Prem Chand Jain, C.J.
1. The question of law that needs our decision, reads thus :-
'Whether a complaint lodged by a private individual securing permission from the Government or the Labour Commissioner as the case may be could be regarded as a complaint made under Section 34 of the Industrial Disputes Act by the Government or the Labour Commissioner or under its or his authority ?'
2. S. N. Hada and others have filed these petitions for the quashing of the order No. IAA/CR-217/81-82, dated 11th May 1982 passed by the Labour Commissioner - third respondent (Annexure-J) as being illegal and void. The Commissioner of Labour by virtue of his order, which has been impugned in these petitions, has granted permission to the Binny Mills Staff Association to prosecute the management of M/s. Binny Limited (The Bangalore Woolen, Cotton and Silk Mills Co., Ltd.), Bangalore, for violation of some of the terms of agreement dated 8th of December 1980 (Annexure-G). When the petitions came up for hearing before a learned Single Judge of this Court, a contention was raised on behalf of the petitioners that no permission could be granted to a private individual or trade union to lodge a complaint under Section 34 of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). In other words the contention sought to be raised before the Learned Single Judge was that Section 34, which reads as under :
'34. COGNIZANCE OF OFFENCES :
(1) No Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under this Act or of the abatement of any such offence, save on complaint made by or under the authority of the appropriate Government.
(2) No Court inferior to that of a Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence punishable under this Act'.
authorised prosecution by the State and not by a private individual.
3. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the State had submitted that a complaint could be lodged by a private person with the previous permission of the Government or the authority named as the case may be. In support of his contention reliance had been placed on a single Bench Judgment of this Court in K. Pundarika Aithal v. Allampolli Venkataram 1974(1) KLJ 85.
4. After hearing the Counsel for the parties, the learned single Judge found considerable force in the construction suggested by the learned Counsel for the petitioners on the language of Section 34(1) of the Act. As there was likelihood of taking a view different from the one expressed in Pundarika Aithal's case (supra) the learned single Judge thought it appropriate to refer the matter to a Division Bench under Section 9 of the Karnataka High Court Act.
5. The matter was heard by a Division Bench. After hearing the learned Counsel for the parties, the Bench found that there was an unreported decision of a Division Bench in Criminal Appeal No. 528/1973 decided on 22nd July 1974 M. S. Rama Rao v. Jayashankar which has taken the same view as in Pundarika Aithal's case (supra) and as the point in issue, though had been decided by the Bench, needed reconsideration, the aforesaid question was referred to be decided by a Full Bench.
6. Mr. R. N. Narasimha Murthy, Senior Advocate, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners, raised a contention before us that the expression in Section 34(1) of the Act 'by or under the authority' means that the government or the authority (in case of delegation of power), as the case may be itself can lodge a complaint or it could authorise any other officer of the State Government to lodge a complaint. What was sought to be argued by the learned Counsel was that the prosecution has to be by the State and not by a private individual with the permission of the Government or the Labour Commissioner, that if a private individual lodges a complaint with the permission of the Government or the Labour Commissioner, the latter would have no control or authority over the complainant, and that the person lodging the complaint must be an agent of the State.
7. On the other hand, it was submitted by Sri Rajendra Babu, learned Counsel appearing for the State, whose contentions were adopted by Sri K. Subba Rao, learned Counsel, that under Section 34(1) of the Act even a private individual could be authorised by the State Government to file a complaint and that in the event of holding that it is only the Government or its agent who could file a complaint great hardship was likely to be caused to the aggrieved party.
8. Before dealing with a merits, it would be appropriate to notice the two decisions of this Court which have resulted in the reference. In Pundarika Aithal's case (supra), which is a Single Bench Judgment, the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner was that the complaint filed against the petitioner was not a valid complaint under the law as a compliant can be filed either by the Government itself or by any person authorised by the Government. It was also contended that the Government had delegated the powers of filing a complaint under Section 39 of the Act to the Labour Commissioner, that under Section 39 of the Act the Government is entitled to delegate its powers only to an authority subordinate to the State Government and not to anybody else, that the Labour Commissioner alone could have filed the complaint himself, but he could not authorise a private person to file a complaint because under Section 39 even the Government can delegate its powers only to an authority subordinate to the State Government and not to any person, and that Section 34 is controlled by Section 39 and as such the Labour Commissioner could not delegate powers of filing a complaint to a private person but should have only authorised the person subordinate to the State Government to file a complaint. The Learned Judge, relying on the Judgment of the Kerala High Court in State of Kerala v. Mary C. Nidhiri Chacko wherein is observed (1961-II-LLJ-569 at 571) :-
'The Section, in fact, confers two powers on the appropriate Government, the first to make a complaint and the second to authorise the making of a complaint or, in the words of Counsel for the defence to delegate in any particular case, its power to make a complaint. Section 39 of the Act authorises the appropriate Government to delegate any power exercisable by it under the Act, and the delegation made by the State Government in favour of the Labour Commissioner under Ex. P5 is of both the powers under Section 34(1) in so far as offences under Section 29 are concerned, namely, the power to make a complaint, and the power to authorise some body else to make a complaint. The delegation is a perfectly good delegation in terms of the Section, and since the Section itself authorises to the delegation of the power to authorise someone else to make complaint, no question of a delegate being disentitled to make a further delegation arises.'
rejected the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner and dismissed the Revision Petition.
