Prem Singh and Others Vs Govt of Nct of Delhi Through Commissioner of Police and Others - Citation 1115152 - Court Judgment

Judgment:

G. George Paracken:

1. All these five Original Applications are almost identical and, therefore, they are disposed of by this common order. Facts in them which are necessary for their adjudication are detailed hereunder:-

OA 4219/2011

The applicant is aggrieved by the impugned Annexure A-1 show cause notice dated 14.3.2011 and the impugned Annexure A-2 order dated 11.5.2011 passed by the respondents. By the aforesaid show cause notice, he was called upon to explain as to why his candidature for the post of Constable (Executive) in Delhi Police should not be cancelled. The reasons given for the same are as follows:-

âScrutiny of your Application Form and Attestation Form filled up by you revealed that you had disclosed in the relevant columns of both the forms about the facts of your involvement in criminal case FIR No.39/2007, dated 15.02.2007 U/s 143/323/341 IPC, PS Laxmangarh, Distt. Alwar (Rajasthan) in which you had been acquitted by the Court vide order dated 04.12.2009 as both the parties compromised the matter.

Accordingly, the case was examined by the Screening Committee of PHQ constituted by the Commissioner of Police, Delhi to judge the nature of your involvement in above criminal case, gravity of the offence, judgment of the court, grounds of acquittal as well as judgment dated 04.10.1996 in Civil Appeal No.13232 of 1996 (arising out of SLP (C) No.5340 of 1996) DAD Vs. Sushil Kumar. You were not found suitable for police service by the Screening Committee that on 14.02.2007 the complainant Sh. Mukesh was assaulted by Brij Lal, Shiv Lal, Kajori, Sita Ram and you along with others with sharp and blunt weapons. The victim received injuries on his person. After completion of investigation of the case a Charge Sheet U/s 323/341/325 IPC was filed by local police. Later on, during trial of the case the Honble Court vide order dated 04.12.2009 acquitted you for the offence U/s 341/323/354/379 IPC vide its order dated 18.05.2009. The Screening Committee has observed that you along with your associates armed with blunt and sharp edged weapons assaulted the complainant and caused grievous injuries to him. Though the matter was compromised but your criminal intention incapacitates the victim.â

2. The applicant has given the Annexure A-3 reply dated 22.3.2011 to the aforesaid show cause notice stating that the FIR No.39/2007 was registered against him under Sections 321/341/143 IPC but challaned under Sections 321/341/325 IPC by the local Police at Laxmangarh Police Station with ulterior motive. He has also stated that he was made accused in the said case due to enmity and he did not attack anybody as stated in the FIR. According to him, he belonged to a rural area and to a very poor family and he did not have any other source of income. He has, therefore, requested the respondents to allow him to join the post of Constable (Executive) to which he has already been selected. Further, he has stated that the various judgments have been passed by this Tribunal and the Honble High Court of Delhi making it clear that a person cannot be punished by way of denying him appointment in Government for an offence which has already been considered by the Criminal Court and acquitted him from the charge.

3. However, after considering the aforesaid reply, the competent authority did not get satisfied with it and, therefore, by the impugned Annexure A-2 order dated 11.5.2011, it held that the applicant was not found suitable for appointment for the post of Constable (Executive) Male in Delhi Police and accordingly his candidature was cancelled. The said order reads as under:-

âCandidate Prem Singh Choudhary (Roll No.422110) had applied for the post of Constable (Exe.) Male in Delhi Police during the recruitment held in 2009 (Phase-I) and selected provisionally, subject to verification of character and antecedents, medical fitness and final checking of documents etc. He was involved in criminal case FIR No.39/2007, dated 15.02.2007 U/s 143/323/341 IPC, PS Laxmangarh, Distt. Alwar (Rajasthan) in which he was acquitted by the court vide order dated 04.12.2009 as both the parties had compromised the matter. He had disclosed about the registration of above criminal case in the relevant column of Attestation Form filled up by him.

The case of candidate Prem Singh Choudhary was examined by the Screening Committee of PHQ constituted by the Commissioner of Police in the light of the attending circumstances which led to the commission of above offence, nature of offence, nature of justice, type of weapon used, grounds of acquittal, court judgment, the role of the candidate as well as judgments of Honble Supreme Court of India dated 04.10.1996 in Civil Appeal No.13231 of 1996 (arising out of SLP (C) No.5340 of 1996) DAD Vs. Sushil Kumar and dated 24.11.2010 in Civil Appeal No.9913 of 2010 (arising out of SLP (C) No.16989 of 2006) Daya Shankar Yadav Vs. Union of India and Other, he was issued Show Cause Notice vide No.3827/Rectt.Cell (R-IV)/NPL, dated 14.03.2011 proposing for cancellation of his candidature for the post of Const. (Exe.) Male in Delhi Police on account of his involvement in above mentioned criminal case. In his reply, the candidate has submitted that he was selected as a Constable in Delhi Police in the year 2009 and he was falsely implicated in case FIR No.39/2007 u/s 324/341/143 in which challan u/s 323/341/ 325 IPC was filed. Later on, the case was decided by the Honble Court and he was acquired on 04.12.2009. He further stated that the above said criminal case was registered due to revenge and he belongs to poor family and there is no other source of income for livelihood and prayed to withdraw the above said SCN with the request to allow to join the Department.

On perusal of the contents of FIR and its judgment, it reveals that Sh. Mukesh (complainant) was assaulted by candidate Prem Singh Choudhary along with Brij Lal, Shiv Lal, Kajori, Sita Ram with sharp and blunt weapons. The victim received injuries on his person. After completion of investigation of the case, a Charge Sheet U/s 323/341/325 IPC was filed by the local police. Later on, during trial of the case the Honble Court vide order dated 04.12.2009 acquitted him as both the parties had compromised the matter. He along with his associates armed with blunt and sharp edged weapons assaulted the complainant and caused grievous injuries to him. Though the matter was compromised but his criminal intention incapacitates the victim and such type of person is not suitable for appointment in a disciplined force like Delhi Police.

Therefore, on the reconsideration of the entire material on record, observations of the Screening Committee, contents of FIR and the role attributed to the candidate, he has not been found suitable for appointment to the post of Constable (Exe.) Male in Delhi Police, hence, his candidature is, hereby, cancelled.â

OA 4499/2011

4. The applicant in this OA was also a candidate for the post of Constable (Executive). He has also been served with almost identical show cause notice and order canceling his candidature on 14.3.2011 and 11.5.2011 respectively. They are reproduced as under:-

âShow cause notice

Scrutiny of your Application Form and Attestation Form filled up by you revealed that you had disclosed in the relevant columns of both the forms about the facts of your involvement in criminal case FIR No.169/2006 U/s 341/323/354/379 IPC, PS Mundawar, Distt. Dausa (Raj.) in which you had been acquitted by the Court vide order dated 18.05.2009 as both the parties compromised the matter.

Accordingly, the case was examined by the Screening Committee of PHQ constituted by the Commissioner of Police, Delhi to judge the nature of your involvement in above criminal case, gravity of the offence, judgment of the court, grounds of acquittal as well as judgment dated 04.10.1996 in Civil Appeal No.13232 of 1996 (arising out of SLP (C) No.5340 of 1996) DAD Vs. Sushil Kumar. You were not found suitable for police service by the Screening Committee on the ground that complainant Sh. Chuttan Lal Bairva reported that on 14.11.2006 at about 3:00 PM, while his wife Rajwanti Devi reming from folds, she was criminally assaulted and tried to outrage her modesty by you along with other accused namely Chet Ram and Narain. On hearing her cries, some villagers working in the nearby fields rescued her. They tried to chase the accused persons but they succeeded in fleeing from the spot. During trial of the case, the matter was compromised by both the parties, as such the Honble Court acquitted you for the offence U/s 341/323/354/379 IPC vide its order dated 18.05.2009. The Screening Committee has observed that you tried to outrage the modesty of the woman. One of the duties of policemen is to protect the life and property of public, more importantly underprivileged and weaker sections of society including the woman. Keeping in view of your conduct and criminal propensity, you cannot be entrusted with responsibility to protect the property of citizen.

Letter canceling his candidature

âCandidate Rajesh Kumar Meena (Roll No.910402) had applied for the post of Const. (Exe.) Male in Delhi Police during the recruitment held in 2009 (Phase II) and selected provisionally subject to verification of character and antecedents, medical fitness and final checking of documents. He was involved in criminal case FIR No.169/2006 U/s 341/323/354/379 IPC, PS Mundawar, I Dausa (Raj.) in which he was acquitted by the Court vide order dated 18.05.2009 as both the parties compromised the matter. He had disclosed about the registration of above criminal case in the relevant column of Application Form and Attestation Form filled up by him.

The case of candidate Rajesh Kumar Meena was examined by the Screening Committee of PHQ constituted by the Commissioner of Police in the light of the attending circumstances which led to the commission of above offence, nature of offence, nature of injuries, grounds of acquittal, the judgment, the role of the candidate as well as judgments of Honble Supreme Court of India dated 04.10.1996 in Civil Appeal No.13231 of 1996 (arising out of SLP (C) No.5340 of 1996) DAD Vs. Sushil Kumar and dated 24.11.2010 in Civil Appeal No.9913 of 2010 (arising out of SLP (C) No.16989 of 2006) Daya Shankar Yadav Vs. Union of India and Other, he was issued Show Cause Notice vide No.3851/Rectt.Cell (R-IV)/NPL, dated 14.03.2011 proposing for cancellation of his candidature for the post of Const. (Exe.) Male in Delhi Police on account of his involvement in above mentioned criminal case. In his reply, the candidate has submitted that he was falsely implicated in the above-said criminal case and allegation reg. outrage of modesty of woman had been leveled against him without any base or due to enmity whereas he has high regards for roman. Further, allegation of theft u/s 379 IPC could not be substantiated during investigation of the case and charges were framed only u/s 323/341/354 IPC. No independent witnesses except one Gopal Bairwa, who is father-in-law of the complainant, was cited as witness and it is clear from the facts the FIR lodged by the complainant was a motivated one and charges under Section 379 IPC as well as outraging the modesty of a woman were not proved. The complainant finally compromised the matter as there was no truth in the facts and also stated that in the various verdicts, it has been made clear that a person cannot be punished for offence in which he has been acquitted by the court.

On perusal of the contents of FIR and its judgment, it reveals that on 14.11.2006 at about 3:00 PM, Smt. Rajwanti Devi W/o complainant Sh. Chuttan Lal Bairva was coming from fields, she was criminally assaulted and tried to outrage her modesty by candidate Rajesh Kumar Meena along with other accused namely Chet Ram and Narain. On hearing her cries, some villagers working in the nearby fields rescued her. They tried to chase the accused persons but they succeeded in fleeing from the spot. During trial of the case, the matter was compromised by both the parties, as such the Honble Court acquitted him for the offence U/s 341/323/354/379 IPC vide its order dated 18.05.2009. He tried to outrage the modesty of the woman. One of the duties of policemen is to protect the life and property of public, more importantly underprivileged and weaker sections of society including the woman. Keeping in view of his conduct and criminal propensity, he cannot be entrusted with responsibility to protect the property of citizen.

OA 958/2012

5. The show cause notice dated 25.11.2010 in the case reads as under:-

âYou, candidate Raj Kumar (Roll No.411137) had been selected provisionally for the post of Constable (Exe.) Male in Delhi Police during the recruitment held in the year 2009, subject to satisfactory verification of character and antecedents, medical fitness and final checking of documents etc.

Scrutiny of your Application Form and Attestation Form filled up by you revealed that you had disclosed about the facts of your involvement in criminal case FIR No. 283/07 U/S 143/323/451/336 IPC, PS Shrimadho Pur, Distt. Sikar (Raj.) in which you had been acquitted by the Court vide order dated 22.05.2008.

Accordingly, the case was examined by the Screening Committee of PHQ constituted by the Commissioner of Police, Delhi to judge the nature of your involvement in above criminal case, gravity of the offence, judgment of the court, grounds of acquittal as well as judgment dated 04.10.1996 in Civil Appeal No. 13231 of 1996 (arising out of SLP(C) No.5340 of 1996) DAD Vs. Sushil Kumar. You were not found suitable for police service by the Screening Committee on the ground that on 14.10.2007, you along with other accused namely Pushkar Singh, Balbir, Hari and Purshottam and 14/15 persons forcibly entered in the house of complainant Ram Chander and assaulted with lathi, jelly and snatched jewellary of his brothers daughter-in-law and also tried to outrage her modesty. In the scuffle, the victims received injuries. After investigation a charge sheet was filed in the court and cognizance u/s 147/451/323/336 IPC was taken by the court. Later on both the parties had compromised the case u/s 451/323 IPC with the approval of the court while u/s 147/336 IPC they were tried and later on acquitted vide order dated 22.05.2008 in the absence of sufficient evidence as well as material witness did not support the prosecution story.

You candidate Raj Kumar (Roll No. 411137) are, therefore, called upon to Show Cause as to why your candidature for the post of Constable (Exe.) in Delhi Police should not be cancelled for the reasons mentioned above. Your reply, if any, should reach this office within fifteen days, failing which it will be presumed that you have nothing to say in your defense and the case will be decided ex-parte on its merit.â

6. The letter dated 22.3.2011 canceling his candidature reads as under:

On scrutiny of Application Form and Attestation Form filled up by you revealed that you had disclosed in the relevant columns of both the forms about the facts of your involvement in criminal case FIR No.283/07 U/S 143/323/451/336 IPC, PS Shrimadho Pur, Dist. Sikar (Raj.) in which you have been acquitted by the Court vide order dated 22.05.2008.

You submitted your reply stating therein that you were falsely implicated in the above said criminal case and you are totally innocent and had no connection with the alleged offence. You further added that the said FIR was an outcome of a family dispute between your father and his elder brother and an FIR 248/207 was registered by your father against the opposite party. Later, upon settlement of issues between the families, the cross cases ended into acquittal. You further pointed out that he opinion of the screening committee is erroneous and arbitrary as no finding has been given by the screening committee and there was no prudent consideration of the judgment of acquittal and the department attempted to overreach the judgment of competent judicial body. You have also cited various courts judgments/matters decided earlier with the request to withdraw the show cause notice and issue appointment order for the post of Const. (Exe.) in Delhi Police.

The plea(s) put forth by you in your reply have been considered and found not convincing because of the reasons that on 14.10.2007, you along with other accused namely Pushkar Singh, Balbir, Hari and Purshottam and 14/15 persons forcibly entered in the house of complainant Ram Chander and assaulted with lathi, jelly and snatched jewellary of his brothers daughter-in-law and also tried to outrage her modesty. In the scuffle, the victims received injuries. After investigation a charge sheet was filed in the court and cognizance u/s 147/451/323/336 IPC was taken by the court. Later on, both the parties had compromised the case u/s 451/323 IPC with the approval of the court while u/s 147/336 IPC they were tried and later on acquitted vide order dated 22.05.2008 in the absence of sufficient evidence as well as material witness did not support the prosecution story.

Therefore, on the basis of report submitted by the Screening Committee duly constituted by the Commissioner of Police, Delhi and in view of all circumstances as stated above, you have not been found suitable for appointment to the post of Constable (Exe.) Male in Delhi Police and your candidature for the post of Constable (Exe.) Male is hereby cancelled with immediate effect.â

OA 245/2012

7. The show cause notice dated 8.11.2011 in this case reads as under:-

âCandidate Ms. Deepa Tomar was selected provisionally to the post of W/Constable (Exe.) in Delhi Police-2005, subject to satisfactory verification of her character and antecedents and medical examination etc. In the Application Form and Attestation Form, she mentioned that C.N.198/2003 u/s 364 IPC P.S. Baraut, Bagpat (UP) and Case No.2352/05 were registered against her and were pending in the Court of C.J.M. Bagpat (UP). The candidature of Ms. Deepa Tomar was kept pending until the final decision. The above said case has been finalized vide judgment dated 04.05.2011 and she has been acquitted by the Court.

Her case was examined in detail by the Screening Committee constituted by the Commissioner of Police under the provisions contained in Standing Order No.398/2010 but she was not found suitable for appointment in Delhi Police by the Screening Committee. While considering the case of candidate Ms. Deepa Tomar the Committee kept in view the facts of circumstances of the criminal case and the judgement of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India dated 04.10.1996 passed in Civil Appeal No.13231 of 1996 (arising out of SLP (C) No.5340 of 1996) DAD vs. Sushil Kumar and dated 24.11.2010 in Civil Appeal No.9913 of 2010 (arising out of SLP (C) No.16989 of 2006)-Daya Shankar Yadav v. UOI and Ors.

To ensure that the police of a State is efficient, the State must ensure that each individual recruited to the police force, at whatever level, must possess good moral character and integrity. Candidate Ms. Deepa Tomar was acquitted in the case by extending benefit of doubt which cannot be said to be an honorable acquittal. Seeking employment in Delhi Police requires utmost integrity, propriety and uprightness of character. Considering the nature of offence, material on record, the Screening Committee has found that candidate Ms. Deepa Tomar is not suitable for appointment in Delhi Police.

