R.C. Chavan, J.
1. Rule, returnable forthwith. By consent, heard finally.
2. The petitioner, a distiller holding licence for manufacturing country liquor and potable liquor, has challenged the orders passed by respondent No. 2. Commissioner of State Excise, Mumbai, on 4-5-2002 and 11-3-2005 to the extent the orders refuse to levy privilege fees at the rates, which were applicable for the year 2001-2002.
3. The petitioner, a partnership firm, decided to convert itself into a Private Limited Company by the same name and sought transfer of the licences for manufacturing of liquor, known as 'CL-I' and 'PLL'. They, therefore, applied to respondent No. 2 seeking to know the procedure for such transfer of licences in the name of new entity. This letter of the petitioner, dated 29-10-2001, was replied by respondent No. 2 on 18-2-2002. After exchange of queries, replies and applications, on 30-3-2002, the Under Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra in Home Department wrote to respondent No. 2 that the Government had permitted the transfer of licences in the name of new entity, including the changes in relation to deletion of the names of deceased partners. The petitioner deposited the privilege fees of Rs. 1,48,505/-for transfer of CL-I licence and Rs. 6,75,000/-for transfer of PLL licence by challans in the Reserve Bank of India on 30-3-2002 and informed respondent No. 2 of the same on 31-3-2002. On 5-4-2002, the petitioner again informed respondent No. 2 that the fees, which were payable on the date the permission was granted, had been paid.
4. The fees for transfer of such licences had been enhanced for the year 2002-2003 by a notification dated 10-1-2002. Therefore, on 4-5-2002, respondent No. 2 informed the petitioner by letters, which are at Annexures K & L, the impugned communications, that the petitioner should pay privilege fees for transfer at the rates prescribed for the year 2002-2003 since the rates had been increased with effect from 1-4-2002. The respondent also informed the petitioner that the rate of fees prevailing at the time of actual amendment of the licence would apply. The petitioner then wrote to the Minister on 11-5-2002 that he was entitled to be charged fees at the rates prevalent till to 31-3-2002. Respondent No. 2 reiterated his stand by the impugned communication dated 11-3-2005 and also referred to a letter dated 28-1-2004, which the petitioner claims to have not been received by him. The petitioner replied this impugned communication on 18-3-2005 and then filed the petition on 19-4-2005.
5. Upon service of notice, the learned AGP appeared for the respondents and respondent No. 2 has filed a reply alleging, among other things, that the petition is untenable as it suffers from delay and laches. According to respondent No. 2, the cause of action accrued on 4-5-2002, when the petitioner was informed that he was liable to pay privilege fees at the rates prevailing at the time of actual amendment in the licence. The letter dated 11-3-2005 was only a reminder and, therefore, could not have been invoked by the petitioner to provide him with a cause of action. The respondent further submitted that Sub-section (2) of Section 137 of the Bombay Prohibition Act provided for a statutory appeal against the impugned orders to the Government. Since such appeal had not been preferred within the prescribed time, the orders had become final and, therefore, the writ petition was not tenable.
6. Respondent No. 2 further submitted that the fees for transfer of the two licences were Rs. 13 lacs each for the year 2002-2003. The letter dated 30-3-2002 was not addressed by the Under Secretary to the petitioner, but was sent to respondent No. 2. The petitioner may have received the letter in good faith, but it did not entitle him to act upon the said letter, since no order had been passed enabling him to pay fees. Since the privilege fees would have to be paid at the rates prevalent at the time of actual amendment, and since the current rates are Rs. 13 lacs for CL-I licence and Rs. 18 lacs for PLL licence, the petitioner is liable to pay deficit fees. Respondent No. 2 also clarified that reference to fees at the rates prevalent for the year 2002-2003 in the respondent No. 2's letter dated 11-3-2005 was inadvertent. Respondent No. 2 further submitted that the decision of this Court in the case of Somras Distillers, Nagpur v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. reported in 1996 (1) Mh.L.J. 782, is not applicable and the petition was, therefore, liable to be dismissed.
