V.S. Sirpurkar Chairman
1. This judgment will govern the three appeals filed by one Shri Sunil Arjan Lulla being Appeal No. 12 of 2011; Shri Nandu Ahuja being Appeal No. 11 of 2011 and Ms. Jyoti Deshpande being Appeal No. 13 of 2011. The Competition Commission of India (for short the "CCI") by its impugned order dated 25.05.2011 have held that few parties who were engaged in the business of cinema production and / or distribution had been guilty under Section 3(3) of the Competition Act, 2002 (in short the "Act") in as much as they had engaged themselves in cartel conduct. The CCI had also found that the said conduct had caused appreciable adverse effect on competition.
2. The CCI had proceeded against more than 17 persons on the basis of the information provided by the FICCI Multiplex Association of India which was laid before the CCI on 26.05.2009 under Section 19(1) of the Act, through the advocates representing the Informant.
3. It was alleged that one body called United Producers/Distributors Forum ("UPDF" for short), the Association of Motion Pictures and TV Programme Producers (hereinafter referred to as "AMPTPP" for short) and the Film and Television Producers Guild of India (hereinafter referred to as "FTPGI" for short) were behaving like a cartel. It was alleged that the UPDF is an association of film producers and distributors which also included corporate houses and individual independent film producers and distributors. It was alleged that AMPTPP and FTPGI were the members of the UPDF and the three amongst themselves represented producers and distributors of almost 100% of Hindi films produced/ supplied/distributed in India and thereby exercised control over Indian Film Industry.
4. It was further alleged that vide Notice dated 27.03.2009, all producers and distributors including even those who were not the Members of UPDF were instructed not to release any new films to the Members of the Informant for the purposes of exhibition at the multiplexes operated by the members of the informant. It was then alleged that the said notice was on account of their being a conflict between the members of the UPDF and the members of the Informant on the issue of revenue sharing ratio. The said notice further elaborated that revenue sharing ratio is usually negotiated between individual producers and the individual multiplex operator for every film and ratio depends upon the running of the film. Normally 48% of the revenue shared is claimed by the producers in the first week, 38% in the second week, 30% in third week and 25% in the fourth and subsequent weeks in Maharashtra. It was pointed out that the ratio varies from State to State but the pattern of sharing was almost the same. It was pointed out that the average sharing ratio was 40% to 44% which was usually paid to the producer/distributor by the multiplex industry and that this percentage was increased from around 32%. It was alleged that right from early 2009 the producers/distributors started demanding unreasonable sharing ratio of the flat rate of 50% for all weeks and all types of films. It was urged further that the several negotiations were attempted by the multiplex operator with producers/distributors to persuade them to call off their boycott on Multiplexes and to arrive at an amicable resolution but to no effect. It was, therefore, urged that during the continuance of the differences between the multiplex operators/ producers/distributors several other producers/ distributors organized under the umbrella of UPDF and AMPTPP and FTPGI issued a notice dated 09.05.2009 to their respective members to comply with the notice dated 27.03.2009 issued by UPDF and not to release any film in the multiplexes. The afore-mentioned organization went on to the extent of issuing a warning in the notice dated 9.5.2009 that in case of failure to comply with the instructions given in the notice this might lead to life time suspension/strict disciplinary action against the concerned member. It was pointed out that AMPTPP had requested vide letter dated 8.5.2009 the Motion Pictures Association (MPA) and the Eastern India Motion Pictures Association (EIMPA) not to entertain the request filed by M/s. People Pictures (a Member of AMPTPP) to release their Hindi film titled "99". It was then pointed out that all the members of the UPDF along with the aforementioned bodies of AMPTPP and FTGP were acting in concert with each other to fix the price which action is in infringement of Section 3(3)(a) of the Act and by that also limiting/controlling supply by refusing to release Hindi films for exhibition in multiplexes to members of the informant which was in violation of Section 3(3)(b) of the Act. It was further alleged that UPDF and its members were collectively boycotting the multiplexes cinema operators in violation of Section 3(3)(c) of the Act.
