G. George Paracken, Member (J).
1. The grievance of the Applicant is that the Respondents, in an arbitrary manner and in violation of the relevant provisions contained in Rule 10 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, have not reviewed the order dated 03.02.2012.
2. The brief facts of the case are that, vide Annexure A-1 vide order dated 03.02.2012, the Applicant deemed to have been suspended from service with effect from 31.01.2012 in terms of sub-rule (1) and (2) of Rule 10 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 for the reason that, vide FIR No.03/2012 dated 31.01.2012, a case was registered against him under Section 7(3) of POC Act and on his arrest on the same date, he was detained under judicial custody exceeding 48 hours. In the said order it was also stated that he will remain under suspension until further orders. In the subsequent Annexure A-2 order dated 24.04.2012, he was informed that the Review Committee at its meeting held on 23.04.2012 reviewed his suspension and observed he was earlier placed under suspension vide order dated 03.02.2012 and it was effective from 31.01.2012 and as per DOPandTs OM No.11012/4/2003-Estt.(A) dated 7th January, 2004. He was also informed that Committee decided to continue his suspension until further orders. According to the Applicant, the Respondents failed to consider that his suspension could not have been extended beyond the period of 90 days which expired on 30.04.2012. Moreover, as no time limit was given in the aforesaid order dated 03.02.2012, the suspension had become invalid by 30.04.2012 after said 90 days period and he was required to be reinstated in terms of Rule 10 (7) of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 w.e.f. 01.05.2012. According to the said rule, if the suspension order is not reviewed after 90 days or extended period of review, the suspension order gets lapsed. However, as per Annexure A-3 order dated 31.10.2012, the Review Committee again met on 23.04.2012 and reviewed the aforesaid suspension in terms of sub-rule (6) of Rule 10 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 and on its recommendation, it was decided to extend the suspension period for 180 days beyond 31.10.2012. The competent authority, under FR 53 (1)(ii)(a), has also reviewed the payment of subsistence allowance but decided that there shall be no increase/decrease for the same. The Applicant has, therefore, sought a direction to quash and set aside the aforesaid orders dated 03.02.2012, 24.04.2012 and 30/31.10.2012. He has also sought a declaration that the action of the Respondents in continuing him under suspension even after the period of suspension has already lapsed w.e.f. 01.05.2012/20.10.2012 is illegal, arbitrary and unconstitutional. Further, he has sought a declaration that he is deemed to be in service as ITO w.e.f. the aforesaid date(s) with all consequential benefits.
3. The Applicant has also informed the Respondents, vide letter dated 04.04.2012, that he has already been released on bail from Tihar Jail on 02.04.2012.
4. In support of the aforesaid submissions, the learned counsel for the Applicant has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Union of India and Others Vs. Dipak Mali 2010 (2) SCC 222 wherein it has been held as under:-
œ2. Under Rule 10 of the Central Civil Services (CCA) Rules, 1965 amended by Notification dated 23rd December, 2003, Sub-Rules (6) and (7) were inserted. As the same are relevant to the facts of this case, the same are extracted hereinbelow:
"An order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under this rules shall be reviewed by the authority competent to modify or revoke the suspension, before expiry of ninety days from the date of order of suspension, on the recommendation of the Review Committee constituted for the purposes and pass orders either extending or revoking the suspension. Subsequent reviews shall be made before expiry of the extended period of suspension. Extension of suspension shall not be for a period exceeding one hundred and eighty dates at a time?.
Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rules 5, an order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under sub- rules (1) or (2) of this rule shall not be valid after a period ninety days unless it is extended after review, for a further period before the expiry of ninety days."
3. The aforesaid amendment came into effect from 2nd June, 2004, but as a Review Committee was not constituted, the respondent's suspension was not reviewed as required by the amended Rules. The respondent, therefore, claimed that the suspension order must be deemed to have lapsed and accordingly, he approached the Central Administrative Tribunal by filing O.A. No.540/2004 for a declaration that the suspension order dated 10th August, 2002, became invalid on the expiry of 90 days from the date on which Sub-Rules (6) and (7) of Rule 10 came into force, since the same had not been extended by the Review Committee.