7. I have heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Assistant Government Pleader for the respondents.
8. The learned Assistant Government Pleader urged that the petition suffers from delay and laches. He submitted that though the petitioner had been informed on 4-5-2002 itself that the petitioner was required to pay deficit fees as per prevalent rates, the petitioner kept quiet and approached this Court only on 26-4-2005. He submitted that the letter dated 11-3-2005 was in fact only a reminder and, therefore, could not help the petitioner in contending that the petition does not suffers from delay and laches. Relying on a judgment in the case of Rup Diamonds and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. reported in : 1989(40)ELT226(SC) , the learned Assistant Government Pleader submitted that inordinate unexplained delay in preferring the writ petition, which was brought almost after one year of the first rejection, had been disapproved by the Supreme Court, and was held to be sufficient to persuade the Court to decline to interfere. The learned Assistant Government Pleader, therefore, submitted that the delay in the present case, which is longer still, must persuade this Court to decline to interfere.
9. His learned adversary pointed out that the observations of the Supreme Court in the said case would show as to why the Supreme Court felt that delay of one year should have persuaded the writ court to decline to interfere. The Court had relied on a previous judgment in the case of Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller, I & E, reported in : [1969]2SCR861 , where it was observed that the exchange position of this country and the policy of the government regarding international trade varies from year to year and, therefore, it would be odd for the Court to issue directions in respect of a licence granted in the year 1968. He submitted that in the context of import-export regulation and the foreign exchange situation, the Supreme Court made made those observations, which would not apply to the present petition.
10. For the law relating to delay and laches, which may have wider application than the observations in the case of M/s. Rup Diamonds, the learned Counsel sought to place reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Company Limited v. District Board, Bhojpur and Ors. reported in : [1992]2SCR155 . In that case, the Collector had made a demand towards cess from the petitioner Company and the Company had filed a suit challenging the demand for the period from 1953-1954 to 1966-1967. The suit was dismissed and a first appeal filed before the High Court, too was subsequently dismissed. In the meantime, demand for cess for the period from 1967-1968 to 1971-1972 was also raised by the Collector. The petitioner Company filed a writ petition before the High Court seeking to have the notice of demand quashed. This writ petition, which was filed in the year 1974, was dismissed by the High Court in limine on the ground of inordinate delay. The dismissal of both the first appeal as well as the writ petition was challenged before the Supreme Court. In this context, the Supreme Court observed in para 13 of the judgment that the rule relating to delay and laches is not a rule of law, but one of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion. The Court observed that each case must depend on its own facts, and the real test to determine delay in such cases is that the petitioner should come to the writ court before a parallel right is created, and that the lapse of time is not attributable to any laches or negligence. The Court held that the test was not to physical running of time and that where the circumstances justifying the conduct exists, the illegality, which is manifest, could not be sustained on the sole ground of laches.
11. The learned Counsel for the petitioner, therefore, submitted that the petition cannot be dismissed due to laches, since no other parallel right is created in any other person, which would be affected by entertaining the petition. He submitted that his client had, since beginning, pointed out to the authorities concerned as to what was his liability, and had, in fact, discharged that liability, which had irked the authorities. Therefore, according to him, the petitioner cannot be shut out on the ground of delay and laches.
12. I have carefully considered the rival contentions on this aspect. There can be no doubt that a person aggrieved must rush to a writ court promptly. In this case, it would have been possible for the petitioner to approach the Court even on receipt of communication dated 4-5-2002. But since the petitioner had made a representation and since the wheels of the Government do not move swiftly, it would be improper to find fault with the petitioner for not rushing to the Court immediately. His having waited till the receipt of the communication dated 11-3-2005, therefore, cannot be interpreted as negligent inaction, warranting dismissal of his petition. In view of this, applying the principles laid down in the case of Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Company Limited, cited supra, it would have to be held that the petition cannot be barred by applying the principle of delay and laches.
13. The learned Assistant Government Pleader next submitted that Sub-section (2) of Section 137 of the Bombay Prohibition Act would have enabled the petitioner to prefer an appeal before the State Government against the impugned communicated dated 4-5-2002 or 11-3-2005. Though such a remedy was available to the petitioner, the petitioner has chosen to rush to this Court without exhausting the remedy of appeal. The learned Assistant Government Pleader, therefore, submitted that the petition should not be entertained on the ground of availability of an alternate remedy. For this purpose, the learned Assistant Government Pleader relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. and Anr. v. State of Orissa and Anr. reported in : [1983]142ITR663(SC) . In that case, the petitioner was held to have an efficacious remedy by way of appeal and second appeal under Sales Tax Act, and, in event of failure to get relief in appeals, to have the case stated to High Court. Yet the petitioners had filed writ petitions before Orissa High Court, which were dismissed in limine. When the petitioners took the matter to the Supreme Court, the Court held that it was well recognised that where a right or liability was created by a statute, which gives a special remedy for enforcing it, only the remedy provided by that statute must be availed of, and since the Sales Tax Act provided for an appeal and a further appeal, the petitioners should have invoked that remedy.
