S.P. Srivastava, J.
1. Feeling aggrieved by the order passed by a learned Single Judge allowing the writ petition filed by the contesting respondent No. 1 and directing that he will be entitled to the pension awarded under the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Swatantrata Sangram Sainik Samman Nidhi Niyam, 1972, from the date of the application, the State as well as the Collector, District Gwalior have come up in this Letters Patent Appeal seeking redress praying for the setting aside of the impugned order.
2. We have heard the learned Govt. Advocate representing the State-appellants as well as the learned counsel representing the contesting respondent/petitioner, and have carefully perused the record.
3. The facts in brief shorn of details and necessary for the disposal of this appeal lie in a narrow compass.
4. The petitioner/respondent No. 1 had submitted an application dated 10-3-1988 seeking Swatantrata Sainik Samman pension. The State Government vide its order dated 18-12-1991 sanctioned an amount of Rs. 400/-per month payable as Samman Nidhi to the petitioner/applicant during his life time under the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Swatantrata Sangram Samman Nidhi Niyam, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as Niyam, 1972) subject to the terms and conditions contained therein clearly providing that the pension will become payable from the date of the order.
5. The petitioner had filed the writ petition giving rise to this appeal challenging that part of the order passed by the State Government whereunder the pension sanctioned in his favour was to be payable from the date of the issuance of the order claiming that in the circumstances of the case since the application for pension had been filed in the year 1988 and the delay in the disposal of that application was attributable to the State Government itself, he should not be deprived of the pension amount for the period elapsing between the date of filing of the application and the date of the passing of the order granting the payment of pension.
6. The learned single Judge vide the impugned order being of the view that no reason had been given by the State Government as to why the pension was being released from the date of the issuance of the order, placing reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Mukundlal Bhandari v. Union of India and Ors., reported in AIR 1993 SC 2127 and finding that the other decision of the Apex Court in the case of Union of India and Ors. v. Ganesh Chandra Dolai and Ors., reported in (1997) 10 SCC 289, was distinguishable on facts came to the conclusion that the petitioner ought to have been granted the pension from the date of the application filed by him and consequently issued the impugned direction.
7. The learned counsel for the appellants has strenuously urged that in the provisions contained in the Madhya Pradesh Swatantrata Sangram Sainik Samman Nidhi Niyam, 1972 an amendment was brought into effect vide the insertion of Sub-rule (6) of Rule 3 of the aforesaid Rules which was enforced with the publication of the amended rule in the Madhya Pradesh Extraordinary Gazette dated 8-3-1999.
8. The Sub-rule (6) of Rule 3 of the aforesaid Niyam had been inserted with retrospective effect providing that Swatantrata Sangram Sainik would be entitled to the benefit of the Rajya Samman Nidhi with effect from the date of the order of sanction.
9. In view of the aforesaid amendment in the Niyam, 1972, the learned counsel for the appellants has urged that the impugned order passed by the learned single Judge deserved to be set aside.
10. The learned counsel for the petitioner/respondent No. 1 on the other hand has tried to assail the validity of Sub-rule (6) of Rule 3 of Niyam, 1972 which stands inserted in the Rules by virtue of the amendment with retrospective effect.
11. The learned counsel for the petitioner/respondent has tried to urge that the aforesaid sub-rule referred to hereinabove which has now been inserted is unreasonable and discriminatory.
12. So far as the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner/ respondent in regard to the sub-rule in question being not reasonable and vitiated on account of the discrimination is concerned, suffice it to say that it is settled principle that the wisdom of the legislature cannot be scanned by the Court. So far as regards the efficacy, efficiency and policy underlying the provisions of any statutory enactment of that the legislature is the only judge; and is only responsible to a Court of justice for the lawfulness of what it does and of that the Court is the only judge.
13. In the aforesaid view of the matter, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner/respondent noticed hereinabove is totally devoid of merit and is not at all acceptable.
14. The learned counsel for the appellants has strenuously urged that although an amendment with retrospective effect cannot be taken to have the effect of defeating a vested right yet since the amendment in question has been effected during the pendency of the appeal which is the continuation of the original proceedings, its effect can be taken into consideration and this Court will be well within its jurisdiction to interfere in the impugned order taking notice of this subsequent event which had taken place during the pendency of the appeal and grant adequate relief to the appellants.