4. There is no dispute that the suspension of the respondent was not extended. The Tribunal, accordingly, allowed the application filed by the respondent and by its order dated 29th March, 2005, quashed the suspension order dated 10th August, 2002.
5. The said order of the Tribunal was questioned before the High Court on the ground that while Sub-Rules (6) and (7) of Rule 10 came into force only on 2nd June, 2004, the application had been made prematurely in July, 2004 even before the expiry of three months. It was contended that since the matter was subjudice on account of the pendency of the Original Application filed by the respondent before the expiry of 90 days from 2nd June, 2004, the petitioners were unable to review the respondent's case.
6. Dealing with the said contention the High Court held that since there was no interim stay in O.A.No.540/2004 filed by the respondent, there was nothing to prevent the petitioners from reviewing the suspension within 90 days from 2nd June, 2004. On such ground the High Court dismissed the writ petition. It is against the said order of the High Court that the present Special Leave Petition has been filed.
7. On behalf of the Union of India, it was not denied that the amended provisions of Rule 10 came into effect from 2nd June, 2004, and that the case of the Respondent was reviewed on 20th October, 2004, beyond the period envisaged under Sub-rule (6) thereof. It was, however, contended that the delay in conducting the review was not on account of any laches on the part of the petitioners, but having regard to the fact that the Respondent filed OA No.540 of 2004, before the Central Administrative Tribunal in July, 2004, and the same was disposed of by the Tribunal on 18th August, 2004, during which period the petitioner was unable to take any action under Rule 10 in view of the provisions of Section 19(4) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, which provides that where an application has been admitted by a Tribunal under Sub-section (3), every proceeding under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances in relation to the subject matter of such application pending immediately before such admission, shall abate, and save as otherwise provided by the Tribunal, no appeal or revision in relation to such matter shall thereafter be entertained under such rules.
8. It was submitted that since the proceedings were pending before the Tribunal, the Petitioner had no option but to stay its hands in regard to the proceedings against the respondent. It was also submitted that on 20th October, 2004, when the Reviewing Committee took up the Petitioners' case, it extended the period of suspension, which was again extended thereafter by order dated 8th April, 2005. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that having regard to the above, the order passed by the High Court upholding the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal was liable to be set aside along with the order passed by the learned Tribunal.
9. On behalf of the Respondents, it was urged that Section 19(4) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, did not contemplate stay but abatement of proceedings before other authorities once an application was admitted by the Central Administrative Tribunal. By virtue of Sub-section (4) of Section 19, on admission of such application proceedings pending before other Courts and Forums would abate unless otherwise directed by the Tribunal. Learned counsel contended that in the absence of any stay, nothing prevented the petitioners from reviewing the petitioner's case and the explanation forthcoming for not taking steps under Sub-section (6) of Section 7 must inure to the benefit of the respondent.
10. Having carefully considered the submissions made on behalf of the parties and having also considered the relevant dates relating to suspension of the Respondent and when the Petitioner's case came up for review on 20th October, 2004, we are inclined to agree with the views expressed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, as confirmed by the High Court, that having regard to the amended provisions of Sub- rules (6) and (7) of Rule 10, the review for modification or revocation of the order of suspension was required to be done before the expiry of 90 days from the date of order of suspension and as categorically provided under Sub- rule (7), the order of suspension made or deemed would not be valid after a period of 90 days unless it was extended after review for a further period of 90 days.
11. The case sought to be made out on behalf of the petitioner, Union of India as to the cause of delay in reviewing the Respondent's case, is not very convincing. Section 19(4) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, speaks of abatement of proceedings once an original application under the said Act was admitted. In this case, what is important is that by operation of Sub-rule (6) of Rule 10 of the 1965 Rules, the order of suspension would not survive after the period of 90 days unless it was extended after review. Since admittedly the review had not been conducted within 90 days from the date of suspension, it became invalid after 90 days, since neither was there any review nor extension within the said period of 90 days. Subsequent review and extension, in our view, could not revive the order which had already become invalid after the expiry of 90 days from the date of suspension.
