K.K. Verma, J.
1. On 12-1-1987 respondent 1 Roop Chand filed an application under Section 151, C. P. C. -- registered as M.C.C. 6/87 -- seeking an order for a clarification in the judgment dated 24-9-1986 of Dr. T. N. Singh, J., in Second Appeal No. 7/86 (Roop Chand v. Bhanu Prakash). On 29-6-1987 the learned single Judge dismissed the application but granted two weeks' time to applicant Roop Chand to deliver vacant possession of the suit accommodation to the landlord-decree-holder, non-applicant Bhanu Prakash, under Sub-section (7) of Section 12 of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961. Non-applicant Bhanu Prakash, aggrieved by the grant of two weeks' time to applicant Roop Chand, has filed a L.P.A. under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent.
2. The learned counsel for respondent 1 Roop Chand has raised a preliminary objection that the present L.P.A. is not maintainable under Section 100A, C.P.C. and also because the impugned order was not a 'judgment' within the meaning of that expression in Clause 10 of the Letters Patent. On the other hand, the appellant's learned counsel maintained that the appeal was maintainable because the impugned order was passed in an independent proceeding, and that, the direction, which deprived the appellant of a valuable right under the decree, amounted to a 'judgment' for the purpose of Clause 10 of the Letter Patent.
3. The question of maintainability of the appeal has to be seen in the light of the following facts. Appellant Bhanu Prakash got a decree for eviction of respondent No. 1 Roop Chand under Sections 12(1)(a) and 12(1)(b) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 about a non-residential accommodation situate at Morar (in the city of Gwalior). The tenant's appeal was dismissed by the District Judge, Gwalior who affirmed the eviction on the ground contained in Section 12(1)(h) only. The learned District Judge ascertained from the tenant whether he elected to be placed in occupation of the accommodation. On a query from the learned District Judge, the tenant's counsel told the Court that the tenant elected to be placed in occupation of the accommodation after the rebuilding thereof. The map of the suit accommodation (Ex.P-7) and the map of the proposed construction in the place of the suit accommodation (Ex.P-8) were, however, not pressed into service by the learned District Judge while reciting the statement of the tenant's counsel at paragraph 30 of the judgment.
4. The learned District Judge gave three months' time to the tenant for delivery of possession of the suit accommodation to the landlord. The learned District Judge, however, added the following rider, 'Lakin wadi -- respondent wadgrast dukan ka rikt adhi-patya tabhi prapt kar sakega jab wah wadgrast dukan ka punaha nirman ka karya shuru karne ki sthiti main ho'.
5. The tenant's second appeal was admitted for final hearing on 7-8-1986. The ground involved was stated to be 'the construction of Section 12(1) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act. 1961' which was stated to be a substantial question of law, being a question of interpretation of a statute. On 24-9-86, the date for the final hearing of the appeal, landlord Bhanu Prakash executed an undertaking before a notary. This written undertaking was filed in the Court. Overruling the tenant's submission that the undertaking did not satisfy the requirement of Section 12(7), the learned single Judge accepted the undertaking and disposed of the second appeal in the following terms : 'I direct that the first respondent-landlord shall undertake, as proposed, reconstruction of the premises within a month of the same being vacated by the appellant-tenant. The construction shall be completed within one year and tenant shall be put back into possession of the area which he was occupying previously at the rent to be determined either mutually or by the Court under the M. P. Accommodation Control Act. I further direct that the appellant-tenant shall give vacant possession of the premises to respondent No. 1 within a period of four months so that construction on the premises can be undertaken as directed above, The landlord-respondent No. 1 shall suffer penalty in the nature of damages payable to the tenant-appellant at the rate of Rs. 50/- per day, in the event of his failure to put the tenant-appellant in possession of the concerned premises in accordance with these directions. It is also made clear that in case reconstruction of the premises is not undertaken within the stipulated time by the respondent No. 1-land-lord, the tenant shall be entitled to be put back in possession of the premises from which he is to be dispossessed in execution of the decree passed by the trial Court.
In the result, this appeal is allowed to the extent that eviction of the tenant for a period of four months is stayed to enable him to deliver possession amicably to the plaintiff-landlord.'
6. On 12-1-1987 Roop Chand, the tenant made an application in the High Court describing it as an 'application under Section 151, C.P.C. for clarification and modification of the order dated 24-9-86 passed by the Hon'ble Justice Shri Dr. T. N. Singh in second appeal No, 7/86.
7. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the application run as follows :
'2. That, the applicant is actually occupying shop 13'6' x 8' (exterior) and 17'6' x 8'9' (interior) total area 322 sq. ft. on the front of the road adjacent to the Sadar Bazar Road (Main Market). But after reconstruction, there will be three shops on the road side. The middle shop which corresponds to the floor on which the petitioner tenant's shop exists is shown in the middle of the three shops. Its dimension would be 23'6' x 10' (i.e. total area 236 sq. ft.)
3. That, the undertaking was vague and ambiguously worded. It was not clear which shop will be given and on that basis it is not clear in the order that middle shop out of three shops after reconstruction, will be restored to the tenant.'
8. The relief sought was as follows :
'Therefore, it is humbly prayed that it may be clarified in the order the exact place and the actual shop which will be restored to the applicant after reconstruction, which according to the plan should be the middle one out of the three shops to be constructed. This clarification and modification is necessary, so that the landlord may not harass the petitioner and restoration of possession may not be delayed due to ambiguity of the order.'
9. The application was listed for hearing (for admission) on 16-1-1987 when counsel for landlord Bhanu Prakash entered appearance in the case. A week's time was given to both sides to file replies about the pendency of an appeal (from the second appellate decree) before the Supreme Court.
10. However, on 21-1-87 the case was relisted for hearing of I. A. No. 1/87. Although the I. A. No. 1/87 is not on record. It appears that it must have been for some short of stay of the operation of the second appellate decree by which four months' time had been given to the tenant to vacate the suit -accommodation. It transpired during the hearing that the tenant's S.L.P. had been dismissed by the Supreme Court. The learned single Judge expressed the view that the prayer made in I. A. No. I/87 that the tenant's right to 'protection' could not be refused. The landlord's learned counsel made a concession that on his getting a week's time to file a reply, the tenant's right of re-entry into the accommodation under Section 18 of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 shall not be deemed to have been lost to him. The learned single Judge ordered that the landlord may file his reply and till then the tenant may retain the possession of the suit accommodation without having suffered disqualification (in the matter of his re-entry) under Section 18. On 27-1-1987, the landlord's prayer for extension of time to file a reply and the tenant's prayer for extension of his right to retain his possession were allowed. On 15-4-1987 and 20-4-1987, the Court allowed ajoint submission that M.C.C. No. 6 of 1987 be heard with M.C.C. No. 40/87 and M.C.C. No. 12/87 respectively. On 28-4-1987 arguments in the three cases were heard in part. The record of C. S. No. 27-A/82 was ordered to be requisitioned. The case was adjourned to 26-6-1987. The stay order in favour of the tenant was extended till 26-6-1987. On 27-6-1987, the stay was extended till 29-6-1987 when the remaining arguments were heard and the learned single Judge held that the application under Section 151 had no merit and was premature and was accordingly dismissed. It was what followed in the order that has led to the filing of the L.P.A. by the landlord :
'The question which only survives for my consideration is that the time fixed in both judgments for delivery of possession of the accommdation in their possession by the respondent/tenant to enable the landlord to rebuild having expired what order in that regard has to be passed. Shri R. D. Jain appearing for the landlord has seriously contested the right of the tenant to get an extension of time for delivery of possession. However, I do not see any merit in his opposition because from time to time, this Court has made orders extending the time of delivery of possession and today this position cannot be retracted. However, more than ten months' time having elapsed since order and judgments were passed in the two appeals granting four months' time in each case, it is necessary to ensure that the privilege is not further abused. Accordingly, I direct that the tenant in each case must deliver vacant pos-session of the premises in their occupation to the landlord within a period of two weeks from today, in default, it shall be open to the landlord to execute the decree of the trial Court in each case for eviction.'
11. Aggrieved by the learned single Judge's grant of two weeks' time to the tenant to vacate the suit accommodation, the landlord has filed the present Letters Patent Appeal, but without having obtained a declaration from the learned single Judge that the case was a fit one for appeal.
12. Now, the contents of the Clause 10 of the Letters Patent were marshalled in Madhukar Trimbaklal v. Godavari, AIR 1940 Nagpur 39 (FB) in the following form :
Part I.
Part II.
Part III.
We do further ordain that an appeal shalllie to the said High Court of judicatureat Nagpur from the judgment of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Courtpursuant to Section 108 Government of IndiaAct.
