for condensation had been preferred within the time prescribed in section 269G of the Act.
4. The question in the two appeals before us is the same, namely, whether the Tribunal was right in holding that it had no power to condone the delay unless the application for condensation of delay had been filed within the prescribed time. If this question is answered in the affirmative, then no further problem arises and the appeals have to be dismissed. If, on the other hand, the question is answered in the negative, ITSA Nos. 4 and 5 will have to be remanded to the Tribunal for the appeals before it being admitted and disposed of on merits. ITSA No. 6 of 1976 will have to be remanded to the Tribunal for consideration whether there was sufficient cause for condensation of delay and for disposing of the appeal in the light of the conclusion on this question.
5. It may be convenient at this stage to set out some of the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961, which have a bearing on the question before us. The Act provides for various types of applications and appeals being made or filed there under within a prescribed period. Some of these provisions need to be touched upon. Section 184 deals with an application for registration. Sub-section (4) reads as under :
'(4) The application shall be made before the end of the previous year for the assessment year in respect of which registration is sought :
Provided that the Income-tax Officer may entertain an application made after the end of the previous year, if he is satisfied that the firm was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application before the end of the previous year.'
6. Reference may next be made to section 249, which provides for an appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner or the Commissioner (Appeals) from an order of the Income-tax Officer. Sub-section (2) provides for a period of 30 days within which the appeal is to be preferred and sub-section (3) reads as under :
'(3) The Appellate Assistant Commissioner [or, as the case may be, the Commissioner (Appeals)] may admit an appeal after the expiration of the said period if he is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not presenting it within that period.'
7. The next stage is of appeal/cross-objections against the order of the Appellant Assistant Commissioner before the Appellate Tribunal. Section 253(3) and (4) provide for a period of 60 days within which an appeal/cross-objection is to be preferred. Sub-section (5) says :
'The Appellate Tribunal may admit an appeal or permit the filing of a memorandum of cross-objections after the expiry of the relevant period referred to in sub-section (3) or sub-section (4), if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not presenting it within that period.'
8. We may now refer to section 264 which provides for an application to the Commissioner of Income-tax for revision of an order of the subordinate authority. Such an application is to be preferred normally within a period of one year but under the proviso to section 264(3) :
'Provided that the Commissioner may, if he is satisfied that the assessed was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within that period, admit an application made after the expiry of that period.'
9. We next come to section 256 which provides for an application to the Appellate Tribunal to state a case to the High Court on a question of law, which has to be presented within a period of sixty days. But the proviso to section 256(1) says :
'Provided that the Appellate Tribunal may, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the application within the period hereinbefore specified, allow it to be presented with in a further period of not exceeding thirty days.'
10. These are instances of Provisions where there is the prescription of a period of limitation coupled with a full or limited power to condone the delay in suitable cases.
11. Now, reference may be made to certain provisions of the Act which provide for the making of an application within a specified period but do not provide for what is to happen if the application is not preferred within the time mentioned. Under section 146 (which has recently been made inapplicable in future), an assessed could apply within one month of the assessment made under section 144 to the Income-tax Officer for cancellation of the assessment on certain grounds. But there is no provision in the Act for condensation of delay in the preferring or making of such an application. Again, under section 154 of the Act, an assessed may seek to have certain orders rectified. Though there is no time-limit within which the application is to be preferred, the order of rectification has to be made within a period of four years from the date of the order sought to be rectified. This section also contains no provision for any relief or condensation where the application for rectification itself is preferred after the period of four years above mentioned. We then come to section 256(2) which provides for an application to the High Court, where the Tribunal refuses to state a case. Such an application has to be preferred within six months from the date of the service of the notice of an order by the Tribunal, but here again there is no specific provision as to what is to happen if the application itself is preferred beyond the period of six months.