12. For the said reasons, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order of the High Court and the Special Leave Petition is, accordingly, dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
6. He has also relied upon the order of the Jaipur Bench of this Tribunal in OA 406/2005 Ram Avtar Verma Vs. U.O.I. and Others decided on 08.02.2007. The Applicant in the aforesaid case was suspended vide order dated 26.06.2002 w.e.f. 11.06.2002 on the ground of remaining in judicial custody in a CBI case. The said order was reviewed and extended by the order dated 02.04.2004. The Tribunal has, therefore, set aside the aforesaid order of extension vide its order dated 08.02.2007. The Respondents challenged the aforesaid order before the High Court of Rajasthan in Writ Petition No.5723/2007 but it was dismissed on 23.07.2009. The relevant part of the said order reads as under:-
œIt may be pointed out that concerned employee was initially put under suspension vide order dated 26.06.2002 with effect from 11.06.2002 on the ground of remaining in judicial custody in a C.B.I. case. Above suspension order was subsequently extended vide order dated 02.04.2004.
The relevant Rule 10 of the CCS Rules came to be amended and new sub-rule (6) and sub-rule (7) were inserted vide Notification dated 03.01.2004 and the amended provisions were made effective from 02.04.2004. As per newly inserted sub-rule (6) it was mandatory for the authority to review suspension within 90 days from the date of order of suspension as per recommendations of the Review Committee constituted for the purpose. However, in the present case above sub-rule (6) has not been followed. It was only on 21.09.2004 when the suspension has further been extended. Since it was obligatory on the part of the authority and mandatory under the Rules to review suspension within 90 days, in our opinion, no error or illegality has been committed by the tribunal in giving proper relief to the respondent.
Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed as having no merits. However, without making any observation on the merits at this stage since the criminal case is still pending before the trial court, the petitioner is always free to pass fresh order if the circumstances so warrant in accordance with law.
7. The Respondents have filed their reply stating that the Applicant was placed under suspension vide order dated 03.02.2012 under Rule 10(1) and 10(2 of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 till further orders. However, the said suspension was reviewed by the Review Committee on 24.04.2012 and conveyed the aforesaid decision to the Applicant. The Committee again reviewed his suspension on 30.10.2012 and further extended the period of suspension for 180 days from 30.10.2012 as the Applicant was still under suspension. They have also stated that the Applicant had submitted a letter dated 09.11.2012 requesting the Respondents to reinstate him on the ground that the suspension period has ended on 30.10.2012 and the said letter has been submitted to the competent authority for appropriate decision. The learned counsel for the Respondents has submitted that the suspension of the Applicant is in accordance with the rules and in this regard he has relied upon an order of the co-ordinate Bench of this Tribunal in OA 1091/2006 A.A. Farooquee Vs. U.O.I. and Others. The relevant part of the said order reads as under:-
œ16. The Honourable Supreme Court in State of Orissa through its Principal Secretary Home Deptt. V. Bimal Kumar Mohanty, JT 1994 (2) SC 51 have considered this aspect of suspension and its continuance in a similar case after considering its own judgments in R.P.Kapur V. Union of India, (1964) 5 SCR 431 (Constitution Bench), Balvant Railal Ratilal Patel V. State of Maharastra, (1968) 2 SCR 577, V.P. Gindroniya v. the State of Madhya Pradesh and Others, (1970) 3 SCR 448, Government of India and Ministry of Home Affairs and Others vs. Tarak Nath Ghosh, (1971 3 SCR 715 held thus:
œ13. It is thus settled law that normally when an appointing authority or the disciplinary authority seeks to suspend an employee, pending inquiry or contemplated inquiry or pending investigation into grave charges of misconduct or defalcation of funds or serious acts of omission and commission, the order of suspension would be passed after taking into consideration the gravity of the misconduct sought to be inquired into or investigated and the nature of the evidence placed before the appointing authority and on application of the mind by disciplinary authority. Appointing authority or disciplinary authority should consider the above aspects and decide whether it is expedient to keep an employee under suspension pending aforesaid action. It would not be as an administrative routine or an automatic order to suspend an employee. It should be on consideration of the gravity of the alleged misconduct or the nature of the allegations imputed to the delinquent employee. The Court or the Tribunal must consider each case on its own facts and no general law could be laid down in that behalf. Suspension is not a punishment but is only one of forbidding or disabling an employee to discharge the duties of office or post held by him. In other words it is to refrain him to avail further opportunity to perpetrate the alleged misconduct or to remove the impression among the members