14. The learned Assistant Government Pleader also drew my attention to the judgment of this Court in the case of Gulabsing Anantramsingh Thakur v. Collector, Amravati and Ors. reported in : 1996(1)MhLj549 , which considered the provisions of Section 137 of the Bombay Prohibition Act. In that case, a liquor licence was cancelled by the Collector without giving a notice. The petitioner sought to invoke writ jurisdiction without resorting to the remedy by way of appeal provided under Section 137 of the Bombay Prohibition Act. This Court had held that a petition, where no allegations of mala fides were made, and the only objection which was taken was that the petitioner was not heard, could not be entertained without the petitioner exhausting the alternate remedy. The Court had also observed in that case that there were distinct questions of fact, which this Court could not go into. In view of this, the learned Assistant Government Pleader submitted that since the petitioner has not furnished any explanation as to why it cannot invoke remedy by way of appeal, the petition should be dismissed.
15. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that even in the case of Gulabsingh Anantramsingh Thakur, in para 5, this Court had observed that there can be no dispute that mere existence of alternate remedy would be no bar for filing a writ petition. The Court had refused to entertain the writ petition, since it involved distinct questions of fact. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that in the instant case, there would be no occasion for going into any disputed questions of fact, since there are no such questions raised. He submitted that the Apex Court has held on a number of occasions that existence of alternate remedy cannot be a bar for entertaining a writ petition.
16. In the case of Dr. Smt. Kuntesh Gupta v. Management of Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya, Sitapur (U.P.) and Ors. reported in : 1987(32)ELT8(SC) , the High Court of Allahabad had dismissed the petition on the ground of existence of an alternate remedy under Section 68 of the U.P. State Universities Act. When the matter was taken to the Supreme Court, the Court held that existence of an alternate remedy is not an absolute bar to the maintainability of the writ petition. When the authority had acted wholly without jurisdiction, the High Court could not refuse to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution on the ground of existence of an alternate remedy. The Court found that the impugned order was a nullity and, therefore, held that it could be a useless formality even to remit the matter back to the High Court for disposal of writ petition on merits, and itself proceeded to quash the impugned order! The learned Counsel for the petitioner, therefore, submitted that mere existence of an alternate remedy cannot be a ground for refusing to entertain the petition.
17. The learned Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on another judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of ABL International Ltd. and Anr. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. reported in : (2004)3SCC553 . In that case, it was urged that the petitioner had an alternate remedy of civil suit and it was also urged that there were some disputed questions of fact. In spite of this, the Court held that the power to issue prerogative writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary and is not limited by any other provisions of the Constitution. High Courts have imposed upon themselves certain restrictions in the exercise of this power, like existence of an alternate remedy. Therefore, even though there may be suitable efficacious remedy by way of suit, the Court held, on the facts of that case, that it would not be proper to relegate the parties to a suit considering that the dispute arose in the year 1994 and the Court was considering the lis in the year 2003.
18. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that in the case of Asmaco Plastic Industries and Anr. v. Municipal Corporation For City of Thane and Ors. reported in 1992 Mh.L.J. 1212, a Division Bench of this Court rejected the submission that the writ jurisdiction should not be allowed to beinvoked, since there was an alternate efficacious remedy by filing a statutory appeal. The Court observed that the petition was pending for about 8 years and it would be harsh to drive the parties to a fresh bout of litigation and spend considerable amount and time.
19. The learned Counsel for the petitioner, therefore, submitted that since, as observed in the judgments on which he relied, there are no fetters on the power of this Court to issue prerogative writ under Article 226 of the Constitution. Existence of remedy by way of appeal under Section 137 of the Bombay Prohibition Act cannot be invoked by the respondents to bar this petition.