12. It is in the context of these provisions that we have to construe section 269G. Section 269G occurs in Chapter XX-A relating to the acquisition of immovable properties. Under section 269C read with section 269F, the Competent Authority can acquire certain properties in certain circumstances by passing an order under sub-section (6) of section 269F. Under sub-section (8) of section 269F, the Competent Authority is required to serve a copy of the order on the transfero, the transferee and on every person who has made objections against the acquisition. Where such an order is passed, the aggrieved party may appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. Where the aggrieved party is the transferor or transferee or any other person referred to in sub-section (8) of section 269F, the appeal has to be preferred within a period of 45 days from the date of the order, or a period of 30 days from the date of the service of a copy of the order on such person referred to in sub-section (8) whichever period expires later. If the appeal is preferred by any other person who is interested in the property that is acquired, the appeal has to be preferred within 45 days from the date of the order of acquisition. Having stated this, the proviso to section 269G(1) reads as follows :
'Provided that the Appellate Tribunal may, on an application made in this behalf before the expiry of the said period of forty-five days or, as the case may be, thirty days, permit, by order, the appeal to be presented within such further period as may be specified therein if the applicant satisfies the Appellate Tribunal that he has sufficient cause for not being able to present the appeal within the said period of forty-five days or, as the case may be, thirty days.'
13. Before proceeding further, the provisions of section 269H may also be extracted :
'269H. (1) The Commissioner or any person aggrieved by any order of the Appellate Tribunal under section 269G may, within sixty days of the date on which he is served with notice of such order under that section, prefer an appeal against such order to the High Court on any question of law :
Provided that the High Court may, on an application made in this behalf before the expiry of the said period of sixty days, permit, by order, the appeal to be presented within such further period as may be specified therein, if the applicant satisfied the High Court that he has sufficient cause for not being able to present the appeal within the said period of sixty days.'
14. The provision for condensation of delay here is couched in language similar to that contained in section 269G.
15. One more provision that may be relevant for our purposes is sub-section (8) of section 269G which provides that every appeal shall be disposed of as expeditiously as possible and that an endeavor shall be made to dispose of such an appeal within 90 days from the date on which it is presented.
16. Looked at in the above background, the line of reasoning in support of the decision of the Tribunal in the cases under appeal is easily discernible. Under the scheme of the Act, wherever a time-limit is provided for the making of an application or the preferment of an appeal and the Legislature intends that any delay in the making of such an application or preferment of such an appeal may be condoned, it says so expressly. In some situations such as in sections 146 and 154, the Legislature does not presumably intend any delay being condoned at all. In other situations, such as in sections 249, 253 and 264, a very wide discretion to condone the delay is given to the appropriate Tribunal. In yet other situations, such as in section 256(1), there is a provision for condensation of delay but only up to a specific extent. So far as sections 269G and 269H are concerned, the statute expressly provides that any application for condensation of delay must be preferred before the expiry of the period of 45 days, 30 days or 60 days, as the case may be. In the cases under appeal, it is common ground that the appeals as well as condensation applications were presented beyond the period mentioned in section 269G(1). That being so, the Tribunal held that, under the scheme of the Act, it was clear that it had no power to condone the delay and the appeals had to be dismissed, even though it also found as a fact, in ITSA Nos. 4 and 5, that there was sufficient cause for the delay in the making of the application by the assessed. The question is whether this view taken by the Tribunal is correct.
17. To start with, there can be No quarrel with the settled proposition that a right of appeal is not an inherent right but is one that is conferred by the statute and has to be exercised strictly in conformity with the statutory provisions which create it. If thE statute limits the time within which an appeal can be filed, it has to be filed within the period so limited. Any power of condensation of delay in doing so has to be traced either to the provisions of the special statute under consideration or to the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963. Under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, as well as under the 1961 Act, there have been a number of decided cases which have consistently held that a delay in the making of an application or the filing of an appeal for which a period of limitation is prescribed under the Act can be condoned only if there is a specific provision in the special Act itself enabling such condensation and that, in the absence of such a specific provision, the general provisions of the Limitation Act cannot be relied upon to seek such condensation. An extreme example of this may be given. As pointed out earlier, section 146 of the Income-tax Act makes no provision for condensation of delay and it has been held, quite recently and following an earlier decision, that an application for setting aside an ex parte assessment filed beyond the period of one month mentioned in section 146 cannot be entertained : vide CIT v. Gupta & Sons P. Ltd. : [1984]146ITR506(MP) . So also, under section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, an application seeking reference to the High Court had to be preferred before the Tribunal within 60 days of the date of service of the appellate order and there was no provision for condensation of delay. A large number of cases held that neither the Tribunal nor the High Court had any power to condone any delay in making such an application on any ground whatsoever. These cases are collected in footnote 15 at page 1151 of Vol. I of the 7th edition of Kanga Palkhivala on he Law and Practice of Income Tax. This line of decisions is also strongly relied upon on behalf of the Department to support the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal. It is argued that the Income-tax Act is a special enactment which is a completely self-contained code and it is not permissible to invoke the provisions of the Limitation Act in order to seek a relief which does not find specific mention in the Income-tax Act itself.