Not being a judgmentpassed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdictionby a Court subject to thesuperintendence of the said HighCourt, and not being an ordermade in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the powers ofsuperintendence under the provisions of S. 107,Government of India Act, or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction.
And that notwithstandinganything hereinbefore provided an appeal shalllie to the said High Court from a judgmentof one Judge of the said HighCourt or one Judge of any Division Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdictionin respect of a decree of ordermade in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court where the Judge who passed the judgmentdeclares that the case is a fit one for appeal. 1:
13. The tenant's learned counsel submitted that the present appeal is untenable owing to the bar in Section 100A (C.P.C.). It runs as under :
'100A. No further appeal in certain cases.-- Notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent for any High court or in any other instrument having the force of law or in any other law for the time being in force, where any appeal from an appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall He from the judgment, decision or order of such single Judge in such appeal or from any decree passed in such appeal.'
14. It was also submitted that the Letters Patent Appeal is not maintainable because the learned single Judge has not given a declaration that the case decided by him was a fit one for appeal.
15. It was also submitted that the impugned directions given by the learned single Judge do not amount to a 'judgment' within the meaning of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent.
16. Now, we come to the respondent No. 1's contention that Section 100A, C. P. C. creates a bar to a Letters Patent appeal from the order of the learned single Judge.
17. In the tenant's application dated 12-1-1987 under S, 151, C.P.C. the heading of the application (vide, paragraph 6, supra.), its contents, more particularly the grounds given in its paragraphs 2 and 3 (vide, paragraph 7, supra.) and the relief claimed (vide, paragraph 8, supra.) show that an order had been sought for an amendment in the second appellate judgment dated 24-9-1986 by the Court's making a clarification about the exact place and the identity of the shop (out of the three shops proposed to be constructed by the landlord over a site which included the site of the suit shop which was restorable to him (the tenant) after the envisaged construction of the proposed new building.
18. The respondent No. !'s learned counsel has relied on 'Ratanlal v. Gajadhar', AIR 1949 Nagpur 188, a decision given in a Letters Patent appeal. The facts leading to the appeal was as follows. A single Judge to the High Court passed an ex parte decree in a second appeal. The respondent made an application under Order 41, Rule 21 read with Order 42, C.P.C. for a rehearing of the second appeal. This application was rejected by another single Judge before whom it had been listed. Without leave from the single Judge, the maker of the application filed the Letters Patent appeal in question.
19. The Division Bench held in Ratanlal's case, AIR 1949 Nagpur 188, that in entertaining and deciding the application under Order 41, Rule 21 read with Order 42, the single Judge had exercised the second appellate jurisdiction under which the second appeal had been heard and decided ex parte, and, therefore, the Letters Patent appeal was non-maintainable for want of leave of the single Judge under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent.
20. On the other hand, the present appellant's learned counsel has cited 'Ganpatrai v. Chamber of Commerce, AIR 1952 SC 409, wherein it has been observed that an application under Section 152, C.P.C., for an amendment in a single Judge's final order in a liquidation case initiated before him was an independent proceeding.
21. In Ratanlal's case, AIR 1949 Nagpur 188, the appellant's counsel, arguing on the point of the maintainability of the Letters Patent appeal had submitted that the order under Letters Patent must itself deal with an order passed by a Lower Appellate Tribunal before it can be excluded under Clause 10 for want of the leave of the single Judge for filing a Letters Patent appeal. It was further argued that if the order appealed against is an original order in the sense that neither it seeks to uphold, revise or modify an order of a Lower Appellate Court then it is not exempt from a L.P.A. The Division Bench pointed out the assumptions of the argument as follows :
'... The assumption underlying the argument is this. It is assumed that the scheme of the Letters Patent contemplates at least one appeal, or a revision against every order. If any particular order is made appealable to a Lower Court, or if it is revisable by this Court, then there can be no further appeal under the Letters Patent against the order of the High Court. But when the single Judge of the High Court is not dealing directly with an order of a lower Tribunal either in second appeal or a revision then an appeal lies against his order under the Letters Patent.'
22. The Court repelled the aforementioned submissions at paragraph 6 of their judgment. It was said :
'... The prohibition, in our opinion applies to all orders passed in the exercise of second appellatejurisdiction. The prohibition is on all orders passed in the exercise of a certain kind of appellate jurisdiction, namely, a jurisdiction exercised 'in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction.' It is our opinion that the words quoted qualify the words, 'appellate jurisdiction' used earlier in the clause and not the order sought to be attacked in the Letters Patent appeal.'
