V.A. Mohta, J.
1. Petitioner Baidyanath Giri joined Army Service as a guardman clerk in 1965. In due course, he was promoted as Hawaldar Clerk in 1979. On 12th December, 1987 he was served with a charge sheet for violation of section 64(e) of the Army Act, 1950 (the Act). The charge was that between 6th May and 18th May, 1986, he directly accepted a sum of Rs. 10,000/- a gratification as a motive for procuring enrolment of one Kaushal Kishor. After an enquiry conducted as per the Army Rules, 1954 (the Rules) framed under section 191 of the Act, the District Court Martial as per section 110 read with section 114 was ordered and in it several witnesses were examined and cross-examined. The District Court Martial found the petitioner guilty and imposed the punishment of reduction to the ranks and to suffer rigorous imprisonment for six months. No reasons were recorded. The sentence was subject to confirmation as per section 153. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner presented a petition as required under section 164(1) of the Act to the confirming authority. The Brigadier Commandant, Brigade of the Guards, Regimental Centre, who rejected the petition, by order dated 12th April, 1988 confirmed the sentence, again by a non-speaking order. During the pendency of this petition, second petition under section 164(2) filed before the General Chief of Army Staff also came to be rejected, vide order dated 12th September, 1988. By this petition, all those orders are impugned.
2. Two contentions are raised : (i) Since the order of punishment is not preceded by a speaking order, the principles of natural justice are violated and (ii) The punishment is shockingly disproportionate to the charge.
3. Having heard Shri Trivedi and Shri Darda, the learned Counsel for the parties and examined the object and scheme of the Act and the Rules, we do not find merit in any of the contentions. True it is that as laid down in the case of the The Siemens Engineering and . v. The Union of India, : AIR1976SC1785 , a quasi-judicial order must normally contain reasons, but this principle is not of universal application. It does admit of exceptions though they are being continuously reduced by judicial pronouncements made from time to time. Army services are very special and sensitive in nature and governed by the Act which is separate and built in Code into itself. Scheme of the Act to which we shall shortly advert to itself provides for passing a non-speaking order. In fact, the point is no more res integra in view of the case of Som Datt v. Union of India, : 1969CriLJ663 , The following observations are material :
'In the present case it is manifest that there is no express obligation imposed by section 164 or by section 165 of the Army Act on the confirming authority or upon the Central Government to give reasons in support of its decision to confirm the proceedings of the Court Martial. Mr. Dutta has been unable to point out any other section of the Act or any of the Rule made therein from which necessary implication can be drawn that such a duty is cast upon the Central Government or upon the confirming authority. Apart from any requirement imposed by the statute or statutory rule expressly or by necessary implication, we are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Dutta that there is any general principle or any rule of natural justice that a statutory tribunal should always and in every case give reasons in support of its decision.'
4. Section 64 of the Act deals with the subject of miscellaneous offences. Sub-clause (e) with which we are concerned reads thus :
'64. Any person subject to this Act who commit any of the following offences, that is to say--
x x x x(e) directly or indirectly accepts or obtains, or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain for himself or for any other person, any gratification as a motive or reward for procuring the enrolment of any person, or leave of absence promotion or any other advantage or indulgence for any person in the service; or
Section 77 provides that a warrant officer or a non-commissioned officer sentenced by a Court martial to imprisonment for life, imprisonment field punishment or dismissal from service, shall be deemed to be reduced to ranks. Section 110 read with section 114 of the Act deals with the power to convene a district Court-martial and composition of district Court-martial. Section 152 deals with the powers of Court martial in relation to proceedings under the Act. The substance of this provision is that any trial by a Court-martial under the Act shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding with the meaning of sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code and the Court- martial shall be deemed to be a Court within in the meaning of sections 480 and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 153 provides that a finding and sentence is not valid unless it is confirmed as provided under the Act. Under section 155, the power to confirm a finding and sentence of District Court Martial has been given to any officer empower in this behalf by warrant of such officer. Section 164 deals with remedy against order, finding or sentence of the Court Martial. Sub-section (1) provides that any person aggrieved by any orders passed by any Court Martial may present a petition to the officer or authority empowered to confirm it. Sub-section (2) provide for a further petition to the Central Government or to the Chief of the Army Staff or any prescribed officer superior in command to the one who confirmed such finding or sentence of any Court martial.
