1. The Petitioner-employer has filed the present Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, challenging the judgment and order dated 17.1.2006 passed by 8th Labour Court, Mumbai in Complaint (ULP) No.139 of 2005, as also the judgment dated 10.4.2007 passed by the learned Member, Industrial Court, Mumbai in Revision Application (ULP) no.33 of 2006 confirming the judgment of the Labour Court. The Labour Court by its Judgment has allowed the complaint filed by Respondent no.1 and has declared that the Petitioner has committed unfair labour practice under Items 1(b) (d) (f) of Schedule IV of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971 and has directed the Petitioner to permit Respondent no.1 to forthwith report for work with continuity of service and full back wages with effect from 1.3.2005.
2. Respondent no.1-employee had filed Complaint (ULP) No.139 of 2005 against the Petitioner-employer. In the complaint filed by Respondent no.1 before the Labour Court, the case of Respondent no.1 in short is as follows:-
That since October, 1998 the Respondent no.1 was in the service of the Petitioner as a security guard. The Petitioner was engaging thousands of security guards and was providing security services to its various customers in Mumbai and outside Mumbai. Respondent no.1 was assigned work at various places in Mumbai. At the relevant time when the dispute arose, Respondent no.1 was posted at the Awa Garment, Sangli state, Nityanand Nagar, Ghatkopar (W), Mumbai. This establishment was a manufacturer of garments and was employing about 250 employees. Respondent no.1 was working as a security guard and the predominant duties of Respondent no.1 was to guard the premises and regulate the entry of workmen, material and other incoming and outgoings in the said establishment. Respondent no.1 was posted at the gate of the said establishment. His duties included marking of attendance of workers when they reported for work as also when they leave the factory premises. He was also required to maintain record of incoming and outgoing vehicles. That he was working alongwith four other security guards out of which one was lady guard who was required to remain at the gate from 11 a.m. to 7 p.m.. Whereas the main security guards used to work for 12 hours, two at a time and that his duty hours were from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m. every day. He was also required to prepare Roaster once in a fortnight assigning shift to the remaining three guards and that such duty was only a minuscule part of duty of respondent no.1. That on 28.2.2005 when he was carrying on his normal duty at around noon, one Ram Agya Singh accompanied by Nanhe Singh and Jai Singh approached the work place in a jeep. All these three persons were superior officers of the petitioner and that Mr.R.A.Singh started asking respondent no.1 as to whether respondent no.1 was paying haft a (money) to one Mr.Amarjeet Singh who was a branch manager of Ghatkopar branch of the petitioner at the relevant time. On Respondent no.1 answering that he was not paying any haft a, the said persons physically put Respondent no.1 in a jeep and took him to the Petitioner's office at Ghatkopar. Respondent no.1 was assaulted by the said three persons at the Ghatkopar Office as also Respondent no.1 was compelled to write a letter of resignation under force and duress. It was the case of Respondent no.1 that he was made to sign this letter which was earlier got written by the said three persons from one Mr.Ganesh Rumani who was working as a security guard along-with Respondent no.1. That Respondent no.1 had no option but to sign the letter which Respondent no.1 remembers to have contents that Respondent no.1 was resigning from the services of the Petitioner voluntarily. The contents of the said letter as forcefully taken from him, were totally false and incorrect and there was no reason for respondent no.1 to resign from the services of the Petitioner as he had no other job and there was no other reason for him to submit a resignation. That again on the same day at 4 p.m. Mr.R.A.singh came back to Awa Garments and physically lifted Respondent no.1, put him in a jeep and again Respondent no.1 was brought to Ghatkopar branch where Respondent no.1 was again assaulted by lathi and was locked inside the room. It is alleged that thereafter two persons got another letter of resignation written by someone and Mr.R.A.Singh thereafter came inside the room and forced Respondent no.1 to sign the said letter. However, Respondent no.1 could not read the contents of the second letter as Respondent no.1 was under extreme physical pain due to assault and beating by hands, lathi and blow. That he was forced to make statement against Mr.Amarjeet Singh, the then Branch Manager of Ghatkopar branch of the Petitioner and that he was