Commissioner of Income-tax Vs. H.E.G. Ltd.

Decided On : Apr-20-2001

Court : Madhya Pradesh

Notice (8): Undefined index: topics [APP/View/Case/meta.ctp, line 36]
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			'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 1055.	Article 141;  [A.K. Patnaik, C.J., Dipak Misra, Abhay Gohil, S. Samvatsar, & S.K. Gangele, JJ]  Dismissal of SLP arising from decision of High Court  Whether binding precedent Decision of Division Bench in Rama and Company v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [2007(II) MPJR 229] overruled by Full Bench of same High Court  Prior to delivery of decision of Full Bench order passed in Division Bench decision assailed in SLP before Supreme Court  Dismissal of SLP by short reasoned order, though declaration of law, but High Court is bound to follow earlier decisions in field regard being had to concept of precedents as per law laid down by Apex Court and Larger bench decision in Jabalpur Bus Operators Association, reported in [2003(1) MPJR 158]. Court clarifies that Dr. Jaidev Siddha v. Jaiprakash Siddha, 2007(2) MPJR (FB) 361; AIR 2007 MP 269 (FB) is not impliedly overruled in view of dismissal of SLP 
Articles 226 & 227; [A.K. Patnaik, C.J., Dipak Misra, Abhay Gohil,               S. Samvatsar, & S.K. Gangele, JJ] Power to issue writ under Article 226  - [per Majority] The High Courts exercise original jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and supervisory jurisdiction and the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. But, an eloquent and fertile one, a writ of certiorari is issued in exercise of original jurisdiction. Whenever word supervisory has been used in the context of Article 226 it is in contrast with the appellate or revisional jurisdiction. When a writ is issued under Article 226 of the Constitution in respect of Courts or tribunals it is done in exercise of original jurisdiction and the parameters are different than Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It is worth noting that the power under Article 227 was there in a different manner under the Government of India Act. Power of superintendence is distinct from the exercise of power of revisional or supervisory jurisdiction which is a facet of the power of superintendence. The confusion occurs when one applies the principle of equivalence or equates the exercise of supervisory power and power of superintendence with original or supervisory jurisdiction. There is an acceptable nuance between the concept of jurisdiction and exercise of power by certain parameters. Both do come within the fundamental concept of judicial review but the jurisdiction exercised is different when under Article 226 a writ is issued it is issued in exercise of original jurisdiction whether against a tribunal or inferior Courts or administrative authorities. The word superintendence has not been used in Article 226 of the Constitution. It is also evident that the term writs  is not referred to in Article 227. 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SAMAJ KE KAMJOR VARGON KE KRISHI BHUMI HADAPNE SAMBANDHI KUCHAKRON SE PARITRAN TATHA MUKTI ADHINIYAM [3/1977]. Section 2: Writ appeal  Maintainability from order of single Judge-When permissible Held, Maintainability of a writ appeal from an order of the learned single Judge would depend upon many an aspect and cannot be put into a strait jacket formula. It cannot be stated with mathematical exactitude. It would depend upon the pleadings in the writ petition, nature of the order passed by the single Judge, character and the contour of the order, directions issued, nomenclature given and the jurisdictional prospective in the constitutional context are to be perceived. It cannot be said in a hyper-technical manner that an order passed in a writ petition, if there is assail to the order emerging from the inferior tribunal or subordinate Courts has to be treated all the time for all purposes to be under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It would depend upon the real nature of the order passed by the learned single Judge. The pleadings also assume immense significance. It would not be an over emphasis to state that an order in a writ petition can fit into the subtle contour of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution in a composite manner and they can co-inside, co-exist, overlap or imbricate. In this context it is apt to note that there may be cases where the single Judge may feel disposed or inclined to issue a writ to do full and complete justice because it is to be borne in mind that Article 226 of the Constitution is fundamentally a repository and reservoir of justice based on equity and good conscience. It will depend upon factual matrix of each case. Dr. Jaidev Siddha v. Jaiprakash Siddha, 2007(2) MPJR (FB) 361: AIR 2007 MP 269 (FB) is not impliedly overruled in view of dismissal of SLP preferred against order reported in Rama and Company v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2007 (2) MPJR 229 (DB) (MP)].  -  Hence, on both the counts the disallowance of guest house expenses was bad in law. Section 143(1)(a)(i) of the Act is almost like an ex parte assessment because on the basis of the return filed by the assessee and it is scrutinised by the Assessing Officer, the intimation is sent to the assessee specifying the sums so payable because that is a sort of a demand notice under Section 156 of the Act. ' 4. That apart the disallowance invoking Section 143(1)(a) was not justified as prima facie adjustment on the issue was clearly a debatable one.',