Candidate Ms. Deepa Tomar is, therefore, called upon to show cause as to why her candidature for the post of Constable (Exe.) Female in Delhi Police-205 should not be cancelled on the above grounds. Her reply, if any, should reach the undersigned within 15 days from the date of issue of this notice, failing which it will be presumed that she has nothing to say in her defence and decision will be taken ex-parte on merits.â

8. The letter dated 30.12.2011 canceling her candidature reads as under:

âCandidate Ms. Deepa Tomar was selected provisionally to the post of W/Constable (Exe.) in Delhi Police-2005, subject to satisfactory verification of her character and antecedents and medical examination etc. In the Application Form and Attestation Form, she mentioned that C.N. 198/2003 u/s 364 IPC P. S. Baraut, Bagpat (UP) and Case No.2352/05 were registered against her and were pending in the Court of C.J.M. Bagpat (UP). The candidature of Ms. Deepa Tomar was kept pending until the final decision. The above said case has been finalized vide judgment dated 04.05.2011 and she has been acquitted by the court.

Her case was examined in detail by the Screening Committee constituted by the Commissioner of Police under the provisions in Standing Order No.398/2010 but she was not found suitable for appointment in Delhi Police by the Screening Committee. While considering the case of candidate Ms Deepa Tomar the Committee kept in view the facts of circumstances of the criminal case and the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India dated 04.10.1996 passed in Civil Appeal No.13231 of 1996 (arising out of SLP (C) No.5340 of 1996) DAD Vs. Sushil Kumar and dated 24.11.2010 in Civil Appeal No.9913 of 2010 (arising out of SLP (C) No.16989 of 2006)- Daya Shankar Yadav Vs. UOI and Ors.

A Show Cause Notice vide No.8110/Rectt.Cell (AC-IV)/ PHQ dated 09.11.2011 was issued to Ms Deepa Tomar, proposing for cancellation of her candidature for the post of Constable (Exe.) Female in Delhi Police-2005 on account of her involvement in above mentioned criminal case. She submitted her reply on 21.11.2011 stating therein that she was acquitted by the court after due consideration of all facts and evidence.

I have gone through the reply submitted by candidate Ms Deepa Tomar in response to the show cause notice but the same is devoid of merits. In the interest of justice, she was also called for personal hearing on 14.12.2011. At the time of hearing, she did not say anything except what she had already stated in her reply to the show cause notice.

Candidate Ms Deepa Tomar was acquitted in the case by extending benefit of doubt as the prosecution failed to prove the charges which cannot be said to be an honorable acquittal. It is pertinent to mention here that Shri Jitender Singh is still untraced. Seeking employment in Delhi Police requires utmost integrity, propriety and uprightness of character. On the basis of the report submitted by the Screening Committee and considering the nature of offence, material on record, the proposed Show Cause Notice is confirmed and candidature of candidate Ms Deepa Tomar(Roll No.201946) for the post of Constable (Exe.) Female in Delhi Police-2005 is, hereby, cancelled.â

OA 2503/2011

9. The show cause notice dated 8.11.2011 in this case reads as under:-

âYou, candidate Shiv Sing (Roll No.904386) had been selected provisionally for the post of Constable (Exe.) Male in Delhi Police during the recruitment held in the year 2009, subject to satisfactory verification of character and antecedents, medical fitness and final checking of documents etc.

Scrutiny of your Application Form and Attestation Form filled up by you revealed that you had disclosed about the facts of your involvement in criminal case FIR No. 410/2009 U/S 143/323/341/379 IPC, PS Sewar, Distt. Bharatpur (Rajasthan) in which you had been acquitted by the Court vide order dated 01.12.2009.

Later on, both the parties had compromised the matter and all the accused including you were required vide order dated 01.12.2009. The Screening Committee has observed that you along with your associates armed with deadly weapons criminally trespassed into the house of the complainant and assaulted the members of his family. You were involved in a case of theft and your involvement in crime shows your propensity in indulging in crime without fear of law and is therefore, not recommended for appointment as Const. (Exe.) Male in Delhi Police.

As such, you candidate Shiv Singh (Roll No. 904386) are, therefore, called upon to Show Cause as to why your candidature for the post of Constable (Exe.) in Delhi Police should not be cancelled for the reasons mentioned above. Your reply, if any, should reach this office within ten days, failing which it will be presumed that you have nothing to say in your defense and the case will be decided ex-parte on its merit.â

10. Learned counsel for the applicants in OA-4219/2011 (supra), OA-4499/2011 (supra), OA-958/2012 (supra) and OA-2503/2011, Shri Anil Singal challenged the aforesaid impugned show cause notices and the orders canceling their candidatures on the following grounds:

âthe respondents have been judgmental over the decision of the trial court which acquitted him and unless the order of acquittal contains some other insinuation or indictment, the same has to be accepted,

once the case has been compromised between the parties, the acquittal of the applicant is liable to be treated as acquittal on merits as per Section 320 Cr. PC. Therefore, the allegations of dishonesty and absence of integrity cannot be raised,

the respondents were very much aware of the aforesaid criminal case at the time of his filling up the application form and its result also. However, he was allowed to take physical, medical, written as well as interview/personality test and he was even provisionally selected. Thereafter, the denial of appointment on the ground that he was acquitted of the charge since the cases were compromised is arbitrary and illegal; and

The Apex Court, High Court of Delhi and this Tribunal allowed a number of similar cases.â

11. The learned counsel, Shri Sachin Chauhan has taken the following additional grounds in challenging the show cause notice and the order canceling the candidature of the applicant in OA-245/2012:

The show cause notice was issued without proper application of mind. While the applicants candidature was for the post of Women Constable (Executive) but the cancellation order was in respect of Constable (Executive) Female,

There is no rule in Delhi Police whereby the candidature can be cancelled on acquittal in the criminal case,

The screening committee and the respondents failed to consider that the applicant has been falsely implicated in the criminal case as the same is the offshoot of the matrimonial problem between the applicant and the family of her in-laws,

The show cause notice and cancellation order are bad in law, as they have been issued subsequent to the decision taken by the screening committee and they are issued against the principles of natural justice,

The applicant has not been supplied with a copy of the report of the screening committee despite the fact the show cause notice is based on the findings of the screening committee. It is essential for the department to supply the documents on which the reliance is placed by the department to built up their own case and further to provide opportunity to the applicant to give a defence to provide opportunity to her to give a defence in response to the allegation leveled against the applicant by providing the documents relied upon by the respondents,

The submission and pleas raised by the applicant need to be placed before the screening committee and then only a finding in relation to her suitability has to be given but the submission and pleas of the applicant have never been placed before the screening committee,

The screening committee and the respondents failed to consider the peculiar fact in the trial court judgment; and

The screening committee has totally overlooked the vital facts and the findings of the trial court within the judgment and has been swayed away by merely mentioning of the line that the applicant is entitled for benefit of doubt and on the basis of that has given a finding that the present acquittal is not honorable without considering and dealing the very important and relevant facts jotted down by the trial court within the body of the judgment and thus the finding of the screening committee is vague and without application of mind.

12. In this regard, learned counsel for the applicant, Shri Anil Singal has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana and another, (1996) 4 SCC 17. While in service, the appellant therein came to be convicted in a summary trial for the offence under Section 294 IPC (for causing annoyance to others by doing an obscene act in public or singing/reciting an obscene song in public) by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhiwani, Haryana and was ordered to pay a fine of Rs.20/-. However, he was terminated from service on the ground of his aforesaid conviction stating his services were no more required. The Section 294 of IPC reads as under:-

â294. Obscene acts and songs. âWhoever, to the annoyance of others,

(a) does any obscene act in any public place, or

(b) sings, recites or utters any obscene songs, ballad or words, in or near any public place,

shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine, or with both.â

13. The Apex Court held that a conviction under Section 294 IPC on its own would not involve moral turpitude depriving the appellant of the opportunity to serve the State. The Court further held that mere payment of fine of Rs.20/- does not amount to show that the conviction was validly and legally recorded. The Court also invited the attention of the Parliament to make provision in such plea-bargaining that punishment of fine up to a certain limit, say up to Rs.2000 or so, on a summary/ordinary conviction shall not be treated as conviction at all for any purpose and all the more for entry into and retention in government service. The relevant part of the said judgment is as under:-

â13. We had required of the respondents to produce before us the copy of the Judgment whereby the appellant was convicted for the offence. As was expected only a copy of the institution/summary register maintained by the court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhiwani was placed before us showing that the appellant on 4-6-1980 was imposed a fine of Rs.20/-. A copy of the treasury challan supporting that the fine paid was deposited by the Chief Judicial Magistrate the same day has also been produced. The copy of summary register neither discloses the substance of the allegations put to the appellant, nor the words in which the plea of guilt was entered. It is of no significance that the appellant treats himself a convict as he had pleaded guilty. Ex facie it only shows that the entry concerns F.I.R. No.231/3-6-1980 under Section 294 IPC. Therefrom it is difficult to discern the steps taken in the summary trial proceedings and what had the appellant pleaded to as guilty, whether to the allegations in the FIR or to the provision of the IPC or any other particular? Mere payment of fine of Rs.20/- does not go to show that the conviction was validly and legally recorded. Assuming that the conviction is not open to challenge at the present juncture, we cannot but deprecate the action of the respondents in having proceeded to adversely certify the character and antecedents of the appellant on the basis of the conviction per se, opining to have involved moral turpitude, without satisfying the tests laid down in the policy decision of the government. We are rather unhappy to note that all the three courts below, even when invited to judge the matter in the said perspective, went on to hold that the act/s involved in conviction under section 294 IPC per se established moral turpitude. They should have been sensitive to the changing perspectives and concepts of morality to appreciate the effect of Section 294 IPC on today's society and its standards, and its changing views of obscenity. The matter unfortunately was dealt with casually at all levels.

14. Before concluding this judgment we hereby draw attention of the Parliament to step in and perceive the large many cases which per law and public policy are tried summarily, involving thousands and thousands of people through out the country appearing before summary courts and paying small amounts of fine, more often than not, as a measure of plea-bargaining. Foremost along them being traffic, municipal and other petty offences under the India; Penal Code, mostly committed by the young and/or the inexperienced. The cruel result of a conviction of that kind and a fine of payment of a paltry sum on plea-bargaining is the end of the career, future or present, as the case may be, of that young and/or in experienced person, putting a blast to his life and his dreams. Life is too precious to be staked over a petty incident like this. Immediate remedial measures are therefore necessary in raising the toleration limits with regard to petty offences especially when tried summarily. Provision need be made that punishment of fine upto a certain limit, say upto Rs.2000/- or so, on a summary/ordinary conviction shall not be treated as conviction at all for any purpose and all the more for entry into and retention in government service. This can brook no delay, whatsoever.

15. As a result of the above discussion, we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court as also that of the two courts below and decree the suit of the appellant as prayed for, with costs.â

14. Shri Singal has also relied upon a relative recent judgment of the Apex Court in Commissioner of Police and others v. Sandeep Kumar (Civil Appeal No.1430/2007) decided on 17.3.2011. The Apex Court in the said case has been considering the case of a Head Constable (Executive) who for the first time disclosed in the attestation form that he had been involved in a criminal case with his tenant which had already been compromised and he had been acquitted. He was given a show cause notice to show cause why his candidature should not be cancelled because he concealed the fact of his involvement in the aforesaid criminal case. As the authorities were not satisfied with his explanation, it cancelled his candidature. In the said case, the Apex Court dismissed the petition filed by the Commissioner of Police and held that when the incident happened, the respondent must have been only 20 years of age and at that age young people often commits such indiscretions which can often be condoned. The relevant part of the said judgment is as under:-

âWe respectfully agree with the Delhi High Court that the cancellation of his candidature was illegal, but we wish to give our own opinion in the matter.

When the incident happened the respondent must have been about 20 years of age. At that age young people often commit indiscretions, and such indiscretions can often been condoned. After all, youth will be youth. They are not expected to behave in as mature a manner as older people. Hence, our approach should be to condone minor indiscretions made by young people rather than to brand them as criminals for the rest of their lives.

In this connection, we may refer to the character 'Jean Valjean' in Victor Hugo's novel 'Les Miserables', in which for committing a minor offence of stealing a loaf of bread for his hungry family Jean Valjean was branded as a thief for his whole life.

The modern approach should be to reform a person instead of branding him as a criminal all his life.

We may also here refer to the case of Welsh students mentioned by Lord Denning in his book 'Due Process of Law'. It appears that some students of Wales were very enthusiastic about the Welsh language and they were upset because the radio programmes were being broadcast in the English language and not in Welsh. Then came up to London and invaded the High Court. They were found guilty of contempt of court and sentenced to prison for three months by the High Court Judge. They filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals. Allowing the appeal, Lord Denning observed :-

âI come now to Mr. Watkin Powell's third point. He says that the sentences were excessive. I do not think they were excessive, at the time they were given and in the circumstances then existing. Here was a deliberate interference with the course of justice in a case which was no concern of theirs. It was necessary for the judge to show - and to show to all students everywhere - that this kind of thing cannot be tolerated. Let students demonstrate, if they please, for the causes in which they believe. Let them make their protests as they will. But they must do it by lawful means and not by unlawful. If they strike at the course of justice in this land - and I speak both for England and Wales - they strike at the roots of society itself, and they bring down that which protects them. It is only by the maintenance of law and order that they are privileged to be students and to study and live in peace. So let them support the law and not strike it down. But now what is to be done? The law has been vindicated by the sentences which the judge passed on Wednesday of last week. He has shown that law and order must be maintained, and will be maintained. But on this appeal, things are changed. These students here no longer defy the law. They have appealed to this court and shown respect for it. They have already served a week in prison. I do not think it necessary to keep them inside it any longer. These young people are no ordinary criminals. There is no violence, dishonesty or vice in them. On the contrary, there was much that we should applaud. They wish to do all they can to preserve the Welsh language. Well may they be proud of it. It is the language of the bards - of the poets and the singers - more melodious by far than our rough English tongue. On high authority, it should be equal in Wales with English. They have done wrong - very wrong - in going to the extreme they did. But, that having been shown, I think we can, and should, show mercy on them. We should permit them to go back to their studies, to their parents and continue the good course which they have so wrongly disturbed.â

[Vide : Morris Vs. Crown Office, (1970) 2 Q.B. 114 ]

In our opinion, we should display the same wisdom as displayed by Lord Denning.

As already observed above, youth often commit indiscretions, which are often condoned. It is true that in the application form the respondent did not mention that he was involved in a criminal case under Section 325/34 IPC. Probably he did not mention this out of fear that if he did so he would automatically be disqualified.

At any event, it was not such a serious offence like murder, dacoity or rape, and hence a more lenient view should be taken in the matter.

For the reasons above given, this Appeal has no force and it is dismissed. No costs.â

15. Shri Singal has further relied upon the following judgments of the Honble High Court of Delhi in the matters:Â Â Delhi Police and another v. Omveer Yadav (WP No.12899/2009) decided on 19.4.2010,

Govt. of NCT of Delhi v. Jai Prakash (WP No.3566/2010) decided on 24.5.2010,

Govt. of NCT of Delhi v. Sunil Kumar (WP No.5768/2010) decided on 27.8.2010,

Govt. of NCT of Delhi and another v. Dinesh Kumar (WP No.5510/2010 with connected petitions) decided on 11.11.2010; and

Ram Het Meena v. Union of India and others (WP No.9314/2009) decided on 15.3.2011,

Govt. of NCT of Delhi and another v. Dharam Veer Singh (WP (C) No.1694/2011 with connected petitions) decided on 15.2.2012; and

Commissioner of Police, Delhi v. Manjeet (WP (C) No.5273/2012) decided on 6.9.2012.

16. In Omveer Yadavs case (supra), the Honble High Court of Delhi considered the cases of Delhi Administration through its Chief Secretary and others v. Sushil Kumar, (1996) 11 SC 605 and R. Radhakrishnan v. Director General of Police and others, AIR 2008 SC 578. In the case of Sushil Kumar (supra), the Apex Court held that the candidates concerned were involved in cases under Sections 304, 324/34 of IPC and, therefore, the view taken by the appointing authority, in the background of the case, could not be said to be unwarranted. In R. Radhakrishnans case (supra), the petitioner therein had concealed his involvement in the criminal case. The High Court distinguished both those cases and upheld the observations of this Tribunal that though a person with stigma cannot be enrolled but an innocent person cannot be denied the right for public employment, if he has been implicated falsely and there is no incriminating material against him. The relevant part of the judgment is reproduced as under:

âThe Tribunal, however, noted that no fraud has been played by the respondent and his name was not included in the FIR, and the arrest of the respondent was almost a year after the incident of car snatching. It was also observed that had the name of the respondent been in the FIR, the facts would have been different. Reliance was also placed on the fact that at the instance of the victim/complainant that he could identify the prime accused Manoj and his accomplice, a test identification parade was conducted where the complainant had Failed to identify the respondent leading to an application being filed by the petitioners for his release on the ground that putting up the name of the respondent shall be a futile exercise and the plea of the petitioner was accepted and the Metropolitan Magistrate had released the respondent by order dated 24th November, 206. The Tribunal also noted that the case of the respondent is not where he was acquitted after the trial or by availing any benefit of doubt. The Tribunal had held that though a person with stigma cannot be enrolled, however, an innocent person cannot be denied the right for public employment if is implicated falsely and there is no incriminating material against the respondent. In the circumstances, the order of the petitioners holding that the reasons disclosed by the respondent to the show cause notice for canceling his candidature were not convincing and were without any basis and perverse was not accepted and it was set aside.