15. In support of the aforesaid submission, the learned counsel for the appellants has heavily relied upon on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Mithilesh Kumari and Anr. v. Prem Behari Khare, reported in AIR 1989 SC 1247.
16. In the aforesaid decision, the Apex Court had clarified that a retrospective operation is not to be given to a statute so as to impair existing right or obligation, otherwise than as regards matter of procedure unless that effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the language of the enactment indicating that the presumption against retrospective operation is strong in cases in which the statute, if operated retrospectively, would prejudicially affect the vested rights or the illegality of past transaction, or impair contracts, or impose new duty or attach new disability in respect of past transactions or considerations already passed. It was emphasised that the presumption against retrospectivity may be rebutted by necessary implications from the language employed in the statute pointing out that it cannot be said to be an invariable rule that a statute could not be retrospective unless so expressed in the very terms of the section which had to be construed. This part of the observation was not approved in its later decision in the case of R.R. Reddy v. Padmini (AIR 1996 SC 238).
17. In the present case what we find is that the statute in very clear terms has expressed that the Sub-rule (6) in question will be deemed to be effective from the date of the enforcement of the rules itself. It is, therefore, obvious that the legislative intent was for providing monetary benefits flowing from the order granting the pension from the date of the issuance of the order granting the sanction and not from the date on which the application had been submitted. Such a retrospectivity, we are of the considered opinion, could not affect the already released benefits to a person similarly situated as the retrospectivity contemplated could not be taken to defeat any vested right. The provision so inserted by way of amendment of the rules could affect the pending applications and the pending lis, if any.
18. It may further be noticed that the Apex Court in its decision in the case of Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor & General Traders, reported in AIR 1975 SC 1409, had observed that it is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceeding. Equally clear is the principle that procedure is the hand-maid and not the mistress of the judicial process. It was clearly indicated that if a fact, arising after the lis has come to Court and has a fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of moulding it, is brought diligently to the notice of the Tribunal, it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stulify or render incpt the decretal remedy. The equity justifies bending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fairplay is violated, with a view to promote substantial justice - subject, of course, to the absence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances. The Apex Court went on to observe that nor can we contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts to confine it to the trial Court, if the litigation pends, the power exists, absent other special circumstances repelling resort to that course in law or justice.
19. The Apex Court in its aforesaid decision had approved of the observations made in the decision in the case of Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukla v. Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri, reported in AIR 1941 FC 5, referring to the rule adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Patterson v. State of Alabama, reported in (1934) 294 US 600 at p. 6007, whereunder it was observed as follows :
'We have frequently held that in the exercise of our appellate jurisdiction we have power not only to correct in the judgment under review but to make such disposition of the case as justice requires, And in determining what justice does require, the Court is bound to consider any change, either in fact or in law, which has supervened since the judgment was entered.'
20. It may further be noticed that in the decision in the case of Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukla (supra), it had been observed by the Apex Court that an appeal is by way of a re-hearing and the Court may make such order as the Judge of the first instance could have made if the case had been heard by him at the date on which the appeal was heard.
21. The view expressed by the Apex Court in its decision in the case of Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu (supra) was reiterated in its later decision in the case of Hasmat Rai and Anr. v. Raghunath Prasad, reported in AIR 1981 SC 1711.
22. In its decision in the case of Kamleshwar Prasad v. Pradumanju Agarwal (dead) by L.Rs., reported in JT 1997 (4) SC 425, the Apex Court had however clarified that if under the statute, an order of the appellate authority is made final and the said order is a decree of the Civil Court in that event the decree of a competent Court having become final cannot be interfered with by the High Court in the exercise of its power of superintendence under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution by taking into account any subsequent event which might have happened.
23. The situation in the present case is entirely different. The writ petition giving rise to this appeal had been filed invoking the extraordinary original jurisdiction of this Court. In the circumstances, therefore, the ratio of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Mithilesh Kumari and another (supra) stands squarely attracted.
24. In view of our conclusions indicated hereinabove, this appeal succeeds and the writ petition giving rise to this appeal is dismissed.
25. There shall however be no order as to costs.