23. At paragraphs 7 and 8 of the judgment the Division Bench in Ratanlal's case, AIR 1949 Nagpur 188, have set out the reasons for their conclusion in the following terms :
(7) Now there can be doubt that Pollock, J., passed the order under appeal before us in the exercise of appellatejurisdiction; further that thejurisdiction, he was exercising was second appellate jurisdiction, that is to say a jurisdiction 'in respect of a decree..... made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction.' He obtained seisin of the case as a Second Appellate Court. Without the decree of the Lower Appellate Court which came up to this Court in second appeal the order which Pollock, J. made could not have been passed. The jurisdiction he was exercising was accordingly second appellate jurisdiction.
(8) Now a court can only have one class of jurisdiction in any given matter. In the exercise of that jurisdiction (second appellate here) it can and must do many things; it can exercise many powers. It can hear counsel. It can fix dates for hearing. It can grant adjournments. It can impose adjournment costs. It can even hear witnesses and admit to evidence additional documents. It does all this in the exercise of second appellate jurisdiction. It does not jump from jurisdiction to jurisdiction such successive stage, nor alter its status according to the powers it exercises in the given matters. It is not a Court of second appeal where it hears an argument and a Court of original jurisdiction when it grants an adjournment or imposes a penalty such as adjournment costs, or receives additional evidence. It is true that the Judge has many of the powers of an original Court and can do many of the things which an original Court does, but it does those things in the exercise of appellate, or second appellate jurisdiction, as the case may be, and not as an original Court. Section 107(2), Civil P.C., expressly recognises this and enacts that subject to the provisions of Sub-section (1). 'The appellate Court shall have the same powers and shall perform as nearly as may be the same duties as are conferred and imposed by this code on courts of original jurisdiction in respect of suits instituted therein.'
It is to be observed that the appellate Court is invested with the same 'powers' and not with the same 'jurisdiction'. Thejurisdiction remains appellate whatever the nature of the Court may happen to exercise.'
24. In Ganpat Rai's case, AIR 1952 SC 409, the Court had before it Civil Appeal No. 182 of 1951 and Civil Appeals Nos. 167, 167-A/1951 on a special leave granted by the Pepsu High Court at Patiala under Article 133(1)(c). The observations (appearing at paragraph 8 of the judgment) relied on by the present appellant's learned counsel, relate to Civil Appeal No. 158/1951 before the Supreme Court.
25. The facts in respect of Civil Appeal No. 152/1951 were as follows. A liquidation proceeding was initiated against a company named the Marwari Chamber of Commerce Ltd. The official liquidation settled the list of contributions. The Liquidation Judge of the High Court passed an order on 4-6-J946 for payment of Rs. 4,762. 13/3. The Official Liquidator and the contributory preferred appeals to a Division Bench of the High Court which enhanced the sum (in favour of the Liquidator) to Rs. 24,005/ - 7/3. This time the contributory filed an appeal to the Judicial Committee, Patiala. The Judicial Committee, Patiala, set aside the appellate judgment of the Division Bench on the ground that the appeal was barred by time, and restored the order of the Liquidation Judge on 6-12-1949.
26. On 2-2-1950, the contributory made an application under Section 152, C.P.C. before the Liquidation Judge, praying therein that owing to a clerical or arithmetical error arising from an accidental slip or omission had resulted in stating that a sum of Rs. 24,005/7/3 was due by the contributory instead of the correct figure of Rs. 21, 805/ 7/3.
27. The learned single Judge dismissed the application on 15-3-1950. At that date the Pepsu Ordinance 10 of 2005 was in force. In fact, it had come into force in August, 1948. Section 82 of the Ordinance provided that subject to any other provision of law, an appeal shall lie to a Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment, decree or order of one Judge of the High Court. The proviso to the section, however, stated that no such appeal shall lie to the Division Bench of the High Court unless the single Judge who decided the case or in his absence the Chief Justice certified that the case is a fit one for appeal.
28. The contributor made an application to the learned single Judge for a certificate for leave to appeal but this application was dismissed. Notwithstanding the withholding of the leave by the learned single Judge, the contributory preferred an appeal from the single Judge's order dated 16-3-1950. The Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the appeal on the ground of want of a certificate from the single Judge. This order led to C.A. No. 152/1951 in the Supreme Court.