5. The Commission vide its order dated 29.05.2009 directed the informant to appear before the CCI on 09.06.2009 and to produce documentary evidence for supporting and corroborating the contents. The informant on 18.06.2009 filed copies of the agreements between certain multiplex operators and producers/distributors. In the meetings of the Commission on 19.06.2009 it was informed by the counsel of the informant that UPDF have called off their strike and have resumed supply of films to multiplex operators with effect from 12.06.2009 and therefore the interim relief was not pressed. However, the informant was further directed to produce agreements and documentary evidence available with him.
6. Accordingly, on 30.6.2009 the Commission formulated an opinion that prima facie case existed of infringement of the provision of the Act and directed the Director General (D.G. for short) to investigate into the matter.
7. The D.G. after seeking extension of time once went ahead with the enquiry and issued notices to the relevant persons. On that basis the D.G. submitted the report on 25.9.2009 and concluded that there was a cartel like conduct by the Members of two associations namely AMPTPP and FTPGI. It was deduced that the members of these two organizations who were producers and distributors had decided collectively not to release films to multiplex owners during the period from 4th April, 2009 to 12th June, 2009, till they could extract more favourable revenue share from Multiplex owners. It was also held by the D.G. that the Multiplex owners could release only a few low budget movies during that period. The D.G. found as many as 16 persons were the key persons involved in this legal exercise. Accordingly, notices were issued to them. Consequently, three appellants have been found to be the key players in the whole affair. Holding the said persons guilty, order under Section 27 was passed against the parties who were noticed including the above three appellants. The Commission had deduced that the opposite parties by entering into the impugned agreement had contravened the provisions of Section 3(1) read with Section 3(a)(b) of the Act and had also caused appreciable adverse effect on competition in terms of Section 19(3) of the Act. Each of the opponent parties were inflicted with the penalty of Rupees One lakh under section 27(b) of the Act. Barring the above three appellants all the others have accepted the order and have also made the payments of the penalties. It is only the present three persons who have filed the appeal before us.
8. At the relevant time Sunil Arjan Lulla - appellant in Appeal No. 12 of 2011 was the Managing Director of one company namely Eros International Media Ltd. (hereinafter "Eros International"). This company was engaged in distribution of the cinematograph films and was operating in India as well as abroad. It is alleged that this company is one of the major producers and distributors of Hindi films. Shri Nandu Ahuja, the appellant in Appeal No. 11 of 2011 was the Vice-President (Distribution) of Eros International. Ms. Jyoti Deshpande, appellant in Appeal No. 13 of 2011 was Chief Executive Officer of Eros International PLC, which company is a Group Company of Eros Group. It is to be seen that the Eros International PLC does not carry out business of either production or distribution of cinematograph films in India.
9. From the report of the Director General, it is seen that that the three appellants, as described, belong to the Eros Group. They were described as key persons involved on behalf of producers-distributors. It was alleged that all the producers, including the above three appellants, that is to say producers and distributors generally held meetings and conferences on the issue of revenue sharing between multiplexes on one hand and producers and distributors on other. During the enquiry, it was seen that these two appellants had attended the meeting held on 16.03.2009 at Club Andheri as also a press conference dated 7th of April, 2009, in hotel Hotel Marriot at Juhu. Ms. Jyoti Deshpande had paid the expenses for that meeting. The payment was made through her credit card. A notice was also issued by UPDF on 27.03.2009.