of service that dereliction of duty would pay fruits and the offending employee could get away even pending enquiry without any impediment or to prevent an opportunity to the delinquent officer to scuttle the enquiry or investigation or to win over the witnesses or the delinquent having had the opportunity in office to impede the progress of the investigation or enquiry etc. But as stated earlier, each case must be considered depending on the nature of the allegations, gravity of the situation and the indelible impact it creates on the service for the continuance of the delinquent employee in service pending enquiry or contemplated enquiry or investigation. It would be another thing if the action is actuated by malafides, arbitrary or for ulterior purpose. The suspension must be a step in aid to the ultimate result of the investigation or enquiry. The authority also should keep in mind public interest of the impact of the delinquents continuance in office while facing departmental enquiry or trial of a criminal charge.
The charges against the Applicant relate to acts of corruption. An appropriate court is seized of the matter. We would, therefore, be loath to interfere with the original order of suspension or its continuance.
17. The OA is dismissed on above considerations. There will be no order as to costs. 7. He has further relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in U.O.I. Vs. Rajeev Kumar 2003 (6) SCC 516. The relevant part of the said order reads as under:-
œ29. Another plea raised relates to a suspension for a very long period. It is submitted that the same renders the suspension invalid. The plea is clearly untenable. The period of suspension should not be unnecessarily prolonged but if plausible reasons exist and the authorities feel that the suspension needs to be continued, merely because it is for a long period that does not invalidate the suspension.
30. Some other pleas were pressed into service to contend that High Court's order is justified. It is submitted that these stands were highlighted before the High Court though not specifically dealt with. Since the High Court has not dealt with these aspects, we do not take the other contentions into account to express any view.
31. Though factually it is undisputed that fresh order of suspension had been passed in each cases, the same relates to a separate cause of action and if any dispute is raised as regards its legality, the same has to be adjudicated by the concerned or the Tribunal, as the case may be, on its own merits and in accordance with law.
32. The impugned order of the High Court in each case stands quashed. The appeals are allowed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
8. He has further relied upon the judgment of the Honble High Court of Delhi in W.P. (C) No.7675/2010 Union of India and Others Vs. Pramod Kumar Bajaj decided on 07.12.2012. the operative part of the said order reads as under:-
œ5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has challenged the findings of the Tribunal as manifestly erroneous and untenable on two counts. Firstly, the learned counsel for petitioner has urged that the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal is clearly contrary to Rule 10 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 as also the OM No.11012/8/2003 Estt.(A) dated 23.10.2003 issued by the Department of Personnel and Training. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that once Rule 10(2) of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 comes into play there is no occasion or stage for the review committee to reexamine the suspension order passed against the respondent in case he is released from detention prior to expiry of the statutory period mentioned under Rule 10(6) of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. Therefore, the finding of the Tribunal to the effect that on release of the respondent from detention on 04.01.2010, the review committee ought to have reconsidered the suspension order passed against the respondent is mistaken and opposed to Rule 10(2). In order to appreciate the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it would be necessary to reproduce Rule10 of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 which is done as under:-
œRule 10. Suspension
(1) The appointing authority or any authority to which it is subordinate or the disciplinary authority or any other authority empowered in that behalf by the President, by general or special order, may place a Government servant under suspension -
(a) where a disciplinary proceeding against him is contemplated or is pending; or
(aa) where, in the opinion of the authority aforesaid, he has engaged himself in activities prejudicial to the interest of the security of the State; or
(b) where a case against him in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation, inquiry or trial:
Provided that, except in case of an order of suspension made by the Comptroller and Auditor-General in regard to a member of the Indian Audit and Accounts Service and in regard to an Assistant Accountant-General or equivalent (other than a regular member of the Indian Audit and Accounts Service), where the order of suspension is made by an authority lower than the appointing authority, such authority shall forthwith report to the appointing authority the circumstances in which the order was made.