threatened of further assault if he did not make statement against said Amarjeet Singh. That his statement was recorded on a tape by Mr.Jaiswal and that Respondent no.1 was also made to write complaint against Mr.Amarjeet Singh stating that Respondent no.1 was paying haft a of Rs.1500/- every month. Respondent no.1 has stated that he was released from Ghatkopar branch office at about 8.30 p.m. and immediately after being released, Respondent no.1 approached Surya Nagar Police Station and made a complaint to the Inspector on duty which was registered as N.C. Complaint no.358 of 2005 dated 28.2.2005. A token stating the number of N.C. was also given to Respondent no.1 from the concerned police station. On the next date i.e. on 1.3.2005 when he reported for work at 7 a.m. as usual at Awa Garment factory, he was not permitted to join duties as already one Mr.R.L.Mishra was posted to work in the place of Respondent no.1 and that is how from 1.3.2005 Respondent no.1 has not been permitted to report for work. Thereafter, Respondent no.1 had also approached the Minister for Labour and Industries and submitted a letter dated 3.3.2005, a copy of which was annexed to the complaint. In pursuance of the said complaint, the Government had appointed a Labour Officer who visited Ghatkopar branch office of the Petitioner to make inquiries. It is stated that however the Petitioner's Branch office has informed the Government Labour Officer that Respondent no.1 had voluntarily resigned and that this had happened some time around 3rd week of March,2005. The Respondent no.1 stated that he had received a message from the Petitioner at his residential address that Respondent no.1 should approach the branch office of the Petitioner at Ghatkopar on 5.4.2005 where he would be paid his legal dues. On 5.4.2005 at 1.30 p.m. Respondent no.1 went to the office, however, again Respondent no.1 was locked up in a room and was asked to give a complaint in writing against Mr.Amarjeet Singh, the then Branch Manager of the Petitioner. The Respondent no.1 was informed that if respondent no.1 signed such letter, he would be permitted to join duty, failing which no duty would be given to him. As regards the legal dues, it was informed to the Respondent no.1 that in fact there was a recovery of Rs.8000/- from him and that he was threatened that such amount would be recovered from him as he had approached the office of the Minister of Labour as well as Security Guard Board. It was the case of Respondent no.1 that with regard to his employment with the Petitioner right from initial appointment, no letter of appointment was given to him and only identity card was given which was snatched away from Respondent no.1 on 28.2.2005 when Respondent no.1 was picked up from Awa Garment factory. It was Respondent no.1's case that after initial work for three months, the Petitioner had started deducting provident fund contribution from the salary of Respondent no.1 and that he had received provident fund statement upto year 2002-2003. The relevant extracts of provident fund account were filed by Respondent no.1 in his complaint before the Labour Court. It was further stated that Respondent no.1 was also covered under ESIC and ESIC Card was issued to him. It was Respondent no.1's case that he was forcibly made to sign the resignation letter when he had no intention to resign and that immediately he had made a police complaint and also a complaint to the Minister of Labour and Industries on 5.3.2005. Respondent no.1 hence stated that it was the case of forcible termination as Respondent no.1 had not signed the complaint against Amerjeet Singh as desired by three superior officers of Respondent no.1. It was his case that no show cause notice, memo or charge-sheet was issued to Respondent no.1 nor any inquiry was held. It was his case that his past record was spotless and hence, it was illegal for the Petitioner to prevent him from joining duties and the same amounted to an unfair labour practice.
3. On the aforesaid facts, Respondent no.1 approached the Labour Court at Mumbai by filing the complaint under Section 28 read with Items 1(a), (b), (d), (f) and (g) of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Union and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act,1971 (hereinafter referred to as œMRTU and PULP Act?) and prayed that the Labour Court be pleased to hold and declare that the Petitioner had engaged in unfair labour practice under Items 1(a), (b), (d), (f) and (g) of Schedule IV of the MRTU and PULP Act,1971 and that the Petitioner be directed to reinstate Respondent no.1 with full back wages and continuity of service with effect from 1.3.2005. Respondent no.1 further prayed that the cost of the complaint and additional compensation for physical and mental torture also be granted in favour of Respondent no.1.