10. As has been stated earlier, the Commission was not satisfied with the enquiry by the Director General and by its order dated 09.10.2009 directed a further enquiry and after the Director General's report was received, the notices were issued to as many a 16 persons, as has been stated earlier. At this juncture, we will examine some of the findings by the Director General in detail. The Director General found that earlier the revenue sharing ratio was as per table given below:
| Type of Films | Big Budget Films | Medium Budget Films | Low Budget Films |
| 1st Week | 48% | 45% | 40% |
| 2nd Week | 38% | 35% | 30% |
| 3rd Week | 30% | 30% | |
| 4th Week and subsequent weeks | 25-30% | 25-30% |
12. It was found by the Director General that there was a punishment mechanism for those members of a cartel, who did not follow the mandate issued by the notice dated 09.05.2009. It was found as a matter of fact that no big-budget film was released during this period, and directions were not to release the films to the multiplexes owners issued, not only by UPDF but also by the AMPTPP and FTPGI.
13. The Director General found that these bodies extracted higher prices by ordering boycott against multiplexes and as a result of the boycott, under the new agreements, the percentage to be given to the producers/ distributors was raised to 50%, 42.5%, 37.5% and 30% for the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th week respectively. Thus, there was a raise of minimum 2% in general. Ultimately, the Director General found that as a result of the boycott, a new agreement came into being with substantial raise in the revenue sharing of the producers and distributors. The Director General also found that as a result of boycott the multiplexes owners also suffered loss of income from food and beverages stalls. The Director General found that thus there was an appreciable adverse effect on the competition on account of boycott called. The Director General found that there were in all about 16 main violators and Eros Group, which was one of the violators was represented by the three appellants.
14. The Commission then went on to consider the replies/ objections/ submissions of the parties including AMPTPP, which was the representative body, who generally denied the allegations. They also urged that they did not have any ulterior motives, gains or profits for itself and it was only safeguarding the interests of their members. AMPTPP also raised plea of fundamental rights of negotiating terms of business. They also raised certain legal issues, questioning the validity of notice sent by the Director General. They also urged that they were not heard properly. They also raised an issue that a notice could not be issued to the respondents under the provisions prior to the amendment of the Competition Act, which came only on 20th May, 2009. Similarly, FTPGI also filed its reply, on more or less same lines.
15. The appellant Sunil Arjan Lulla urged that he did not produce or distribute Hindi films in India or abroad in his personal capacity. He also raised a plea that he could not be penalised for whatever he did before 20th May, 2009. In short, he objected to the notice sent to him. It was pointed out that the notice of boycott dated 27.03.2009 was obviously prior to 20th May, 2009 and therefore, it was clearly illegal, as it could not be held to be violative of any of the provisions of the Act. He also raised the plea of Section 3(5) of the Copyright Act and claimed that the copyright owner had the right to decide the mode of exploitation of his work. He also urged that his participation in the members' conference in April 2009 did not suggest that he was a party to the collective boycott call. Appellants Nandu Ahuja and Ms. Jyoti Deshpande also raised the same plea that they did not produce or distribute Hindi films in India or abroad in their personal capacity and therefore, notice should not have been sent to them by the Commission. Their other contentions were more or less just like appellant - Sunil Arjan Lulla.