(2) A Government servant shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension by an order of appointing authority -
(a) with effect from the date of his detention, if he is detained in custody, whether on a criminal charge or otherwise, for a period exceeding forty-eight hours;
(b) with effect from the date of his conviction, if, in the event of a conviction for an offence, he is sentenced to a term of imprisonment exceeding forty-eight hours and is not forthwith dismissed or removed or compulsorily retired consequent to such conviction.
EXPLANATION - The period of forty-eight hours referred to in Clause (b) of this sub-rule shall be computed from the commencement of the imprisonment after the conviction and for this purpose, intermittent periods of imprisonment, if any, shall be taken into account.
(5)(a) An order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under this rule shall continue to remain in force until it is modified or revoked by the authority competent to do so.
5(b) Where a Government servant is suspended or is deemed to have been suspended (whether in connection with any disciplinary proceeding or otherwise), and any other disciplinary proceeding is commenced against him during the continuance of that suspension, the authority competent to place him under suspension may, for reasons to be recorded by him in writing, direct that the Government servant shall continue to be under suspension until the termination of all or any of such proceedings.
5(c) An order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under this rule may at any time be modified or revoked by the authority which made or is deemed to have made the order or by any authority to which that authority is subordinate.
(6) An order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under this rule shall be reviewed by the authority which is competent to modify or revoke the suspension before the expiry of ninety days from the effective date of suspension on the recommendation of the Review Committee constituted for the purpose and pass orders either extending or revoking the suspension. Subsequent reviews shall be made before expiry of the extended period of suspension. Extension of suspension shall not be for a period exceeding one hundred and eighty days at a time.
(7) An order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under sub rule (1) or (2) of this Rule shall not be valid after a period of ninety days unless it is extended after review, for a further period before the expiry of ninety days.
Provided that no such review of suspension shall be necessary in the case of deemed suspension under sub rule 2, if the Government servant continues to be under suspension at the time of completion of ninety days of suspension and the ninety days period in such case will count from the date the Government servant detained in custody is released from detention or the date on which the fact of his release is intimated to his appointing authority, whichever is later.
6. Secondly, the learned counsel for petitioner has contended that the impugned judgment runs contrary to clear mandate laid down by the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Rajiv Kumar, (2003) 6 SCC 516. It would be pertinent to mention at this stage itself that the learned counsel for respondent has also strenuously relied upon the same decision and has stated that the findings in said decision of Rajiv Kumar (supra) are in fact in his favour.
7. The question which came before the Supreme Court in Rajiv Kumar (supra) related to interpretation of the scope and ambit of Rule 10(2) of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. In Rajiv Kumar (supra), decision under appeal was rendered by a Division Bench of this court in which it was held that sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 does not contain any provision wherefrom it can be deduced that the deemed suspension in case of custodial detention exceeding fortyeight hours would continue until it is withdrawn. It was further held that on a plain reading of the said provision, it is clear that the suspension comes to an end by operation of law after release of the employee from detention.
