Anjani Kumar, J.
1. By means of present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners challenge the order dated 24th May, 1999, passed by the prescribed authority and the order dated 23rd August, 2003, passed by the appellate authority under the provisions of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972, whereby the appellate authority dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioners-tenant against the order passed by the prescribed authority by which the prescribed authority has allowed the release application filed by the respondent-landlady, copies whereof are annexed as Annexure Nos. 'V' and 'VI', respectively, to the writ petition.
2. The facts leading to the filing of the present writ petition are that the respondent-landlady filed an application under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), before the prescribed authority against the petitioners, who are the tenant of the accommodation in question for the release of the accommodation in question in possession of the tenant-petitioners on the ground of bona fide requirement with the allegations that the petitioners-tenant are in occupation of two rooms and one dalan on the first floor as tenants and that the landlady, who is a widow, has four grown up adult sons and the landlady has purchased the aforesaid accommodation at the time when her sons were minor. With the passage of time, the sons have grown up and the requirement of the landlady for the grown up children is now compelling to get additional accommodation which is in possession of the tenant-petitioners. The four grown up adult sons of the landlady are aged about 27 years, 25 years, 23 years and 21 years, respectively and that the landlady has no kitchen and she cooks her meal in the dalan. The landlady also asserted that the eldest son of the landlady is mentally retarted and the marriage of the other sons could not be performed because of the paucity of the accommodation, it was therefore prayed by the landlord that the accommodation in possession of the tenant may be released in favour of the landlady, as she required the additional accommodation bona fide. It is further asserted that the landlady served a notice for eviction of the petitioners and the release application was filed by the landlady on the ground that the landlady requires the accommodation in question for her bona fide requirement, which may be released in her favour. The petitioners-tenant contested the aforesaid release application by filing written statement before the prescribed authority. The prescribed authority on the basis of the pleadings of the parties and the evidence on record have arrived at the conclusion that the release application has been filed after service of six months notice, as is required under law and further that the need of the landlady is bona fide. The prescribed authority further found that tenant-petitioner No. 2 had obtained an accommodation in vacant condition when the same was allotted to him by Kanpur Development Authority in Barra Colony, Kanpur, which he has let out on rent and is residing with petitioner No. 1. The prescribed authority further found as of fact and has recorded finding that the need of the landlady is bona fide for the additional accommodation and further that since petitioner No. 2, who has got an accommodation in Barra Colony, Kanpur in vacant position, but instead of occupying the same has let it out, therefore the accommodation in question deserves to be released in favour of the landlady and the prescribed authority vide its order dated 24th May, 1999 allowed the release application filed by the landlady and released the accommodation in question in favour of the landlady.
3. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioners-tenant preferred an appeal under Section 22 of the Act before the appellate authority and argued the same points before the appellate authority. The appellate authority after considering the evidence on record and after discussing the arguments advanced on behalf of the parties have affirmed the findings with regard to bona fide requirement of the accommodation in question in favour of the landlady. The appellate authority further found that there is sufficient material on record to demonstrate that the petitioner No. 2 has obtained two house bearing house Nos. 11/762 E.W.S.-4, Barra, Kanpur and E-275 Block E.W.S., Scheme E.W.S., Daheli, Sujanpur in vacant position, which he has let out to others on rent, therefore the comparative hardship need not be considered, as the case of the tenant-petitioners is covered by the Explanation of Section 21 of the Act. The aforesaid fact of getting possession of two accommodations, referred to above, has been disputed by the petitioners-tenants before the appellate authority and the tenants have submitted that merely because the Kanpur Development Authority has allotted the aforesaid accommodation in favour of petitioner No. 2, the petitioner No. 2 would not become the owner of the said accommodation, therefore the Explanation relied upon by the landlady would not apply to her case. For the ready reference, the Explanation carved out under Section 21 of the Act.
'21. Proceedings for release of building under occupation of tenant.--
(1)...
(a)...
(b)...