16. On the basis of this, the Commission went on to analyze various provisions of the Competition Act like Section 3, 2(b), 2(l) and came to the conclusion that the notice dated 27.03.2009 was issued by UPDF and both AMPTPP and FTPGI were the members of UPDF. It was found that both the members had issued notice dated 09.05.2009 to their respective members to comply with the boycott notice dated 27.03.2009 and the members were cautioned against releasing any film in the multiplexes. Not only this, but it was also found that in the notice dated 09.05.2009, a warning was given that in case of the failure to comply, the erring members could face life time suspension/ strict disciplinary action etc. It was found that there was actually a collective boycott upto 12th June 2009. The Commission endorsed the finding given by the DG and held that the boycott of multiplexes by the opponent parties was a blatant act of limiting or controlling of production, distribution of films and their act of boycott was an example of joint price-fixing. The Commission then went on to consider the various objections raised, such as - (1) Section 3(5) of the Copyright Act; (2) Right of the Association; and (3) The collective bargaining. We need not dwell upon on these aspects, as we are quite satisfied with the findings of the Commission on these aspects. We were not, as a matter of fact, addressed any arguments on these aspects during the debate. Be that as it may, we find that the Commission has relied on some reported decision of High Court and Supreme Court, they being - (1) Gramophone Company of India Ltd. v. Super Cassette Industries Ltd., decided on 01.07.2010, Manu/DE/1801/2010, (2) Microfibres Inc. v. Girdhar and Co., RFA (OS) No.25/2006 (DB) decided on 28.05.2009; (3) Entertainment Network (India) Limited v. Super Cassette Industries Ltd., Manu/SC/2179/2008 2008(5)O.K. 719. As also the other decisions on various jurisdictions, namely United States v. Microsoft [38 1998 WL 614485 (DDC Sept. 14, 1998) quoted in Hove Kamp et al, 2005 p 36] and Otter Tail Power Co. v. the United States, 410 (U.S. 366 (1973), and Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) as also Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. v. Santosh V.G., (Manu/De/0406/2009). After discussing these cases, the Commission rightly came to the conclusion that there was no question of any infringement of any rights that producers and distributors had under the Copyright Act, 1957 arise. The Commission rightly concluded that the multiplexes owners were also not infringing the rights of the producers/ distributors on the other hand, they were only seeking the release of the films and thus were facilitating the rights of the producers/ distributors under the Copyright Act. It was also rightly observed that the provisions of the intellectual property laws did not have any absolute overriding effect on the competition law. We are thus satisfied that all the question regarding the copyright was correctly decided by the Commission.
17. This takes us to the aspect of the defence of collective bargaining. In that also we are satisfied with the analysis by the Commission. The Commission correctly came to the conclusion that the plea of collective bargaining was devoid of any substance. The Commission observed that the collective bargaining by trade association may not be, per-se, bad in law and may be resorted to for legitimate purposes. However, that did not give any right to trade associations for entering into any anti-competitive acts/ agreements. Since the acts on the parts of these associations were clearly anti-competitive and per-se in violation of Section 3, hence there was no question of raising a plea of collective bargaining. We endorse this view.
18. Even on the question of appreciable adverse effect on the competition, the Commission has correctly taken view and considered Section 19(3) of the Act. It came to the conclusion that the members of the UPDF that is AMPTPP and FTPGI control almost 100% of the market for production and distribution of the Hindi Motion Pictures, which are exhibited in multiplexes in India and these members were acting in concert to fix sales prices by fixing the revenue share ratio in violation of Section 3(3)(a) of the Act. It also observed that the Director General's finding that UPDF, AMPTPP and FTPGI were limiting/ controlling the supply by refusing to release the Hindi Motion Pictures for exhibition in multiplexes in violation of Section 3(3)(b) of the Act. In our view, it is a correct finding. We do not see anything wrong in this finding, which has become final against the UPDF, AMPTPP and FTPGI as no appeal having been filed against the above order.
19. The CCI also found that the consumers were adversely affected on account of the boycott effected against the multiplexes. It was also noted by the CCI that on account of the new agreements, the multiplexes had to raise the prices of the tickets which directly hit the viewers i.e. the common consumers. It was seen as a matter of fact that the multiplexes owners had hiked the ticket prices by 15 to 20 per cent depending on their location in September-October, 2009. It was on this basis that the CCI found the opposite parties guilty for breaching the provisions of Section 3(1) read with Section 3(a) and (b) of the Act.