20. The learned Assistant Government Pleader submitted that the judgments on which the learned Counsel for the petitioner relied, were based on the peculiar facts of those cases and the Courts found that dismissing the petitions or asking the parties to invoke the other available remedy would be harsh. Therefore, the Courts had entertained the petitions. He submitted that in the instant case, if, according to the petitioner, the cause of action has arisen only on 11-3-2005, not much time has elapsed and there would not be any loss of time to make it cruel for the parties to go through the appellate round of litigation.
21. There can be no doubt that the facts of the present case are not identical to those on which the learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance. All the same, it cannot be forgotton that the dispute in this case has arisen in the year 2002. The question involved is purely one of application of law, namely, the relevant date for assessing liability to pay privilege fees. Therefore, the learned Counsel for the petitioner is right in submitting that relegating the parties to remedy of appeal before the State Government would not serve any useful purpose, since the matter would in all probability bounce back in this Court. The learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, rightly submitted that it would be appropriate to resolve this question of interpretation in this forum itself.
22. In view of this, the existence of efficacious remedy by way of appeal cannot be a bar for entertaining the present petition because of peculiar questions raised in this petition, which can be more conveniently answered by this Court. After the parties have already exhaustively addressed the Court on this issue, no useful purpose would be served by telling the parties to go back and have a decision from the appellate authority under Section 137 of the Bombay Prohibition Act.
23. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the question as to which is the relevant date for levy of privilege fees, has already been concluded by this Court in Somras Distillers, Nagpur v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. reported in 1996 (1) Mh.L.J. 782. The learned Assistant Government Pleader for the respondents contested this submission and stated that the question involved in the case of Somras Distillers was not similar to the one projected in the present case. In the case of Somras Distillers, a partnership firm had licences 'CL-1', 'PL-L' and 'RS-2' for manufacture and sale of country liquor as well as Indian made foreign liquor. There was a change in the constitution of the partnership. An application was made to the Commissioner of State Excise to record the change on 2-3-1993. On 3-3-1993, the petitioner Firm deposited a sum of Rs. 1,50,000/-towards the fees for carrying out necessary amendment. On 2-6-1993, the petitioner Firm was informed about grant of permission by the State Government on 17-4-1993 and the Firm was directed to make good the deficiency in fees by paying a further sum of Rs. 10,71,000/-. This communication dated 2-6-1993 was challenged before this Court. It was argued before this Court that the relevant date for payment of privilege fees is the date on which the party seeks amendment. The Court held that the relevant date for payment of requisite fees for amendment in the licence would be the date on which the permission is granted, i.e. 17-4-1993. Therefore, according to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the issue is concluded and the fees as on the date of order of the State Government, i.e. 30-3-2002, would be leviable. The learned Assistant Government Pleader submitted that since in that case there was no change in the rate of fees from the date of order by the Government from 17-4-1993 to the date of communication of the order on 2-6-1993, the Court had no occasion to decide as to whether the fees would have to be paid at the rate prevalent on the date of communication or on the date of order. The contention is technically correct. Since this Court was not required to decide whether the fees would be leviable with reference to the date of order or date of communication, but was rather choosing between the date of application and the date of order, it could be argued that the decision is distinguishable. However, it has to be noted that the Court had before it three different dates . the date of publication, the date of order and the date of communication of such order . and the Court had chosen the date of order as the relevant date for levy of privilege fees.
24. The learned Counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the question of levy of fees has also been considered by the Supreme Court in Godfrey Phillips India Ltd. and Anr. v. State of U.P. and Ors. reported in : (2005)194CTR(SC)257 . In that case, after considering the arguments advanced, in para 45 of the judgment, the Court observed as under:
Classically, a tax is seen as composed of two elements : the person, thing or activity on which the tax is imposed and the incidence of tax. Thus every tax may be levied on an object or an event of taxation. The distinction between the two may not, ultimately, be material in the context of the Indian Constitution as we will find later. But for the time being we may note that both these elements are distinct from the incidence of taxation. For example the tax may be imposed on goods on the event of their manufacture, sales, import etc. The law imposing the tax may also prescribe the incidence or the manner in which the burden of the tax would fall on any person and would take within itself the amount and measure of tax. The importance of this distinction lies in the fact that in India, the first two have been given a Constitutional status, whereas the incidence of tax would be a matter of statutory detail. The incidence of tax would be relevant in construing whether a tax is a direct or an indirect one. But it would be irrelevant in determining the subject of the tax.