9. The other case is the unreported Judgment in Criminal Appeal No. 528/73 (M. S. Rama Rao v. V. Jayashankar & Others (supra) decided on 22nd July 1974. The facts of that case are that the appellant M. S. Rama Rao was the President of the Bangalore District Engineering Worker's Union; he filed a criminal complaint in the Court of the J.M.F.C., Bangalore against the respondents who represent the Management : one of the objections taken by the accused before the Magistrate was that in view of Section 39 of the Act, the order of the State Government authorising the appellant to file the complaint was not a valid order and hence the complaint was not maintainable; that objection found favour with the Learned Magistrate resulting in the acquittal of the accused; in the appeal before this Court, on consideration of the provisions of Section 34 of the Act, one of us (Nesargi, J.) has observed thus :-
'A plain reading of this Section shows that a complaint for breach of the provisions of the Act can be made either by the appropriate Government or by a person under the authority of the appropriate Government. The order of the Government produced along with the complaint reads to show that it is an authority issued by the appropriate Government authorising the appellant complainant to file this complaint. Hence, we are opinion that the provisions of Section 34 of the Act have been complied with.'
The learned Counsel appearing for the respondents raised a contention that Section 39 of the Act had also to be taken into consideration while interpreting Section 34 of the Act, on which it has been observed thus :
'A reading of these provisions makes clear that the Government is vested with the power to delegate its powers exercisable under Section 34 of the Act to any one of the persons mentioned in this Section. If by issuing a notification contemplated by Section 39 of the Act the Government delegates powers exercisable by it under Section 34 of the Act, such persons would be competent to pass appropriate orders under Section 34 of the Act. We are therefore unable to agree with the contention of Sri Narasimha Murthy that on the reading of Sections 34 and 39 of the Act the Government could not authorise a private person to file a complaint. Similar is the view expressed by the High Court of Kerala in State of Kerala v. Mary C. Nidhiri Chacko (supra). This Court has cited the decision of the Kerala High Court with approval in K. Pundarika Aithal v. Allampolli Venkataraman & another (supra). We respectfully agree with these two decisions. We therefore hold that the reasoning of the learned Magistrate that the Government could not have authorised the appellant who is private person to file a complaint and hence the complaint is not maintainable, is not in accordance with a provisions of law.'
This is how the view of this Court stands of the interpretation of Section 34 of the Act which, as a result of reference, needs reconsideration.
10. At the outset, it may be observed that during the course of arguments, learned Counsel for the petitioners did not place any reliance on the provisions of Section 39, nor did he contend that for interpreting the provisions of Section 34 any aid could be taken or was necessary to be taken from the provisions of Section 39. To emphasise, the learned Counsel very fairly conceded that the provisions of Section 39 have no relevance for interpreting the provisions of Section 34 of the Act.
11. Coming to the provisions of Section 34, its analysis shows that it confers two powers on the appropriate Government-firstly to make a complaint itself and secondly to authorise the making of a complaint. Section 34, as the language shows, is only a mandate to the Government and confers no power on the Government. It only prohibits the Court from taking cognizance of any offence punishable under the Act unless complaint is made to it by or under the authority of the appropriate Government. The question that needs determination is as to what meaning has to be given to the words 'under the authority of the appropriate Government'. As is evident from the contentions of Sri Narasimha Murthy, Senior Advocate, the authority to be given has to be to a person who is the agent of the Government. What was sought to be highlighted by the learned Counsel was that if an authority is given to a private person, the purpose of the Section would be frustrated as after the giving of the authority the person so authorised (if he happens to be a private person) would not be bound by any advice of the appropriate Government, nor would he remain under its control.