20. The CCI also considered the question that the impugned boycott called was in April, 2009 and further reiterated on 9.5.2009. It was prior to 20th May, 2009 when Sections 3 and 4 were activated. The CCI found as a matter of fact that right from April 4, 2009, the boycott began and continued up to 12.6.2009 and therefore the effect of the boycott was even after 20th May, 2009 when Sections 3 and 4 were activated. In fact it was an admitted position from the replies given by some parties as also the replies given by the representatives of the Cinemax Groups. It was found that in Notice dated 27th March, 2009 it was clearly given out that the boycott would commence from 4th April, 2009. The CCI also found that the no major big budget film was allowed to be released on multiplexes during this time and it was only after 12th June that the big budget films started trickling in the multiplexes. It was observed that the higher prices secured by the agreement dated 9.6.2009 continued thereafter also and thus the opponent parties continued to reap benefits from the higher prices arrived at in the agreement dated 9.6.2009. The CCI therefore agreed that there was a continuing effect of the cartel and that though the parties could not be punished for the acts earlier to 20th May, 2009, the continuation of boycott after 20th May, 2009 had to be noticed and on that count the CCI booked the opponent party. We endorse this finding. In fact after the advent of Sections 3 and 4 on the legal scenario, the continuation of boycott itself was in breach of the various provisions of Section 3 of the Act. This boycott was under the banner of AMPTPP and FTPGI who had found an association called UPDF. All these practically controlled 100% of the business regarding Hindi films and ultimately brought the multiplex owners on the knees by these anti-competitive actions.
21. The CCI then went on to name the persons who were guilty. In that we are not concerned with other persons, since they have not filed an appeal against the order of the CCI. However, as regards the Eros Group which was proceeded against, the CCI has observed that the three appellants were key persons involved in the process of taking coordinated action together with other producers/directors. The CCI has also observed and in our opinion rightly that some of these persons were present in the conference and the meetings of producers/distributors and they had actively associated with the others in giving call for collective boycott.
22. During the debate, it was pointed out that appellant Shri Sunil Lulla admittedly took part in the press conference which was held for the same purpose of getting the revenue share increased from the multiplexes. The notice of boycott dated 09.05.2009 which was issued on behalf of the representative bodies like AMPTPP and FTPGI bears the name of the appellant Nandu Ahuja who never bothered to distance himself away by any clarification. It is unthinkable that Shri Sunil Lulla and Shri Nandu Ahuja were not aware of these activities. In fact, if Shri Nandu Ahuja was shown to be an office bearer and his name was printed on the caution notice dated 9.5.2009. He would be presumed to have the knowledge of the anti-competitive activities and at the same time, his association with AMPTPP and FTPGI would show that he was an active member in these activities. Ms. Jyoti Deshpande who was the senior executive has also played an active role by making the payment for the meeting held in Hotel JW Marriot, Juhu, Mumbai on 7.4.2009 and it is to be seen that the payment was made through her credit card. All these go alone to show that Eros Group was well represented by these three appellants and they were almost alter ego of Eros Group.
23. This is besides the fact that these three appellants never co¬operated in the course of the enquiry before the D.G. They never furnished the requisite details even when they were actively involved in the entire episode. The DG had noted that the payment for the Press Conference dated 7.4.2009 organized at Hotel JW Marriot, Juhu, Mumbai, was made by Ms. Jyoti Deshpande which makes her role obvious. The CCI then went on to give individual reasons against the opponent parties for inflicting the penalty. In that it was observed in the impugned order that in their letter dated 14.3.2011 these three appellants merely sought the copy of the order of the Commission arriving at a conclusion that the purported action on their part amounted to contravention of Section 3 of the Act. This was very strange on the part of the three appellants who wanted to have a copy of the order even before it was passed. It was on this basis that the ultimate penalties were ordered.