The learned Counsel submitted that these observations of the Apex Court would show that a distinction has to be made between the event of taxation and the liability to pay tax and the measure of tax. He submitted that the event of taxation in this case is the order passed by the State Government, permitting the change, in view of the provisions of the Bombay Privilege Fees Rules, 1954. He submitted that Rule 5 of these Rules refers to the fees for privilege of having a transfer of the licence from one name to another. He submitted that this Rule does not refer to communication of order permitting transfer of licence. The learned Counsel pointed out that amendment fee is separately leviable under Rule 8 of these Rules, and is fixed at the rate of Rs. 10/-per amendment. Therefore, according to the learned Counsel, the amendment to the licence is distinct from the order granting privilege of having the licence transferred, and the event that would be taxed is the grant of privilege and not its communication.
25. In its attempt to collect as much revenue as possible, respondent No. 2 has not been able to formulate a clear event, which will attract levy of transfer fees. While, by letter dated 11-3-2005, respondent No. 2 claimed that the tax would be leviable on the date of order, which, according to respondent No. 2, was 4-5-2002, in the letter dated 4-5-2002, the Department had taken the stand that the fees, as may be leviable at the time of actual amendment to the licence, would have to be paid. In para 19 of the affidavit-in-reply, respondent No. 2 took the stand that the petitioner would have to pay fees prescribed for the year 2005-2006. In para 18 of the said reply, it claimed that the reference to fees for the year 2002-2003 in the letter dated 11-3-2005 was inadvertent.
26. After having carefully considered the contentions of the learned Counsel in this behalf, it has to be held that the relevant date for levy of fees cannot be an artificial or arbitrary date of communication of the order, or the date of executing the order passed by carrying out the amendment. Communication of an order or amendment to a licence in pursuance of the orders already passed is a clerical act. It would be illogical to say that the events relevant for levy of privilege fees are these clerical acts of communicating an order, or carrying out an amendment in the licence. Therefore, though it could be said that in the case of Somras Distillers, this Court had no occasion to choose between the date of order and the date of communication, as held in that judgment, the date of order alone would be the relevant date for levy of privilege fees.
27. This takes me to the next question as to when was the order in fact passed . whether it was on 30-3-2002 or on 4-5-2002. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the application was for changes in 'CL-1' and 'PLL' licences. While respondent No. 2 was undoubtedly competent to sanction changes in 'CL-1' licence, sanction from the Government was necessary for change in 'PLL' licence. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that whenever a part of the prayer is beyond the competence of the authority entertaining such a request, the entire application is considered by a higher authority, which can grant all the prayers, and, therefore, the proposal of the petitioner to permit him to have his licence amended was forwarded by respondent No. 2 to the Government of Maharashtra. In the entire reply filed by respondent No. 2, the respondent has nowhere claimed that he had already independently dealt with the question of amendment to 'CL-1' licence, or that any orders were passed by him before or after forwarding the case pertaining to 'PLL' licence to the Government of Maharashtra. The learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the letter dated 30-3-2002 issued by the Under Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra, Home Department, and addressed to respondent No. 2 would show that the Government had considered the request in respect of both 'CL-1' and 'PLL' licences and had passed the orders to permit changes. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, it would not be open for respondent No. 2 to contend that 30-3-2002 was not the date on which such orders were passed by the Government.
28. Though the learned Assistant Government Pleader submitted that the letter dated 30-3-2002 is only an intra-departmental communication and not an order passed by the State Government, he could not point out that there was any different order passed by the Competent Authority permitting change in the licence. If in respect of 'PLL' licence, respondent No. 2 did not have the requisite authority, the letter bearing No. FLR. 112002/42759/5-B, dated 4-5-2002 written by respondent No. 2 could also not be termed as the order passed by the Competent Authority for permitting change in 'PLL' licence. Therefore, the relevant document would be the order passed by the Government permitting change in the two licences, and not the two communications dated 4-5-2002 by respondent No. 2 to the petitioner.