5. Rule 22 of the Rules deals with hearing of charge; Rule 23 with the procedure for taking down the summary of evidence; Rule 24 with the remand of the accused for trial by a Court Martial; Rule 25 with the procedure on charge; Rule 33 with the rights of accused to prepare defence; Rule 60 with the summing up and advice by the judge-advocate is open Court after which no other address is allowed. Rule 61 deals with consideration of finding. It reads thus :
'61(1) The Court shall deliberate on its finding in closed Court in the presence of the Judge-Advocate.
(2) The opinion of each member of the Court as to the finding shall be given by word of mouth on each charge separately.'
Rule 62 deals with the announcement of finding. It reads thus :
'62(1) The finding on every charge upon which the accused is arraigned shall be recorded and, except as provided in these rules, shall be recorded simply as a finding of 'guilty' or 'Not guilty'
x x x x
Rule 64 deals with the procedure on conviction. Rule 80 deals with the sitting in closed Court. It reads thus :
'80(1) A Court-martial shall, where it is so directed by these rules, and may in any other case on any deliberation amongst the members, sit in closed Court.
(2) No person shall be present in closed Court except the members of the Court, the Judge-Advocate (if any) and officers under instruction.
x x x xUnder Rule 95 the accused is permitted to be defended either by a friend or by a defending officer. In appropriate cases, even representation by a Counsel is permitted. Rule 182 provides that proceedings of Court of enquiry are not admissible in evidence except for certain specified purposes.
6. It is apparent that the Act and the Rules give sufficient opportunity to the accused to defend himself almost at every stage and even permits legal aid. Several built in safeguards are provided for the defence of the accused. Open enquiry is permitted but not beyond a particular stage. Reasons are not far to seek. The Act deals with sensitive service in which secrecy and confidentiality is vital unlike ordinary trial or departmental enquiry. It is futile to make comparison between offences connected with the Army Service and other services. As held by the Supreme Court in Harish Uppal v. Union of India, : [1973]2SCR1025 the trials under the Act and the ordinary law cannot be equated. The following observations are to the point:
'To accept this contention would mean that all the procedure laid down by the Code of Criminal Procedure should be adopted in respect of the Court martial, a contention which cannot be accepted in the face of the very clear indication in the Constitution that the provisions which are applicable to all the Civil cases are not applicable to cases of Armed Personnel. It is not a requirement of the principles of natural justice.'
Principles of natural justice have not been standardized and have to be viewed in the whole context, such as the object and scheme of the statute, the type of enquiry and host of attendant circumstances. Courts are not always obliged to sit in public. In appropriate cases a departure from the normal rule of public enquiry can be made. What applies to public enquiry, applies with equal force to recording reasons or what is known as writing a 'speaking order'.
7. True it is that even the Court Martial is a `Court' and proceedings are `judicial' for certain purposes specified in section 152 of the Act and the Act provides for representations to higher authorities; but that by itself does not mean that the punishment gets vitiated by virtue of the only fact that no reasons are to be disclosed. Judicial review of the material upon which punishment is based always possible though on limited grounds, such as perversity etc.
8. Reliance was placed also on Article 21 of the Constitution. Though in the instant case validity of the Rules is not questioned, this aspect of the matter has been considered in the case Prithi Pal Singh v. Union of India A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 1413 on which the petitioner had placed reliance. The challenge to the validity of certain provisions of the Rules based on Article 21 has been repelled.
9. It is contended that the punishment is shockingly disproportionate. We do not think so. Extreme penalty has not been awarded in this case after taking into consideration not only the gravity of the misconduct but also the past service record. The proposition that in appropriate cases there can be a judicial interference even in punishment imposed under the Act admits of no debate. if any precedent is needed, it is the recent case of Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, : 1988CriLJ158 in which for violation of section 130 of the Act, the enquiry was held to be vitiated and the punishment was held to be shockingly disproportionate, considering the peculiar background of that case. Having regard to the charge levelled and the patent falsity of the defence in the instant matter, the punishment imposed seems to be reasonable in any case case it can not be dubbed as shockingly disproportionate to the charge. The defence, so seriously suggested but looks ridiculous, has been that a sum of Rs. 10,000/- was voluntarily given to the petitioner to meet the expenses of looking after the boy Kaushal Kishor with whose family the petitioner had no previous acquaintance.
10. To conclude, the petition is dismissed. Rule discharged.