24. Before us, it was firstly argued, as before CCI, that the three appellants did not do anything in their personal capacity and they were merely employees of the Eros International and therefore they could not be booked in their individual capacity. It was urged that the CCI should have proceeded against the company and not against its individual employees. It was also urged that the CCI never proceeded against the company and targeted only these three persons who were acting on behalf of the company. In fact at the point of time it was urged that in absence of the company being joined, these three individuals could not be proceeded against at all. For this purpose, a reported decision of the Supreme Court was relied upon. It is also urged that under Section 48 of the Act, the Directors and/or its office bearers of the company could be made liable. However, the learned counsel forcefully urged that for this purpose initiation of inquiry against the company is sine quo non and in this case neither Eros International nor Eros International PLC were proceeded against. It is on this basis that the appellant relied on the decision of Aneeta Hada Vs. Godfather Travels and Tours (P) Ltd. reported in (2012) 5 SCC 661. In our opinion, this contention is incorrect. Firstly, speaking about the Aneeta Hada's case the aforementioned Supreme Court decision was under the provisions of Negotiable Instrument Act and completely under the different factual scenario. The said decision was under the realm of criminal law, where it was urged that the prosecution of an employee of the company who had signed a cheque on behalf of the company, which was dishonoured could not continue, if the company was not joined as a party to the prosecution as an accused. It was based on Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The learned counsel wanted to try to show that the language of Section 48 of the Competition Act is identical with the language of Section 141 of Negotiable Instruments Act, where instead of the word "offence", the word "contravention" was used. It was, therefore, contended that since the company namely Eros International or Eros International PLC (Group company of Eros Group) were not joined, therefore, the proceedings under Section 3 of the Act could not continue.
25. The argument though attractive, lacks the merit. As has already been shown, the offence under Section 138 is that of a dishonour of a cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of amount of money to another person for the discharge of any debt or other liability. In this comparison, the contravention of Section 3 is entirely in different sphere and lies in civil jurisprudence. Under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, when a person, who is an employee of a company, puts his signature on the cheque, it is because the company cannot write a cheque and sign the same. It has to be done through some employee. Whereas in Section 3 of the Competition Act, a company does not have essentially to take the services of its employee for contravening any of the provisions of Section 3. The nature of liability in Section 138 read with Section 141 is entirely different from the liability of the company contravening Section 3 of the Competition Act. The actus-reus for an offence under Section 138, is putting the signature on the cheque on behalf of the company, which cheque is ultimately dishonoured, and that is the only actus-reus. Such is not the case in the contravention of Section 3. The company may pass a resolution to contravene the provisions of Section 3(1) or 3(3). Section 141 specifically provides that if the offence under Section 138 is committed by a company, every person who was incharge of, and was responsible to the company, as well as the company would be deemed to be guilty of the offence. Then it would be up to the concerned person who is being prosecuted to show that the offence was committed without his knowledge and that he had exercised all the due diligence to prevent the commission of the offence. Reading the language of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act along with the language of Section 138, it is clear that a person, who writes the cheque for the company, can be made liable, as he has done the act of signing the cheque. Besides him any other person named in Section 141 could also be joined, but such person who is joined under Section 141 sub-Section (1) has actually not done any actus-reus in the sense he has not signed the cheque, which is the actus- reus for Section 138 and yet he is also made liable for the dishonour of the cheque, if he can be covered in the language of Sections 141(1) and Section 141(2). Such is not the position in respect of Section 3 of Competition Act and for this reason, it is not possible for us to accept the argument that in the absence of any proceedings against Eros International and Eros International PLC, it would not be possible to proceed against the three appellants.
26. It has already been shown in the discussions of the earlier paragraphs that these three appellants were actively canvassing in favour of the boycott of multiplexes. They were doing all the efforts. The details of which have come in the previous paragraphs. The defence of these appellants that they were not doing this in their personal capacity, is of no consequence, in view of the language of Section 3, as also in view of the definition of the word "person". It is to be noted that the definition of "person" is as under:-
"2. Definitions.
