Swatanter Kumar, C.J.
1. The present Appeal is directed against the order passed by the learned Single Judge in Notice of Motion No. 2561 of 2007 dated 13th October, 2008 vide which the application filed by the Plaintiffs/Appellants under Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ( hereinafter referred to as the said 'Code') has been dismissed. Necessary f.s are that the Appellants filed the suit for damages for loss and destruction of certain antique pieces of furniture which were hired by the Defendants for the sets of a film under production. This resulted from the fire broke out in the Studio on 18th February, 2004 when shooting of the film was going on. It was averred in the plaint by the Plaintiffs/Appellants that the goods being in the nature of antique furniture had no market value and the value of which would appreciate by passage of time and though the furnitures were on hire basis the Respondents were liable to make good the losses. The Respondents had even filed the claim with the Insurance Company admitting the value of furnitures and in fact that was the admission of liability which was the basis of the Plaintiffs' claim in the suit. This suit was contested by the Defendants by denying their liabilities to make good the claim raised by the Plaintiffs and further contending that simpliciter lodging of claim with the Insurance Company is neither an admission on merit nor ascertaining of liability in relation to the claim made by the Plaintiffs in the suit.
2. Learned Counsel appearing for the Appellants, while relying on the provisions of Order XII Rule 6 of the Code contended that it is not only the admission in the pleadings of the parties but even on the basis of documents or any other material wherein the Defendants have admitted their liabilities the Appellants would be entitled to a decree on admission. The Appellants relied upon the claim raised by the Respondents before the Insurance Company and contended that the survey reports are a clear admission of liability as well as quantum which the Appellants have claimed in the suit. Thus, according to the Appellants, the learned Single Judge has erred in law in not relying upon these documents and not passing a decree on admission. Reference was also made to a letter dated 21st July, 2005 written by the Respondents to the Senior Inspector of Police, Dadar Police Station, Dadar, Mumbai, wherein these documents were submitted to him, which show an admission of liability and the total estimated loss to the extent of Rs. 5,90,03,040/-.
3. The learned Counsel for the Appellants also relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra, Bombay and Ors. v. Britannia Biscuits Co. Ltd. and Ors. : 1994(5)SCALE44 to raise an issue that the transaction in question was for sale and not simpliciter for bailment and there was absolute liability on the part of the Respondents to make good the losses. In that case, the Company was manufacturing biscuits and selling the same in tins and charging only for biscuits and for the tins the Company took a deposit with the stipulation that in case the tin was returned within three months in good condition, the deposit would be refunded. The tins so supplied to purchasers were shown as the assessee's stock in its account books but were debited in the customer's account. No sales tax was charged on such deposit. The High Court held that the arrangement in respect of the tins between the assessee and the purchasers was one of bailment and not a transaction of sale as, according to the High Court, there was an obligation on the assessee to accept the tins returned and a corresponding obligation on the customer to return the tins. Therefore, the High Court concluded that the amount in question could not be treated as price of the tins sold and that the same was not exigible to sales tax. Allowing the Revenue's appeals, the Supreme Court held that the High Court was right in holding that the question whether there has been a sale of tins at the end of the accounting year - or along with the biscuits themselves - has to be determined on the precise terms of the transaction between the respondent and its customers and that on this aspect the manner in which the respondent maintained its accounts or made entries therein is not very much relevant. Once it is held that there was no obligation to return the tins, the theory of bailment falls to the ground. It would then not be a case of bailment within the meaning of Section 148 of the Contract Act. The transaction in question was neither a bailment nor a pledge. It was a composite transaction. It was to start with an entrustment which could result in a sale of tins in case of non-return of the tins. While entrusting the tins, the respondent took care to stipulate and receive the value of the tins and a little more - to be precise 20 per cent. If the tin was returned, well and good - the transaction remained one of entrustment. But if not returned within 3 months, it became a sale as per the terms of the transaction. The fact that the respondent was receiving back the tins even after the expiry of three months and returning the deposits, was more by way of grace - probably a business decision - rather than a matter of right or an obligation.