We have perused the impugned order, the petition filed by the respondent before the Tribunal, reply of the petitioners before the Tribunal and the writ petition. The learned counsel for the petitioners has also relied on (1996) 11 SCC 605 Delhi Administration and Ors. Vs. Sushil Kumar, AIR 2008 SC 578, R. RAdhakrishnan Vs. Director General of Police and Ors. in support of the petitioners - plea and contentions. Sushil Kumar (supra) was also relied by the petitioners before the Tribunal. However, it was held that in the case relied on by the petitioners, the case was under Section 304, 324/34 of IPC and the Supreme Court had held that the view taken by the appointing authority in the background of the case, could not be said to be unwarranted. The Supreme Court had held so in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. Apparently, the case relied on by the petitioner is distinguishable as in the case of the present respondent, his name was not included in the FIR, he was not arrested for almost after one year and the complainant, though stated that he could identify the accused and his associates, however, in the test identification, he had failed to identify the respondent leading to an application being filed by the petitioners for release of his name, as it was contended that putting up respondents name would be a futile exercise. Although, these facts were disclosed to the petitioners, however while passing the order dated 16th October, 2008, these facts apparently were not taken into consideration and merely on the basis that name of the respondent was disclosed by the accused Manoj Kumar, it was held that the reasons given by the respondent are not convincing. Apparently, the petitioners had passed the orders mechanically and in the circumstances, the order of the Tribunal quashing the order dated 16th October, 2008, canceling the candidature of the respondent and holding that he is not suitable for the post of constable is arbitrary and could not be sustained in law and therefore, the order of the Tribunal setting aside the same does not suffer from any illegality or such irrationality, which would require any interference by this Court.

The other case relied on by the petitioner of R. Radhakrishnan (supra) is also distinguishable as in that case, a candidate had filed an application for appointment to he post of fireman and he was provisionally selected. The candidate in the said case, in reply to a question in the application whether he had ever been convicted in any criminal case as an accused had stated that he had not been involved in any case and subsequently it had transpired that he had suppressed the material fact and consequently, his candidature was cancelled. The case of the respondent is not of suppressing of any fact and in the circumstances, the ratio of R. Radhakrishnan (supra) cannot be relied on by the petitioners. Even the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Sushil Kumar on peculiar facts and circumstances of the said case, cannot be treated to be a binding precedent.

In totality of the facts and circumstances, therefore, this Court does not find any such illegality or irregularity in the order of the Tribunal, which will require any interference by this Court with the order impugned before us. The writ petition in the facts and circumstances, is without any merit and, it is therefore, dismissed.

The parties are however, left to bear their own costs.â

17. In the case of Jai Prakash (supra), the High Court has again upheld the order of this Tribunal and held that the decision of the authorities in refusing to give appointment to the Constable concerned, despite his selection, merely because he was involved in a criminal case but acquitted much before his date of appointment and for which he has given all the information to the authorities as is required under the law, cannot be upheld. Relevant portion of the said judgment reads as under:-

â3. It was informed to the respondent that a Screening Committee constituted by the Commissioner of Police examined the gravity of the offence against the candidate and also relied upon a judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Govt. of NCT of Delhi Vs. Sushil Kumar 1996 (11) SCC 6-5 and, thus, decided to cancel the candidature of the respondent.

4. This decision was challenged by the respondent alleging that the Screening Committee was not within the jurisdiction to sit in the judgment over the matter denovo, more so when the respondent has been acquitted on merits. Reliance was placed on a judgment of Punjab and Haryana High Court reported as Bhag Singh v. Punjab and Sind Bank 2006 (1) SCT 175. It was also submitted that the decision of the petitioner had put the respondent at a great disadvantage inasmuch while waiting for his appointment in Delhi Police he had not accepted the offer of appointment as Cashier in Bank and Sub-Inspector in Railway Protection Force, which postings were offered to him. It was also submitted that the absence of any rules denying a appointment in respect of acquittal of the criminal case, shows arbitrariness as no such power was conferred on the petitioners by any statutory provision.

5. The Tribunal allowed the OA by making the following observations:-

"7. In appropriate cases, the administration, of course, has the discretion to come to bonafide finding, whether or not unsuitability for a posting especially in an organization which is to enforce law and order. An acquittal in a case, cannot, therefore, always be considered as a situation, binding hands of the prospective employer. However, we find that in the case cited before us every aspect of the situation had been discussed in detail by the criminal court. There was no evidence sufficient enough to show that the applicant had misbehaved or committed crime or offence as suggested in the FIR. But nevertheless it had been stressed that there was nothing to connect the applicant with the alleged offence. Notwithstanding to contend that applicant required to be penalized by denying him appointment appears to be arbitrary. Of course, we do not think that the Committee especially constituted for the purpose has the power to decide individual which are presented before it, but in the present instance, the issue has been approached mechanically and without due application of mind. The applicant had become undesirable for appointment not for good reason.

8. Therefore, we quash the impugned orders and direct that the applicant is to be conferred appointment. We remit the matter to the respondents so that appropriate orders are to be passed giving appointment to the applicant to the post of SI (Fix.). This should be done within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Applicant should be given seniority notionally from the date of his acquittal, namely, 5.6.2009 but he will not be entitled to any arrears of pay."

6. In another judgment delivered by the Tribunal vide its order dated 3.3.09 in OA No.2413/2008 in the case of Vivek Mathur Vs. Commissioner of Police and Anr. it was held that merely because an FIR was lodged against the applicant ipso facto cannot lead to a conclusion that the concerned person is to be considered unsuitable for public service.

7. In so far as the case of Sushil Kumar is concerned, it was not a case where the Honble Supreme Court was dealing with a situation where the candidate stood already acquitted in the criminal case and in fact that was a case where there was concealment of facts which is not so in the present case. It is also a matter of record that persons who were also in similar situation were granted appointments earlier. Therefore, the case of the respondent cannot be treated differently.

8. We may observe here that merely because a person is prosecuted in respect of any criminal offence and is acquitted of the offences so alleged against him, he cannot be disqualified for public appointment. Admittedly, there are no such rules and regulations framed by Delhi Police or by Govt. of India whereby merely criminal proceedings had been initiated against a person that he would be debarred from joining public service.

9. xx xx xx

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14. It may also be observed here that Central Administrative Tribunal in the case of Shri Anil Vs. Commissioner of Police, Police Headquarters, The Deputy Commissioner of Police (Hd. Quarters), Police Headquarters and the S.O. to CO Police Headquarters decided on 09.04.2010 has discussed the law on the subject and has summarized the legal position as follows:

22. What is discerned from the reading of the above ratio is that once, who deliberately withheld on suppression certain information, respondents are within their right to either cancel the candidature or terminate the services of the applicant, which would not be interfereable in judicial review by the Court.

23.Â However, another aspect of the matter is that the appointing authorities, more particularly in the instant case the Delhi Police, are not acting as quasi judicial authorities but are acting as administrative authorities within their domain to appoint a selectee, who has no indefeasible right of appointment. What is required for adjudging his suitability is laid down under Section 25 of the Delhi Police (Appointment and Recruitment) Rules, 1980 and the only condition precedent for such appointment is that on attestation form if something is disclosed, the person should be found to have born a good moral character and there is nothing pending against him.

24. Mere involvement in a criminal case or registration of FIR is not a proof of involvement in a riminal case unless the trial court, which is the only competent form to record a finding as to the guilt of an accused in a criminal offence, delivers the verdict holding one guilty of the offences. The decision in Ghurey Lal (supra) where the Apex Court ruled that once the findings of the trial courts are based on fundamental principles of the criminal jurisprudence, the acquittal is a presumption of one being innocent.

25. Insofar as the benefit of doubt and hostility of witnesses are concerned, these are the aspects, which will not be material or relevant to record a finding by the administrative authorities as to involvement of the person in criminal activity or his being guilty of committing the crime. What is allowed to the administrative authorities is to adjudge the suitability of a person but not in a manner that whatever recorded on judicial side by the court of criminal jurisdiction should be overreached and overridden by taking a definite view or reading between the lines in the judgment to arrive at a finding of guilt. It is trite in law that if the acquittal by a trial court is not challenged by the prosecution in higher forum by making an appeal against the acquittal, the decision of the trial court acquitting the accused stands final and cannot be questioned or interpreted otherwise by administrative authority, which is coram non judice in the circumstances."

15.Â In the case of Ghurey Lal Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2008) 10 SCC 450, the Apex Court has held that the accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. The trial courts acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. On proper analysis of the ratio and findings of this case, it is revealed that the findings of the trial court are based on the fundamental principles of the criminal jurisprudence. Presumption of innocence in favour of the accused further gets reinforced and strengthened by the acquittal of the trial court. Due or proper weight and consideration must be given to the trial courts decision.

16. Thus, taking into consideration the legal position as enunciated above, the decision of the authorities in having refused to give the respondent employment despite his selection merely because he was involved in a criminal case though he was acquitted much before his date of appointment and for which he had given all the information to the authorities as is required under the law, cannot be held and therefore, the decision of the Tribunal in allowing the OA cannot be faulted within in any manner whatsoever. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed with no order as to costs."

18.Â In the case of Sunil Kumar (supra), the Honble High Court has held that with reference to the latest amendments in the Criminal Procedure Code and emphasis on plea bargaining and concept of summary trials, it is desirable to evolve clear guidelines on the subject. Further, according to the High Court, it would be the duty of the Court to consider on case to case basis as to which brush with criminal law would disentitle the person concerned to public employment notwithstanding that the person has been acquitted. The following part of the said judgment is relevant and it is reproduced as under:-

â5. On 25.08.2010, deciding W.P. (C) 2068/2010 Govt. of NCT Delhi and Anr. Vs. Robin Singh, we had an occasion to visit the area pertaining to when should brush with criminal law disentitle a citizen of this country to enter public service.

6. Pertaining to the Police force, we had noted that apart from physical fitness and medical fitness, emotional maturity, good judgment, ability to handle situation, good moral character and integrity were attributes which must be possessed by an individual. We had noted that of all these characteristics the test to which candidates are subjected are limited to physical strength and medical fitness as also good moral character and integrity. We found that the last attribute was being measured in a most archaic manner by simply looking at the fact whether a person was an accused in a particular FIR. We had noted that this archaic system was inherited from the British Raj ignoring that the purpose of governance then was to rule and the purpose of governance now is to serve. With reference to the offences under the Penal Code noting that they can broadly be classified as felonies and misdemeanors, we had analyzed that offences were treated of higher and lower degree under the Penal Code with reference to the fact that some of them carrying mandatory sentences and some of them carrying none. We had noted the classification of offences into bailable and non-bailable category as also cognizable and non-cognizable categories. We had noted the deliberations at an All India Seminar on Correctional Service held at New Delhi in March 1969 where it was emphasized that it was time to lay down guidelines pertaining to problem of rehabilitation of ex-convicts with emphasis on the need for their employment under the Government. We had noted that only the State of Haryana had issued an Office Memorandum dated 02.02.1973 listing such offences which were to be treated as grave and serious and involving moral turpitude thereby disentitling the persons convicted for such offences to be given public employment. With reference to the latest amendments in the Criminal Procedure Code and emphasis on plea bargaining and concept of summary trials, we had noted that it is desirable to evolve clear guidelines on the subject. Till the Executive spoke we held that it would be the duty of the Court to consider on case to case basis as to which brush with criminal law would disentitle the person concerned to public employment notwithstanding that the person has been acquitted.

7. The said decision pertaining to a case where the aggrieved person was charged for punishable under Section 323/504 and 506 IPC. We had held in his favour.

8. In the instant case the brush which the respondent had was with a charge for offences punishable under Section 323/506 IPC. He has been acquitted.

9. It would be of interest to note that the respondent in W.P. (C) 2068/2010 was also applying for the post of S.I. (Executive). We had noted that the place where such a candidate would be working would not on the street and not with arms. The person concerned would be doing office job.â

19.Â In the case of Dinesh Kumar (supra), the High Court has held that the gravamen of the allegation constituting the act committed by the respondent which was treated as voluntarily causing hurt was not known. What was the nature of insult heaped upon the complainant which attracted the offence punishable under Section 504 IPC and what was the act which attracted the crime of criminal intimidation is also not known. But from a trinity of the three i.e. the alleged offence punishable under Section 323 IPC, Section 504 IPC and Section 506 IPC, it can be safely presumed that the allegation against the respondent was of abusing the complainant and threatening to beat him followed by simple beating. All those offences are non-cognizable and needless to state that they are bailable. No moral turpitude, as generically understood, was involved. The acts did not shock the moral conscious of the society and with reference to the motive do not evidence a person with depraved character. Therefore, the offences were not of the kind which would justify dismissal or removal from service, if the respondent had committed the same if in service. The other relevant part of the said judgment is as under:-

â16.In the decision reported as 171 (2010) DLT 705 Government of NCT of Delhi and Anr. vs. Robin Singh, a co-ordinate Bench of this Court of which one of us namely Pradeep Nandrajog, J. was a member of, had visited the law on the subject and answered the question: Whether a conviction by Competent Court of Law would justify non-grant of public appointment. Needless to state, the corollary to the question answered would be whether a person charged of having committed a penal offence, but acquitted after trial or due to a compromise would be disentitled for public employment.

17.Â The decision notes that in jurisprudence abroad. With respect of public employment relatable to police service, apart from attributes, emotional maturity and ability to remain calm in emotionally charged situations, apart from good moral character and integrity, are determined with reference to scientifically conducted screening processes. It was noted that in India the archaic system of police verification is still being adopted. It was noted that not to induct a person with a criminal background in public service is based on the premise that considerations of public policy, concern for public interest, regard for public good, would justify such a prohibition. Thus, the primary consideration was. Whether public interest/public good would be jeopardized if a person with a criminal background is inducted in public service.â

20.Â In Ram Het Meenas case (supra), the petitioner successfully cleared the selection process for appointment as a Constable-Driver under CISF but on account of being convicted for an offence punishable under Section 336 IPC, he was let off on probation. While disposing of the said writ petition, the High Court directed the respondent-CISF to reconsider his candidature in the light of the law laid down in Robin Singhs case. The relevant part of the said judgment is as under:-

â4.Â We may note that the petitioner did not suppress any information when he applied for the job. Filling up the application form he truthfully disclosed that he was prosecuted in a Criminal Court and when asked to clarify as to the nature of the prosecution he truthfully disclosed his being convicted and being let off on probation. He enclosed a copy of the judicial verdict.

5. We highlight that it is not a case where the petitioner suppressed the truth or tried to hide relevant facts which had a bearing on his character verification.

6. One the issue whether any kind of brush with the process of the criminal law resulted in a conviction should render a citizen of this country ineligible for public employment on the ground that a brush with criminal law is indicative of immoral character or a character which renders a person ineligible for public employment or renders it undesirable to induct said person in public employment, in the decision reported as 171 (2010) DLT 705 (DB) Government of NCT of Delhi and Anr. Vs. Robin Singh. In paras 16 to 38 it was observed as under:-

16. It is no doubt true that police plays an essential role of enforcement of law and order in modern societies. Without an efficient police force, a society would become anarchic. To ensure that the police force of a state is efficient, the state must ensure that each individual recruited to the police force, at whatever level, must possess the following attributes:-

(a) Physical Strength and fitness/Free from medical diseases.

(b) Emotional maturity, and ability to remain calm in emotionally charged situations.

(d) Good moral character and integrity.

(e) The ability to carry a great deal of responsibility in handling difficult situations alone/ dependability.

(f) Good Judgment

17. Keeping in view the above attributes, which are the minimum required of a person who becomes a member of the police force, it becomes the duty of the State to carefully screen the candidates with reference to the aforesaid attributes. But, what we find in India is that the only screening done is with respect to the moral character and integrity, physical strength and free from medical disease. Evidenced by the instant case, the first attribute is sought to be verified by archaic means i.e. checking on the police dossiers or relying upon information provided by the candidate himself and the second, of physical strength, by subjecting the candidates to a physical test, and of being free from medical disease by conducting the medical examination. No evaluation pertaining to the emotional maturity, ability to remain calm in emotionally charged situations, ability to handle difficult situations and be responsive and the ability of initiative in work is conducted.