4. The Petitioner appeared before the Labour Court in the said Complaint (ULP) filed by Respondent no.1 and filed its written statement inter alia denying the case of Respondent no.1. In short the Petitioner's case before the Labour Court was as follows:-
That the complaint as filed by Respondent no.1 was not maintainable in view of the fact that Respondent no.1 was not a workman as defined under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act,1947 inasmuch as that Respondent no.1 was a Security Supervisor which was apparent from the identity card issued by the Petitioner. Respondent no.1 in the entire complaint has not alleged that he was not working as a Security Supervisor and that on the contrary Respondent no.1 had stated in his complaint that at the site there were four other security guards working with him and that he was assigning shift to the security guards. That Respondent no.1 in order to bring the matter within the ambit of the MRTU and PULP Act has made false allegations that he was working as a security guard. On the merits of the Respondent no.1's case, it was stated by the Petitioner that Respondent no.1 had voluntarily submitted his resignation and hence, there was no case of any illegal termination. It was stated that the request of Respondent no.1 for reinstatement was, in fact, pending before Suraksha Rakshak Mandal and when that issue was pending, Respondent no.1 ought not to have filed the complaint before the Labour Court asking for the same relief. That the Petitioner had not terminated the services of Respondent no.1 and that by letter dated 28.2.2005, Respondent no.1 had voluntarily submitted his resignation. The allegations of assault at the hands of the personnel of the Petitioner-Company were denied as false. That the complaint of Respondent no.1 was false and fabricated, and was also untenable in law and that the complaint did not attract any of the items of Schedule IV of the said Act as alleged by Respondent no.1. It was stated that the fact that four other security guards were working with him at Awa Garment, itself established that Respondent no.1 was a security supervisor as borne out from the identity card. The incident of 28.2.2005 was denied to be false and fabricated. It was also contended by the Petitioner that Respondent no.1's complaint to the police station and Minister of Labour and Industries are also false and fabricated. The Petitioner averred that by its letter dated 22.4.2005, Respondent no.1 was informed about acceptance of resignation and that in full and final settlement as amount of Rs.17,684/- was due from Respondent no.1 to be repaid to the petitioner and in that regard Respondent no.1 was called upon to meet the Petitioner on 25.4.2005. That as the said letter was not accepted by Respondent no.1, it was forwarded by a covering letter dated 23.4.2005 to Respondent no.1 by registered post AD. It was hence, stated that the resignation of Respondent no.1 was accepted by the Petitioner. The Petitioner, therefore, contended that Respondent no.1's claim that the Petitioner has indulged in any unfair labour practice, was false and that the complaint deserved to be rejected.
5. On the aforesaid factual background, Respondent no.1- complainant examined himself before the Labour Court and was duly cross examined on behalf of the Petitioner. On behalf of the Petitioner Shri.Kunal V.Kaushal, Chief Executive of the Petitioner had tendered his evidence and was cross examined on behalf of Respondent no.1.
6. The learned Labour Judge, after taking into consideration the material on record of the Complaint and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties, by his judgment and order dated 17.1.2006 allowed the complaint and declared that the Petitioner has committed unfair labour practice under Items 1(b) (d) (f) of Schedule IV Of the MRTU and PULP Act,1971, and directed the Petitioner to permit Respondent no.1 to report for work forthwith with continuity of service and full back wages with effect from 1.3.2005. On a revision being preferred by the Petitioner under Section 44 of MRTU and PULP Act before the Industrial Court at Mumbai, the learned Member of the Industrial Court by an order dated 10.4.2007 rejected the revision application as filed by the Petitioner. In these circumstances, the Petitioner has preferred the present Writ Petition assailing the concurrent findings of the Courts below.
7. While considering the present Writ Petition for admission, this Court by an interim order dated 18.1.2008 stayed the operation of the impugned judgment and order of the Labour Court till the final hearing of the petition however recording in the order as follows:-
œThe main issue that needs to be addressed in the petition is whether the Respondent is a 'workman within the meaning of section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, which question goes to the root of the matter.?