18. Mr. A. B. Saharya, who addressed the principal arguments on behalf of the appellants, put forward his submissions in three parts : Firstly, he urged that the decisions relied upon for the Department were rendered in the light of the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, but section 29 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, has since been replaced by a new section 29 in the Limitation Act, 1963. According to him, the two provisions are substantially different and the new provisions which are currently applicable warrant a totally different approach and call for a different interpretation altogether. For the purpose of convenience, the two provisions may be set out side by side :
INDIAN LIMITATION ACT, 1908 LIMITATION ACT, 1963s. 29(1)..... s. 29(1).....(2) Where any special or local law (2) Where any special or localprescribes for any suit, appeal or law prescribes for any suit,application a period of limitation appeal or application a perioddifferent from the period of limitation different fromprescribed thereforee by the First the period prescribed by theSchedule, the provisions of section Schedule, the provisions of3 shall apply, as if such period section 3 shall apply as ifwere prescribed thereforee in that such period were the periodSchedule, and for the purpose of prescribed by the Schedule anddetermining any period of for the purpose of determininglimitation prescribed for any suit, any period of limitationappeal or application by any prescribed for any suit, appealspecial or local law- or application by any specialor local law, the provisions(a) the provisions contained contained in sections 4 to 24in section 4, sections 9 to 18, and (inclusive) shall apply only insection 22 shall apply only in so so far as, and to the extent tofar as, and to the extent of which, which, they are not expresslythey are not expressly excluded by excluded by such special orsuch special or local law ; and local law.(b) the remaining provisions ofthis Act shall not apply.
19. Mr. Saharya points out that under the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, section 29 excluded the applicability of section 5 of the said Act specifically. It was, thereforee, necessary for any special enactment which described the incorporation of the principle of section 5 in regard to any suit, application or appeal to specifically so provide. That is why the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, as well as the Income-tax Act, 1961, contained special provisions analogous to those of section 5. He submitted that, after the Limitation Act, 1963, has come into force, any special law like the Income-tax Act has to be construed in the light of the said Act and if this is done, he submitted, it will be clear that the provisions of section 5 are automatically attracted in a]] cases for the computation of the period of limitation under the special or local laws. They can be excluded only in so far as and to the extent to which the special law excludes such application.
20. Secondly, anticipating a possible objection that the provisions of the Limitation Act can have application only to appeals and applications made before a court and not those before a tribunal, Shri Saharya contended that this is not so and that the language of section 29 is wide enough to cover even appeals or applications before a tribunal. In this context, he drew our attention to a series of decisions regarding the effect of section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and pointed out that these decisions have unanimously held that the provisions of section 5 were attracted in all cases where the limitation is to be computed under a special law, even where the appeal or application lay not to a court but to a tribunal. He drew our attention in this context to the preamble to the Limitation Act, 1963, the language of section 5 of the said Act as well as to the modifications effected by the said Act to the provisions contained in the earlier Act.
21. Thirdly, turning to the provisions of section 269G(1), Mr. Saharya contended that the proviso to this sub-section cannot be said to expressly exclude the applicability of section 5 of the Limitation Act. He placed great emphasis on the language of this proviso which, he said, has been deliberately worded differently from the provisos in sections 246, 249 and 253 earlier referred to. He urged that this proviso did not at all deal with the topic of condensation of any delay in the filing of an appeal beyond a prescribed period of limitation, as did the provisos to sections 249, 253 or 264 of the Act. This proviso is one which really extends the period of limitation in certain cases. According to Mr. Saharya, section 269G(1) read with the proviso leads to the result that the appeal has normally to be filed within the period of 45 days or 30 days prescribed in sub-section (1) but that this period will stand extended to a further date to be specified by the Tribunal where an application is made to it before the prescribed period explaining why it is not possible to file the appeal within the prescribed period. Thus viewed, he contended, there is no repugnance between the proviso and the applicability of section 5 of the Limitation Act. According to him, the position is this :
(a) If the appeal is filed within the period of 45 days or 30 days mentioned in section 269G(1), there is no difficulty.