18. We find that in some jurisdictions abroad, such as United States of America, Canada, Philippines, to name a few, a psychological test is conducted to ascertain the suitability of candidates commensurate to the nature of job they are being inducted to. At times a polygraph test is also conducted to check the deceiving tendencies of candidates. Because so much public trust is placed in peace officers, candidates for these positions are carefully screened to rule out emotional instability, poor judgment, lack of dependability, or other problems which might negatively affect their law enforcement work.

19. A criminal record is a record of a person's criminal history, generally used by potential employers to assess the candidates trustworthiness. The information included in a criminal record varies between countries and even between jurisdictions within a country. In most cases it lists all non-expunged criminal offenses and may also include traffic offenses such as speeding and drunk-driving. In some countries the record is limited to actual convictions (where the individual has pleaded guilty or been declared guilty by a qualified court) while in others it also includes arrests, charges dismissed, charges pending and even charges of which the individual has been acquitted. The latter policy is often argued to be a human rights violation since it works contrary to the presumption of innocence by exposing people to discrimination on the basis of unproven allegations.

20. It is unfortunate that in India we are not marching ahead in the comity of nations and prefer to be governed by the recruitment processes which are a legacy of the British era; ignoring that the purpose of governance then was to rule and the purpose of governance now is to serve.

21. We have prefaced our decision with the statement whether pendency of a criminal proceeding or for that matter a conviction by a competent court of law may justify eyebrows to be raised, but would it justify the shutting of ones eye?

22. Now, a man can be booked for the offence of over-speeding and perhaps may be convicted for parking his motor vehicle in a non-parking area. Would this man be of a character, compelling in public interest and for public good, not to induct him in public service? The answer would be in the negative. As against that, a man has committed murder or has broken into a departmental store and stolen cash. Would this man be of a character, compelling in public interest and for public good, not to induct him in public service. The answer would be in the affirmative.

23. Not to induct persons with a criminal background in public service, is based on the premise that considerations of public policy, concern for public interest, regard for public good would justify a prohibition. Thus, the primary consideration is, whether public interest and public good would be jeopardized if a person with a criminal background is inducted in public service. And this takes us straight to the core of the issue, whether brush with penal law would justify the eyes to be closed against the offender or only such brush with penal law which is of a higher degree of criminality. If the answer is in the negative, the further question: what should be the higher degree of criminality which would justify the eyes being shut to such person needs to be addressed.

24. With respect to the first two examples given by us in para 22 above, none would argue that for such trivial offences the eyes must be shut against the offender, and with regard to the next two, everybody would agree that the eyes should be shut to such a person who has to be ignored. We concede that the examples are in the extreme, but they certainly help us in understanding as to the process of reasoning required to be adopted to decide as to on which side of the border-line a case would fall.

25. A look at the penal laws in India would show that most of the penal offences can be categorized under two broad categories i.e. felony and misdemeanour. A further look at the sections stipulating penalties would show that felonies are treated as more grave vis-Ã -vis misdemeanours. Further, by classifying offences as cognizable and non-cognizable, higher and lower degrees of criminality to the offences can be discerned. Further, by classifying offences as bailable and non-bailable, the degree of criminality can be further discerned.

26. The civil concept of an offence being of a depraving character is to look at whether the act complained of suffers from the tag of a moral turpitude or not.

27. We do not intend to make a catalog of reported decisions as to what misdemeanours should normally attract the penalty of removal or dismissal from service. We may simply state that with respect to conviction for grave and serious offences alone, on the anvil of public interest and for public good, Courts have held that the offender has rendered himself unfit to continue in office and in extreme cases summary dismissal or removal from service by invoking Article 311 of the Constitution is also held justified.

28. Thus, we have a guideline of serious and grave offences being the touchstone in case of the door being shown to the government servant.

29. Looking through the prism of case law pertaining to when can the door be shown to a government servant and by doing reverse engineering we can safely say that what is good for the door to be shown, is good for prohibiting entry through the door, and thus while denying public employment with respect to the offence committed by a person, it can be said, and we say so, that it may be a serious violation of the constitutional right of a citizen to be fairly treated in the matter of public employment if trivial offences committed by the citizen would justify the State shutting its eyes and denying employment.

30. Having answered the question posed in para 1 above, and the answer being in favour of the citizen, we need to answer the further question as to which offences or brush therewith, would justify non entry into public service.

31. We have a clue; of offences being grave, serious and involving a moral turpitude justifying public employment not being given. These would certainly not justify the offender being inducted into public service. None would disagree that convicted and fined for parking a car in a no-parking area or convicted for over-speeding would attract the de minimis principle, but the problem would be in cases closer to the borderline. For therein would lie the problem as to in which side of the boundary line should they be categorized.

32. It is unfortunate that in India, the Government does not come out with white papers of the deliberations at various seminars, but we find a reference made to the âAll India Seminar on Correctional Service - held at New Delhi in March 1969, to consider and lay guidelines pertaining to the problem of rehabilitation of ex-convicts, with emphasis on the need for their employment under the government. Vide OM dated 2.2.1973, No.6857-GSI-72-2755, the State of Haryana has listed the penal offences which have been treated as grave, serious and involving moral turpitude. The said OM lists the under-noted penal offences as grave, serious and involving moral turpitude, disentitling the convict to public employment;â

33. We are a little surprised at the list as it excludes offences such as promoting enmity or doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of harmony i.e. offences punishable under Section 153-A IPC. It excludes offences pertaining to mutiny and its abetment i.e. offences under Sections 131 to 136 IPC. But we do not comment. However, what we find is, the common thread of including all offences against women and such offences which are punishable with imprisonment for life as also imprisonment for a term exceeding three years and above. We get a clue. Offences which do not carry a mandatory sentence of imprisonment and it to be imprisoned the term is less than 3 years and the offender can be let off with payment of fine, are not included in the said list. It is an undisputed fact that there are no rules to guide the authorities in Delhi Police as to in what cases despite acquittal, the person can be kept out of service or can be deprived of employment.

34. That apart, as generically understood, offences involving moral turpitude can be classified with reference to the act being one which shocks the moral conscience of the society in general and this can be determined with reference to the motive of the offender i.e. whether the motive which led to the act was a base one or alternatively whether on account of the act having been committed the perpetrator could be considered to be of a depraved character or a person who was to be looked down upon by the society.

35. Today, with plea bargaining being a well-recognized facet of the administration of criminal law and a part of criminal jurisprudence in India, we do perceive a large number of cases involving thousands and thousands throughout the country, appearing before the Summary Courts and paying small amounts of fine, more often than not, as a measure of plea bargaining. Foremost would be amongst them petty crimes committed mostly by the young and/or the inexperienced. Some may even undergo a petty sentence of imprisonment of a week or ten days. We may also notice that Section 302 Cr.P.C. prescribes for taking note of compoundable offences at the instance of the complainant itself and there are cases where compounding can take place with the permission of the Court.

36. Life is too precious to be staked over petty incidents and the cruel result of conviction for petty offences being the end of the career, the future and the present, of young and inexperienced persons cannot blast their life and their dreams.

37. In a growing democracy, where the systems are failing and the weak and the downtrodden are hardly given the opportunity to sharpen their intellect thereby diminishing the ability of their consciousness to act as a mirror to their acts and actions, it is high time that the executive brings into place a policy where summary/ordinary conviction should not be treated as a conviction for entry or retention in government service.

38. Till then, it would be the duty of the Court to interpret the law by harmonizing human sufferings and human wants, delinquencies and criminal tendencies; conscious of the fact that passengers on Spaceship Earth are the rich and the poor, the needy and the well-off, the hungry and the well-fed, the educated and the uneducated. The need of the hour is to understand that criminals are not born and are not irredeemable brutes. Crime may be a disease but not the criminal, who are a kind of psychic patients and to understand, that anti-social maladies are mostly the result of social imbalances. It must be remembered that on the one hand, social stresses, for various reasons, explosively mount in the real worlds hard environs and the harsh remedy of heartless incarceration and ouster from society deepens the criminality. The swing of the pendulum to the humanist side requires respect for the worth of personhood and the right of every man and woman in its residual human essence.â

7. In the said decision, a person convicted of offences punishable under Section 323/504/506 IPC was held not rendered ineligible for public employment.

8. Accordingly, we dispose of the writ petition quashing the order dated 13.1.2009 and issue a direction to the respondents to reconsider the candidature of the petitioner in light of the law laid down in Robin Singhs case (supra), relevant parts whereof have been extracted extensively hereinabove.

9. Necessary decision would be communicated to the petitioner within four weeks from today and further action would be taken by the parties as per the said decision. 10. No costs.â

21.Â In the case of Manjeet (supra), the relevant facts were as under:-

The respondent has applied for recruitment to the post of Constable (Exe.) Male pursuant to an advertisement published by the Delhi Police in the year 2009. Consequent upon his application respondents name was provisionally selected for the said post subject to verification of his antecedents and medical fitness etc. The respondent had disclosed both in the application and the attestation form about his alleged involvement in a criminal case registered vide FIR No.104 dated 25.07.2002 under Sections 148/149/323/427/506 of IPC at Police Station- Kanina, District Mahendergarh, Haryana. The respondent further disclosed that he had been acquitted of the criminal charges by virtue of the judgment dated 28.05.2007 passed by the Trial Court. Since the respondent had disclosed about his alleged involvement in the said criminal case, the petitioner referred the matter to the Screening Committee for the purpose of determining suitability of the respondent for appointment to the post of Constable in Delhi Police. But the Screening Committee, after taking into consideration the charges levelled against the respondent in the said FIR, declared him unfit for appointment. The Screening Committee came to this conclusion only on the basis of the allegation made in the FIR and the story of the prosecution before the Trial Court. There was no independent material before the Screening Committee apart from the above for ascertaining antecedents of the respondent therein. Thus the Screening Committee arrived at its conclusion solely on the basis of the said FIR against the respondent. Consequently, a show cause notice dated 14.03.2011 was served upon the respondent calling upon him to explain the reasons as to why his candidature to the post of Constable be not cancelled. In the reply, the respondent submitted that he had been duly acquitted of all the criminal charges and, therefore, no reason subsisted with the petitioner to cancel his candidature. However, the petitioner was not satisfied with the reply of the respondent and cancelled the candidature of the respondent by virtue of the order dated 11.05.2011.

22.Â The Tribunal allowed the aforesaid OA and its operative part as under:

âWe find the impugned order (11.05.2011) passed in this case is similar to several cases which have been dealt with by us, wherein bare minimum facts emanating from the prosecution version are stated, a cryptic mention of the reply filed by the candidate concerned is reproduced, and by accepting the prosecution version as gospel truth, the order of cancellation of candidature of the candidate is passed.â

23.Â The High Court also dismissed the writ petition filed against the aforesaid order and held as under:-

â8.Â In the present case, it is relevant to note that the respondent was tried on the basis of the allegation, as made by the prosecution, that on 22.07.2001, one Amar Singh and Sajjan Singh while working as driver and conductor of bus No.HR 66-0339 were allegedly attacked by the respondent and other miscreants. According to the allegations the respondent and the other miscreants broke the window panes of the bus and also hit the driver on whose complaint the said FIR was registered. It was further alleged that when the complainant raised an alarm and the respondent along with others fled from the site and one bag containing Rs.35,000/- was found missing from the bus.

9.Â During the trial of the case, none of the material witnesses deposed in tune with the prosecution version and they were thus declared hostile. Subsequently, the respondent as well as the other accused persons were acquitted of all the criminal charges by virtue of the judgement dated 28.05.2007. As observed above the primary reason which resulted in acquittal of the respondent was the fact that the witnesses produced by the prosecution did not support the story put forth by the prosecution. Hence, the acquittal granted by the Trial Court could not be said to be acquittal on technical grounds as the acquittal was pronounced by the Trial Court concerned after conducting a full-fledged trial and after examination of all the witnesses produced by the prosecution.

10.Â The issue raised in the present petition is no longer res integra. The decision in Devender Kumar Yadav vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi and Anr., WP(C) No.8731/2011, dated 30.03.2012, in which one of us, namely, Badar Durrez Ahmed, J. was a member of, can be cited with profit. In this case, candidature of a candidate was cancelled due to his alleged involvement in two FIRs. One FIR was under Section 325/506 IPC and the other FIR was under Section 323/325/34 IPC. It has been held that:-

â12. Such acquittals, where the material witnesses are produced during trial, but, they do not support the case of the prosecution, to our mind cannot be said to be technical acquittals. We cannot accept the contention that only a case, where the accused is acquitted despite material witnesses supporting the case of the prosecution on merits, would be a case of acquittal other than technical acquittal. We cannot presume that a witness, who does not support the case of the prosecution is necessarily doing so in collusion with the accused, in order to save him from punishment, despite his actually having committed the offence, with the commission of which he is charged. It may be true in some cases, but may not necessarily be so in each case. What has to be seen in such cases is as to whether the material witnesses were examined or not. If they are examined, but do not support the prosecution and consequently it is held that the charge against the accused does not stand proved, that would not be a case of technical acquittal. We would like to note here that no independent inquiry was held by the respondents to verify the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations which were made against the petitioner in the FIRs that were registered against him.

The Screening Committee which considered the case of the petitioner had no material before it which could give rise to an inference that the petitioner had actually committed the offences for which he had been prosecuted. As noted earlier, there is a presumption of innocence attached to an accused in a criminal case and the onus is on the prosecution to prove the charges leveled against him. Acquittal of the accused, after trial, only strengthens and reinforces the statutory presumption, which is otherwise available to him. We, therefore, hold that the view taken by the Screening Committee was not based on some legally admissible material and therefore cannot be sustained in law.â

11. In Commissioner of Police and Anr vs. Ramanuj Upadhyay, WP(C) No.3926/2012, decided on 09.07.2012, this Court following its decision in Devender Kumar Yadavs case (supra) came to the following conclusion:-

â8. It is obvious from the facts as indicated above that the sole reason as to why the respondents candidature has been cancelled was the fact that his name found mention in the said FIR. We have, time and again, reiterated that once a person has been acquitted in a criminal case, the factum of his name being mentioned in FIR cannot stand in the way of his employment with the Delhi Police. Here, we find that although the respondent had been clearly acquitted after a full fledged trial by the Trial Court, the petitioner still took into account the fact that his name has been mentioned in the FIR and concluded that, he had been involved in the alleged incident. This course of conduct is clearly untenable. It was open for the Screening Committee and for that matter the petitioner to have rejected the candidature of the petitioner on some other valid ground based on some other inquiries made by them but they could not have cancelled the candidature of the respondent solely on the ground that the petitioners name found mentioned in the said FIR which culminated in an acquittal by the criminal court.â

12. In view of the foregoing discussion and the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that the judgment of the Tribunal cannot be found fault with.

13. It is observed that the petitioners decision of cancelling the candidature of the respondent was based exclusively on the contents of the said FIR registered against him. The petitioner did not even conduct an independent enquiry so as to ascertain the character of the respondent and cancelled the candidature of the latter by merely relying on the contents of the said FIR and the prosecution story. The petitioner also failed to grant due weightage to the tender age of the respondent at the time of the commission of the alleged offence as also the fact that seven years had elapsed between the alleged incident and time of the application of the respondent for the post of Constable. The action of the petitioner in this behalf is clearly untenable. The reasoning of the petitioner, that just because the name of the respondent figured in an FIR his candidature is liable to be cancelled, cannot be sustained in law.

14. Resultantly, the writ petition is devoid of merit and is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.â

24.Â The applicant has further relied upon the Orders of this Tribunal in Anoop Kumar v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi and another (OA-178/2008) decided on 23.7.2008, Samraj Singh v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi and another (OA-153/2009) decided on 8.12.2009, Mandeep v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi and another (OA-2540/2011) decided on 20.1.2012 and Shani Kumar v. Commissioner of Police and another (OA-1821/2011) decided on 24.1.2012. In all the aforesaid OAs, the decision of the Screening Committee of the respondents to cancel the candidature of the candidate based on the allegations made against the candidate concerned in FIR has been quashed and set aside by this Tribunal.