8. The Supreme Court after reciting the Rule 10 of CCS (CCA) Rules held as under:-
œ14. Rule 10(2) is a deemed provision and creates a legal fiction. A bare reading of the provision shows that an actual order is not required to be passed. That is deemed to have been passed by operation of the legal fiction. It has as much efficacy, force and operation as an order otherwise specifically passed under other provisions. It does not speak of any period of its effectiveness. Rules 10(3) and 10(4) operate conceptually in different situations and need specific provisions separately on account of interposition of an order of Court of law or an order passed by the Appellate or reviewing authority and the natural consequences inevitably flowing from such orders. Great emphasis is laid on the expressions "until further orders" in the said sub-rules to emphasise that such a prescription is missing in Sub-rule (2). Therefore, it is urged that the order is effective for the period of detention alone. The plea is clearly without any substance because of Sub-rule 5(a) and 5(c) of Rule 10. The said provisions refer to an order of suspension made or deemed to have been made. Obviously, the only order which is even initially deemed to have been made under Rule 10 is one contemplated under Sub-rule (2).The said provision under Rule 10(5)(a) makes it crystal clear that the order continues to remain in force until it is modified or revoked by an authority competent to do so while Rule 10(5)(c) empowers the competent authority to modify or revoke also. No exception is made relating to an order under Rules 10(2) and 10(5)(a). On the contrary, specifically it encompasses an order under Rule 10(2). If the order deemed to have been made under Rule 10(2) is to lose effectiveness automatically after the period of detention envisaged comes to an end, there would be no scope for the same being modified as contended by the respondents and there was no need to make such provisions as are engrafted in Rule 10(5)(a) and (c) and instead an equally deeming provision to bring an end to the duration of the deemed order would by itself suffice for the purpose.
15. Thus, it is clear that the order of suspension does not lose its efficacy and is not automatically terminated the moment the detention comes to an end and the person is set at large. It could be modified and revoked by another order as envisaged under Rule 10(5)(c) and until that order is made, the same continues by the operation of Rule 10(5)(a) and the employee has no right to be re-instated to service. This position was also highlighted in Balvantrai Ratilal Patel v. State of Maharashtra (1997) 6 SCC 312.Indication of expression "pending further order" in the order of suspension was the basis for aforesaid view.
16. Reference has been made to Sub-rule 5(b) of Rule 10. According to the High court the same appears to have been made "ex majori cautela". Conceptually Sub-rules 5(a) and 5(b) operate in different fields and for different purposes, i.e., when more than one disciplinary proceedings come to be initiated to cover all such situations. Both the provisions have to be read harmoniously. Otherwise, Sub-rule 5(a) would become meaningless and Sub-rule 5(c) purposeless and both provisions would be rendered otiose and superfluous.
17. View of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High court (supra) that the legal fiction created ceases to be effective for the purposes is clearly unsustainable and we do not approve of the same.
9. The learned counsel for the petitioner next drew our attention to the relevant portion of Government of India instructions issued by Ministry of Personnel and Training as OM No.11012/16/85-Estt.(A) dated 10.01.1986 contending that in the instant case it is not that respondent was only taken into custody but no prosecution was launched against him subsequent to his detention. On the contrary, it is averred that charge sheet has been filed against respondent and the said position is evident from the fact that FIR No.33/2009 is pending before a Metropolitan Magistrate, Rohini Courts and this court has dismissed an application filed on behalf of the respondent under Section 482, Cr. P.C, 1973 seeking quashing of the said FIR. It is relevant to note that as per instructions contained in OM No.35014/9/76-Estt.(A) dated 08.08.1977 in cases where deemed suspension under Rule 10(2) is found to be totally erroneous and the employee concerned is not prosecuted, the deemed suspension in such cases may be treated as revoked from the date the cause of the suspension itself ceases to exist, i.e., the Government servant is released from police custody without any prosecution having been launched. However, it is still desirable for administrative purposes that a formal order revoking suspension under Rule 10(5)(a) be passed. In view of this, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that suspension order issued against respondent is not totally baseless or wholly unjustifiable and in fact criminal prosecution is still pending against respondent.
10. Per contra, the learned counsel for respondent has submitted that the reasoning adopted by the Tribunal in holding that the Review Committee ought to have reconsidered the suspension order under Rule 10(5)(a)once the respondent was released from detention on bail is sound and findings of the Tribunal as such warrant no interference.
11. In our considered opinion, the finding of the Tribunal to the effect that there is nothing incorrect with the first order of suspension dated 31.12.2009 by virtue of which respondent was placed under suspension w.e.f. the date of his detention cannot be faulted with. The Tribunal rightly held that as soon as respondent underwent detention for more than 48 hours, he is deemed to be placed under suspension by invocation of Rule10(2) of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965.
