V.S. Aggarwal, J.
1. This is an appeal preferred by Smt. Raj Bala and others, hereinafter described as 'the appellants' directed against the award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtak, dated 14.1.2000. By virtue of the impugned award, the learned Tribunal awarded a compensation of Rs. 50,000/- under the heed 'no fault liability' to be paid by respondents Bijender, Sanjay Singh and Dharam Pal jointly and severally, alongwith interest at the rate of 11% per annum from the date of filing of the petition till realisation.
2. The relevant facts are that Smt. Raj Bala and others had filed a petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. It was alleged that on 28.9.1998 Virender Kumar s/o Baldev Singh was travelling in a jeep bearing registration No. HR-12P/0148 from Bahadurgarh to Rohtak. The said jeep was being driven by Bijender. When the vehicle reached about 6-7 kms. from Bahadurgarh towards Rohtak. Bijender started driving the jeep at a fast speed. Another jeep was noticed coming from Rohtak side. Bijender dashed his jeep against the jeep coming from the opposite direction as a result of which Virender Kumar suffered injuries. He was removed to the hospital at Rohtak where he succumbed to his injuries. The claimants were the widow and minor children of the deceased. They claimed a compensation of Rs. 8 lacs. The deceased was working as an Accountant with the Modern Food Industries (India) Limited.
3. In the written statement that has been filed by respondents No. 1 to 3, it was asserted that the accident had not taken place as has been pleaded. However, it was admitted that the deceased was travelling in the jeep owned by respondents No. 1 to 3 from Bahadurgarh to Rohtak. When the jeep reached 6-7 kms, from Bahadurgarh, another jeep cam from Rohtak side being driven in a rash and negligent manner. It struck against the jeep being driven by respondent No. 1 and caused the alleged accident. It was asserted that the appellants have intentionally not impleaded the owner and insurance Company of that vehicle.
4. In the separate written statement filed by National Insurance Company, it was projected by way of preliminary objection that the petition is vague. It was further asserted that there was no driving licence with the driver of the alleged jeep. It was a fake licence. The liability to pay the amount in this process was denied.
5. The learned Tribunal framed the issues and after recording the evidence had held that the appellants had failed to prove that there was rash and negligent driving on the part of respondent No. 1. It was further asserted that it is not established that the driver had a valid licence. The result was that no fault liability of Rs. 50,000/- was fastened on respondents No. 1 to 3. The petition qua Insurance Company, respondent No. 4, was dismissed. Aggrieved by the same, present appeal has been preferred.
6. The first and the foremost question agitated has beenas to if there was rash and negligent driving on the part of respondent No. 1, who was the driver of the jeep As mentioned above, the learned Tribunal returned the finding that it has not been established. Indeed, the said finding must be stated to be based on evidence. The reasons are obvious. Mahender Singh PW2, eyewitness, has stated in his cross-examination that he had not witnessed the accident. Obviously, his statement is of little avail. So far as Mandroop PW3 is concerned, he deposed firstly that on 28.9.1998 he was driving the favour-wheeler from Delhi to Rajasthan loaded with gunny bags. A jeep was following his vehicle. In the meantime, another jeep was noticed coming from the Rohtak side. The jeep coming behind his vehicle tried to over take his Tata four-wheeler and in that process hit against the vehicle coming from the other side. During cross-examination, he added that the police did not record his statement during his visit to PGI MS Rohtak. He had not filed any claim with regard to the injuries sustained by him in the said accident. He admitted that the claimants had brought him from Rajasthan to deposit in the Court. This testimony of Mandroop Singh was rightly rejected because this was not the plea of the appellants that Mandroop Singh was driving the vehicle on the fateful day. Otherwise also, the testimony did not reconcile with the claim set up by the appellant about the manner in which respondent No. 1 is stated to be driving the vehicle rashly or negligently. In these circumstances, indeed, the evidence did not establish that there was rash and negligent driving on the part of respondent No. 1 and the Tribunal awarded the compensation under the head no fault liability.