25.Â In Anoop Kumars case (supra), the applicant therein was a candidate for the post of Constable in Delhi Police. He filled up his application form on 24.3.2006 clearly disclosing that a criminal case FIR No.526/04 u/s 308/325/34 IPC was registered against him and pending trial. He was provisionally selected having qualified the physical, medical, written examination as well as interview/personality test. While those who successfully competed for the post of constable were being appointed, the applicant therein, however, received a show cause notice dated 11.12.2007 for cancellation of his candidature on the ground that he was acquitted of the charge since witnesses turned hostile, and that it was not an honourable acquittal. The applicant in the aforesaid case responded to the show cause notice vide his reply dated 26.12.2007, and as the same was not found convincing, his candidature was cancelled vide order dated 8.1.2008. It is this order that has been called in question in the aforesaid Original Application filed by him under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. After detailed discussion, this Tribunal, vide order dated 23.7.2008, allowed the aforesaid OA with its operative part as under:-

â7.Â We have heard the learned counsel representing the parties and with their assistance examined the records of the case. From the judgment of acquittal recorded by the learned ASJ, New Delhi dated 24.8.2007 (Annexure A-3), it would appear that the applicant along with one Vikas was tried for offences u/s 308/325/34 IPC. Bittoo Singh, the first informant, on 8.8.2004 while lodging the FIR, stated that on 5.8.2004 he had gone to Central School, Sector 8, R. K. Puram at 1.30 pm to pick up his grandsons Manish Sagar and Piyush Sagar and when he left for his house along with both his grandsons and reached outside the school gate on service road at 1.40 pm, a motorcycle No. DL 49 SK 9393 on which there were two boys and two more boys who were near them started abusing him and also told him that his grandson had beaten up their brother few days ago. They also declared âaaj tujhe hum dekhengeâ. He further told the police that one boy namely Vikas was also present there who was studying along with Piyush Sagar and had beaten him up many days ago. He suspected Vikas to have called those four boys outside the school who caught hold of him and grappled with him. In the meantime, Bittoo Singhs nephew Jaipal Singh also reached there who had come to pick up his nephew from school and when he saw that those boys were quarreling with him, he tried to rescue him and was also beaten by the boys. Two of those boys, namely, Ajay and Vikas were armed with dandas and one of the other two boys grappled with him and the fourth boy grappled with Jaipal. The boys, namely, Anoop (the applicant herein) and Vikas attacked them with dandas and both of them sustained injuries. He further informed that he could identify both the boys who grappled with both of them. The material witnesses, it appears from the judgment, turned hostile. The learned trial judge, while acquitting both the accused observed as follows:

âIn view of the testimony of PW1 to PW5 there is no incriminating evidence on record against both the accused persons that they had picked up quarrel with the injured and caused injuries on their person. Hence their statement u/s 313 CrPC is dispensed with. They are acquitted of the charges. The bail bonds stand discharged.â

We are surprised, rather distressed that even though it has been ordained authoritatively by judicial pronouncement that the nature of offence and the manner of acquittal has to be examined properly, the respondents appear to have ignored both. Denial of appointment to a citizen for all times to come is indeed a serious matter. The same cannot be dealt with so lightly so as not even to consider the attending circumstances leading to commission of crime, nature of offence that may appear from the contents of the first information report, statements of witnesses and the medical evidence. While considering the manner of acquittal, it may not be enough to simply observe that the witnesses had turned hostile, and by simply so observing, to deny appointment to a citizen. The judgment of the criminal court has to be taken into consideration with all the aspects leading to acquittal. The manner of acquittal, and in particular, as to whether the same is a clean acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt, has also to be taken into consideration. To elaborate, insofar as, the nature of offence is concerned, we may mention that some times the facts disclosed in the FIR supported with other material, even if taken to be gospel truth, may not constitute an offence under which an FIR is registered, challan presented and the accused tried. In a case of acquittal, where witnesses have not deposed in tune with the statements made by them before the police, the finding of acquittal is recorded without going into any other aspect of the case. If thus in a given case, the offence with which an accused is charged and tried, may not at all be gone into, his plea that the offence with which he was charged was not made out at all even from reading of the FIR and attending circumstances, has to be gone into at some stage. Making a mention of the offence with which a person might have been charged and put to trial is no way to determine the nature of offence. We are of the considered view that nature of offence is not exclusively determinable only on the label or sections on which an FIR may be registered. With a view to find gravity of offence for which a person may have faced criminal trial, the narration of facts in the FIR, supporting material and the medical evidence is required to be taken into consideration. Insofar as, the manner of acquittal is concerned, once again, the judgment of the criminal court has to be carefully gone into. In a given case, the witnesses may not have deposed in tune with their statements made before the police, but they may not have been declared hostile and cross-examined by public prosecutor. Such a situation arises when the prosecution witnesses may support the prosecution version to some extent and the public prosecutor may think that to the extent they have supported prosecution version, the finding of conviction can yet be recorded. He may thus not declare the witnesses to be hostile nor thus cross-examine them. In ultimate analysis, as to whether the accused has been acquitted by giving benefit of doubt or it is a case of clean acquittal, has also to be seen. In the present case, the narration of facts given in the FIR would reveal that four persons, including the applicant gave beatings to Bittoo Singh and Jaipal. Only two, out of four, were put to trial. In the FIR itself, Bittoo Singh appears to have made contradictory statements. In the first instance, he stated that two boys who were armed with dandas were Ajay and Vikas, whereas others had only grappled. He, however, later named the applicant as also one of those who had caused injuries to him. With a view to satisfy ourselves with regard to gravity of offence, we required the counsel representing the parties to produce before us the medico legal report of Bittoo Singh and Jaipal. The same has been made available to us. It appears that Bittoo Singh, the first informant, had received five injuries on his person. Two of the five injuries are swelling of lower wrist and right eye. Even though, two other injuries are of vertex of head and occipital front region, but all the five injuries are simple in nature. Jaipal, the other injured received four injuries, but for injury number (iii) which is âone incisor teeth on lower maxilla broken, other injuries are simple in nature. It is only injury number (iii) on the person of Jaipal which can be said to have brought the offence under section 325 IPC. The provisions contained in section 308 IPC may not have been attracted in the facts and circumstances of the present case. We are conscious that we are not here to determine the controversy with regard to nature of offence, but surely, all these aspects were required to be taken into consideration by the concerned authorities in finding out the nature of offence. The situation where the criminal court may record a finding of conviction is entirely different. The concerned authorities in that event would have no choice but for to follow the judgment of the criminal court, but in a case where the relevant aspects of the case have not even been touched upon, it becomes duty of the high ranking police officers to take them into consideration while dealing with a serious matter like denial of appointment to a citizen. We may reiterate that the Honble Delhi High Court in Deepak Kumar and Others (supra) held that the nature of offence and manner of acquittal has to be gone into properly. Further, the concerned authorities have to find out if the offence alleged against a person involves moral turpitude and that the same is heinous, grave and committed with such evil propensities that he may not deserve to be appointed. Simply observing the provisions of IPC with which a person may be charged and tried, does not appear to be sufficient compliance of the directions issued by the Honble High Court. The observations made above would be more pertinent if the offence with which a person is charged and tried under the sections that might have been mentioned in the FIR may not appear to be so serious. To illustrate, whereas, it may be permissible to hold the nature of offence to be serious when a person is tried under sections 302, 376 and such other offences, the same may not be true when a person is not charged with such serious offences as mentioned above.

8.Â On the findings, as mentioned above, we would have normally remitted this case to the concerned authorities to have a fresh look at the matter in view of our observations made above, but what we find from the records is that in similar circumstances, the respondents employed one Brahm Prakash who too was involved in a case u/s 308 IPC. The applicant made such a mention in his reply to the show cause. He has reiterated the same in para 5.7 of the OA, which reads as follows:

â5.7 Because the respondent failed to appreciate that in the present recruitment Sh. Brahm Prakash having Roll No.4000076 was also involved in a criminal case under S 308 IPC and acquitted of the charge by the Court as the matter was compromised by both the parties and witnesses did not support the prosecution case, was appointed as a constable, but the applicant was discriminated and arbitrarily his candidature was cancelled.â

In the corresponding paragraph of the counter reply, the fact stated in the pleadings of the OA, as mentioned above, has not been denied. All that has been mentioned is that each and every case is decided after considering all facts of the case like ground of involvement, gravity of offence and acquittal etc. It may be mentioned at this stage that this Tribunal while deciding OA Nos.2429/2006 and connected OAs (supra) was dealing with different cases, some of which were such which came to this Tribunal in a second round of litigation. The OAs initially filed by them were allowed by this Tribunal by holding that an acquittal is an acquittal and the mere fact that a person has been acquitted by giving benefit of doubt when the witnesses turn hostile, would not make any difference. This view of the tribunal did not find favour with the Division Bench of the Honble Delhi High Court, and all the matters were remitted to the Commissioner of Police to find out the nature of offences and the manner of acquittal, and accordingly pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. While defending the order of the Tribunal, the applicants had urged before the Honble High Court that there was clear and apparent discrimination even in the decision making process of the respondents as in some cases they had cancelled the candidature of few persons on the ground that they were not suitable for the post of constable, whereas in cases of some other similarly situated persons, against whom also there were criminal cases, the respondents had taken a decision to allow them to join and work as constable in the same police department. In support of the said contention, cases of Rajesh Kumar and Braham Pal were referred. Braham Pal, it was urged, was involved in a criminal case u/s 308 IPC and was acquitted of the charge by the court pursuant to compromise arrived at between the parties and as the witnesses did not support the prosecution case, and he was allowed to work as constable. On the aforesaid contention raised by the applicants, while remitting the case to the Commissioner of Police, the Honble High Court also observed that in some other cases the Commissioner of Police had allowed the applicants to join the post considering the gravity of the offence wherein they were involved. One of the aspects that had thus to be considered by the Commissioner of Police was to find out whether a person similarly situate to an applicant was appointed or not. This aspect of the case we have also referred to in our judgment in Sanjeev Kumar and Others (supra). There is absolutely no dispute that a person similarly situated has since been appointed. The applicant may not be right in saying that Braham Prakash was a candidate along with him, as it appears he competed in selection process held earlier, but nonetheless, there were no distinguishing features between the nature of offence and the manner of acquittal in his case and that of the applicant. This plea was specifically raised by the applicant and surely, as the respondents had no answer to the same, they just kept quiet over it. The learned counsel representing the applicant has relied upon a decision of this Tribunal in OA No.1495/2007 decided on 7.1.2008 in the matter of Virender Singh v Union of India and Others. The applicant therein was involved in a criminal case for offence u/s 308/34 IPC, and yet this Tribunal had directed the respondents to consider his candidature without taking into consideration his involvement in the criminal case, but the same appears to be distinguishable on facts. Acquittal in the said case was a clean acquittal. It was not a case of witnesses turning hostile and further, when the offence was said to have been committed, the applicant therein was a minor and had made application for appointment as constable after eight years of the incident. It is true that we have held in the case aforesaid that offence u/s 308 IPC is an attempt to commit culpable homicide not amounting to murder, maximum sentence prescribed for which is seven years, and it is not a heinous crime. The applicant, it appears, has been meted out with discriminatory treatment. The respondents cannot be permitted to have different yardsticks for different people. They have to have a uniform view when the facts presented before them are absolutely identical.

9.Â In view of the discussion made above, this Application is allowed. Direction is issued to the respondents to offer appointment to the applicant for the post of constable, if he may otherwise be entitled to. In other words, the appointment to the applicant would not be denied on the ground of his involvement in a criminal case. There shall be no order as to costs.â

26. In Samraj Singhs case (supra), the respondents therein invited application from the suitable candidates through newspaper advertisement dated 22.9.2006 for the recruitment of Constable (Driver) in Delhi Police under Rule 17-A (XX) of the Delhi Police (Appointment and Recruitment) Rules, 1980. The applicant therein submitted his Application Form (No.1236) on 09.10.2006. He, with Roll No.200528, was declared provisionally selected subject to satisfactory verification report of his character and antecedents. He filed the Attestation Form on 22.11.2007. His character and antecedents were got verified through District Magistrate, Buland Shahar (UP). As per verification report dated 31.12.2007, the applicant therein was found involved in 2 criminal cases viz. (i) FIR No.684/99, dated 28.10.1999, U/S 307/506 IPC in PS Kotwali Nagar, Buland Shahar (U.P.) and (ii) FIR No.465 dated 06.10.2003, U/S 323/341/506/34 IPC in PS. Darya Ganj, Delhi. Briefly, it is noted that in one case he was involved for committing the offence of attacking on the complainant with knife and Katta (country made revolver) and in other case he has manhandled the complainant. The said cases were decided on 27.03.2002 and 23.12.2007 respectively and the applicant therein was acquitted of the charges. The respondents on scrutiny of the Application and Attestation Forms found that the applicant in the said case had disclosed about his involvement in the above mentioned cases. It was the case of the applicant therein that in case of the FIR No.684/99 he has been acquitted of the charge vide judgment dated 27.03.2002 and in FIR No.465/2003, the matter has been settled amicably between the parties and he feels that the acquittal in both cases is honourable. But the respondents came to a different conclusion. The Commissioner of Police, Delhi (Respondent-1) therein constituted a Committee consisting of Joint Commissioner of Police/Headquarters as Chairman, Dy. Commissioner of Police/Vigilance and Legal Advisor to Commissioner of Police, Delhi as members to examine the cases of candidate who disclosed their involvement in the Application Form as well as Attestation Form. The Committee also examined the applicants cases keeping in view various instructions issued by Police Headquarters on the subject and judgment dated 04.10.1996 passed by the Honble Supreme Court of India in a Civil Appeal No.13231 of 1996 [arising out of SLP(C) No.5340 of 1996] DAD v. Sushil Kumar [Delhi Administration v. Sushil Kumar, 1996 (11) SCC 605] and found the applicant therein not suitable for the post of Constable (Driver) in Delhi Police. A Show Cause Notice proposing the cancellation of his candidature for the post of Constable (Driver) in Delhi Police was issued to him vide No.58877/Rectt.Cell (AC-II)/PHQ, dated 01.09.2008 to which the applicant therein submitted his reply on 15.09.2008. The Appointing Authority granted personal hearing to the applicant on 31.10.2008. The applicant therein did not say anything more than what he had already stated in his reply to the Show Cause Notice. Therefore, considering the reply, the proposed Show Cause Notice was confirmed and candidature of the applicant for the post of Constable (Driver) in Delhi Police was cancelled vide letter No.62110/Rectt. Cell/(AC-II)/PHQ, dated 14.11.2008 (Annexure-A/2). Being aggrieved, the applicant therein has filed the OA. While allowing the said OA, this Tribunal has held as under:-

â6. Having gone through the judgments passed in both the cases, we also went through the reply given by the Applicant to the Show Cause Notice issued to him dated 1.09.2008. It is also appropriate for us to take the extract of certain relevant paragraphs of the said reply which the Respondents should have considered before declaring the Applicant not suitable for the post of Constable (Driver). Those paragraphs are extracted below :-

â8. That in this context, it is submitted that I was wrongly implicated in the said case. Even the FIR was against unknown person and I have been a victim of ill-luck to have been falsely implicated in the said case due to some misunderstanding. Since the complainant understood and woke up to the miseries of a wrongly implicated person, and rose to the occasion and helped us in getting the offence compounded. Compounding of offence was the only preferred resort as it was the only short-cut available under law to get rid off the long protracted trial otherwise, I being innocent would definitely had been acquitted even after a full fledged trial. The delay in conclusion which could not be afforded as I was expecting my selection and appointment in Delhi Police. To avoid delay in appointment, the compounding was resorted to.

9. That it is not out of place to mention here that Lok Adalats have been constituted for disposal of cases in a summary way and through the process of arbitration and settlement between the parties, expeditiously and with lessor costs. It is a conciliatory agency to make justice quicker and less expensive. Lok Adalats have been constituted to secure that the operation of the legal system promotes justice.

In this background, the order of Lok Adalat cannot be given a demeaning construction to propose cancellation of candidature holding that the acquittal is not honourable since it was a settlement. The very purpose of holding Lok-Adalats is to promote justice and if the orders of Lok-Adalats are taken adverse while adjuding suitability for appointment, it will be demeaning to the entire system of Lok Adalat.

Even Traffic Unit of Delhi Police organizes Lok Adalats where the alleged traffic violation are settled. The alleged violator does not enter into any trial and at the same time gets himself rid from the challan by being benefited from the summary disposal of the alleged violation, though he may not be the real violator or even the alleged violation be false.

Therefore, to propose or to conclude that the proceedings in Lok-Adalat have any kind of reflection whatsoever, on the suitability to hold a post in Govt. is absolutely contrary to the Scheme, objectives and system of Lok-Adalat.

Thus, the conciliation arrived at in Lok Adalat does not stand in the way of applicants appointment.â

7. The impugned order refers to the Honble Supreme Court judgment in Sushil Kumars case (supra). The facts and circumstances in that case reveals that there had been concealment of facts of his involvement in a criminal case and cancellation of his appointment was done on the basis of the concealment of his involvements in a case where offences were alleged to have been committed U/S 304 read with 324 and 34 of IPC; and the appointment was received by him on deceitful means and such criminal cases were detected by the Competent Authority while verifying the character and antecedents through the concerned authorities. In that background the Honble Supreme Court upheld the cancellation of candidature. The facts and circumstances of the case in the present OA is far different from one which the impugned order dated 1.09.2008 relied upon. Each case for appointment is different from the other. While considering the Applicants case, neither the Committee nor the Appointing Authority has paid adequate attention to the reply given by the Applicant. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the judgment of Honble Supreme Court in Sushil Kumars case (supra) is not to be relied upon by the Respondents in deciding the case of the Applicant.

8. Having gone through these facts and the reply furnished by the Applicant to the Respondents, we come to the considered conclusion that the Respondents have not properly analysed the case of the Applicant and have erred in canceling the candidature of the Applicant. We also find that the Applicant has very forcefully made out a case in his support.