(b) If the appellant anticipates that he will not be in a position to file the appeal within the period of 45 days or 30 days and makes an application to the Tribunal within the said period, it was open to the Tribunal to extend the period of limitation and the appeal can be filed within the extended period of limitation.
(c) In either of the above cases, if there is delay either beyond the period of 45 days or 30 days prescribed in the sub-section or the further period up to which the Tribunal extends the period of limitation, it was open to the appellant at any time to invoke the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act and to seek the condensation of delay in the filing of the appeal.
22. Sri Saharya, thereforee, submitted that there is nothing in the language of any of the provisions of the Income-tax Act, and more particularly in the language of sections 269G and 269H, which precludes the assessed from seeking condensation of delay where the appeal could not be filed within the specified period or the extended period. The Tribunal, having held in ITSA Nos. 4 and 5 of 1976 that there was sufficient cause for the delay in the filing of the appeal, should have entertained the appeals instead of dismissing them on the ground of limitation. In support of his contention, Mr. Saharya referred to the following decisions : Adinaranappa v. Mallamma, AIR 1950 Mys 13; State of West Bengal v. Moti Lal Kanoria, : 1966CriLJ1210 ; Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra, : [1974]3SCR31 ; Subhadramani Dhal v. Jagannath Patra, : AIR1975Ori30 ; Mangu Ram v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, : 1976CriLJ179 ; Mohd. Ashfaq v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, U. P., : [1977]1SCR563 ; Kerala State Electricity Board v. T. P. Kunhaliumma, : [1977]1SCR996 ; Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Madanlal Dan & Sons : [1977]1SCR683 ; Raj Chopra v. Shanno Devi, : AIR1981Delhi18 ; CIT v. Trilokinath : [1984]147ITR613(MP) and Manoj Ahuja v. Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax .
23. Shri Dhir, who appeared on behalf of the appellant in ITSA No. 6 of 1976, adopted the arguments of Mr. Saharya. He referred to the decisions in Mahesh Harilal Khaman v. B. N. Narasimhan, : AIR1982Guj298 , and Nirmal Khosla v. Union of India, , in support of his contention that the delay in the filing of the appeal in his case should have been condoned by the Tribunal.
24. In reply, Shri Wadhera, learned counsel for the Department, in addition to the line of cases indicated earlier, drew our attention to the following decisions : Siha Singh v. Sundur Singh, AIR 1921 Lah 280; Lata Mangeshkar v. Union of India : [1959]36ITR527(Bom) ; Laxminarayan R. Rathi v. ITO [1963] 52 ITR 254 ; New Savan Sugar and Gur Refining Co. Ltd. v. CIT : [1969]74ITR7(SC) ; Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Parson Tools and Plants : [1975]3SCR743 ; Cochin Co. v. CIT : [1978]114ITR822(Ker) ; Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax (Acquisition) v. Kedar Nath Jhunjhunwalla : [1982]133ITR746(Patna) ; Ghanshyamdas Gopaldas Mohta v. Union of India : [1983]139ITR1013(Bom) ; Rambhai Manja Nayak v. Union of India : [1983]142ITR211(Guj) ; CIT v. Gupta & Sons P. Ltd. : [1984]146ITR506(MP) and A. Gupta Trust Estate v. CWT .
25. We have heard the learned counsel at great length having regard to the importance and the possibility of frequent recurrence of the issue involved. We are of the opinion that a decision of this issue should be based entirely on the interpretation to be placed on the provisions of section 269G(l) in the context and the scheme of various provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961. In our view, it is not necessary to travel over the wider issues that were raised by the counsel for the appellant. We do not, thereforee, propose to deal in detail with the provisions of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, and the Income-tax Act, 1961, or the numerous decisions thereon which have been rendered in different contexts. We do not propose to dwell upon the impact of the modifications effected by section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963, in the corresponding provision of the earlier enactment. We do not also wish to discuss the question whether the language of the new section 29(2) is wide enough to attract the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act to proceedings not before a court but before a Tribunal, as one possible view is that section 29(2) only enables the application of section 5 to appeals and applications under special or local law but contains nothing to enlarge the applicability of section 5 which is, on its terms, applicable only to courts. We shall assume for the purpose of these cases (as contended for by the learned counsel for the appellant), (i) that the provisions of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act can be invoked for interpreting the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (ii) that this provision is attracted not only in respect of proceedings before courts but also in respect of proceedings before the Tribunals like the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal; and (iii) that, thereforee, the provisions of sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act will apply in so far as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
26. Granting these premises in favor of the appellant, the short question that comes up for our consideration is as to whether the proviso to section 269G(1) can be said to expressly exclude the application of section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act in regard to appeals before the Tribunal under that section. This question involves two aspects which we now proceed to discuss.