(I)" person" includes-
(i) an individual;
(ii) a Hindu undivided family;
(iii) a company;
(iv) a firm;
(v) an association of persons or a body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, in India or outside India;
(vi) any corporation established by or under any Central, State or Provincial Act or a Government company as defined in section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956 );
(vii) any body corporate incorporated by or under the laws of a country outside India;
(viii) a co- operative society registered under any law relating to co- operative societies;
(ix) a local authority;
(x) every artificial juridical person, not falling within any of the preceding sub- clauses;"
The Act therefore, takes care of the 'acts done' by the individuals also. Very significantly, the word "person" is not defined in Negotiable Instruments Act. The reason is not far to see. The actus-reus in the Negotiable Instruments Act has to be done by an individual, though such individual may do it in different capacities, one more reason why we have held that the law laid down in Aneeta Hada's case is not applicable to the present case. However, we do not stop at that, if an anti-competitive agreement can be brought about by the efforts of a person, then that person would also be equally responsible for the contraventions of the provisions of Sections 3 or 4 as the case may be. We, therefore, have no hesitation in holding that the plea that these appellants were acting on behalf of their company and not for their personal gains, were equally if not more, responsible for the contraventions. They were working tirelessly for getting the revenue share hiked. Therefore, it cannot be argued on their behalf that they had no individual gain. Perhaps had they not been able to bring about the desired hike in the revenue shares, probably they would have been adversely viewed by the company. It cannot, therefore, be said that they were not acting in the self-interest. This is apart from the fact that the names of Shri Arjan Lulla as well as Ms. Jyoti Deshpande have been appearing as a producer of some films. It was argued very seriously that, that is a business practice. We are not impressed by this, but even if that fact is to be ignored, it is clear that the acts of these appellants in bringing about and continuing with the boycott would draw them in the dragnet of the mischief of Section 3.
27. It was then argued though at the late stage that though the three appellants had insisted upon leading the evidence. That opportunity was not given. This plea has no merits whatsoever. It is a well-known fact that all the three appellants have suffered a conviction for the offence under Section 43 of the Act, in as much as they failed to co-operate with the Commission and avoided to supply any information, which was sought for by the Director General. This conviction would show a complete lack of bonafide on the parts of all the three appellants. We have seen the whole correspondence as well as the orders passed from time to time by CCI and we find that it is only at the fag-end, when they were given an extra opportunity to put their say that the appellants in the so called preliminary objection, sought for an opportunity to lead evidence. By that time, the CCI had already closed the matter for judgment. Thus, it was a poor attempt on the part of the three appellants to perpetrate the proceedings by anyhow dragging the same. This is apart from the fact that even in that last reply, the appellants have not shown as to what they wanted to prove by leading evidence. There is no explanation whatsoever. Even at the stage of arguments, the learned counsel could not give any reasonable explanation on this count. We, therefore, reject this plea. We are of the firm opinion that instead of writing letters after letters and making frivolous requests, the appellants could have filed the affidavits for evidence before the CCI. That they never did. We have seen the whole correspondence in this behalf, as also the orders passed by the CCI from time to time.
28. It was tried to be suggested that in fact the Eros Group had not boycotted and during April to 12th June, Eros had released films like "Me Shivaji Raje Bhosle Boiltoy" and "Tera Mera Ki Rista". From this, the learned counsel wanted to urge that they were not the part of the boycott. Firstly, the first mentioned film was not a Hindi film. The only Hindi film which was allegedly released was "Aa Dakhen Zara", which was not a big- budgeted film. Therefore, this plea that they were not part of the boycott and had not boycotted the multiplexes is rejected. It was haltingly suggested that during the period from 27th March, 2009 onwards upto 12th June 2009, 15 films were released. That does not mean that the concerned persons or organisations had not entered into an agreement to boycott the multiplexes. At any rate, this was a very insignificant number.
29. This is apart from the fact that the AMPTPP and FTPGI have not challenged the order penalising them for the contravention of Section 3. It was not even argued and indeed could not be that Eros had no connection whatsoever with these two representative organisations. Their connection is well established. We are quite satisfied with the order of the CCI. We are also satisfied with the penalty ordered, which in our opinion is insignificant and tends to be on the lenient side. For all these reasons, we are of the opinion that these appeals have no merits.
30. We hold accordingly and dispose of all the three Appeals.