G.C. Gupta, J.
1. This appeal filed under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) is directed against the order dated 31-5-82 passed by the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation Durg in case Nos. 26/80 and 27/80 dismissing the claim of the appellants on account of accidental death of Amarnath.
2. Deceased Amarnath was employed as a driver with respondent No. 1 and was driving their truck No. MHG 4005 when he met with an accident on 28-4-73. As a result of the injury received in the aforesaid accident Amarnath died on 3-5-73. Since Amarnath was an employee and died of employment injury, it was claimed that the appellants were entitled to pay compensation under the Act. The application claiming compensation was however filed on 12-5-80 i.e. about more than 7 years after the death of Amarnath. It may be mentioned that appellant No. 1, the widow of late Amarnath filed her separate claim whereas the 2 other appellants being minor son and daughter of the deceased filed their separate claim. The two claims were however heard and decided together and disposed of by the impugned order. The learned Commissioner on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record held that there was no sufficient cause for condoning delay of about 5 years. The claims were accordingly dismissed.
3. Submission of the learned Counsel for the appellants is that facts on record clearly indicate that both respondents had assured the appellant No. 1 that compensation will be paid and this constitutes the sufficient cause for condoning the delay. It is also submitted that minority of appellants 2 and 3 would by itself be a ground for condoning delay as they being under legal disability are entitled to file the claim after attaining the majority. The learned Counsel for the respondents however supported the impugned order and submitted that no case for interference of this court is made out.
4. As far as the finding that the appellant No. 1 had no 'sufficient cause' for filing the application after about 5 years of expiry of period of limitation is concerned, the same appears to be well merited in the context of facts and circumstances of the case. Amarnath died on 3-5-73 and therefore the application claiming compensation should have been made within 2 years from that date. When the legislature provides a period of limitation for preferring such claims it must be presumed to have fixed the outer limit which must be followed as a general rule. Extension of time fixed by the legislature must therefore he held to be an exception. That is why the Commissioner has been given the discretion in the matter which discretion has to be exercised only if the claim had not been preferred in time due to sufficient cause. The word sufficient cause must mean the something as the reasonable cause for delay and must therefore exclude every unreasonable cause. The case of the appellant No. 1 is that she had been approaching the employer and the insurance company with the request for payment of compensation. As far as employer is concerned there is nothing on record to indicate that he at any time made any promise. On the contrary the letter 29-3-75 (Ex. P-2) written by the Insurance Company would indicate that the employer was not communicating even with the Insurance Company. In case an employer does not communicate even with the Insurance Company far so long, the normal assumption should be that the employer was not paying any attention to the alleged claim. To persue the matter with such an employer for another period of 5 years, cannot be a reasonable attitude. Under the circumstances it was the obligation of the appellant No. 1 to file the claim within a reasonable period after the receipt of letter Ex. P-2. Under the circumstances the finding that the appellant No. 1 had no sufficient cause for filing the application beyond the period of limitation is the correct finding needing no interference of this court,
5. As far as other 2 appellants are concerned they were admittedly minors and continued to be so on the date of application. They had therefore filed the present claim through their next friend and guardian. The fact that their next friend is their mother sufficiently justifies the conclusion that the next friend has been used only as a prop to support the claim which otherwise would have fallen through on the ground of limitation. Submission of the learned Counsel is that Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act would apply to these proceedings and would therefore entitled these minors appellants to the benefit of Section 6 of the said Act. In spite of the fact that there is no direct authority supporting this proposition, this court would assume that Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act would apply only to examine if benefit of Section 6 of this Act can be given to these appellants. Section 6 of the Limitation Act deals with cases where the person entitled to institute the suit is a minor and deals with those cases where all claimants are minors. Section 7 is an exception of this section and deals with those cases where one of the several persons jointly entitled to the suit, is under disability. In the instant case it cannot be disputed that the 3 appellants are the dependents of the deceased and are entitled to claim compensation. Because of the provisions of Section 8(1) of the Act neither these appellants nor any one acting for them is entitled to give discharge of liability under the Act. In Amalcamated C.F. Ltd. v. Chhotibai 1973 MPLJ 389 a division bench of this court considered the distinction between Sections 6 and 7 of the Limitation Act and held that if any one of the claimants not suffering from disability was not in a position to give discharge in his/her own right in respect of the rights of the minor, the limitation would be extended in favour of the entire