Explanation.--In the case of a residential building :
(i) where the tenant or any member of his family (who has been normally residing with or is wholly dependent on him) has built or has otherwise acquired in a vacant state or has got vacated after acquisition a residential building in the same city, municipality, notified area or town area, no objection by the tenant against an application under this sub-section shall be entertained;
(ii) [* * * *]
(iii) where the landlord of any building is---
(1) a serving or retired Indian Soldier as defined in the Indian Soldiers (Litigation) Act, 1925 (IV of 1925), and such building was let out at any time before his retirement, or
(2) a widow of such a soldier and such building was let out at any time before the retirement or death of her husband whichever, occurred earlier, and such landlord needs such building for occupation by himself or the members of his family for residential purposes, then his representation that he needs the building for residential purposes for himself or the members of his family shall be deemed sufficient for the purposes of Clause(a), and where such landlord owns more than one building this provision shall apply in respect of one building only.]
(iv) [* * *]'
4. A perusal of the aforesaid Explanation under Section 21 of the Act clearly demonstrates that it only talks of getting an house in vacant position and not that the ownership of the said house. The fact that the aforesaid two accommodations were allotted by the Kanpur Development Authority in favour of the tenant No. 2 and that he has let it out to other persons clearly demonstrates that the case of the landlady is covered by the Explanation of Section 21 of the Act. The appellate authority therefore maintained the order passed by the prescribed authority and dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioners-tenant vide order dated 23rd August, 2003.
5. Before this Court also learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the tenants-petitioners advanced the same arguments. Learned Counsel for the tenants contended that the landlady has more than sufficient accommodation in her possession and she can accommodate even the grown up sons in the accommodation in her possession and the need shown by the landlady for the additional accommodation is only a mere desire and. on the aforesaid basis the authorities below have committed error in releasing the accommodation in question in favour of the landlady. This argument is rebutted by learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-landlord, who submitted on the strength of the series of decisions of this Court that, the landlord is the best Judge of his additional requirement, provided the same is not mere desire and flimsy. The prescribed authority have considered the requirement of additional accommodation as prayed for by the landlady and have arrived at the conclusion that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the need of the landlady for the additional accommodation cannot be said to be mere desire, therefore it was also bona fide need of the landlady. The said finding has been affirmed by the appellate authority and in view of the recent decision of the Apex Court in Ranjeet Singh v. Ravi Prakash, 2004 (2) AWC 1721 (SC) : 2004 (2) SCCD 890, this Court in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India will not re-appraise and reassess the evidence in order to arrive at the different conclusion and in the teeth of the findings recorded by the prescribed authority and affirmed by the appellate authority.
6. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Ranjeet Singh (supra), the aforesaid submission of the tenants that the landlady does not require the accommodation in question bona fide or that the finding recorded by the prescribed authority and affirmed by the appellate authority deserves to be quashed by this Court, deserves to be rejected and is hereby rejected.
7. Coming to the question of comparative hardship, learned Counsel for the petitioners-tenants submitted that from the perusal of the orders passed by the prescribed authority and affirmed by the appellate authority, it is clear that neither of the authorities have considered the comparative hardship and the tilt of the comparative hardship vis-a-vis landlady and the tenants. In this view of the matter, the order passed by the prescribed authority and affirmed by the appellate authority deserves to be quashed. On the other hand, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-landlady submitted that since the case of the landlady is covered by the Explanation of Section 21 of the Act, referred to above, the comparative hardship need not be gone into by the authorities below. The prescribed authority as well as the appellate authority have not committed any error in arriving at the findings that since the case of the landlady is covered by the Explanation to Section 21 of the Act, therefore the accommodation in question deserves to be released in favour of the landlady.
8. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the arguments advanced on behalf of the parties as well as the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Ranjeet Singh (supra), I am in full agreement with the arguments advanced on behalf of the respondent-landlady that since the case of the landlady is covered by the Explanation to Section 21 of the Act, therefore in my opinion, the authorities below have not committed any error, much less error apparent on the face of record, which may warrant any interference by this Court in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
9. In view of what has been stated above, this writ petition has no merit and is accordingly dismissed. The interim order, if any, stands vacated. However, there will be no order as to costs.