4. The learned Counsel further relied upon the judgment in the case of Uttam Singh Dugal and Co. Ltd. v. Union Bank of India and Ors. : AIR2000SC2740 to buttress his submission that a decree on admission as contemplated under Order XII Rule 6 of the Code is wide enough to include an admission of fact in the pleadings or otherwise whether orally or in writing. On the basis of any of this, the Court could pass a decree on admission. The provision is capable of wide construction but it has to be applied in strict sense i.e. the ingredients specified under this provision must be satisfied before a decree can be claimed by the Applicant under this provision. The admission made may be in the pleadings or otherwise which would include documents or any other material which is on the Court file but it must be unambiguous and definite admission. It is not proper for the Court to pass a decree on inference. In fact, in absence of an unambiguous and definite admission of liability and quantum, it would be difficult for the Court to pass a decree on such basis. It will be useful to make a reference to the case of Raj Kumar Chawla v. Lucas Indian Services : AIR2006Delhi266 where the Court discussed the intent and scope of the term 'admission' as contemplated under Order XII Rule 6 of the Code, held as under:
5. The provisions of Order XII are intended to provide expeditious grant of decree in favour of a plaintiff in a suit or proceedings where the defendant has made any admission in the pleadings or otherwise, orally or in writing of any amount due. The plaintiff would be entitled to a decree on the basis of such admission without waiting for completion of the trial. The provisions of Order XII Rule 6 were incorporated by way of amendment. The legislative object of these provisions is to curtail the period for determination of disputes between the parties to a suit and ensure that a decree on admission is passed without any unnecessary hindrance. The expression `Admission' has been given a wider meaning and connotation so as to take within its ambit admissions made by a party in pleadings or otherwise, orally or in writing. These provisions thus are capable of liberal construction and without imposition of any unreasonable restriction, must be permitted to operate but the Courts have to be careful while passing a decree on admission. The Court essentially should look into the fact that all essential ingredients of an admission are satisfied before such a decree is passed in favour of any of the parties to the suit. Admission has to be unambiguous, clear and unconditional and the law would not permit admission by inference as it is a matter of fact. Admission of a fact has to be clear from the record itself and cannot be left to the interpretative determination by the Court, unless there was a complete trial and such finding could be on the basis of cogent and appropriate evidence on record. Rule 6 of Order XII certainly enables a party to obtain a speedy judgment fully or partially to which according to the admission of the defendant the plaintiff is entitled to. In the case of the Uttam Singh Duggal and Co. v. Union Bank of India and Ors. : AIR2000SC2740 the Court while explaining the scope and ambit of these provisions held as under:
Learned Counsel for the appellant contended that Order XII, Rule 6 comes under the heading `admissions' and a judgment on admission could be given only after the opportunity to the other side to explain the admission, if any, made; that such admission should have been made only in the course of the pleadings or else the other side will not have an opportunity to explain such admission, that even though, the provision reads that the Court may at any stage of the suit make such order as it thinks fit effect of admission, if any, can be considered only at the time of trial; that the admission even in pleadings will have to be read along with Order VIII, Rule 5(1) of CPC and Court need not necessarily proceed to pass an order or a judgment on the basis of such admission but call upon the party relying upon such admission to prove its case independently, that during pendency of other suits and the nature of contentions raised in the case, it would not be permissible at all to grant the relief before trial as has been done in the present case; that the expression `admissions' made in the course of the pleadings or otherwise will have to be read together and the expression `otherwise' will have to be interpreted ejusdem generies.
As to the object of the Order XII, Rule 6, we need not say anything more than what the legislature itself has said when the said provision came to be amended. In the objects and reasons set out while amending the said rule, it is stated that 'where a claim is admitted, the Court has jurisdiction to enter a judgment for the plaintiff and to pass a decree on admitted claim. The object of the Rule is to enable the party to obtain a speedy judgment at least to the extent of the relief to which according to the admission of the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled.' We should not unduly narrow down the meaning of this Rule as the object is to enable a party to obtain speedy judgment. Where other party has made a plain admission entitling the former to succeed, it should apply and also wherever there is a clear admission of facts in the face of which, it is impossible for the party making such admission to succeed.
The next contention canvassed is that the resolutions or minutes of meeting of the Board of Directors, resolution passed thereon and the letter sending the said resolution to the respondent bank cannot amount to a pleading or come within the scope of the Rule as such statements are not made in the course of the pleadings or otherwise. When a statement is made to a party and such statement is brought before the Court showing admission of liability by an application filed under Order XII, Rule 6 and the other side has sufficient opportunity to explain the said admission and if such explanation is not accepted by the Court, we do not think the trial Court is helpless in refusing to pass a decree. We have adverted to the basis of the claim and the manner in which the trial Court has dealt with the same. When the trial Judge states that the statement made in the proceedings of the Board of Directors meeting and the letter sent as well as the pleadings when read together, leads to unambiguous and clear admission with only the extent to which the admission is made is in dispute. And the Court had a duty to decide the same and grant a decree. We think this approach is unexceptionable.