29. In C.A. No. 152/1951 the appellant submitted that Ordinance 10 of 2005 of the Patiala State did not govern an appeal from the single Judge of the High Court to a Division Bench of the High Court. It was submitted that the Patiala States Judicature Farman R. Shahi 1999, Bikarmi governed such appeals and that no certificate was required in terms of the Farman for such an appeal.
30. The Supreme Court upheld the order of the Division Bench of the High Court to the effect that no appeal lay from an order of a single Judge without a certificate (in the terms of Section 52 of the Pepsu Ordinance 10 of 2005). For this conclusion, the Supreme Court gave the following reasons at paragraph 8 of the ruling:
'(8).....It is true that under Section 44 of the earlier Farman a certificate that the case is a fit one for appeal is required only if the judgment, decree or order sought to be appealed is made in the exercise of civil appellate jurisdiction. It is, however, clear that we are not governed by this provision. The amendment application was made on 2-2-1950 as stated already. No appeal is provided under the Civil Procedure Code from an order amending or refusing to amend a judgment, decree or order, though an appeal would lie from the amended decree or order. There is no warrant for the view that the amedment petition is a continuation of the suit or proceedings therein. It is in the nature of an independent proceeding, though connected with the order of which amendment is sought. Such a proceeding is governed by the law prevailing on its date, which admittedly is Pepsu Ordinance 10 of 2005, and which provides in Section 52 for a certificate.'
31. Now, before us the issue of the maintainability of the present appeal (avowedly under Clause 10) is in the main, linked with the bar under Section 100A, C.P.C. to a letters patent appeal, and, in the alternative, with the effect of want of a declaration of the learned single Judge that the case before him (M.C.C. No. 6/87) was a fit one for appeal, on the tenability of the present appeal.
32. Hence, the law laid down at paragraphs 5 to 8 in Ratan Lal's case, AIR 1949 Nagpur 188 is relatable to the subject: whether the order, impugned in the present appeal, was or was not an order in second appellate jurisdiction for the purposes of Section 100A, C.P.C. and Clause 10 of the Letters Patent.
33. On the other hand, in Ganpat Rai's case, AIR 1952 SC 409 the question (posited at paragraphs 31 and 32 supra) before us was not in issue in Ganpat Rai's case, AIR 1952 SC 409 because there the order of the learned single Judge was admittedly in the original jurisdiction as contradistinguished from first or second appellate jurisdiction. That is the reason why the Supreme Court has said nothing in it about the kind or category of the jurisdiction invoked and exercised by the learned single Judge before whom the application dated 2-2-1950 was made under Section 152, C.P.C. This aspect of the case has not to be lost sight of in understanding the effect of the observations (in the ruling) relied on by the appellant's learned counsel.
33A. Now, the aforementioned observations cover two matters. The first was a reference to the absence of any provision of law in the C.P.C. for an appeal from an order (under Section 152, C.P.C.) amending or refusing to amend a judgment, decree or order. These observations, however, did not support -- in fact, it was not meant to support -- the appellant's plea that he was entitled to file an internal appeal to a Division Bench of the High Court under the Patiala States Judicature Farman R. Shahi 1999, Bikarmi. Hence, the aforementioned observations do not support the appellant's plea that the present appeal is maintainable under Clause 10 Letters Patent before us.
34. Again, the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court (in Ganpat Rai's case), that the amendment petition was not a continuation of the suit or proceedings therein or that the amendment petition initiated a proceeding which was in the nature of an independent proceeding cannot be read as observations on kind or category of the jurisdiction of the learned single Judge.
35. Hence, we do not agree with the appellant's learned counsel's submission that Ganpat Rai's case, AIR 1952 SC409 implicitly overruled the view at paragraphs 5 to 8 in Ratanlal's case, AIR 1949 Nagpur 188.
36. Coming to the case before us, it is plain that the tenant's application sought clarification an amendment of the ordering part of the judgment (vide paragraph 5, supra) and consequentially in the second appellants decree. It is clear that the High Court had the exclusive jurisdiction to make such an amendment in the judgment (and the decree) under Section 151, C.P.C., and that too in the exercise of its second appellate jurisdiction because it was a single Judge of the High Court who had given the judgment and passed the decree under Section 100, C.P.C. which has invested a High Court with the second appellate jurisdiction. No other jurisdiction of the High Court was, or could be, invoked in the tenant's application dated 12-1-1987. It then follows that the learned single Judge assumed the second appellate jurisdiction in entertaining the application and, in so doing, making the directions (impugned in this Letters Patent Appeal) after dismissing the application. This view is consistent with the view in Ratanlal's case, AIR 1949 Nagpur 188.