27. The first aspect is whether the application of section 5 of the Limitation Act can be said to be excluded by section 269G unless the latter section refers specifically to the former section and expressly excludes its applicability. On this aspect, it is now well established that, in order to exclude the application of any of the provisions of the Limitation Act, that provision need not be expressly referred to and specifically excluded by the special or local law. What is necessary is to find out whether there is a sufficiently clear indication in the language of the special or local law which would make the application of the provisions of sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act or any one of them inconsistent with, or redundant to, its scheme. Reference may be made in this context to the decision of the Supreme Court in Hukumdev v. Lalit Narain, : [1974]3SCR31 . I11ustrations of provisions which have been considered as excluding the application of the Limitation Act are found in the decisions in Bhagwan Das v. Delhi Administration, : 1975CriLJ1091 and Mohd. Ashfaq v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, : [1977]1SCR563 . A situation in which such exclusion could not be inferred may be seen in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Madanlal Das & Sons : [1977]1SCR683 . In the light of these decisions, it is clear that the provisions of section 5 may be inapplicable, notwithstanding the absence of any specific reference to it, if such exclusion can be spelt out even otherwise having regard to the object, scheme and context of section 269.
28. Turning now to the second aspect, the short point to be considered is whether, in the context of section 269G and having regard to the scheme of the Income-tax Act, the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act are or are not intended to be applicable. Having considered the matter carefully from all aspects, we have come to the conclusion that the scheme, context and language of section 269G exclude the applicability of section 5 of the Limitation Act. We say so, primarily, on three grounds :
29. In the first place, a perusal of the various sections of the Income-tax Act which contain provisions of this nature and which have been extracted earlier, would clearly show that, whether enacted before 1963 or after 1963, these provisions have clearly touched upon the question of delay in the filing of an appeal or application and provided for the situation in different ways at different places. As already pointed out, in some cases no provision for condensation of delay has been enacted; in certain other places, provisions for condition on the same lines as section 5 of the Limitation Act has been introduced and in yet other places, provision for condensation of delay exists but the period of delay in respect of which condensation can be granted is limited in some way or the other. It is, thereforee, clear that under the scheme of the Income-tax Act, the question of condensation of delay has to be decided in the light of the express provisions contained in the section itself and not on general principles incorporated in the provisions of the Limitation Act.
30. Secondly, though the provisos to section 269G and 269H are somewhat differently worded, they substantially enact a provision enabling an appellant to file an appeal beyond the time prescribed thereforee. The difference in language has become necessary only because the statute contemplates the seeking of an extension of time before the prescribed time has expired and, hence, the usual statutory language used for condensation as in sections 246, 249 and 264 is inappropriate. We are unable, thereforee, to agree with the learned counsel for the appellant that there is a qualitative difference in the nature of the two sets of provisions.