9. In the result, we quash and set aside the Show Cause Notice dated 1.09.2008 (Annexure-1) and the order of the Respondents dated 14.11.2008 (Annexure-2). We remit the matter of the Applicant to the Respondent-1 with direction to pass appropriate order for appointment of the Applicant to the post of Constable (Driver). This should be carried out within a period of 8 weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. He should be assigned position just above the person ranked below him in the Select List. He will be entitled to appropriate fixation of pay but not to any arrears, arising out of such exercises.

10.With the above directions, the OA is allowed. No costs.â

27. In the case of Mandeep (supra), the applicant, desiring to be a Constable in Delhi Police esponded to an advertisement issued in 2009 to fill up 6302 vacancies for the post of Constable (Exe.) Male and applied for the said post under OBC category. He was put through Physical Endurance and Measurement Test, Written Test and was declared provisionally selected against Roll No.928371, subject to verification of character and antecedents, medical fitness and final checking of documents etc. He was got medically examined and declared fit. The character and antecedents of the applicant therein were got verified from the authority concerned which revealed that he was involved in two criminal cases (i) FIR No.137 dated 24.06.2005 under Section 147/148/149/336/341/323/451 of the IPC and (ii) FIR No.235, dated 20.09.2005 under Section 341/323 of the IPC both cases registered at Police Station, Chirawa, Distt. Jhunjhunu, Rajasthan. The Trial Court acquitted him vide order dated 14.7.2005 and 05.05.2010 respectively. The respondents therein on scrutiny of Application and Attestation Forms found that he had disclosed the facts of his involvement in the above said two criminal cases in the relevant columns of the attestation form. Accordingly, the case of the applicant in the said case was examined by the Screening Committee constituted for this purpose to examine the circumstances which led to the commission of above offences, nature of offences, grounds of acquittal, judgment of the Trial Court and the role of the candidate. The Screening Committee observed that applicant was involved in two criminal cases wherein he had assaulted the complainants with deadly weapons causing injuries to them. He was found involved in violent act and has no respect for law. In a disciplined force, a person of such temperament is not suitable for appointment in a Delhi Police, as such the Committee did not recommend his case for appointment to the post of Constable (Exe.) Male in Delhi Police. Therefore, the applicant therein was issued a Show Cause Notice vide Office Memo dated 14.03.2011 proposing cancellation of his candidature for the said post to which he submitted his reply on 22.3.2011. The applicants grounds in the aforesaid case were considered along with relevant records and the respondents did not find the same convincing. Thus, in view of the observation made by the Screening Committee he was found not suitable for the post of Constable (Exe.) Male in Delhi Police and his candidature for the said post was cancelled by Memo dated 11.05.2011. Feeling aggrieved, the applicant therein approached this Tribunal in assailing (i) the said order 11.5.2011 and (ii) the Show Cause Notice dated 14.3.2011. He has also prayed to direct the respondents to issue letter of appointment to him to the post of Constable (Exe.) with all consequential benefits. The OA was allowed with the following relevant part:

â4. Having heard the contentions of the parties, with the help of the counsel, we perused the pleadings and relied on judgments. The controversy for our consideration is whether the applicant is to be considered for appointment to the post of Constable (Exe.) Male in Delhi Police?

5. At this stage, we may refer to both the criminal cases to find out the nature of offence and the acquittal ordered by the Trial Court. The 1st criminal case i.e. FIR No.137 dated 24.06.2005 was registered on the complaint of Shri Chand, who reported that on 23.06.2005 accused persons namely, Ramji Lal, Dhanpat, Mange Lal, Babu Lal, Rajender, Ravi Pal, Sandeep etc. blocked the way of his land in a planned way by dropping some soil. They abused complainant and Rattan Singh and tried to kill them. A Panchayat was held on the incident and at that time the applicant along with other accused, all of a sudden assaulted the complainant with lathis, stones and barchhi and caused injuries to the complainant. The Trial Court vide its order dated 14.07.2005 acquitted all the accused including the applicant charged under Section 148/336 of IPC in the absence of proper evidence and under Section 451/149/323 of the IPC due to compromise between both the parties.

6. Further, the second criminal case i.e. FIR No.235 dated 20.09.2005 under Section 341/232 of the IPC was registered on the complaint of Shri Swarup Singh, who reported that on 19.09.2005 at about 8.30 p.m. his brother Satayavir was returning from the fields and near Gidania, he was assaulted with lathi by Hawa Singh and the applicant along with others and caused several injuries to him. When the complainant reached at the spot, the applicant fled away from the spot. The injured was admitted at Chirawa Hospital. The Trial Court vide order dated 05.05.2010 acquitted him along with others for offence under Section 325/323/341 of the IPC due to compromise between both the parties.

7. The acquittal of the applicant is partly on the prosecution failed to prove its case, and partly the complainant and applicant entered into compromise. The Trial Court has acquitted him in both cases. Hence, the applicant cannot be put to a blame worthy position. A stand was taken by the respondents that the applicant was acquitted partly due to the compromise reached between the parties, and as such the acquittal is not honourable. Therefore, respondents found him unsuitable for the post of Constable. This stand was contested by the counsel for the applicant on the plea that compounding of offences granted by the Trial Court is acquittal under Section 320 of Cr.PC. We have carefully considered this issue. It is noted that the Sub Section 8 of Section 320 envisages that âa composition of an offence under this Section shall have the effect of an acquittal of the accused with whom the offence has been compounded.â In this regard law is well settled. The Honble Apex Court in Khursheed and Another Versus State of UP [2007-12-SCC-68] has laid the ratio as follows :

â15. Sub-section (8) of Section 320 states that the composition of offence under the section shall have an effect of acquittal of the accused with whom the offence has been compounded. The resultant effect of compounding of offences would be that the accused should be acquitted. In other words, once the offences have been compounded and the requisite permission is granted by the Court, the accused must be acquitted.â

In view of the above, we are of the considered view that the applicant was honourably acquitted in both criminal cases.

8. We are surprised that even though the judicial pronouncements in both criminal cases have gone in favour of the applicant as he has been acquitted, denial of appointment to him for all times to come is really a serious matter. We have very carefully examined the facts of the case in both FIRs, leading to commission of the alleged crimes, nature of offences and we are of the considered view that those do not appear to be so serious or grave or heinous offences for which the applicant can be branded as a criminal for all times to come and prevented employment.

9. A careful study of the facts in Sushil Kumars case (supra) relied on by the respondents in their impugned order, would reveal that the Honble Supreme Court was considering a case where the candidate did not stand acquitted and the fact of the case was that the candidate concealed in his application and attestation forms about his involvement in a criminal case. In present case, facts are far different. the applicant has disclosed both FIRs in the Attestation Form and Application Form. This cannot be called as concealment. Further, the applicant has been acquitted in both criminal cases. In the case of Ghurey Lal Versus State of Uttar Pradesh [2008-10-SCC-450] the Honble Apex Court has held that the accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. The Trial Court judgment acquitting the applicant has, therefore, held him as innocent. Non-consideration of the said fact of acquittal and relying more on the allegations/complaints in the FIR though held not proved, the applicant has been denied his legitimate claim to be appointed to the post of Constable (Exe.) Male in Delhi Police. We do not find adequate and convincing reasons behind the stand taken by the respondents.

10. We may, now, refer to some of the latest judgments in the subject which have guided us in the instant OA. In Sandeep Kumars case (supra) Honble Supreme Court considered the facts of the case and noted that Sandeep Kumar at the relevant time was young, he concealed his involvement in a criminal case under Section 325/34 of IPC which resulted in Sandeep Kumars acquittal. While holding the cancellation of Sandeep Kumars provisional selection as illegal and relying on Morris Versus Crown Office [1970-2-QB-114] observed that young people often commit indiscretions and such indiscretions have often been condoned. Youth will be youth; they are not expected to behave in a manner as older people do and minor discretions committed by young people should be condoned rather than to brand as criminals for the rest of their lives. Recently, the Honble High Court of Delhi considered a case similar to the present OA and following the judgment of Apex Court in Sandeep Kumars case (supra), High Court in the matter of Rajesh Kumar Versus Commissioner of Police and Another [WP(C) No.8223/2011 decided on 22.11.2011] has allowed the Writ Petition and quashed this Tribunal order and inter alia observed in the following manner :-

â7. The hard reality cannot also be lost sight of. A disclosure of the FIR even if leading to acquittal, invariably leads to rejection of the application. The applicants thus cannot be blamed for shying away from making such disclosure and/or from indulging in concealment for fear of rejection at the threshold only without even having any opportunity to explain. We may in this regard also notice that the âPolicy For Deciding Cases of Candidates Provisionally Selected in Delhi Police, Involved in Criminal Cases (Facing Trial or Acquitted)â has been framed vide Standing Order No.398/2010 dated 23.11.2010. The said Policy also provides that even where the disclosure has not been made in the application form and the facts are discovered on verification, the case is required to be referred to the Screening Committee to assess suitability for appointment. The concept of minor offences and/or offences not involving moral turpitude has also been evolved. The same indicates that the respondents have themselves accepted the judgment of the Apex Court in Sandeep Kumar (supra). The Tribunal has thus erred in ignoring the dicta in Sandeep Kumar and in blindly following the earlier judgments in Daya Shankar Yadav and Ram Ratan Yadav (supra) when the judgment in Sandeep Kumar was an advancement in law.â

Following the dicta of Honble Supreme Court in Sandeep Kumars case (supra) and that of High Court in Rajesh Kumars case (supra), the Full Bench of this Tribunal in OA No.2602/2011 decided on 14.12.2011 to follow the said law.

11. Taking into consideration the totality of facts and circumstances of the case; guided by the trite law as stated above and for the reasons stated within, the applicant succeeds in his case. On the basis of above reasoning, we would have normally remitted this case to the concerned authorities to have a fresh look in view of our observations made above, but what we find in the OA is that the applicants case relates to the year 2009 and considerable time has passed and those selected then are already in position. On two important grounds we do not intend the case to be remitted back to the respondents but to decide the OA in a conclusive manner. (1) It is well settled position in law, as laid by High Court of Delhi and Supreme Court that young people commit indiscretions which being minor in nature can be condoned rather than to brand them as criminals for the rest of their lives and have quashed orders of the respondents with directions to offer appointments in Delhi Police. The present case fits into the above decision of the Apex Court. (2) The respondents have offered appointments to many similarly circumstanced candidates.

12. In terms of our above orders and directions, the OA, having merits, is allowed. No costs.

13. Resultantly, for the above reasons the impugned order dated 11.05.2011 is quashed. The respondents are directed to issue offer of appointment to the applicant for the post of Constable (Exe.) Male in Delhi Police, if he is otherwise eligible. Consequently, the applicant will be entitled to his seniority as per his rank in the relevant seniority list but he will not be entitled to any back wages. Let the directions and orders as ordained above be complied with as expeditiously as possible but not later than nine weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order.â

28. In Shani Kumars case (supra), the candidature of the applicant as Constable (Exe) was cancelled by the respondents. He had admittedly made mention of his involvement in a criminal case, both in his application as well as attestation forms. He cleared all the tests. However, a show cause notice came to be issued to the applicant on 03.03.2011 proposing to cancel his candidature. The applicant therein responded to the same vide his reply dated 14.03.2011, but, as mentioned above, his candidature had been cancelled vide order dated 22.02.2011. It appeared that after selection of the applicant on the post of Constable (Exe.), the matter went before the screening committee which opined in consideration of the facts of the case that it would not be desirable to appoint the applicant in Delhi Police. The facts on which the applicant was involved in the criminal case, as mentioned in the show cause notice, were that on complaint of one Yoginder, when he along with his brother Upender was sitting on Chabutra outside the house of Sukhdev on 19.05.2007 at about 7.30 p.m., noticed the applicant therein along with Ankit, Cheenu and Ram Bhajan coming on two motorcycles towards village side. He recognized the applicant and others as they all belonged to his village. The applicant in the aforesaid case and other accused abused, threatened and opened fire at his brother Upender, who sustained bullet injuries on his thigh. He raised alarm, and on seeing some villagers, the applicant along with others fled away from the spot on the motorcycles. Upender was taken to Government Hospital, Shamli. The complainant further mentioned that all the accused were dreaded criminals and had murdered six persons of the village on 14.10.2004, and requested to take legal action against them being absconding criminals. It was further mentioned in the show cause notice that both the material witnesses turned hostile and did not depose in tune with the prosecution version, and as such all the accused, including the applicant therein, were acquitted by the court vide order dated 14.05.2010 by extending benefit of doubt. The committee observed that the applicant along with others was found involved in a case of attempt to murder with deadly weapons and caused bullet injuries to the brother of the complainant, and that he along with others apparently managed acquittal, as due to their dreaded acts, no one dared to depose against them, and that such type of person is unfit for police service. The applicant in his reply stated that he was falsely implicated in the criminal case, and acquitted after a full-fledged trial, and that he could not be made to suffer in the matter of appointment only because an FIR was registered against him, when he was not at fault. He further stated that the court of competent jurisdiction, while acquitting him, returned specific finding that the prosecution had failed to prove its case, and that from the deposition of prosecution witnesses, it was evident that he had no role in the crime. In the impugned order, the explanation furnished by the applicant had been rejected by observing that the plea(s) put forth by him in the reply had been considered and found not convincing. Hence, allowing the aforesaid OA, this Tribunal held as under:-

â4.Â We have heard the learned counsel representing the parties and with their assistance examined the records of the case. It is admitted position that the present is not a case of concealment of facts. The applicant, as mentioned above, had mentioned his involvement in the criminal case, and that he had been acquitted. It is in consideration of the nature of his involvement and gravity of the offence, as also the manner of acquittal, that the applicant has been found unfit to be appointed as a Constable in Delhi Police. We may mention at the very outset that if the witnesses may not support the prosecution case and may be declared to be hostile and cross examined as well, it may be taken, at the most, that the acquittal is not by returning a finding of not guilty, and the benefit of doubt may have been given, but surely, in such an event the prosecution version cannot be taken as a gospel truth. We may only mention at this stage that perusal of the judgment recorded by the learned trial court would reveal that the witnesses have supported the prosecution case except the identity of the accused, when they were declared hostile and cross examined by the public prosecutor. It is rather strange to note that even when there was no evidence whatsoever either recorded before the criminal court or available with the department from any relevant material as regards the allegations made against the applicant by the complainant of the criminal case that the applicant and others were desperate persons and killed six persons earlier, how such a fact was taken into consideration in judging suitability of the applicant for appointment on the post of Constable. Further, the respondents, it appears, had not even taken into consideration in its right perspective the prosecution version, as originally laid, emanating from the complaint of Yoginder. It may be recalled that even if one was to go by his statement in its entirety, he had not made mention of any previous enmity. He had in fact made no allegations as regards the motive that may have actuated the applicant and others to resort to firing. In the circumstances, therefore, it had to be taken that there was no previous enmity, and that being so, it could be a sudden affair. It is no doubt true that the applicant is stated to have abused and threatened the brother of the complainant, but, as mentioned above, there is no mention of any motive on the part of the applicant. Further, it is not known even from the statement of Yoginder as made before the police, as to who resorted to firing. The respondents would not even like to examine the nature of injuries suffered by the only person. It may be, however, mentioned that one person sustained injury on his thigh, but what was the nature of the injury, is not known. It has not been even mentioned in the judgment passed by the learned judge who tried the offence against the applicant and others. It has not been examined as to whether the injuries were result of assault by a fire arm or not. Further, there was no evidence either before the criminal court or from any other source that the witnesses had not deposed out of fear of the applicant. We are of the firm view that such extenuating circumstances which existed on records were not taken into account at all, and further that such facts were considered for which there was no evidence either before the criminal court or any material before the respondents. We may only refer to one judgment recorded by the Honble High Court of Delhi in WP(C) No.5510/2010 in the matter of Government of NCT of Delhi and another v Dinesh Kumar, decided on 11.11.2010, along wit another writ petition bearing WP(C) No.5527/2010 in the matter of Government of NCT of Delhi v Subhash Chand. The facts of one of the cases disposed of by the High Court revealed that the respondent therein was an accused in an FIR u/s 307/323/324/34 IPC. There were two other co-accused, and all were acquitted vide judgment and order dated 15.09.2008. As per the FIR which was lodged by the injured complainant, the incident took place after the complainant and the accused were returning to the village after attending a marriage ceremony, and had some dispute pertaining to someone not dancing during the marriage processions onwards journey to the house of the bride. It was apparent that the friends had fought. Wile dealing with the case aforesaid, the High Court observed as follows:

â20. As regards Dinesh Kumar, we note that the FIR did relate to an offence punishable under Section 307 IPC. But in the absence of any evidence as to which out of the three accused had assaulted the person who received grievous injuries and noting that Section 34 IPC was taken aid of to make liable all three accused, noting that the acquittal was on merits, no doubt two witnesses turned hostile, further, noting the young age of Dinesh Kumar, applying the law laid down in Robin Singhs case (supra), we are of the opinion that the impugned decision of the Tribunal which has directed the petitioner to give employment to Dinesh Kumar needs no interference.â

In the present case, as mentioned above, it is not known as to who out of the four accused, opened fire, injuring the brother of the complainant. The nature of injuries is also not known. It is not even known as to whether the injury was grievous or simple, and as a matter of fact, could be by fire arm. Admittedly, it is on a non-vital part of the body. The applicant in this case would also be young.