8. I have heard Mr.Kiran Bapat, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner and Mr.Aarshad Shaikh, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent no.1.
9. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner at the outset contended that Respondent no.1 was not a workman within the meaning and purview of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act,1947, inasmuch as Respondent no.1 was working as a security supervisor as was clear from the identity card as brought on record in the proceedings before the Labour Court and certain statements made by Respondent no.1 in his cross examination which showed that he discharged duties of a Security Guard. He contended that Respondent no.1 has failed to discharge the burden that he was discharging duties as a Security Guard. In regard to the issues on merits it was contended that it was a clear case of voluntary resignation being tendered by Respondent no.1 on 28.2.2005 and it was subsequently accepted by the Petitioner on 22.4.2005 which letter Respondent no.1 refused to accept. He further contended that the evidence on record demonstrates that the story as pleaded by Respondent no.1 of the incident dated 28.2.2005 was false and fabricated and that nothing of what Respondent no.1 contended had happened. He further contended that the police complaint of Respondent no.1 dated 28.2.2005 and the complaint which was made to the office of Minister of Labour and Industries was also of no consequence in view of voluntary resignation as tendered by Respondent no.1. The learned Counsel for Petitioner also submitted that reliance as placed by Respondent no.1 on the judgment of this Court in the case of JayhindVithoba Mahadik Vs. General Manager, Maharashtra Scooters Ltd (2004 III CLR 166)as taken into consideration by the Labour Court, was of no avail, as by a further order passed by the Division Bench in LPA no.124 of 2004 arising out of the said Judgment, the order of the learned Single Judge 1 (2004 III CLR 166) was set aside by consent. He, therefore, contended that the observations of the Labour Court on the basis of the Judgment in the case of Jayhind Vithoba Mahadik (supra) ought not to be taken into consideration.
10. On the other hand, Mr.Shaikh learned Counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent no.1 submitted that Respondent no.1 who was working as a Security Guard was a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. He contended that it was clear from the record that from the inception Respondent no.1 was discharging duties as a security guard and was so posted at the sites of various clients of the Petitioner. He contended that initially when Respondent no.1 was appointed, no appointment order was issued by the Petitioner and further the Petitioner has also failed to place on record any promotion order by which Respondent no.1 was promoted to the post of Security Supervisor. He contended that the nomenclature œSecurity Supervisor? as being canvassed by the Petitioner in no manner can be said to be the sole criteria to hold Respondent no.1 not to be a workman under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. He contended that the nomenclature itself would not determine the nature of duties as were discharged by Respondent no.1, so as not to fall within the definition of workman, and that the main work being performed by an employee is required to be ascertained to determine whether the employee is a workman or not. He further contended that only because the identity card uses the word œSecurity Supervisor? by itself would not render Respondent no.1 outside the purview of Section 2(s) of the Act. He contended that it was clear from the evidence as come on record before the Labour Court, in regard to the nature of duties discharged by Respondent no.1 that Respondent no.1 was a workman. On the merits of the case he contended that in the incident which took place on 28.2.2005, Respondent no.1 was forced to write a resignation and that Respondent no.1 never desired to resign as he had no other source of livelihood. He submitted that Respondent no.1 was in continuous and spotless service of the petitioner from the year 1998 and hence, there was no circumstance whatsoever which would compel Respondent no.1 to adopt such action of resignation which would deprive Respondent no.1 of his livelihood. He contended that the Petitioner indulged into unfair labour practice as falling under Section 28 read with Items 1(a), (b), (d), (f) and (g) of Schedule IV of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971 and hence, the findings of both the Courts below are based on proper appreciation of evidence, legal and valid and hence, deserve no interference of this Court in the present Writ Petition. Learned Counsel in support of his submissions relied on the following judgments:-
(I) Western India Match co.Ltd. Vs. Their Workmen(1964(3) S.C.R. 560); (II) Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Co. of India Ltd. (in C.A.No.1477 of 1970); The Burmah Shell Management Staff Association (In 1. 1964(3) S.C.R. 560 C.A.no.1478 of 1970) Vs. The Burmah Shell Management Staff Association and ors. (in C.A.No.1477 of 1970); Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Co. of India Ltd. and Ors (in C.A.no.1478 of 1970)(AIR 1971 Supreme Court 922) ; (III) Ananda Bazar Patrika (P) Ltd. Vs. The Workmen (AIR 1971 Supreme Court 922); (IV) Karnataka Bank Ltd. Vs. Sunita B.Vatsaraj (Smt.)(2007 II CLR 650)?