37. For his plea that the present Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable, the appellant's learned counsel has relied on Govind-ram v. Smt. Jhimi Bai, 1988 Jab LJ235. In it, Gulab C. Gupta, J. said that a revision petition lies to the High Court under Section 115, C.P.C. as substituted by the Madhya Pradesh Amending Act 29 of 1984, from an order in an appeal before a District Court accepting a respondent's prayer to withdraw a suit filed under Section 12(a) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 so as to enable her to proceed against her tenant in accordance -vith Section 23 A of the said Act. Gulab C. Gupta. J. held this view saying that the Full Bench decision in Ram-chandra v. Dattatraya, 1986 Jab LJ 344 : (AIR 1986 Madh Pra 191) was distinguishable. In the Full Bench case it was categorically laid down as follows :
'11. As the revision petition in the instant case is directed against an order passed by a district Court in appeal, arising out of a suit of the value of less than twenty thousand rupees, it is not maintainable under Section 115 C.P.C.'
38. Gulab C. Gupta, J. relied on Sinchai Rajila v. Kanhai AIR 1922 Nagpur 84. That decision was given when there was no amendment in Section 115 C.P.C.
39. In the Full Bench case Ramchandra v. Dattatraya 1986 Jab LJ 344 : (AIR 1986 Madh Pra 191) reliance was placed on Shri Vishnu Autar v. ShivAutar, AIR 1980 SC 1575. In it, the Supreme Court, dealing with a U.P. amendment, akin to the amendment made by the amending Act 29, 1984 in the State of Madhya Pradesh, held that the decisions of district Courts rendered in appeal were beyond revisional power of the High Court. We are, therefore, bound by the Supreme Court ruling, and the Full Bench ruling in Ramchandra v. Dattatraya, 1986 Jab LJ 344 : (AIR 1986 Madh Pra 191) which approved of two Division Benches cases, (Gaya Prasad and another v. Deepchand and another in Civil Revision No. 942 of 1984 (reported in 1986 MPLJ 524) and Pirbux v. Babulal in Civil Revision No. 6 of 1985 (J) (reported in AIR 1987 Madh Pra 18). We, therefore, hold that the appellant's argument based on the view of the learned single Judge in Govind Ram v. Smt. Jhimibai, 1988 Jab LJ 235 does not commend itself to us.
40. The respondent's learned counsel has relied on Ganga Vishan Hiralal v. Gopal Digambar Jain Sidhnath Mahavidya-laya in L.P.A. 1/80 (reported in AIR 1989 Madh Pra 285) decided by a Division Bench of the M.P. High Court at Gwalior in which there was a reference to Rajmata Vijaye Raje Scindia's case 1988 MPLJ 78 : 1988 Jab LJ 86. These rulings do not deal with the question which we have discussed above. Hence, there is no point in considering the law expounded in these rulings.
41. In the result, we are of the view that the order impugned in the present letters patent appeal was passed by Dr. T. N. Singh in M.C.C. No. 6/87 in the second appellate jurisdiction.
42. It then follows that Section 100A. C.P.C. comes into play as a bar to the maintainability of the present Letters Patent appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent. In Umaji Keshao Meshram v. Smt. Radhika-bai (1986 Cur Civ LJ (SC) 393 : (AIR 1986 SC 1272), it was observed at paragraph 8 as follows :
'8. It may be pointed out that the provision in Clause 15 providing for an appeal from a judgment in a second appeal decided by a Judge of the High Court if such Judge declares that the case is fit one for appeal has now become inoperative in view of Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which was inserted in that Code by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976, under which no further appeal is to lie against the Judgment of single Judge of the High Court in a second appeal.'
We, therefore, hold that the present Letters Patent appeal is not maintainable in view of the bar created by the provisions of Section 100A, C.P.C.
43. It then follows that it is redundant to consider the effect of want of leave from the learned single Judge and also the subject whether the order impugned in the present appeal is or is not a 'judgment' within the meaning of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent.
44. Since we have held that the present Letters Patent appeal is barred by the provisions of Section 100A, C.P.C. it is unnecessary to take up and decide the correctness or otherwise of the impugned directions given in the order dated 29-6-87 by the learned single Judge in M.C.C. No. 6/87.
45. In the result, we dismiss the present letters patent appeal as not maintainable. In the particular circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. Counsel's fees Rs. 300/- if certified.