5. Finding considerable merit in this Original Application, we allow the same. Order dated 22.03.2011 cancelling the candidature of the applicant for the post of Constable in Delhi Police is quashed and set aside, with direction to the respondents to offer appointment to the applicant as expeditiously as possible, and definitely within a period of six weeks from receipt of this order. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.â

29. The Honble High Court of Delhi, vide judgment dated 21.5.2012 in WP (C) No.3015/2012, upheld the aforesaid order with its operative part as under:-

â5. We feel that once the respondent had been acquitted after examination of all the witnesses, the complaint and all the contents of the FIR could be looked into for the purposes of cancelling the candidature of the respondent. This is not a case of technical acquittal in the sense that witnesses had not coming forward where the material witnesses had died etc. Hence, there was an acquittal after a full-fledged trial. The prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.

6. Furthermore, the petitioners have also not conducted any independent inquiry with regard to the other antecedents of the respondent to assess his suitability for the position of Constable (Executive) in the Delhi Police. What we find is that the order dated 22.03.2011 denies the benefit of appointment to the respondent on the basis of the very same allegations contained in the FIR which could not be substantiated in a court of law. That would, in our view, be highly unfair apart from the fact that such a stand has no backing of law.

7. We have in several similar cases, accepted similar views taken by the Tribunal. Two of them being:-

(i)Â Government of NCT of Delhi and another v. Dinesh Kumar: W.P.(C) 5527/2010 decided on 11.11.2010;

(ii) Government of NCT of Delhi v. Subhash Chand: W.P.(C) 5527/2010 also decided on 11.11.2010.

8. As a result, the writ petition has no merit and the same is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.â

30.Â Learned counsel for the respondents, Shri B N P Pathak, on the other hand, relied upon the following judgments of the Honble High Court of Delhi:

Commissioner of Police v. Shri Rakesh Kumar (WP (C) No.23323/2005) decided on 22.8.2008,

Mahesh Dahiya v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi and another (WP (C) No.6145/2010), decided on 10.4.2010,

ii) Gokul Ram Meena v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi and others (WP (C) No.8620/2010) decided on 13.1.2011,

iii) Sanjeev Kumar v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi and others (WP (C) No.5782/2011) decided on 11.8.2011,

iv) Commissioner of Police v. Ranvir Singh (WP (C) No.6518/2011) decided on 20.12.2011,

v) Govt. of NCT and Delhi and another v. Daulat Ram (WP (C) No.734/2012) decided on 10.2.2012,

vi) Govt. of NCT of Delhi and another v. Dharam Veer Singh (WP (C) No.1694/2011 with connected petitions) decided on 15.2.2012; and

vii)Â Commissioner of Police and others v. Sandeep (WP (C) No.2848/2012) decided on 15.5.2012.

31.Â In the case of Rakesh Kumar (supra), the petitioner was assailing the order dated 25.8.2005 by which this Tribunal has quashed the order of cancellation of the candidature of the Respondent therein for the post of Constable and has directed the Petitioner therein to consider the Respondent for appointment from the due date when his juniors were appointed with consequential benefits. The relevant paragraph of the said judgment is as under:

â6.Â The Tribunal has passed the impugned order as on the sole ground that the Respondent had voluntarily disclosed the involvement in a criminal case at the second stage. The Tribunal relied upon the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Police, Delhi vs. Dhaval Singh - (1999) 1 SCC 246. However, the learned Tribunal did not consider the fact that the Respondent was involved in heinous crime of

âmoral turpitude was involved and his acquittal had been because the injured and the eye witness turned hostile and therefore, the Respondent was not found suitable for the post of Constable in Delhi Police.â

7. In the case of Delhi Administration v. Sushil Kumar (1996) 11 SCC 605, the Respondent therein was selected as Constable. However, on verification it was found that the Respondent was involved in a criminal case under Section 304/324/34 IPC. Though the respondent was discharged/acquitted in the criminal case, the Honble Supreme Court upheld the cancellation of his candidature. It was held as under:

âIt is seen that verification of the character and antecedents is one of the important criteria to test whether the selected candidate is suitable to a post under the State. Though he was found physically fit, passed the written test and interview and was provisionally selected, on account of his antecedent record, the appointing authority found it not desirable to appoint a person of such record as a Constable to the disciplined force. The view taken by the appointing authority in the background of the case cannot be said to be unwarranted. The Tribunal, therefore, was wholly unjustified in giving the direction for reconsideration of his case. Though he was discharged or acquitted of the criminal offences, the same has nothing to do with the question. What would be relevant is the conduct or character of the candidate to be appointed to a service and not the actual result thereof. If the actual result happened to be in a particular way, the law will take care of the consequences. The consideration relevant to the case is of the antecedents of the candidate. Appointing authority, therefore, has rightly focused this aspect and found it not desirable to appoint him to the service.â

32.Â In the case of Mahesh Dahiya (supra), âthe petitioner successfully cleared the selection process and was provisionally selected as a Constable (Driver) in the Delhi Police during the recruitment process in the year 2006 but appointment was deferred pending character and antecedents verification report which brought out that the petitioner and two other persons were co-accused in FIR No.100/2001 P.S. Khajori for having committed offences punishable under Section 363/ 364A/506/34 IPC, of which charges the petitioner was exonerated by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge in his judgment pronounced on 23.08.2002 in session trial No.14/2001â. The respondents rejected his candidature after giving him an opportunity to be heard through a show cause notice, vide order dated 4.5.2009. The petitioner successfully challenged the said order before this Tribunal in OA-1642/2009 (supra) but it was also dismissed vide order dated 21.4.2010. The High Court considered the following facts in the case.â

â2. The petitioner successfully cleared the selection process and was provisionally selected as a Constable (Driver) in the Delhi Police during the recruitment process in the year 2006 but appointment was deferred pending character and antecedents verification report which report brought out that the petitioner and two other persons were co-accused in FIR No.100/2001 P.S. Khajori for having committed offences punishable under Section 363/364A/506/34 IPC, of which charges the petitioner was exonerated by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge when judgment was pronounced on 23.08.2002 in session trial No.14/2001.

3. The decision reveals that the petitioner Mahesh Dahiya as also co-accused Mohan Singh and Manoj were charged with having kidnapped a minor girl aged 13 years and had demanded ransom for her release. The decision shows that the process of law commenced when the victim Lalita, aged 13 years left her house to purchase ration at about 5.00 PM on 18.01.2001 and did not return home. Her family members searched her and on not finding her and receiving ransom calls over the telephone, her father made a statement which was recorded by the Duty Officer and FIR registered pursuant thereto. Ransom was demanded in sum of Rs.1,00,000/- under threat that the victim would be killed. At the place desired by the kidnappers where ransom amount had to be paid, raiding party consisting of Police officers apprehended petitioner Mahesh and Manoj when they took the briefcase from the hand of Deepak, brother of the victim. Recovery memos were prepared at the spot as also the arrest memos. Pursuant to the disclosure statements made by the petitioner and co-accused Manoj the victim was recovered from Dehradun and her statement was recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. as per which she indicted the three accused. The third accused Mohan Singh was arrested. The Police found out that co-accused Mohan Singh had stayed with the victim at a guest house called Almorah Bhawan, Haridwar from which hotel a register containing an entry pertaining to the stay of Mohan Singh and a girl child was seized.

4. At the trial the victim, her father and her brother turned hostile. They did not support the case of the prosecution. But, the father and brother of the victim admitted their signatures on the memos prepared when the petitioner and co-accused Manoj were apprehended. Bachan Singh examined as PW-14 and Umesh Chand examined as PW-15, the manager and the owner respectively of Almorah Bhawan, Haridwar deposed of Mohan Singh staying in their hotel with a girl on the night of 18th and 19th May, 2001, but did not identify the victim as the girl in question. The decision by the learned Addl. Session Judge makes no mention of the learned Magistrate who recorded the victims statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. and thus we presume that the Magistrate concerned was not examined. In respect of her statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. the victim stated that she made the statement at the behest of the Police. We note that the various Police officers associated with the investigation supported the case of the prosecution and in particular the factum of the petitioner and Manoj being apprehended when they took possession of the bag handed over to them by Deepak as containing the ransom money.

5. Suffice would it be to state that since the victim, her father and brother turned hostile, the learned Trial Judge acquitted the three accused. The learned Trial Judge has not considered it relevant to discuss the reminder of the evidence, i.e. the testimony of the various Police officers.

6. The question which arises is, whether the petitioner would be entitled to serve as a Driver Constable with the Delhi Police.â

33. The answer given by the High Court was in the negative. The relevant part of the said judgment is as under:-

â11. Our reasons for so holding is that the acquittal of the petitioner is on account of the principal players i.e. the star witnesses of the prosecution turning hostile. But, there is enough residual evidence which throws negative light upon the petitioner. We hasten to add that the burden of proof at a criminal trial being one of proof beyond reasonable doubt would not mean that the evidence cannot be kept in mind for purposes of deciding the propensity, criminal tendencies etc. of a person.

12. It is in this context that we have labored a little to summarize the quality of evidence led at the criminal trial. The evidence establishes the petitioner being apprehended with co-accused Manoj and the bag containing the ransom money (fake bundles) being recovered and the petitioner being apprehended. Now, Dinesh and his father i.e. the brother and the father of the victim may have turned hostile, but they admitted their signatures on the recovery memos prepared as also the arrest memos. They failed to give any explanation as to why they signed the documents. Maybe at a criminal trial the two turning turtle discredited them and to a large extent the case of the prosecution, but the residual evidence of the memos prepared and the testimony of the Police officers cannot be ignored. That the victim was recovered from Dehradun pursuant to the disclosure statement made by the petitioner and his co-accused cannot be lost sight of. We need to highlight that, two independent witnesses i.e. Bachan Singh and Umesh Chand proved the third co-accused as having stayed in their hotel with a young girl on the intervening night of 18th and 19th May, 2001. As per the FIR Lalita aged 13 years went missing on 18.05.2001.

13. It is not difficult to discern reasons why Lalita, her father and brother turned hostile. Firstly, the social stigma which unfortunately gets attached to a girl victim of a crime of being in the custody of a male for a couple of days before she was rescued may have led the family to re-think on the issue. The second reason could be the three being suborned.

14. We need not go into the reasons as to why Lalita did not stand by her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. and why her father and brother turned hostile. But keeping in view the reminder of the evidence, its quality and nature, we hold that there are justifiable grounds to deny employment to the petitioner as a Constable Driver with the Delhi Police and according our approval to the decision taken by the Department as also the Tribunal we dismiss the writ petition in limine.â

34.Â In Gokul Ram Meenas case (supra), facts of the case were that in the year 2008, an advertisement was issued by the respondents wherein applications were invited for recruitment to the post of Constable Male (Executive) in Delhi Police. The petitioner therein applied for recruitment to the said post under ST category. He was put through physical endurance and measurement test, written test, interview. He was declared provisionally selected against Roll No. 515945, subject to verification of character and antecedents, final checking of documents and medical fitness. On 15.07.2009, the petitioner therein received a show cause notice from respondents wherein it is stated that on receipt of his character and antecedents report from DCP/Special Branch, Delhi it is revealed that a criminal case FIR No. 45, dated 04.05.2007 u/s 143/341/323/354-IPC, P.S. Thana Gazi, District Alwar (Rajasthan) was registered against him. It is further stated that the said criminal case was decided by the aforesaid Court on 01.06.2009 wherein petitioner in the aforesaid case and co-accused persons were convicted for the offence u/s 143 IPC and were given benefit u/s 3 of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 after admonishing. For the offence u/s 323, 341, 354 and 451 IPC, they were acquitted as the matter was compromised. It was also stated in the show cause notice that the petitioner was involved in the case and had an active role as such was unfit for Delhi Police and was asked to give reply to show cause as to why his candidature for the post of Constable Male (Executive) in Delhi Police be not cancelled. Petitioner gave a reply on 28.07.2009 stating that there are judicial directions of the court that conviction would have no adverse effect on petitioner as well as one Shri Gopi Ram in future in their Government services or otherwise. In view of above directions, the Government service of petitioner therein would not be affected. The reply of the said petitioner was not found convincing by respondents as such vide order dated 04.08.2009 the candidature of the petitioner therein for the post of Constable Male (Executive) in Delhi Police was cancelled. Aggrieved with the same, the said petitioner filed an O.A. No. 2497/2009 before the Tribunal wherein he had alleged that at the time of filling up of the attestation form, he had disclosed his involvement in the criminal case. The petitioner therein pointed out about the directions of criminal court which are stated above and contended that respondents are not justified in canceling his candidature. The Tribunal relying on the judgment of the High Court in Satraj Singh v. Union of India and others, 2007 IX AD (DELHI) 241 did not interfere with the order of the respondents dated 4.8.2009 and also observed that the said order had been passed after observing the principles of natural justice. Aggrieved with the same, the aforesaid petition was filed. After considering the case in detail, the High Court held as under:-

âIt is admitted position that petitioner was not issued any appointment letter and was only provisionally selected subject to verification of character and antecedents. In the show cause notice dated 15th July, 2009, the necessary details of criminal case given are as under:-

âSh.Rajinder Prasad s/o Shri Ram Chander Meena reported that on 3.5.2007 at about 7.30/8.00 p.m. he was lying on cot and his wife Smt.Rampati was also sitting with him. Suddenly you along with Narayan, Bharal Lal S.o Ram Nath, Jella Ram S/o Sunder Lal all resident of Bal Ki Dhani, Mundiyawas, The. Thana Gazi Distt. Alwar (Raj.) having lathies in their hands came to his house and Pappu Ram, Ramesh, Narayan, Bharat Lal, Jella Ram assaulted the complainant with legs and fists. You along with Gopi Ram and Phelli Ram took his wife out side on the road and threw her chunni and torn her clothes. You and Gopi Ram caught hold her wife and Phelli Ram attempted to outrage her modesty. When the complainant and his wife raised alarm for rescue, Shri Umrao Khatik and Ramdhan Meena intervened the matter. During trial of the case, both the parties have compromised the matter u/s 323/341/354/451 IPC. The Hon?ble Court found them guilty u/s 143 IPC and admonished all the accused by giving benefit u/s 3 of Probation of Offender Act vide W.P.(C) 8620/2010 judgment dated 01.06.2009. Keeping in view of the above circumstances, it has been established that you were involved in the case and played an active role. The Hon?ble Court found guilty of all the accused including you candidate u/s 143 IPC and admonished by giving benefit u/s 3 of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. Since the acquittal in the said case is not honorable and the offence involves grave moral turpitude, which makes you unfit for police force.â

6. The stand of the petitioner is that when he submitted the application form, the case registered vide aforesaid FIR was sub judice against him in the court of Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Thana Gazi. The petitioner had already mentioned about the case in the application form. The said case has been decided on 1st June, 2009 by the court of Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Thana Gazi, Distt. Alwar (Rajasthan) wherein petitioner and co-accused persons are acquitted u/s 323,341, 354 and 451 IPC due to compromise. The petitioner is convicted u/s 143 IPC and the court has given the benefit of section 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 and it is ordered that in terms of section 12 of Probation of Offenders Act, the conviction would have no adverse effect on petitioner and one Sh. Gopi Ram in future in their Government service or otherwise. In view of the above directions, respondents are not justified in cancelling his candidature.

The Tribunal has considered the aforesaid aspect of the matter in the light of judgment of this court in Satraj Singh Vs. Union of India and ors reported in 2007 IX AD (Delhi) 241 wherein after relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Commandant, 20th Battalion, ITB Police Vs. Sanjay Binjola reported in (2001) 5 SCC 317, it is held that the directions issued by the Session Judge, Bikaner to the effect that the conviction of the petitioner therein shall not have any adverse effect on his service was held to be without jurisdiction and therefore not binding on the respondents. Following the aforesaid judgment the Tribunal has rejected the contention raised by the petitioner that the direction of the Court of Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Thana Gazi, Distt. Alwar, Rajasthan in judgment dated 1st June, 2009 to the effect that the conviction of petitioner would have no adverse effect in future in Government Service is not binding on the Tribunal. Recently, the Supreme Court in Sushil Kumar Singhal Vs. The Regional Manager, Punjab National Bank reported in (2010) IV LLJ 297 SC after taking note of various decisions on the issue, where after conviction, a person was released on probation, has upheld the dismissal of an employee who was convicted for an offence involving mortal turpitude. Even in the said case, appellant therein was given the benefit of Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act by the criminal court. If that is so, there is no reason to uphold the contention of petitioner who is involved in a serious crime.