11. With the eminent assistance of the learned Counsel appearing for the parties, I have gone through the record of the present proceedings. I have been taken through the evidence as led by the parties before the Labour Court and the other documents which are brought on record. As a settled principle of law the jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 particularly when the Court is called upon to issue a writ of certiorari is limited. The jurisdiction in certiorari is not in the nature of an appellate power which the Court wields and hence the Court would not substitute its own view on the appreciation of evidence for the view taken by the Labour Court except in cases where the finding is based on no evidence or apparent perversity resulting in grave miscarriage of justice. Consistent with this legal position, I proceed to consider as to whether there is any infirmity in the findings of the Labour Court in adjudication of Respondent no.1's complaint and whether any interference of this Court is necessary in the present Writ Petition.
12. On the aforesaid background, the first question which falls for consideration is as to whether Respondent no.1 is a workman as falling under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act,1947. The definition of 'workman' under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act,1947 reads as under:-
œ2. Definitions “ In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context “
(s) œworkman? means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include any such person-
(i) who is subject to the Air Force Act,1950 (45 of 1950), or the Army Act,1950 (46 of 1950), or the Navy Act,1957 (62 of 1957); or
(ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a prison, or
(iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity, or
iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding [six thousand five hundred rupees] per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature.?(emphasis supplied)
(NOTE: By Maharashtra Act No.XXIII of 2006 dated 26.2.2006, by amendment in sub-clause (iv) words œone thousand six hundred rupees? are substituted by œsix thousand five hundred rupees?)
A plain reading of the aforesaid definition makes it clear that 'workman' means any person employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under the Industrial disputes Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, however, does not include any person who is subject to the Air Force Act,1950 or the Army Act,1950, or the Navy Act,1957, or who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a prison, or who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity or being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding Rs.1,600/- per month or a person who is employed in supervisory capacity exercises either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature. The definition, therefore, indicates that mere supervisory work being done by a person would not take him outside the purview of the term, unless such person is employed in a managerial or administrative capacity or he is being employed in a supervisory capacity drawing wages exceeding Rs.1,600/- per month or by virtue of the nature of the duties attached to the office or the powers vested in him functions mainly of a managerial nature.
13. The test, therefore, which is required to be applied is to consider in the facts of the case, as to what is the real nature of the work as being discharged by the concerned employee so as to determine whether he is a 'workman'. In the present case, there is no dispute that initially Respondent no.1 was appointed as a security guard in the month of October,1998. Petitioner at no point of time had issued to the Respondent No.1 any appointment order or a promotion order. Respondent no.1 has categorically contended in his complaint before the Labour Court that the predominant duties of the security guard was to guard the premises and to regulate the entry of workmen, material and other incoming and outgoing in the said establishment. He has also stated that he was required to be present at the gate and mark attendance of the workers when they report for work and also when they leave the factory premises. He was also maintaining the record of incoming and outgoing vehicles. He has also stated that he was required to work from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m. every day and that once in a fortnight he was required to prepare duties roster assigning shifts to the remaining three guards which would be required to do work at different times as per the requirement of the company, as he has contended that timing of the said three guards would change in accordance with the requirements of the company. Respondent no.1 has categorically stated that this was only a minuscule part of his duty. He has also stated that he was paid wages as prescribed by the Board. In the affidavit in lieu of examination-in-chief before the Labour Court, Respondent no.1 has reiterated and confirmed his averments in the complaint and has stated that he was working as security guard alongwith other security guards at the relevant time. He also reiterated that though the designation has been mentioned as security supervisor, he had no duty of a supervisor and he was doing the work like any other security guard. In the cross-examination Respondent no.1 has stated that he was not given promotion as Supervisor but it was mentioned on the identity card from 2003. In fact, in the cross-examination of Respondent no.1 he has stated that as a security guard, he was doing 12 hours duty and getting Rs.2800/- per month, but however, after he was made supervisor in the year 2003 and he was paid for 8 hrs Rs.1900/- per month. The statements of Respondent no.1 in the cross examination on which much reliance was placed on behalf of the Petitioner read as under:-
œIt is true that I was doing the changing of the shifts of the Security guards and they were working as directed by me with regard to the shifts. It is true that it was my duty to see whether four security guards were doing the work properly.?