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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Arun Mishra, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This appeal has been preferred under Section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 by the Revenue aggrieved by the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) and Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal had come to the conclusion that addition of guest house expenses could not be sustained as the issue was a debatable one and the notice under Section 143(1)(a) was issued after the issue of notice under Section 143(2). This course was not permissible. Hence, on both the counts the disallowance of guest house expenses was bad in law. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The question raised whether after issue of notice under Section 143(2) notice under Section 143(1)(a) can be issued, is covered by decision of this court in the case of CIT v. Regional Soyabean Products Co-operative Union ltd : [1999]239ITR217(MP) , wherein it has been held as under (page 219) : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The reading of both the aforesaid provisions would show that if any notice under Sub-section (2) of Section 143 of the Income-tax Act, has been issued for the scrutiny of the assessment and the matter is in progress in Subsection (2) then to change the course and resort to Section 143(1)(a)(i) of the Act would be against the principles of natural justice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Once a return has been filed under Section 139 of the Act and the Assessing Officer is proceeding in the matter to scrutinise the return filed and to make an assessment under Section 143(2), thereafter, he suddenly sends an intimation under Section 143(1)(a)(i), it would mean that he has changed the course from usual course and taken the assessee by surprise which is not contemplated by the Legislature. Section 143(1)(a)(i) of the Act is almost like an ex parte assessment because on the basis of the return filed by the assessee and it is scrutinised by the Assessing Officer, the intimation is sent to the assessee specifying the sums so payable because that is a sort of a demand notice under Section 156 of the Act. But, the expression 'without prejudice to the provisions of Sub-section (2)' appearing in the section would mean that once a notice has been issued under Sub-section (2), then in that case, the Assessing Officer shall not resort to Section 143(1)(a)(i). The expression 'without prejudice to the provisions of Sub-section (2)' means that it saves the action already initiated under Section 143(2) of the Act. If the Legislature really intended to give full power to the Assessing Officer under Section 143(1)(a)(i), then they would not have saved the action under Section 143(2). In fact, this expression has carved out an exception that the Assessing Officer can send intimation to the assessee if the Assessing Officer has not exercised his power under Section 143(2) of the Act.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. That apart the disallowance invoking Section 143(1)(a) was not justified as prima facie adjustment on the issue was clearly a debatable one. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. For the reason aforesaid, we do not find any substantial question of law involved in the present appeal. The appeal is dismissed in limine. <p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 1055.	Article 141;  [A.K. Patnaik, C.J., Dipak Misra, Abhay Gohil, S. Samvatsar, & S.K. Gangele, JJ]  Dismissal of SLP arising from decision of High Court  Whether binding precedent Decision of Division Bench in Rama and Company v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [2007(II) MPJR 229] overruled by Full Bench of same High Court  Prior to delivery of decision of Full Bench order passed in Division Bench decision assailed in SLP before Supreme Court  Dismissal of SLP by short reasoned order, though declaration of law, but High Court is bound to follow earlier decisions in field regard being had to concept of precedents as per law laid down by Apex Court and Larger bench decision in Jabalpur Bus Operators Association, reported in [2003(1) MPJR 158]. Court clarifies that Dr. Jaidev Siddha v. Jaiprakash Siddha, 2007(2) MPJR (FB) 361; AIR 2007 MP 269 (FB) is not impliedly overruled in view of dismissal of SLP 