12. However, the Tribunal grossly erred in holding that suspension of the respondent could not have been continued after his release from detention on 04.01.2010 and that in such a case the question of extension of period of suspension by the order dated 12.03.2010 would simply not arise. The reasoning adopted by the tribunal is clearly contrary to the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court in Rajiv Kumars case (supra). The Supreme Court has categorically held that an order of suspension under Rule 10(2) does not lose its effectiveness automatically after the period of detention envisaged under the rules comes to an end. The Supreme Court further held that if the order of deemed suspension was to come to an end once the government official is released from detention, there would be no occasion for the legislature to incorporate Rule 10(5)(a) and Rule 10(5)(c) which provide that the department can modify or revoke the order of deemed suspension. Thus, the decision of the Supreme Court is that the order of suspension passed under Rule 10(2) does not lose its efficacy the moment the period of detention gets over and continues until such order stands modified and/or revoked, by virtue of Rule 10(5)(a). Therefore, till that time the employee has no right to be reinstated in service.
13. Therefore, in our view, there was no necessity for the competent authority to review order of suspension on release of respondent from custody prior to expiry of statutory period of 90 days.
14. Next, the finding of the Tribunal, holding that the Review Committees order dated 12.03.2010 is bad in law for the reason that Review Committee did not re-evaluate the suspension order once the respondent was released from detention, is erroneous and cannot be sustained in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Rajiv Kumars case (supra). We note that in terms of Rule 10(7) it was necessary for the Review Committee to review the suspension order passed under Rule 10(2) before the expiry of 90 days and in fact, in the instant case, the Review Committee did review the suspension order passed against respondent before the expiry of 90 days and accordingly, the order dated 12.03.2010 came to be passed. Therefore, we do not agree with the finding of the Tribunal that the order dated 12.03.2010 was bad in law. The said order complied with the requirements of Rule 10(7) in every respect.
15. In view of the foregoing discussion, we find merit in the submissions of the petitioner and the impugned order dated 31.08.2010 is accordingly set aside. The writ petition is allowed.
8. We have heard the learned counsel for the Applicant Ms. Ritika Chawla with Mr. M.K. Bhardwaj and the learned counsel for the Respondents Shri R.V. Sinha. The question for consideration in this OA is the application of sub-rule (6) and (7) of Rule 10 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 which were inserted in rule book vide Notification dated 23.12.2003, which have been extracted elsewhere in the order. Those provisions are crystal clear. It says, an order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under this rules shall be reviewed by the authority competent to modify or revoke the suspension, before expiry of ninety days from the date of order of suspension. In this case, the order of deemed suspension was made against the Applicant vide order dated 03.02.2012. Under the aforesaid provision, the aforesaid order was required to be reviewed by the competent authority before expiry of ninety days from the aforesaid order, i.e., before 03/05/2012 and accordingly the Review Committee met within the aforesaid stipulated period, i.e., on 23.04.2012 and extended the period of suspension again until further order. But the said order is partially wrong as the next review could not have been held for an indefinite period. Rather, it should have been for a definite period of 180 days. The said 180 days expired on 19.10.2012. Admittedly, the next review was held only on 30.10.2012. Since the aforesaid review was not held within the extended period of 180 days, the order dated 31.10.2012 is invalid. Therefore, as held by the Apex Court in its judgment in Dipak Mali (supra), the Applicant shall be deemed to have been re-instated in service w.e.f. 20.10.2012. The order of this Tribunal in the case of A.A. Farooquee (supra), the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Rajeev Kumar (supra) and the judgment of the High Court of Delhi in the case of Pramod Kumar Bajaj (supra) are not relevant in this case, as they are not dealing with sub-rule (6) and (7) of Rule 10 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965.
11. In view of the above position, this OA is allowed. The Respondents shall treat that the Applicant has since been reinstated in service w.e.f. 20.10.2012 with all consequential benefits. The Respondents shall also pass appropriate orders implementing the aforesaid direction within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.