31. Thirdly, there is a very important reason why a proviso of the nature in question has been introduced in sections 269G and 269H. These sections occur in Chapter XX-A of the Income-tax Act. This Chapter provides for the acquisition by the Government of immovable properties in certain cases of transfer with a view to counter the evasion of tax. It is unnecessary to set out in detail the provisions of this Chapter. It is sufficient to note that where parties purport to transfer property for a stated consideration and that consideration is found to be understated for the reasons contemplated by the statute, the Government has been given a power of acquiring the property and superseding the transfer effected by the parties. In other words, an order of acquisition passed under section 269F has got very serious repercussions in respect of the title to the property. Transfer of title by agreement or transaction between the parties is made to give way to a statutory vesting of title in the Government. It is, thereforee, of great importance that such an order of Government which affects the vesting of title should reach its finality at a very early point of time. That is why section 269G also emphasises the need for the Tribunal disposing of an appeal filed before it as expeditiously as possible and as far as possible within ninety days from the date on which it is presented. It is further important to see that under section 269-I, the property vests in the Central Government as soon as may be after the order for acquisition made under sub-section (6) of section 209F becomes final. The order under section 269F becomes final in the circumstances set out in the Explanationn to section 269-I (1). Under this Explanationn in a case where the order of acquisition is not made the subject of an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal under section 269G, the order becomes final upon the expiry of the period during which such an appeal may be presented under that section. If, on the other hand, an order for acquisition is made the subject-matter of an appeal to the Tribunal, the order becomes final when it is confirmed by the Tribunal and there is no further appeal to the High Court from the order of the Tribunal before the expiry of the period during which such an appeal may be presented to the High Court. If the order of the Tribunal is made the subject-matter of an appeal to the High Court, then the order of acquisition becomes final only when it is confirmed by the High Court. It is only after the order has become final that the property will vest in the Central Government and directions can be given by the Competent Authority regarding surrender or delivery of possession to the Competent Authority. In this set of statutory provisions, it will be appreciated that the Legislature found it necessary to impose a rigid time-limit within which the appeal is to be filed before the Tribunal or the High Court. In the case of the Tribunal, it provides that, normally, the appeal shall be presented within a period of 45 days or 30 days as mentioned earlier. If, however, an assessed is not able to present the appeal within this period of time, he is expected to file an application within a period of 45 days or 30 days stating his inability to do so and requesting the Tribunal to specify a larger time within which he may be permitted to do so. The importance of this requirement will be easily recognised in the context of clauses (a) and (b) of the Explanationn to section 69-I (1).
32. It will be appreciated that if the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act were held to be applicable, as contended for by the assessed, making it possible for an assessed to go to the Tribunal at any time and plead that he had sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within the time specified and that the delay should be condoned, the result will be to render fluid the position regarding the vesting of the property. The same is the position where an appeal is preferred to the High Court. If the assessed's contentions were to be accepted, there would not be any certainty at all regarding the point of time when an order of acquisition becomes final because it will be liable to be set aside by any party either by an application for condensation of delay filed before the Tribunal or before the High Court or both. This will lead to great confusion and uncertainty in regard to the vesting of property and in regard to the issue of directions for surrender or delivery of possession with further consequences flowing under the Act. That is why the Legislature expressly provided that before the expiry of the period of 45 days or 30 days, there should be an indication as to whether the time for the filing of the appeal has to be extended or not. If an application in terms of the proviso is presented before the expiry of the said period, then the Competent Authority would know when an appeal is likely to be presented; and, as soon as the Tribunal's order is passed, he will also know the period of time by which the appeal should and would be preferred to the High Court. In other words, the proviso has been deliberately inserted in the peculiar context of the provision with a view to ensure that there is no uncertainty regarding the point of time by which an order of acquisition will become final. To hold to the contrary would result in utter chaos. As in the present case, the appeal may be preferred long after the period of limitation prescribed by the statute. Where the assessed fails, he can prefer an appeal to the High Court and the question of condensation of delay may be pending before the High Court for a long number of years, as indeed, it has been pending in the present case. If such were to be possibilities of an appeal, the whole scheme of the Chapter will become unworkable. We are of the opinion that the proviso to section 269G(1) and perhaps also the proviso to section 269H(l) cannot be interpreted in such a way as to permit the condensation of delay unless an application is preferred before the Tribunal before the expiry of the period of limitation specified in sub-section (1) of each of these sections.
33. We are conscious that the usefulness of the proviso, without a possibility of relaxation by applying section 5 of the Limitation Act, will be very much circumscribed. It can create very great hardships such as, for example, where the appellant has an accident while on his way to file an appeal on the last day All possible causes for delay beyond the prescribed period cannot be anticipated before its expiry and cases where there is justifiable reason for delay may go unprotected. On the other hand, the introduction of the principle of condensation to an application made even after the expiry of the period may make it impossible to have a time-frame within which the appeal should be disposed of and may frustrate, as pointed out earlier, the whole scheme of the acquisition chapter and in particular the purpose of section 269-I. In either view, there are bound to be a few hard cases. Both types of difficulties could perhaps have been solved if the section had been so worded as to permit the filing of an application after the expiry of the prescribed period but within a prescribed number of days (say, fifteen) thereafter. But we have to interpret the section as it stands and we think that we should give due effect to the difference in language of the proviso to section 269G as compared to the other provisions and its raison d'etre in the context of the paramount desirability of ensuring expeditious vesting of title to the property in dispute.