On the basis of these statements, it is contended on behalf of the Petitioner that this is clear admission on the part of Respondent no.1 that he was in fact discharging duties of a nature which would indicate that Respondent no.1 was not a workman.
14. This contention as raised on behalf of the Petitioner cannot be accepted for two reasons firstly that this part of the evidence cannot be read in isolation and the entire evidence is required to be seen. It is quite clear from the evidence that Respondent no.1 was discharging duties as a Security Guard as stated by him in the Complaint and in the affidavit in lieu of examination in chief. The cross examination in no manner disproves the case of Respondent no.1 on the predominant nature of the duties as discharged by him. Moreover, it is the Petitioner who has failed to discharge its burden in proving its assertion that Respondent no.1 was in fact discharging duties as a Security Supervisor. No independent material is produced to show as to what are the duties of a Security Guard and that of a Security Supervisor. No appointment/promotion order as a Security Supervisor is brought on record to show what are the duties of a Security Supervisor. Petitioner is obviously an employer who has chosen not to maintain appropriate record. This would no doubt defeat the rights of the workmen and deprive them of the elementary protection under the Labour welfare Legislations. There is no cogent material on record to disprove the categorical claim of Respondent no.1 in regard to discharge of duties by him of a Security Guard. Secondly, it is a settled law that the nomenclature /designation of an employee would not by itself determine that an employee is not a workman. In the present case, it has come on record that Respondent no.1 was working as a security guard right from October,1998. A careful consideration of the material as brought on record before the Labour Court clearly indicates that none of the duties as being performed by Respondent no.1 were of supervisory nature or functions of a managerial nature capacity. The indices of the exercise of supervisory authority are totally absent. A stray incident of allocation of shifts once in a fortnight which was nothing but the requirement of the concerned industry cannot be conclusive to mean that Respondent no.1 at all material times was discharging supervisory function so as to be not a 'workman' as falling under the definition under Section 2(s) of the Act. The principal nature of the duties of Respondent no.1 as appeared in the evidence was to work as security guard and that to for 12 hours a day. The evidence which has come on record do not in any manner show that the principal nature of duties as discharged by Respondent no.1 were of supervisory, administrative or managerial nature. Therefore, the Petitioner's contention that Respondent no.1 is not a workman cannot be accepted.