29. The learned Assistant Government Pleader for the respondents submitted that the communication dated 30-3-2002 was in fact not addressed to the petitioner. It was addressed to respondent No. 2 and, therefore, could not qualify to be an order.Relying on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab and Anr. reported in : AIR1963SC395 , and Tagin Litin v. State of Arunachal Pradesh and Ors. reported in : AIR1996SC2121 , the learned Assistant Government Pleader submitted that intra-departmental communications cannot give the petitioner any cause of action.
30. In Bachhittar Singh's case, the Court was considering the notings on the file by the Revenue Minister that the charges against the appellant were serious and they were true, but the dismissal of the appellant would be harsh and he should be reverted to his original post. No action was, however, taken. The appellant contended that the remarks by the Minister were orally communicated by the Minister to him. In this context, the Court held that until a final decision was reached, a provisional decision by even Council of Ministers did not matter. The Court observed that it was of essence that the order had to be communicated to the person, who would be affected by that order, and until the order was communicated to the person, it would be open for the Council of Ministers to consider the matter over and over again and, therefore, till communication, the order cannot be regarded as anything more than provisional in character.
31. In Tagin Litin's case, the claim rested on an order making an appointment not communicated to the appointee. The Court observed in para 11 of the judgment that it was settled law that, in order to be effective, an order passed by the State or its functionaries must be communicated to the person who would be affected by that order and until the order is so communicated, the said order is only provisional in character and it would be open to the concerned authority to reconsider the matter and alter or rescind the order.
32. The learned Counsel for the petitioner first submitted that these authorities have no bearing on the facts of the case at hand, because, in this case, it is nobody's contention that the order has been rescinded or altered by the Government. The order stands as it is. He further submitted that the question in this case is not as to what was the order ultimately passed by the Government, but as to when it was passed. Therefore, the decisions in question are not applicable. He further submitted that in this case, respondents cannot take advantage of the fact that the letter dated 30-3-2002 was addressed to respondent No. 2 by the Under Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra, Home Department, to contend that the order was not communicated to the petitioner, because in the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of respondent No. 2, respondent No. 2 has more than once said that the copy of the aforesaid letter dated 30-3-2002 might have been given to the petitioner in good faith. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that it is not the respondent's contention that the order was stolen by the petitioner or was obtained by foul means. He submitted that repeatedly respondent No. 2 has said that the order might have been given to the petitioner in good faith by the concerned person in Mantralaya. If this is so, the learned Counsel for the petitioner rightly wondered as to how the respondent could contend that the order was not communicated to the petitioner in the absence of any rule prescribing any particular mode of communication. Therefore, there is no substance in the contentions raised by the learned Assistant Government Pleader about communication of the order and it would have to be held that the order was communicated on 30-3-2002 itself when the order was passed.
33. To sum up, the respondents' challenge to the petition on the ground of delay and laches may not be countenanced, because there was no negligent inaction on the part of the petitioner, and delay in filing the petition has not resulted in creation of any parallel right. Secondly, the petition cannot also be dismissed on the ground of availability of alternate remedy, since the petition does not involve any disputed question of fact and involves only question of interpretation of rules, which can be more conveniently done in this Court rather than by an appeal before the State. Thirdly, the relevant date for assessing privilege fees would be the date on which the State passed the order, which is apparently 30-3-2002, and not the date of communication or the date on which the amendment is actually carried out. Though the communication dated 30-3-2002 may be an intra-departmental communication, since it was communicated to the petitioner in good faith, the respondents cannot claim that there was no communication of the orders passed. And lastly, as this is a case of amendment to two different licences in respect of which respondent No. 2 did not have any authority, the Competent Authority to pass orders was only the Government. It may incidentally be pointed out that even in the case of Somras Distillers, the question was one of amendments to 'CL-1' and 'PLL' licences and even there the authority, which had granted permission, was the State Government, as may be seen from para 2 of the said judgment.
34. In view of this, the impugned orders dated 4-5-2002 and 11-3-2005 . Annexures K, L and O to the petition, are quashed and set aside as invalid and contrary to law, insofar as they seek to recover privilege fees applicable for years subsequent to the year 2001-2002. The respondents are directed to accept privilege fees deposited by the petitioner on 31-3-2002 in accordance with the rates prevalent on that date and transfer the licence in terms of the order passed by the State Government on 30-3-2002.
35. Rule is made absolute in the aforesaid terms. However, in the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.