12. To find out the plausibility of the arguments raised by the learned Counsel, it would be appropriate to notice certain Sections which deal with the offences under the Act. Section 25-Q provides penalty if an employer contravenes the provisions of Section 25-M or Section 25-N. Sections 25R makes a provision for penalty for closure of an undertaking without complying with the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 25-O. Section 25-U prescribes penalty for committing unfair labour practices. Under Section 26 penalty is provided if any workman commences, continues or otherwise acts in furtherance of a strike which is illegal under the Act. Similar is the provision with regard to employer under sub-section (2) of Section 26. Section 27 talks of penalty on a person who instigates or incites others to take part in or otherwise acts in furtherance of a strike or lock-out which is illegal under the Act. Under Section 28 penalty is provided for expending or applying any money in direct furtherance or support of any illegal strike or lock-out. In the event of the breach of any term of any settlement or any award by any person, penalty is provided under Section 29. Section 30 talks of penalty in case any person wilfully discloses any such information as is referred to in Section 21 or contravenes the provisions of that Section; under this Section it is also provided that the complaint can be made by or on behalf of the trade union or individual business affected. Under Section 30-A penalty is provided for closure without notice. Under Section 31(1) penalty is provided if any employer contravenes the provisions of Section 33; it is also provided under sub-section (2) that for non-compliance of any of the provisions of this Act or any rule made thereunder for which no other penalty is provided, punishment extending to Rs. 100/- may be awarded. This is how the provisions relating to penalty stand.
13. As we look at the matter, interpretation of Section 34 would be easier if the scheme of the Act, especially penalty provisions, are kept in mind as cognizance of a complaint under Section 34 is taken by a Magistrate only with regard to the offences specified therein. Under the Act, two parties between whom lis exists are the Employer and the Employee. An offence of which complaint can be made would be committed either by the Employer or the Employee. By enacting penal provisions the aim of the legislature is to ensure compliance of the order of the Tribunal and also to ensure obedience and compliance of the provisions of the statute. By non-compliance or disobedience of any provision of the Act, it is an individual right - either of the Employer or of the Employee - which is affected. The intent of the Legislature in enacting a provision like Section 34 is to save the party against whom the complaint is to be filed, from harassment, and it is for that reason that the Government is required to apply its mind and determine the propriety of filing a complaint. The phrase 'under the authority of the appropriate Government' implies a sanction by the Government after it has considered the desirability of prosecution. If such a provision had not been enacted there could be every likelihood of filing of frivolous complaints indiscriminately. Moreover, there are certain offences which have importance either to the Employer or the Employee only. In such matters why should the Government at all involve its officers in filing the complaint and not allow the real aggrieved party to prosecute the complaint properly and diligently. What interest can the Government or its agency have in filing and prosecuting a complaint in which the rights of some private individuals are involved and which does not require determination of some question which may be of some importance and may warrant intervention of the State Government or its agency. As is clear, authorisation is a pre-requisite essential for taking cognizance of an offence under this Section. The appropriate Government, therefore, is required to apply its mind and satisfy itself before it grants the authority. It is this satisfaction which is material and sufficient for the purpose. Once on consideration of the relevant material the State Government finds it to be a fit case for prosecution, then who should file the complaint is not of much importance. The interpretation sought to be put on the words 'under the authority of the appropriate Government' does not in any way advance the purpose of the Act. Strict grammatical or etymological propriety of language would not be of much use in understanding the intent of the Legislature and in construing the provision in question. It is well settled that the words of a statute, when there is a doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonize with the subject of the enactment and the object which the Legislature has in view. As has been brought out earlier, the intent of the Legislature is only to ensure the non-filing of frivolous complaints and nothing more.
14. Further, the provisions of Section 30 of the Act throw light and indicate clearly the intention of the Legislature that a private person could also be authorised to file a complaint. The Section provides that any person who wilfully discloses any such information as is referred to in Section 21 in contravention of the provisions of that Section shall, on complaint made by or on behalf of the trade union or individual business affected, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees or with both. Before filing the complaint, the complainant shall have to move the Government for authorisation as Section 34 is clear that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under this Act or of the abatement of any such offence, save on complaint made by or under the authority of the appropriate Government. In case the view is taken that only the Government or its agent can file a complaint, then the provisions of Section 30 providing for the filing of the complaint by or on behalf of the trade union or individual business affected, would become redundant, which could never be the intention of the Legislature. Thus viewed from any angle, we find it difficult to hold that under this provision, a private body or person other than the agent of the Government cannot be authorised by the Government to file a Complaint in a Court of law.
15. During the Course of arguments, our attention had been drawn to the provisions of Section 196 of the Criminal Procedure Code and also to her Judgments in Public Prosecutor v. S. A. Jabbar (1966-II-LLJ-888) and Provat Kumar Kar v. William Trevelyan Cartis Parker : AIR1950Cal116 . In our view these Judgments and Section 196 of the Criminal Procedure Code are of no relevance in deciding the point in controversy.
No other point arises for consideration.
16. For the reason recorded above, our answer to the question is as follows :
That the Government can authorise a private person also to file a complaint and such a complaint shall be regarded as a valid complaint under Section 34 of the Industrial Disputes Act on which Court can take cognizance of any offence punishable under the Act.