34. For these reasons, we have come to the conclusion that the Tribunal's view that it was not in a position to condone the delay in the filing of the appeal is correct and should be upheld.
35. These appeals are, thereforee, dismissed but, in the circumstances, we make no order as to costs.
D.K. Kapur, J.
36. I agree, but add a few words. The key to the entire question as to whether the limitation period can be extended under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, rests, in my view, on the language of section 269-I(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. That section reads as follows :
'269-I (1). Vesting of property in Central Government. -As soon as may be after the order for acquisition of any immovable property made under sub-section (6) of section 269F becomes final, the competent authority may, by notice in writing, order any person who may be in possession of the immovable property to surrender or deliver possession thereof to the competent authority or any other person duly authorised in writing by the competent authority in this behalf, within thirty days of the date of the service of the notice.
Explanationn. - For the purposes of this sub-section, an order for the acquisition of any immovable property (hereinafter in this Explanationn referred to as the order for acquisition) made under sub-section (6) of section 269F becomes final, -
(a) in a case where the order for acquisition is not made the subject of an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal under section 269G, upon the expiry of the period during which such appeal may be presented under that section;
(b) in a case where the order for acquisition is made the subject of an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal under section 269G, -
(i) if the order for acquisition is confirmed by the Appellate Tribunal and the order of the Appellate Tribunal is not made the subject of an appeal to the High Court under section 269H, upon the expiry of the period during which such appeal may be presented under that section to the High Court;
(ii) if the order of the Appellate Tribunal is made the subject of an appeal to the High Court under section 269H, upon the confirmation of the order for acquisition by the Court.'
37. The most important part of this provision is the date on which the property vests in the Central Government. As stated, it vests when the order under section 269F(6) becomes final. The Explanationn to this section indicates when it becomes final. This varies with circumstances. It becomes final if no appeal is filed before the Appellate Tribunal under section 269G on the expiry of the period during which the appeal could be presented. This means that the vesting of the property is postponed for the period of limitation mentioned in section 269G. When that period is over and no appeal has been filed, the property will vest in the Central Government. The period under section 269G is 45 days from the date of the order, or 30 days from the date of service of the copy of the order, whichever is later. There is a power in the Appellate Tribunal to extend the period of limitation. But, that can be done only by moving an application before the expiry of the prescribed period of 45 days or 30 days, as the case may be. Thus, if no application is moved, the property will vest in the Central Government, but if an application is made, the Appellate Tribunal may extend the period and thus the vesting will be postponed.
38. Similarly, if under section 269-I, an appeal is presented to the Appellate Tribunal, the vesting is postponed till the appeal is decided. If no further appeal is filed to the High Court under section 269H, then the vesting will take place. If an appeal is filed to the High Court, then the Explanationn shows that the vesting is postponed till the order of acquisition is confirmed by the High Court. I completely agree with my learned brother's judgment that these special provisions regarding extension of limitation contained in sections 269G and 269H are intended for the purpose of ensuring that the property which is to vest in the Central Government does vest by a particular time. Thus, the conclusion is inevitable that if no appeal is filed to the Appellate Tribunal within the prescribed period, then the property vests in the Central Government. If an application for extension of time is made within that time, then the order under section 269F(6) does not become final till the appeal is heard. If a further appeal is taken to the High Court, the vesting is postponed till the order of acquisition is confirmed by the High Court. If no appeal is filed to the High Court, and here again there is a period of limitation prescribed by section 269H, the vesting will take place in accordance with the appellate order of the Tribunal which will become final. Thus, the various provisions in sections 269G, 269H and 269-I are inter-related and form a complete code regarding the date and time as to when the property vests in the Central Government. The operation of these inter-related provisions shows that the vesting is postponed in accordance with the time stated in the Explanationn to section 269I(1). I completely agree that this set of provisions has the effect of excluding the operation of section 5 of the Limitation Act. I also agree that the appeal should be dismissed with no order as to costs.