Articles 226 & 227; [A.K. Patnaik, C.J., Dipak Misra, Abhay Gohil,               S. Samvatsar, & S.K. Gangele, JJ] Power to issue writ under Article 226  - [per Majority] The High Courts exercise original jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and supervisory jurisdiction and the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. But, an eloquent and fertile one, a writ of certiorari is issued in exercise of original jurisdiction. Whenever word supervisory has been used in the context of Article 226 it is in contrast with the appellate or revisional jurisdiction. When a writ is issued under Article 226 of the Constitution in respect of Courts or tribunals it is done in exercise of original jurisdiction and the parameters are different than Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It is worth noting that the power under Article 227 was there in a different manner under the Government of India Act. Power of superintendence is distinct from the exercise of power of revisional or supervisory jurisdiction which is a facet of the power of superintendence. The confusion occurs when one applies the principle of equivalence or equates the exercise of supervisory power and power of superintendence with original or supervisory jurisdiction. There is an acceptable nuance between the concept of jurisdiction and exercise of power by certain parameters. Both do come within the fundamental concept of judicial review but the jurisdiction exercised is different when under Article 226 a writ is issued it is issued in exercise of original jurisdiction whether against a tribunal or inferior Courts or administrative authorities. The word superintendence has not been used in Article 226 of the Constitution. It is also evident that the term writs  is not referred to in Article 227. On a scrutiny of Article 227 it would be crystal clear that power of superintendence conferred on the High Courts is a power that is restricted to the Courts and tribunal in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. On the contrary the power conferred on the High Court under Article 226 is not constricted and confined to the Courts and tribunals but it extends to any person or authority. Be it noted, Article 226 as has been engrafted in the Constitution covers entirely a new area, a broader one in a larger spectrum. When the Legislature has used the terms in exercise of original jurisdiction and supervisory jurisdiction it has to be understood that they are used in contradistinction in the constitutional context as has been interpreted by the Apex Court. The words of the Section have to be understood to mean exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India which is always original. -- M.P. SAMAJ KE KAMJOR VARGON KE KRISHI BHUMI HADAPNE SAMBANDHI KUCHAKRON SE PARITRAN TATHA MUKTI ADHINIYAM [3/1977]. Section 2: Writ appeal  Maintainability from order of single Judge-When permissible Held, Maintainability of a writ appeal from an order of the learned single Judge would depend upon many an aspect and cannot be put into a strait jacket formula. It cannot be stated with mathematical exactitude. It would depend upon the pleadings in the writ petition, nature of the order passed by the single Judge, character and the contour of the order, directions issued, nomenclature given and the jurisdictional prospective in the constitutional context are to be perceived. It cannot be said in a hyper-technical manner that an order passed in a writ petition, if there is assail to the order emerging from the inferior tribunal or subordinate Courts has to be treated all the time for all purposes to be under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It would depend upon the real nature of the order passed by the learned single Judge. The pleadings also assume immense significance. It would not be an over emphasis to state that an order in a writ petition can fit into the subtle contour of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution in a composite manner and they can co-inside, co-exist, overlap or imbricate. In this context it is apt to note that there may be cases where the single Judge may feel disposed or inclined to issue a writ to do full and complete justice because it is to be borne in mind that Article 226 of the Constitution is fundamentally a repository and reservoir of justice based on equity and good conscience. It will depend upon factual matrix of each case. Dr. Jaidev Siddha v. Jaiprakash Siddha, 2007(2) MPJR (FB) 361: AIR 2007 MP 269 (FB) is not impliedly overruled in view of dismissal of SLP preferred against order reported in Rama and Company v. 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			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Commissioner of Income-tax Vs. H.E.G. Ltd.',
			'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 1055.	Article 141;  [A.K. Patnaik, C.J., Dipak Misra, Abhay Gohil, S. Samvatsar, & S.K. Gangele, JJ]  Dismissal of SLP arising from decision of High Court  Whether binding precedent Decision of Division Bench in Rama and Company v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [2007(II) MPJR 229] overruled by Full Bench of same High Court  Prior to delivery of decision of Full Bench order passed in Division Bench decision assailed in SLP before Supreme Court  Dismissal of SLP by short reasoned order, though declaration of law, but High Court is bound to follow earlier decisions in field regard being had to concept of precedents as per law laid down by Apex Court and Larger bench decision in Jabalpur Bus Operators Association, reported in [2003(1) MPJR 158]. Court clarifies that Dr. Jaidev Siddha v. Jaiprakash Siddha, 2007(2) MPJR (FB) 361; AIR 2007 MP 269 (FB) is not impliedly overruled in view of dismissal of SLP 