body of the plaintiffs. Applying the ratio of this decision it can be easily held that since appellant No. 1 did not have the capacity to give discharge on behalf of minor claimants, the period of limitation would extend to the benefit of all claimants. The learned Counsel for the respondents however submits that this result can not follow in the instant case as Section 7 of the Limitation Act could not be applied to the facts and circumstances of the case even if read with Section 29(2). According to the learned Counsel though Section 29(2) deals with suit, appeal or application in general, Section 7 is restricted only to suits or application for the execution of a decree. The submission appears to be that application in the instant case not being an application for execution of the decree. Section 7 cannot be applied to the facts and circumstances of the case. In Janardan v. Govt. Pleader Durg 1971 MPLJ 1046 it has been held that a complaint to a criminal court could not be equated with an application or a petition and hence provisions of Limitation Act would not apply. This decision may therefore, be treated to be an authority in support of the respondents' submission. In spite of it this court is not able to accept this submission. Section 29(2) of this Act applies Sections 4 to 24 even in those cases where they would otherwise not apply. It would therefore be illogical to read Section 7 de-hors. Section 29 as in such a situation the only conclusion would be that this section does not apply. This would frustrate the very purpose of Section 29 of the Act. The correct method of reading this provision would be to treat it is a part of Section 29(2) and apply the same in all those cases where Section 29(2) applies. In this view of the matter Section 7 must not only apply to suit and application for execution of a decree but to all applications covered by first part of Section 29(2). This provision provides that Sections 4 to 24 would apply only in so far as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by the Act and therefore sufficiently indicates that they were to be applied in respect of all applications unless excluded by the special or local law. In this view of the matter Section 7 of the Limitation Act would govern proceedings and will have the effect of enlarging the period of limitation.
6. Learned Counsel for the respondents however seriously disputes the application of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act to proceedings before Commissioner for Workmen's compensation. The Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation is not a court and that is the reason why Section 115 C.P.C. has not been applied to it. But application of Section 29 of the Limitation Act is not confined to courts alone. Indeed in Vidyacharan v. Khubehand AlR 1964 SC 1099 the Supreme Court applied this provision to proceedings before the election tribunal. Thereafter this Court in Abhimanyu v. Virendra Brijbihari 1978 MPLJ 189 invoked Section 29 for applying Section 5 of the Limitation Act to proceedings before election tribunal. The Supreme Court in Hukumdev v. Lalit Narain : [1974]3SCR31 took the same view of the matter. Under the circumstances this court is not able to accept the submission of the respondents. In the opinion of this court the provision would be attracted and applied to proceedings before the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation. As a necessary consequence it must be held that the disability of the appellants 1 and 2 would have the effect of extending the period of limitation. In this view of the matter application filed by them cannot be treated as barred by limitation. Submission that in such a situation the claim would be premature, cannot be taken serious note, as the claim like the present one can always be filed with the help of next friend or guardian. It is the responsibility of the Commissioner to protect the interests of minors by giving suitable directions at the time of disbursement of compensation.
7. In this view of the matter this court is not able to sustain the impugned order. In the opinion of this court the claim was not barred by limitation because of the minority of the appellants 1 and 2 and therefore could not be dismissed.
8. There is yet another reason why such a claim should not be permitted to be defeated. Section 10A of the Act obliges the Commissioner on receiving information from any source about the death of a workman to require the employer to submit the statement in the prescribed form and also deposit the amount of compensation in case he accepts the liability. In such a case if the employer denies his liability the Commissioner has been given the discretion to inform the dependents that it is open to them to prefer a claim for compensation. Not only this the Commissioner is also required to give such information to the dependents to enable them to make the claim as he may be having with him and which he may think fit. Insertion of this provision in the Act sufficiently established the anxiety of the legislature to see that the claim of a bona fide claimant is not defeated. The same intention is obvious from Section 10B of the Act which obliges the employer to report to the Commissioner the circumstances attending death or seriously bodily injury. The Act without doubt is a welfare statute and therefore interpretative process of this court must bring out the contention of the legislature. The interpretation adopted by this court in its opinion establishes the efficacy of this welfare legislation and thereby furthers the intention of the legislature.
9. The appeal succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order is set aside. The Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, Durg is directed to hear and decide the claims of the appellants in accordance with law. No order as to costs of this appeal.