15. In this context, the reliance of the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent no.1 on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case œAnandaBazar Patrika (P) Ltd. Vs. the Workmen (1970(3) Supreme Court Cases 248)? is apposite. In this judgment the Supreme Court was considering the case of an employee who was employed in clerical work. The contention of the employer was that in fact he was working in supervisory capacity. The employer contended that the employee being Senior-most clerk, he was put in-charge of the Provident Fund Section and was given a small amount of control over the other clerks working in his section. He was also allocating work between them, to permit them to leave during office hours and to recommend their leave applications and hence, he was working in supervisory capacity. The Labour Court on appreciation of facts of that case had held that the employee was employed in clerical work and not in supervisory capacity. The Supreme Court in this judgment has held that whether a person is employed in supervisory capacity or otherwise depends upon whether the main and principal duties carried out by the employee are those of supervisory character. The Supreme Court in paragraph (3) and (6) of the Judgment has observed as under:-
œ3. The question, whether a person is employed in a supervisory capacity or on clerical work, in our opinion, depends upon whether the main and principal duties carried out by him are those of a supervisory character, or of a nature carried out by a clerk. If a person is mainly doing supervisory work, but, incidentally or for a fraction of the time, also does some clerical work, it would have to be held that he is employed in supervisory capacity; and, conversely, if the main work done is of clerical nature, the mere fact that some supervisory duties are also carried out incidentally or as a small fraction of the work done by him will not convert his employment as a clerk into one in supervisory capacity. This principle finds support from the decisions of this Court in South Indian Bank Ltd. V. A.R.Chacko and Management of M/s.May and Baker (India) Ltd. V. Their Workmen. In the present case, we have, therefore, to examine the evidence to see whether the Labour Court is right in holding that, because of the main work of Gupta being clerical in nature, he was not employed in supervisory capacity.
6. ¦ ¦. ¦. ¦. ¦
These few minor duties of a supervisory nature cannot, in our opinion, convert his office of senior clerk incharge into that of a supervisor. The Labour Court was, therefore, right in holding that Gupta was a workman on the date of his retirement and that an industrial dispute did, in fact, exist.? (emphasis supplied)
In the case of œBurmahShell Oil Storage and Distributing Co. of India Ltd.? (supra) the Supreme Court in considering the test to be applied to determine as to whether an employee is a workman or not has observed as under:-
œ11. In J. and F. Stone Lighting and Radio Ltd. Vs. Havgarth, 1968 AC Pt. 3, 157 the same test of the substantial nature of the employment was applied in interpreting the words œemployed in manual labour? in the Factories Act. Thus, in the present case also, in determining which of the employees in the various categories are covered by the definition of œworkman?, we have to see what is the main or substantial work which they are employed to do If it is supervisory work, it would be held that they were employed to do supervisory work even though they may also be doing some technical, clerical or manual work. If, on the other hand, the supervisory work be incidental to the main or substantial work of any other type, viz. Clerical, manual or technical, the employment would not be in a supervisory capacity. It is in the light of these principles that we shall no proceed to examine the correctness of the decision of the Tribunal in respect of various categories of workmen involved in this reference. (emphasis supplied)
In a recent judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case œKarnataka Bank Ltd. Vs. Sunita B.Vatsaraj (Smt.)? (supra) in dealing with a similar controversy and after considering the several decisions of the Supreme Court, this Court has held that mere designation of an employee or nomenclature of a post is not determinative of the character of the nature of the duties performed by an employee. The Division Bench in paragraph 16 has observed as under:-
œ16. Considering the various authorities referred to by the learned Counsel for the parties, it is clear that mere designation of an employee or the nomenclature of a post is not determinative of the character of the nature of the duties performed by an employee. An employee would be regarded as performing the supervisory duties only if he is required to supervise the work of one or more of the employees working under him. Supervisions means direction and control. The concerned employee must have a power to supervise, direct and control the work of any other employee or employees working under him. The word œchecking? has multiple meanings. A clerk in the audit department of a company checks the entries in the books of accounts made by other employees. But that checking is not done in a supervisory capacity but is done merely to bring to the notice of the employer any irregularity happening or committed by any other employee. He has no power to punish or correct errors of other employees. But the function of checking by an officer who day to day supervises work and tasks performed by his subordinates, is different from the checking by an audit clerk. The officer supervises and checks work of his subordinates with a view to direct and control their actions. Such checking, unlike checking of any entry in books of accounts by an audit clerk is a supervisory function.? In view of the above principle of law, the duty of the Court in determining whether the employee is a workman or not is to consider whether the main and principal duties carried out by him are those of a supervisory character. I have considered the evidence in a considerable degree of detail, in my opinion, in the present case the Labour Court has appropriately considered the evidence on record which manifestly demonstrates that Respondent no.1 was discharging duties as a security guard and hence it was correct for the Labour Court to hold that the minor deviation of assigning duties to the other guards once in a fortnight cannot go to show that it was a principal work of Respondent no.1. Such minor deviations from the predominant nature of work cannot be canvassed by the Petitioner so as to label Respondent no.1 as not a workman as defined under Section 2(s) of Industrial Disputes Act. I therefore, find no error or perversity on the part of the Labour Court in reaching to a conclusion that Respondent no.1 is a workman.