Articles 226 & 227; [A.K. Patnaik, C.J., Dipak Misra, Abhay Gohil,               S. Samvatsar, & S.K. Gangele, JJ] Power to issue writ under Article 226  - [per Majority] The High Courts exercise original jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and supervisory jurisdiction and the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. But, an eloquent and fertile one, a writ of certiorari is issued in exercise of original jurisdiction. Whenever word supervisory has been used in the context of Article 226 it is in contrast with the appellate or revisional jurisdiction. When a writ is issued under Article 226 of the Constitution in respect of Courts or tribunals it is done in exercise of original jurisdiction and the parameters are different than Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It is worth noting that the power under Article 227 was there in a different manner under the Government of India Act. Power of superintendence is distinct from the exercise of power of revisional or supervisory jurisdiction which is a facet of the power of superintendence. The confusion occurs when one applies the principle of equivalence or equates the exercise of supervisory power and power of superintendence with original or supervisory jurisdiction. There is an acceptable nuance between the concept of jurisdiction and exercise of power by certain parameters. Both do come within the fundamental concept of judicial review but the jurisdiction exercised is different when under Article 226 a writ is issued it is issued in exercise of original jurisdiction whether against a tribunal or inferior Courts or administrative authorities. The word superintendence has not been used in Article 226 of the Constitution. It is also evident that the term writs  is not referred to in Article 227. On a scrutiny of Article 227 it would be crystal clear that power of superintendence conferred on the High Courts is a power that is restricted to the Courts and tribunal in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. On the contrary the power conferred on the High Court under Article 226 is not constricted and confined to the Courts and tribunals but it extends to any person or authority. Be it noted, Article 226 as has been engrafted in the Constitution covers entirely a new area, a broader one in a larger spectrum. When the Legislature has used the terms in exercise of original jurisdiction and supervisory jurisdiction it has to be understood that they are used in contradistinction in the constitutional context as has been interpreted by the Apex Court. The words of the Section have to be understood to mean exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India which is always original. -- M.P. SAMAJ KE KAMJOR VARGON KE KRISHI BHUMI HADAPNE SAMBANDHI KUCHAKRON SE PARITRAN TATHA MUKTI ADHINIYAM [3/1977]. Section 2: Writ appeal  Maintainability from order of single Judge-When permissible Held, Maintainability of a writ appeal from an order of the learned single Judge would depend upon many an aspect and cannot be put into a strait jacket formula. It cannot be stated with mathematical exactitude. It would depend upon the pleadings in the writ petition, nature of the order passed by the single Judge, character and the contour of the order, directions issued, nomenclature given and the jurisdictional prospective in the constitutional context are to be perceived. It cannot be said in a hyper-technical manner that an order passed in a writ petition, if there is assail to the order emerging from the inferior tribunal or subordinate Courts has to be treated all the time for all purposes to be under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It would depend upon the real nature of the order passed by the learned single Judge. The pleadings also assume immense significance. It would not be an over emphasis to state that an order in a writ petition can fit into the subtle contour of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution in a composite manner and they can co-inside, co-exist, overlap or imbricate. In this context it is apt to note that there may be cases where the single Judge may feel disposed or inclined to issue a writ to do full and complete justice because it is to be borne in mind that Article 226 of the Constitution is fundamentally a repository and reservoir of justice based on equity and good conscience. It will depend upon factual matrix of each case. Dr. Jaidev Siddha v. Jaiprakash Siddha, 2007(2) MPJR (FB) 361: AIR 2007 MP 269 (FB) is not impliedly overruled in view of dismissal of SLP preferred against order reported in Rama and Company v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2007 (2) MPJR 229 (DB) (MP)].  -  Hence, on both the counts the disallowance of guest house expenses was bad in law. Section 143(1)(a)(i) of the Act is almost like an ex parte assessment because on the basis of the return filed by the assessee and it is scrutinised by the Assessing Officer, the intimation is sent to the assessee specifying the sums so payable because that is a sort of a demand notice under Section 156 of the Act. ' 4. That apart the disallowance invoking Section 143(1)(a) was not justified as prima facie adjustment on the issue was clearly a debatable one.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