6. The powers under Order XII Rule 6 of the Code has to be exercised judicially on the facts and circumstances of each case. The admission on the basis of which the Court wishes to pass a decree has to be unambiguous, clear and unconditional. There is no doubt that in a suit there can be more than one decree passed at different stages and each decree being separate and independent is enforceable in accordance with law, was the principle stated by : [1971]2SCR171 Chanchal v. Jalaluddin. Admission understood in its common parlance still must be a specific admission. There is very fine distinction between unambiguous and specific admission on the one hand and vague averments of facts which, if proved, could even tantamount to an admission on the part of a party to the suit. The Court has to consider the need for passing a decree on admission under these provisions only in the cases of first category and normally should decline in the cases of the later category.
7. The term `Admission' in Section 70 of the Evidence Act relates only to admission of a party in the course of the trial of the suit and not to the attestation of a document by the party executing it. The essential feature of admission is that it should be `Concise and deliberate act'. It must not be something which was not intended and was not the intention of the party. Pre-requisite to admission are unconditional, unambiguous and intend the same to be read and construed as admission. The scope of admission of a claim is also explained under Order IX Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which contemplates that there must be a claim as laid down in the plaint which is admitted, for the ground stated therein and not simply an admission of cause of action. The legislative intent is clear from the provisions of the Code that an admission has to be unambiguous and clear. The Black's Law Dictionary explain the word `Admission' as follows:
admission: Any statement or assertion made by a party to a case and offered against that party; an acknowledgment that facts are true. Admission against interest. A person's statement acknowledging a fact that is harmful to the person's position as a litigant. An admission against interest must be made either by a litigant or by one in privily with or occupying the same legal position as the litigant. 8. It is also a settled principle of civil jurisprudence that judgment on admission is not a matter of right and rather is a matter of discretion of a Court. Where the defendant has raised objection which will go to the very root of the case, it would not be appropriate to exercise this discretion. The use of the words `May' and `make such orders' or `give such judgment' spells out that power under these rules are discretionary and use of discretion would have to be controlled in accordance with the known judicial cannons. The cases which involves questions to be decided upon regular trial and the alleged admissions are not clear and specific, it may not be appropriate to take recourse to these provisions. In the case of Pariwar Sewa Sansthan v. Dr. (Mrs.) Veena Kalra and Ors. : AIR2000Delhi349 the Court examined at length the provisions and the need for an admission to be unequivocal and positive. The admission would obviously have the consequences of arriving at that conclusion without determination of any question and evidence. The Court while relying upon the case of Balraj Taneja and Anr. v. Sunil Madan and Anr. : AIR1999SC3381 and Dudh Nath Pandey v. Suresh Chandra Bhattasali : AIR1986SC1509 held as under:
In Razia Begum v. Sahebzadi Anwar Begum it was held that Order 12 Rule 6 has to be read along with the proviso to Rule 5 of Order 8. that is to say, notwithstanding the admission made by the defendant in his pleading, the Court may still require the plaintiff to prove the facts pleaded by him in the plaint.
Thus, in spite of admission of a fact having been made by a party to the suit, the Court may still require the plaintiff to prove the fact which has been admitted by the defendant.