7. Learned counsel for the appellants strongly relied upon the decision of Ihe Supreme Court in the case of S. Kaushnuma Begum and others v. The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and others, AIR 2001 Supreme Court 485, to urge that the respondenis should pay the entire compensalion. The Supreme Court in the cited case has referred to the well known decision in the case of Rylands v. Fletcher, 1861-73 All England Reporter 1 and relied upon the following findings :-
'The true rule of law is that the person who, for his own purposes, brings on his land, and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it at his peril, and, if he does not do so, he is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape. He can excuse himself by showing that the escape was owing to the plaintiffs default, or, perhaps that the escape was the consequence of vis major, or the act of God; but, as nothing of this sort exists here, it is unnecessary to inquire what excuse would be sufficient.'
Thereupon, the Supreme Court referred lo the following defences with approval :-
'.....They are (1) Consent of the plaintiff i.e. voienti non-fit injura, (2) Common benefit i.e. where the source of the danger is maintained for the common benefit of the plainliff and the defendant, the defendant is not liable for its escape. (3) Act of stranger i.e. if the escape was caused by the unforeseeable act of a stranger, the rule does not apply. (4) Exercise of statutory authority i.e. the rule will stand excluded either when the act was done under a statutory duty or when a statute provides otherwise. (5) Act of god or vis major i.e. circumstances which no human foresight can provide against and of which human prudence is not bound to recognise the possibility. (6) Default of the plaintiff i.e. if the damage is caused solely by the act or default of the plaintiff himself, the rule will not apply. (7) Remoteness of consequences i.e. The rule cannot be applied ad infinitum, because even according to the formulation of the rule made by Blackburn, J. the defendant is answerable only for all the damage 'which is the natural consequence of its escape.'
8. While relying on the Rylands's case (supra), the Supreme Court had drawn the following conclusions :-
'No Fault Liability' envisaged in Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act is distinguishable from the rule of strict liability. In the former the compensation amount is fixed and is payable even if any one of the exceptions to the Rule can be applied. It is a statutory liability created without which the claimant should not get any amount under the count. Compensation on account of accident arising from the use of motor vehicles can be claimed under the common law even without the aid of a statute. The provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act permits that compensation paid under no fault liability' can be deducted from the final amount awarded by the Tribunal. Therefore, these two are resting on two different premises. We are, therefore, of the opinion that even apart from Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, a victim in an accident which occurred while using a motor vehicle, is entitled to gel compensation from a Tribunal unless any one of the exceptions would apply. The Tribunal and the High Court have, therefore, gone into error in divesting the claimants of the compensation payable to them.'
9. Before applying the ratio decidendi of the said decision, necessarily one has to see the facts in S. Kaushnuma Begam's case (supra). Therein the accident had taken place. The cause of the accident was bursting of front tyre of the jeep resulting in imbalance. It is obvious from the facts in S. Kaushnuma Begam's case (supra) that the principles laid down in Rylands' case (supra) were attracted and consequently the Supreme Court held that a victim in an accident is entitled to get compensation from a Tribunal unless any one of the exceptions would apply. In the present case, it is not so. It cannot be held that there was any fault or rash and negligent driving on the part of respondent No. 1. Therefore, it would be a clear case falling within the exceptions already referred to above. On that ground, there is no ground, thus, to interfere.
10. The only other submission made was that the Insurance Company should be held liable in this regard.
11. The contention so raised necessarily has to be stated to be rejected. The driver of the vehicle had a licence to drive the scooter or a car. He did not have the licence to drive any motor vehicle. Consequently, the person concerned must be held to be not having the necessary licence.
12. An application was filed by respondents No. Ito3 seeking permission to lead additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure. They wanted to place on record the driving licence of respondent No. 1 for light motor vehicle. Indeed, the application has to be rejected because of the reason that additional evidence would only be permitted if with due diligence the respondents could not produce the evidence at the relevant time or it was necessary to pronounce the judgment. At the relevant time, it was not even their case mat respondent No. 1 had the licence to drive the light motor vehicle. It is too late in the day to raise such a plea. The application for leading additional evidence must fail as lacunas cannot be allowed to be filled up. The cross-objections filed by the respondents must also be taken to be without merit and are dismissed.
For these reasons, there is no merit in the appeal. It must fail and is accordingly dismissed.
13. Appeal dismissed.