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			'counselplain' => 'Rohit Arya, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2001-04-20',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'Rajeev Gupta and ;Arun Mishra, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Arun Mishra, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This appeal has been preferred under Section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 by the Revenue aggrieved by the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) and Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal had come to the conclusion that addition of guest house expenses could not be sustained as the issue was a debatable one and the notice under Section 143(1)(a) was issued after the issue of notice under Section 143(2). This course was not permissible. Hence, on both the counts the disallowance of guest house expenses was bad in law. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The question raised whether after issue of notice under Section 143(2) notice under Section 143(1)(a) can be issued, is covered by decision of this court in the case of CIT v. Regional Soyabean Products Co-operative Union ltd : [1999]239ITR217(MP) , wherein it has been held as under (page 219) : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The reading of both the aforesaid provisions would show that if any notice under Sub-section (2) of Section 143 of the Income-tax Act, has been issued for the scrutiny of the assessment and the matter is in progress in Subsection (2) then to change the course and resort to Section 143(1)(a)(i) of the Act would be against the principles of natural justice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Once a return has been filed under Section 139 of the Act and the Assessing Officer is proceeding in the matter to scrutinise the return filed and to make an assessment under Section 143(2), thereafter, he suddenly sends an intimation under Section 143(1)(a)(i), it would mean that he has changed the course from usual course and taken the assessee by surprise which is not contemplated by the Legislature. Section 143(1)(a)(i) of the Act is almost like an ex parte assessment because on the basis of the return filed by the assessee and it is scrutinised by the Assessing Officer, the intimation is sent to the assessee specifying the sums so payable because that is a sort of a demand notice under Section 156 of the Act. But, the expression 'without prejudice to the provisions of Sub-section (2)' appearing in the section would mean that once a notice has been issued under Sub-section (2), then in that case, the Assessing Officer shall not resort to Section 143(1)(a)(i). The expression 'without prejudice to the provisions of Sub-section (2)' means that it saves the action already initiated under Section 143(2) of the Act. If the Legislature really intended to give full power to the Assessing Officer under Section 143(1)(a)(i), then they would not have saved the action under Section 143(2). In fact, this expression has carved out an exception that the Assessing Officer can send intimation to the assessee if the Assessing Officer has not exercised his power under Section 143(2) of the Act.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. That apart the disallowance invoking Section 143(1)(a) was not justified as prima facie adjustment on the issue was clearly a debatable one. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. For the reason aforesaid, we do not find any substantial question of law involved in the present appeal. The appeal is dismissed in limine. <p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '[2002]255ITR251(MP)',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'H.E.G. Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Direct Taxation',
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$title_for_layout = 'Commissioner of Income tax Vs. H.E.G. Ltd. Semantic Analysis'
$shops = array(
	'LAW' => array(
		(int) 0 => 'Section 260A',
		(int) 1 => 'Section 143(1)(a',
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		(int) 4 => 'Section 143(1)(a',
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		(int) 6 => 'Section 143(1)(a)(i',
		(int) 7 => 'Section 139 of the Act',
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		(int) 9 => 'Section 143(1)(a)(i',
		(int) 10 => 'Section 156 of the Act',
		(int) 11 => 'Section 143(1)(a)(i',
		(int) 12 => 'Section 143(2',
		(int) 13 => 'Section 143(1)(a)(i',
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		(int) 1 => '3.',
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		(int) 1 => 'CIT',
		(int) 2 => 'Regional Soyabean Products Co-operative',
		(int) 3 => 'Union ltd :',
		(int) 4 => 'Legislature',
		(int) 5 => 'Assessing',
		(int) 6 => 'Legislature',
		(int) 7 => 'Assessing'
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		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51330/income-tax-act-1961-complete-act">Income Tax Act, 1961</a> - Sections 143, 143(1), 143(2) and 156',
		'appealno' => 'Income-tax Appeal No. 72 of 2000',
		'appellant' => 'Commissioner of Income-tax',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Commissioner of Income-tax Vs. H.E.G. Ltd.',
