Judgment:
S.H.A. Raza, J.
1. Aggrieved against theorder of termination passed against the petitioner contained in Annexure-7 the petitioner hasapproached this Court under Article 226 of theConstitution of India.
2. The main thrust of the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner in this writ petition is that in view of the settled legal position, as enumerated in the decision of this Court in Writ Petition No. 1941 of 1985. Jaikishan and Ors., v. U.P. Co-operative Bank Ltd. and Ors., decided on 3.3.1989 Co-operative Society is an industry and persons engaged in the Societies are workmen and come within the definition of the workmen as contained in U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, hence the termination of the services of a workman engaged in a Co-operative Society without complying with the provisions of Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act would be non-est.
3. There is no denial of the fact that the petitioner was engaged as salesman in the Society, which according to the petitioner, is an instrumentality of the State, as more than 90 per cent of the assets and the liabilities of the said Society vest in the State Government and it functions mainly on the financial assistance granted by the State Government under the supervision of the Registrar, U.P. Co-operative Societies, and Uttar Pradesh Upbhokta Sahkari Bhandar Sewa Niyamawali, 1976 are applicable to the persons in the said Society and the petitioner was drawing a salary of Rs. 300/- per month.
4. It has been argued on behalf of the respondents counsel that the Rai Bareli KendriyaUpbhokta Sahkari Bhandar Limited, Rai Bareliis not a State within the meaning of Article 12 ofthe Constitution of India. In view of law laiddown in Jai Kishan and Others (supra) the present Society is a State within the meaning ofArticle 12 of the Constitution. Although it wasvehemently argued by the respondents that theSociety in question cannot be termed as an'Industry' and the petitioner cannot be said to bea 'workmen' within the meaning of Industrial Disputes Act, but in view of the law laid down by theSupreme Court in M.C. Mehta and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. 1986 (52) FLR 418(SC) it can safely be said that the present Societyis an industry and the petitioner is a workmanwithin the meaning of Industrial Disputes Act.
5. It was next contended by Mr. Rakesh Kumer that the petitioner for a considerable period had absconded from duly and even if the impugned order is quashed he does not deserve to be paid salary for the said period. This question may be decided by the authorities concerned. This Court is concerned only to the extent as to whether the services of the petitioner were terminated in accordance with the provisions of Section 6-N and if the same has not been dispensed with in accordance with Section 6-N of the Industrial Disputes Act, whether the petitioner would be entitled for the wages from the date of the retrenchment. In view of the admitted position while dispensing with the services of the petitioner the procedure prescribed under Section 6-N was not followed. One month's notice as contemplated under the said provision was not given. The petitioner was not paid damages as contemplated and no sanction of the Prescribed Authority was taken. In view of this admitted position there is no option for this Court except to allow this writ petition.
6. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. A writ in the nature of certiorari is issued quashing the impugned order of termination dated 6th July, 1986/22.10.1986 contained in Annexure-7. Petitioner will be entitled to the consequential benefits arising out of the quashing of the impugned order. A writ in the nature of mandamus is issued commanding the opposite parties to put the petitioner back on duty. No order is made as to costs. However, the opposite parties may proceed against the petitioner in accordance with the provisions of Section 6-N of the Industrial Disputes Act.