At this stage it would be useful to recall some factual contentions emerging from the pleadings: In 1995 the appellant/defendant was asked to vacate and hand over possession of the suit premises, on the ground of the violation of the terms of the lease; On 25th May, 1996 a notice was alleged to have been served upon the defendant, requiring it to vacate the premises, on 12th September, 1996, tenancy is alleged to have expired by efflux of time and on 8th September, 1996, telegraphic notices were also alleged to have been served upon the defendant. The defendant had pleaded that they were the contractual tenants in respect of the basement since 12-9-90 and in respect of ground floor since 29-11-85; that the lease deeds dated 12-5-94 were never acted upon and were sham documents; two tenancies existed in respect of the ground floor and two tenancies existed in respect of the basement and plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 used to get separate cheques in their individual names, in respect of each of these portions. In fact, the plaintiffs did not deny the fact that they had been receiving the rent separately in their respective names, with regard to the ground floor and basement tenancies. However, it was pleaded that in 1995, the defendants started issuing two separate cheques in the name of each of the plaintiffs for their convenience. On the basis of these pleadings trial Court, inter alia, framed specific issues that whether the defendant is a contractual tenant or not and whether the lease was validly terminated or was terminated by efflux of time
The question whether defendant became contractual tenant after 1995, when they were called upon to vacate the premises on the ground of alleged violation of the terms of the lease, and effect of the circumstances leading to the acceptance of the rent by the two plaintiffs individually in their respective names would require trial. These questions could not be determined without evidence and, therefore, it cannot be said to be a case of 'unequivocal' and clear positive admission, which is an essential requirement of law for a decree on admission. Learned trial Court instead of concentrating on the question that whether there was any admission on the part of the defendant or not in its pleadings or elsewhere, proceeded to adjudicate upon some of the issues on merits by observing that the pleas raised by defendant are unbelievable, which could not have been done. There being triable issues raised going to the root of the case, the trial Court ought to have proceeded to try the suits and returned findings on merits. The impugned judgment and decrees are thus liable to be set aside and the suits deserve to be remanded for trial in accordance with law.
5. It will be further useful to make a reference to a judgment of this Court in Western Coalfields Ltd. v. Swati Industries : AIR2003Bom369 where the Court took the view that admission made by the parties has to be absolute and unconditional and where in the written statement it had been specifically stated that in terms of another contract, the said amount had already been appropriated. This is not an unqualified admission on part of defendant which would invite a decree against it for the said amount. Nature of admission is neither conclusive to invite order under Order 12, Rule 6 of C.P. C. nor would operate as estoppal against defendant under Section 115 of Evidence Act. The provision of Order XII Rule 6 of the Code contemplates an admission of fact and such admission could not be inferred.
6. In the present case, the Appellants had relied upon the letters written by the Respondents to the Insurance Company or to the Police Authorities, that related to the claim which included the claim regarding furniture belonging to the Appellants. In the written statement filed, the Respondents have denied their liability. They have made out the case of bailment in terms of Sections 148, 151 and 152 of the Indian Contract Act and denied that they have any liability towards the Appellants for the alleged loss. According to the Appellants even if it was considered to be a case of bailment, still the liability would be there as it is for the Respondents to show that they had taken all proper care and precaution for use of the material and furniture given to them on hire. This issue can only be determined during the trial. At best these documents including the claim made to the Insurance Company can be termed as partial admission to the extent of value of the goods but it cannot be inferred from these documents that the Respondents have admitted their liability to pay for the losses and make good the amount of loss claimed by the Appellants. These are the matters which can be decided by the Court finally only after the parties have been given an opportunity to lead evidence in support of their case. In other words, unambiguous admission of liability would be a pre-requisite for decreeing any amount. The admission at best can be treated as a partial admission of the value of the goods and nothing more. The liability to make good the losses is de hors the value of the goods. The learned Single Judge while rejecting the application noticed that the Respondents would be in the position of bailee and as such would be bound to take as much care of the goods bailed to them as a man of ordinary prudence would under similar circumstances, take of his own goods of the same bulk, quantity and value as the goods bailed under the provisions of Section 151 of the Indian Contract Act. Further the learned Single Judge held that the Appellants would have to establish the lack of care, if at all, on the part of the Respondents in respect of damage to the furniture hired by them. This reasoning of the learned Single Judge is in consonance with the provisions of Sections 148 and 151 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Under Section 152 of the Indian Contract Act, the bailee in absence of any special contract is not responsible for the loss, destruction or deterioration of the thing bailed, if he has taken due amount of care described under Section 151. It would be a matter which would require consideration of the Court during the course of the trial.
7. In the same Notice of Motion No. 2561 of 2007, the Applicants had also claimed certain interim orders while titling the application as for decree on admission. It is a settled principle of law that the Order XII Rule 6 of the Code cannot be used where vexed and complicated questions or issues of law arise and it does not contemplate passing of interim orders. Reference in that regard can be made to the case of Manisha Commercial Ltd. v. N. R. Dongre and Anr. : AIR2000Delhi176 as well as to a judgment in the case of Gorivelli Appanna v. Gorivelli Seethamma : AIR1972AP62 .
8. In light of this position of law and nature of the documents referred to by the Appellants, we have no hesitation in holding that it was not a case for passing a decree on admission.
9. For the reasons stated above, we find no merit in the Appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed, with no order as to costs.