Arun Mishra, J.
1. This appeal has been preferred under Section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 by the Revenue aggrieved by the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) and Income-tax Appellate Tribunal.
2. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal had come to the conclusion that addition of guest house expenses could not be sustained as the issue was a debatable one and the notice under Section 143(1)(a) was issued after the issue of notice under Section 143(2). This course was not permissible. Hence, on both the counts the disallowance of guest house expenses was bad in law.
3. The question raised whether after issue of notice under Section 143(2) notice under Section 143(1)(a) can be issued, is covered by decision of this court in the case of CIT v. Regional Soyabean Products Co-operative Union ltd : [1999]239ITR217(MP) , wherein it has been held as under (page 219) :
'The reading of both the aforesaid provisions would show that if any notice under Sub-section (2) of Section 143 of the Income-tax Act, has been issued for the scrutiny of the assessment and the matter is in progress in Subsection (2) then to change the course and resort to Section 143(1)(a)(i) of the Act would be against the principles of natural justice.
Once a return has been filed under Section 139 of the Act and the Assessing Officer is proceeding in the matter to scrutinise the return filed and to make an assessment under Section 143(2), thereafter, he suddenly sends an intimation under Section 143(1)(a)(i), it would mean that he has changed the course from usual course and taken the assessee by surprise which is not contemplated by the Legislature. Section 143(1)(a)(i) of the Act is almost like an ex parte assessment because on the basis of the return filed by the assessee and it is scrutinised by the Assessing Officer, the intimation is sent to the assessee specifying the sums so payable because that is a sort of a demand notice under Section 156 of the Act. But, the expression 'without prejudice to the provisions of Sub-section (2)' appearing in the section would mean that once a notice has been issued under Sub-section (2), then in that case, the Assessing Officer shall not resort to Section 143(1)(a)(i). The expression 'without prejudice to the provisions of Sub-section (2)' means that it saves the action already initiated under Section 143(2) of the Act. If the Legislature really intended to give full power to the Assessing Officer under Section 143(1)(a)(i), then they would not have saved the action under Section 143(2). In fact, this expression has carved out an exception that the Assessing Officer can send intimation to the assessee if the Assessing Officer has not exercised his power under Section 143(2) of the Act.'
4. That apart the disallowance invoking Section 143(1)(a) was not justified as prima facie adjustment on the issue was clearly a debatable one.
5. For the reason aforesaid, we do not find any substantial question of law involved in the present appeal. The appeal is dismissed in limine.