		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 1055.	Article 141;  [A.K. Patnaik, C.J., Dipak Misra, Abhay Gohil, S. Samvatsar, & S.K. Gangele, JJ]  Dismissal of SLP arising from decision of High Court  Whether binding precedent Decision of Division Bench in Rama and Company v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [2007(II) MPJR 229] overruled by Full Bench of same High Court  Prior to delivery of decision of Full Bench order passed in Division Bench decision assailed in SLP before Supreme Court  Dismissal of SLP by short reasoned order, though declaration of law, but High Court is bound to follow earlier decisions in field regard being had to concept of precedents as per law laid down by Apex Court and Larger bench decision in Jabalpur Bus Operators Association, reported in [2003(1) MPJR 158]. Court clarifies that Dr. Jaidev Siddha v. Jaiprakash Siddha, 2007(2) MPJR (FB) 361; AIR 2007 MP 269 (FB) is not impliedly overruled in view of dismissal of SLP 
Articles 226 & 227; [A.K. Patnaik, C.J., Dipak Misra, Abhay Gohil,               S. Samvatsar, & S.K. Gangele, JJ] Power to issue writ under Article 226  - [per Majority] The High Courts exercise original jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and supervisory jurisdiction and the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. But, an eloquent and fertile one, a writ of certiorari is issued in exercise of original jurisdiction. Whenever word supervisory has been used in the context of Article 226 it is in contrast with the appellate or revisional jurisdiction. When a writ is issued under Article 226 of the Constitution in respect of Courts or tribunals it is done in exercise of original jurisdiction and the parameters are different than Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It is worth noting that the power under Article 227 was there in a different manner under the Government of India Act. Power of superintendence is distinct from the exercise of power of revisional or supervisory jurisdiction which is a facet of the power of superintendence. The confusion occurs when one applies the principle of equivalence or equates the exercise of supervisory power and power of superintendence with original or supervisory jurisdiction. There is an acceptable nuance between the concept of jurisdiction and exercise of power by certain parameters. Both do come within the fundamental concept of judicial review but the jurisdiction exercised is different when under Article 226 a writ is issued it is issued in exercise of original jurisdiction whether against a tribunal or inferior Courts or administrative authorities. The word superintendence has not been used in Article 226 of the Constitution. It is also evident that the term writs  is not referred to in Article 227. On a scrutiny of Article 227 it would be crystal clear that power of superintendence conferred on the High Courts is a power that is restricted to the Courts and tribunal in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. On the contrary the power conferred on the High Court under Article 226 is not constricted and confined to the Courts and tribunals but it extends to any person or authority. Be it noted, Article 226 as has been engrafted in the Constitution covers entirely a new area, a broader one in a larger spectrum. When the Legislature has used the terms in exercise of original jurisdiction and supervisory jurisdiction it has to be understood that they are used in contradistinction in the constitutional context as has been interpreted by the Apex Court. The words of the Section have to be understood to mean exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India which is always original. -- M.P. SAMAJ KE KAMJOR VARGON KE KRISHI BHUMI HADAPNE SAMBANDHI KUCHAKRON SE PARITRAN TATHA MUKTI ADHINIYAM [3/1977]. Section 2: Writ appeal  Maintainability from order of single Judge-When permissible Held, Maintainability of a writ appeal from an order of the learned single Judge would depend upon many an aspect and cannot be put into a strait jacket formula. It cannot be stated with mathematical exactitude. It would depend upon the pleadings in the writ petition, nature of the order passed by the single Judge, character and the contour of the order, directions issued, nomenclature given and the jurisdictional prospective in the constitutional context are to be perceived. It cannot be said in a hyper-technical manner that an order passed in a writ petition, if there is assail to the order emerging from the inferior tribunal or subordinate Courts has to be treated all the time for all purposes to be under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It would depend upon the real nature of the order passed by the learned single Judge. The pleadings also assume immense significance. It would not be an over emphasis to state that an order in a writ petition can fit into the subtle contour of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution in a composite manner and they can co-inside, co-exist, overlap or imbricate. In this context it is apt to note that there may be cases where the single Judge may feel disposed or inclined to issue a writ to do full and complete justice because it is to be borne in mind that Article 226 of the Constitution is fundamentally a repository and reservoir of justice based on equity and good conscience. It will depend upon factual matrix of each case. Dr. Jaidev Siddha v. Jaiprakash Siddha, 2007(2) MPJR (FB) 361: AIR 2007 MP 269 (FB) is not impliedly overruled in view of dismissal of SLP preferred against order reported in Rama and Company v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2007 (2) MPJR 229 (DB) (MP)].  -  Hence, on both the counts the disallowance of guest house expenses was bad in law. Section 143(1)(a)(i) of the Act is almost like an ex parte assessment because on the basis of the return filed by the assessee and it is scrutinised by the Assessing Officer, the intimation is sent to the assessee specifying the sums so payable because that is a sort of a demand notice under Section 156 of the Act. ' 4. That apart the disallowance invoking Section 143(1)(a) was not justified as prima facie adjustment on the issue was clearly a debatable one.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'Rohit Arya, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
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		'judge' => 'Rajeev Gupta and ;Arun Mishra, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Arun Mishra, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This appeal has been preferred under Section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 by the Revenue aggrieved by the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) and Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal had come to the conclusion that addition of guest house expenses could not be sustained as the issue was a debatable one and the notice under Section 143(1)(a) was issued after the issue of notice under Section 143(2). This course was not permissible. Hence, on both the counts the disallowance of guest house expenses was bad in law. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The question raised whether after issue of notice under Section 143(2) notice under Section 143(1)(a) can be issued, is covered by decision of this court in the case of CIT v. Regional Soyabean Products Co-operative Union ltd : [1999]239ITR217(MP) , wherein it has been held as under (page 219) : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The reading of both the aforesaid provisions would show that if any notice under Sub-section (2) of Section 143 of the Income-tax Act, has been issued for the scrutiny of the assessment and the matter is in progress in Subsection (2) then to change the course and resort to Section 143(1)(a)(i) of the Act would be against the principles of natural justice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Once a return has been filed under Section 139 of the Act and the Assessing Officer is proceeding in the matter to scrutinise the return filed and to make an assessment under Section 143(2), thereafter, he suddenly sends an intimation under Section 143(1)(a)(i), it would mean that he has changed the course from usual course and taken the assessee by surprise which is not contemplated by the Legislature. Section 143(1)(a)(i) of the Act is almost like an ex parte assessment because on the basis of the return filed by the assessee and it is scrutinised by the Assessing Officer, the intimation is sent to the assessee specifying the sums so payable because that is a sort of a demand notice under Section 156 of the Act. But, the expression 'without prejudice to the provisions of Sub-section (2)' appearing in the section would mean that once a notice has been issued under Sub-section (2), then in that case, the Assessing Officer shall not resort to Section 143(1)(a)(i). The expression 'without prejudice to the provisions of Sub-section (2)' means that it saves the action already initiated under Section 143(2) of the Act. If the Legislature really intended to give full power to the Assessing Officer under Section 143(1)(a)(i), then they would not have saved the action under Section 143(2). In fact, this expression has carved out an exception that the Assessing Officer can send intimation to the assessee if the Assessing Officer has not exercised his power under Section 143(2) of the Act.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. That apart the disallowance invoking Section 143(1)(a) was not justified as prima facie adjustment on the issue was clearly a debatable one. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. For the reason aforesaid, we do not find any substantial question of law involved in the present appeal. The appeal is dismissed in limine. <p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'pubs' => '[2002]255ITR251(MP)',
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LAW: Section 260A, Section 143(1)(a, Section 143(2, Section 143(2, Section 143(1)(a, Section 143, Section 143(1)(a)(i, Section 139 of the Act, Section 143(2, Section 143(1)(a)(i, Section 156 of the Act, Section 143(1)(a)(i, Section 143(2, Section 143(1)(a)(i, Section 143(2, Section 143(2, Section 143(1)(a

PERSON: Arun Mishra

NORP: J.1

DATE: 1961

CARDINAL: 2, 3., 1999]239ITR217(MP, 219, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 4, 5

ORG: Appellate Tribunal, CIT, Regional Soyabean Products Co-operative, Union ltd :, Legislature, Assessing, Legislature, Assessing