16. One more aspect which needs to be considered is, the contention of the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner that the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of œJayhindVithoba Mahadik Vs. General Manager, Maharashtra Scooters Ltd.? (supra) as referred to by the Labour Court in its judgment ought not to be taken into consideration in view of subsequent orders dated 15.6.2004 passed by the Division Bench of this Court in Letters Patent Appeal arising from the said judgment in which the order of the learned Single Judge was set aside by consent of the Petitioner. In my opinion, this submission on the part of the Petitioner, would not be of much avail to the Petitioner for two reasons. Firstly for the reason that, what has been set aside by consent is the 'order' and not the judgment and secondly, in making the observations in the judgment the learned Single Judge has taken into consideration the principles of law as laid down in various judgments of the Supreme Court that nomenclature does not in any manner establish status of a person working in the establishment, as succinctly considered in paragraph 8. Hence, the reference to the said judgment by the Labour Court, in my opinion, would not make much difference to the otherwise settled legal position which is being reflected by the said judgment. In any event the Learned Counsel for the Respondent no.1 has placed reliance on the other judgments of the Supreme Court and this Court (supra) and not solely on the judgment in JayhindVithoba Mahadik's case. Therefore, the submissions of the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner in this regard cannot be accepted.
17. Now turning to the other issues, there is no grievance of the Petitioner in regard to any procedural impropriety by the Courts below. The principal bone of the contention of the Petitioner was that the Labour Court ought to have held Respondent no.1 to be doing supervisory duties and hence Respondent no.1 was not a workman under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. I have already observed hereinabove that on appropriate appreciation of the facts and taking into consideration the evidence which has come on record, the learned Judge of the Labour Court was manifestly correct to come to the conclusion that Respondent no.1 is a workman. As regards the further contention of the Petitioner that it was a case of voluntary resignation of Respondent no.1 and that the case of Respondent no.1 that the letter of resignation was forcibly obtained from him is not proved, appears to be not correct. Perusal of the evidence which has come on record before the Labour Court clearly demonstrates that the case of Respondent no.1 of forcible resignation is no manner displaced on evidence of any nature. Moreover, it is strengthened by the fact that on the day of incident i.e. on 28.2.2005, Respondent no.1 also filed a police complaint (N.C. no. no.358 of 2005) and also thereafter approached the office of Minister of Labour and Industries vide his complaint dated 5.3.2005 and that since no action was taken, Respondent no.1 was constrained to approach the Labour Court in filing complaint under MRTU and PULP Act. It is noteworthy that nothing was brought on record on behalf of the Petitioner to show that a valid procedure was adopted in accepting the resignation of Respondent no.1, if it was alleged to be tendered voluntarily. Further the Labour Court has also rightly appreciated the document of resignation and the other letters dated 22.4.2005 and 23.4.2005, which hardly inspired any confidence to accept the Petitioner's case that the resignation was tendered by Respondent no.1 voluntarily. On a perusal of said letters, I do not find that there is any infirmity on the part of the Labour Court in reaching to the conclusion that the resignation as tendered by Respondent no.1 was not voluntary but it is a case of forceful resignation amounting to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(o o) of Industrial Disputes Act,1947 and that there is no compliance of Section 25-F of the said Act.
18. Taking into consideration the proceedings before the Labour Court and after consideration of the documentary and oral evidence as adduced by the parties, I do not find that there is any infirmity or perversity in the findings arrived by the Labour Court. The Industrial Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction has appropriately taken into consideration the facts on record and has rightly upheld the findings and the conclusion of the Labour Court and do not warrant interference of this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitution.
19. The Writ Petition therefore fails and is accordingly rejected. Rule is discharged. No order as to costs.