Further petitioner is seeking employment in Police which requires utmost integrity, propriety and uprightness of character. Considering the nature of offence, material on record, role of petitioner therein and that there is no honorable acquittal, the Screening Committee has not found him fit for the job. Petitioner was undergoing selection process and was not issued any appointment letter. In view of the judgment in Shankarsan Dash Vs. Union of India reported in AIR 1991 SC 1612, petitioner cannot claim any indefeasible right of appointment. Considering the totality of facts and circumstances, we find no illegality or irrationality in the order of the Tribunal. Present is not a fit case in which we should interfere and grant relief to the petitioner in exercise of discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Writ petition is dismissed with no order as to costs.â

35.Â The petitioner in Sanjeev Kumars case was selected for the post of Constable (Executive) in Delhi Police during the recruitment held in the year 2002. Regard being had to his antecedents, the respondent therein did not extend the benefit of appointment in his favour. Being dissatisfied with the same, he invoked the jurisdiction of this Tribunal in OA No.639/2004 and the Tribunal lanceted the order passed by the authorities declining to take him on service and issued a command to appoint him. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the respondents preferred the writ petition No.8016-17/2005. It is worth noting, the said writ petition was disposed of along with other writ petitions keeping in view the commonality of the factual matrix. A Division Bench of this Court, taking into consideration the concept of signification of antecedents in a disciplined force, passed the following order:

âThe findings recorded by the Tribunal in the present case that whether it is an honourable acquittal or on benefit of doubt has little impact in the service career of the said person is in our considered opinion not appropriate as in the service law, a distinction is always made with regard to the honourable acquittal and acquittal on benefit of doubt, particularly in respect of payment of consequential benefits of some of the service employees, wherein it is provided that if it is honourable acquittal the concerned person will be entitled to full arrears of pay and wages whereas it is provided that if it is honourable acquittal the concerned person will be entitled to full arrears of pay and wages whereas if it is only acquittal on benefit of doubt, he may be deprived of payment of arrears of pay and allowances for the period during which he was under suspension. The same is recognized under law and also approved and upheld by the Supreme Court for which we may appropriately refer to the decisions of this Court in the case of S.P. Thukral v. Delhi Development Authority, LPA No.2066/2005 decided on 6th October, 2005. However considering the facts and circumstances of this case and also the fact that in some other cases the Commissioner of Police has allowed the applicants to join the post considering the gravity of the offence in which they were involved and also the nature of the order passed by the criminal court, we feel that it would be appropriate, if all these matters are remitted back to the Commissioner of Police who shall appreciate the nature and gravity of the offence in which the respondents were involved and the manner in which they were acquitted. Upon consideration of such facts if it is found that they could be allowed to join and work against the post of Constables, they should be allowed to join their posts but their order of appointment would be effective from their joining with no claim at all with regard to the arrears of pay and allowances or seniority. Even after such appreciation of all the facts and circumstances of the cases, if it is found by the Commissioner of Police that respondents cannot be so appointed as they are not suitable and desirable persons to be appointed to the post of Constable, he shall pass an appropriate order giving reasons for such decision.â

36.Â After the said order came to be passed, the Commissioner of Police passed an order by ascribing reasons that the petitioner therein was not suitable to be appointed in a disciplined force. Being grieved by the said decision of the competent authority, the petitioner therein preferred OA No.2429/2006 and the Tribunal disposed it initially on 24.4.2008 along with several original applications. The OA preferred by the petitioner therein faced dismissal. The same came to be assailed in WP(C) No.8059/2008, whereby the High Court remanded the matter to the Tribunal for fresh adjudication on the foundation that the case of the petitioner was not considered by the tribunal on merits. The Tribunal taking note of the fact that a criminal prosecution was launched against the petitioner therein for offences punishable under Sections 302/307/148 of the Indian Penal Code and keeping in view the nature of the acquittal because certain witnesses had become hostile, declined to interfere with the order passed by the competent authority. Dismissing the petition, the High Court held as under:-

â6. Criticizing the legal substantiality of the order, it is submitted by Mr.Raju that the tribunal should not have scanned the order of acquittal with an x-ray as the same is binding on it. It is his further submission that while considering the factum of antecedents, neither the competent authority nor the tribunal could have entered into the reasons of acquittal or the nature of acquittal whether it is an honourable acquittal or an acquittal on a technical ground. Learned counsel has submitted that the conclusion of the tribunal rests on the pronouncement in Delhi Administration Through its Chief Secretary and Ors. v. Sushil Kumar, (1996) 11 SCC 605, though the said decision has not taken into consideration Rules 6 and 25 of the Delhi Police (Appointment and Recruitment) Rules, 1980 and as the decision has been rendered totally ignoring and overlooking the relevant statutory rules, it is per incurium and cannot have the binding precedential value under Article 141 of the Constitution of India.

7.Â The learned counsel for the respondent would submit that the order passed by the tribunal is absolutely impregnable being founded on sound reasons and does not warrant any interference in exercise of power of judicial review under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and further the submission that the decision in Sushil Kumar (supra) is per incurium does not deserve any acceptation.

8. To appreciate the rivalised submissions raised at the Bar, we have carefully scrutinized the order passed by the tribunal. It has analyzed the facts, the responsibility of a person in a disciplined force, the gravity of the offences with which the petitioner was implicated, the nature of acquittal, the responsibility of the public authority and how such a person becomes unsuitable and undesirable to be appointed to the post in question and thereafter declined to interfere with the order passed by the competent authority. In the case of Sushil Kumar (supra), a two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court was dealing with recruitment of a constable in Delhi Police service. While dealing with the suitability and desirability after acquittal, their Lordships have opined thus:

"3. This appeal by special leave arises from the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal, New Delhi made on September 6, 1995 in OA No. 1756/91. The admitted position is that the respondent appeared for recruitment as a Constable in the Delhi Police Services in the year 1989-90 with Roll No. 65790. Though he was found physically fit through endurance test, written test and interview and was selected provisionally; his selection was subject to verification of character and antecedents by the local police. On verification, it was found that his antecedents were such that his appointment to the post of Constable was not found desirable. Accordingly, his name was rejected. Aggrieved by proceedings dated December 18, 1990 culminating in cancellation of his provisional selection, he filed OA in the Central Administrative Tribunal. The Tribunal in the impugned order allowed the application on the ground that since the respondent had been discharged and/or acquitted of the offence punishable under Section 304 IPC, under Section 324 read with 34 IPC and under Section 324 IPC, he cannot be denied the right of appointment to the post under the State. The question is: whether the view taken by the Tribunal is correct in law? It is seen that verification of the character and antecedents is one of the important criteria to test whether the selected candidate is suitable to a post under the State. Though he was physically found fit, passed the written test and interview and was provisionally selected, on account of his antecedent record, the appointing authority found it not desirable to appoint a person of such record as Constable to the disciplined force. The view taken by the appointment authority in the background of the case cannot be said to be unwarranted. The Tribunal, therefore, was wholly unjustified in giving the direction for reconsideration of his case. Though he was discharged or acquitted of the criminal offences, the same has nothing to do with the question. What would be relevant is the conduct or character of the candidate to be appointed to a service and not the actual result thereof. If the actual result happened to be in a particular way, the law will take care of the consequences. The consideration relevant to the case is of the antecedents of the candidate. Appointing Authority, therefore, has rightly focussed this aspect and found him not desirable to appoint him to the service."

37.Â In Ranvir Singhs case (supra), the petitioner impugned the order dated 25.05.2011 of this allowing the O.A. No.3509/2010 preferred by the respondent therein and directing the petitioner to treat the respondent as a validly selected candidate and offer him appointment to the post of sub-inspector(EXE) Male. Notice of this petition was issued and the operation of the order stayed. The petitioner therein, as directed has produced the record relating to recruitment of the respondent therein. The respondent had applied for the said post in the recruitment drive of the year 2007 and was provisionally selected subject to verification of character and antecedent, medical fitness and final checking of documents etc. After he had filled up the application form and the attestation form, he was accused of offences under Sections 332/353/186/285/506 r/w 34 of the IPC and 25/54/59 Arms Act in FIR No.116/2008 dated 30.05.2008 of Police Station Sadar Narwana, District Jind, Haryana. Upon discovery of the said fact during verification, the case of the respondent was put up before the screening committee constituted by the commissioner of police. In the interregnum, the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, Narwana vide judgment dated 15th June, 2009 acquitted the respondent, giving him benefit of doubt. The Screening committee of the petitioner however considering the gravity of the offences with which the respondent was charged and in the light of observations in the judgment (supra) did not find the respondent suitable for the post and the petitioner vide communication dated 8th October, 2009 cancelled the candidature of the respondent. The respondent earlier preferred an O.A. No.2989/2009 impugning such cancellation of his candidature and which O.A. was disposed of vide order dated 19.03.2010 remitting the case to the petitioner to reconsider the same taking notice of the circumstance of acquittal of the petitioner of all the charges. The petitioner therein again considered the case of the respondent and vide order dated 10.6.2010 again found the respondent not suitable for appointment in Delhi Police. OA.No.3509/2010 was filed by the respondent therein impugning the said order and which OA has been allowed as aforesaid by the Tribunal vide orders impugned in the said petition. The Tribunal has primarily relied on Commissioner of Police v. Sandeep Kumar, (2011) 4 SCC 644. Sandeep Kumar had concealed his involvement in a criminal case under Section 325/34 IPC and which case had also ended in an acquittal on compromise. The Honble Supreme Court held that Sandeep Kumar at the time of the FIR was about 20 years of age; at that age, young people often commit indiscretions and such indiscretions can often be condoned; youth will be youth; they are not expected to behave in as mature a manner as older people and minor indiscretions made by young people should be condoned rather than to brand them as criminals for the rest of their lives. Relying upon Morris v. Crown Office (1970) 2 Q.B. 114, it was held that the non-mentioning of involvement in a criminal case was out of fear inasmuch as if the same had been disclosed, he would have been automatically disqualified. The Honble Supreme Court accordingly held cancellation of provisional selection of Sandeep Kumar to be illegal. Allowing the petition, the High Court held as under:

â7. The record produced before us contains the Minutes of the Meeting of the Screening Committee which in addition contains the following:

âIn this case, though the prosecution failed to establish the person who fired and who beat the police officials but the incident of firing was happened, Sh. Ranvir Singh (candidate) was checked at the place of incident and he was found in possession of pistol which shows that he was the person.

This is a case of acquittal in which material witnesses turned hostile. His involvement shows premeditated tendency to indulge in crime without fear of law and such type of attitude renders him unsuitable for appointment in a law enforcing agency and in a disciplined force like Delhi Police.â

8. The respondent had also alleged that the petitioner was indulging in pick and choose policy and stated that about 6 candidates have been given appointment despite being involved in criminal cases. The names and particulars have also been given. This plea of the respondent is also supported from the records produced before us. Though in the said records the reasons for the Screening Committee recommending six other candidates who were also charged with offences, for appointment are not contained and those records were not asked for or produced before us but the very fact that of the seventeen candidates whose cases were examined by the Screening Committee six were recommended shows application of mind by the Screening Committee. It was up to the respondent to establish that the six candidates who notwithstanding involvement in a criminal case were recommended for appointment by the Screening Committee, were similarly placed as the respondent and to make out a case of discrimination. The same has not been done.

9. We have recently in our judgment dated 16.11.2011 in W.P.(C) No.8752/2011 titled Vinod Kumar Vs. Commissioner of Police held that the Court cannot interfere in the assessment made by the Delhi Police as employer, as to who is suitable and who is not for serving in the force which is required to constantly interact and render assistance to public. It has been repeatedly held that the Court cannot interfere in the selection process.

10. We may in this regard also notice that the âPolicy For Deciding Cases of Candidates Provisionally Selected in Delhi Police, Involved in Criminal Cases (Facing Trial or Acquitted)â has been framed vide Standing Order No.398/2010 dated 23.11.2010. The said Policy also provides reference of such candidates to the Screening Committee to assess suitability for appointment; once the petitioner itself is not rejecting the candidature merely on the ground of involvement in a criminal case and notwithstanding such involvement assessing the suitability it cannot be denied the said right. The petitioner Delhi Police is often criticized for its force. The popular public conception of the men in Police uniform being the biggest âGundas cannot be ignored. In the light thereof, a candidate whom the experts in the Screening Committee have found unfit for serving in the police cannot be thrust on the police and the same if done may not only instill a false feeling of bravado and confidence in respondent, detrimental to his functioning in the police but may also affect the morale of the police department. No undue weightage can be given to the factum of the respondent being acquitted of the criminal charge. Just like such acquittal has been held not to impact the departmental inquiry proceedings on the same charge, for the reason of test of proof being different in the two proceedings, similarly in the matter of employment also, an acquittal of a criminal charge cannot be allowed to wash away the said charge or to place a person in the same position as if never had been charged.

11. The petitioner was thus fully entitled to consider the factum of the charge against the respondent even though ultimately acquitted thereof in assessing suitability of the respondent for induction in the police force. Else no error is found in the said assessment capable of interference.

12. The Tribunal in the impugned order has blindly followed the dicta in Sandeep Kumar and other similar judgments in which no assessment of suitability had been done by the Screening Committee. The facts of the present case do not allow applicability of the ratio of the said judgment.â

38.Â In Daulat Rams case (supra), the Writ Petition was directed against the order dated 12.10.2011 passed by this Tribunal whereby OA No. 1514/2011 filed by the respondent therein was allowed. The facts giving rise to the aforesaid writ petition were that on 11.12.2009 the respondent therein applied for the post of Constable (Executive) in Delhi Police. He appeared in the written test and was provisionally selected for the aforesaid post. Despite his having been selected and found physically fit no appointment letter was issued to him for the reason that he had been involved in a criminal case registered vide FIR No. 351/2007 PS Laxman Garh, District Alwar (Rajasthan) under Sections 323/341/324/325 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code which had resulted in acquittal on 12.2.2009, based on a compromise. A show cause notice was issued to him as to why his candidature be not cancelled. In his reply, the respondent therein clarified that complete details of his having been involved in the criminal case had been disclosed by him in the application form as well as in the attestation form. The explanation given by him, however, was not found satisfactory and his candidature was cancelled on 22.3.2011. The Tribunal relying upon the decision of Supreme Court in Commissioner of Police and others v. Sandeep Kumar, (2011) 4 SCC 644 quashed the cancellation of the candidature of the respondent therein and directed the petitioner therein to consider him for the post of Constable (Executive). It was an admitted fact that the respondent therein was involved in a criminal case referred above and he had been acquitted, though pursuant to a compromise, much before he applied for the post of Constable (Executive) with Delhi Police on 11.12.2009. It is also not in dispute that his involvement in the criminal case was disclosed by the respondent not only in the attestation form but also in the initial application form submitted by him. Thus, there was absolutely no concealment on the part of the respondent, while applying to the aforesaid post. In Sandeep Kumar (supra), the respondent before the Supreme Court while replying to Clause 12(a) of the application form whereby he was asked as to whether he had been arrested, prosecuted, kept in detention or bound down, fined or convicted by Court of law for any offence, had replied in the negative and thereby he made a false statement in the application form. The respondent in that case had applied for the post of Head Constable (Ministerial) in 1999. He had already been acquitted on 18.1.1998, pursuant to his compromise with the injured in the case which was registered against him under Section 325/34 of Indian Penal Code. However, while filling up the attestation form, after he had qualified for the post, the respondent therein disclosed his involvement in the criminal case, as also his acquittal based on the compromise. The candidature of the respondent having been cancelled he filed an OA before the Tribunal, which was dismissed. The Writ Petition filed by him was allowed by the High Court. Dismissing the appeal filed by the Commissioner of Police and others, it was held by the Honble Supreme Court that cancellation of the candidature of the respondent therein was illegal. Honble Supreme Court noted that the incident had happened at a time when the respondent would be about 20 years old and observed that at that age young people often commit indiscretions, such indiscretions can often be condoned and therefore the approach should be to condone minor indiscretions made by young people rather than to brand them as criminals for the rest of their lives. The Court felt that probably while filling up the application form the respondent therein had not disclosed his involvement in the criminal case out of fear that if he did so, he would automatically be disqualified. The Court was of the view that since the offence alleged against the respondent was not a serious offence like murder, dacoity or rape, a more lenient view should be taken in the matter. While dismissing the writ petition, the Court held as under:-

âThe case of the respondent therein before this Court, in our opinion, rests on a stronger footing since he did not conceal his involvement in the criminal case even in the initial application form submitted by him, whereas in the case of Sandeep Kumar (supra), the respondent had concealed his involvement while filling up the initial application form. The offences in commission of which he was alleged to be involved were not more serious than the offences in which Sandeep Kumar was involved. We therefore, fail to appreciate, how, in the face of the aforesaid decision of Supreme Court, the Tribunal might have taken a different view in the matter.

3. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decisions of Supreme Court in Delhi Administration Through Its Chief Secretary And Others v. Sushil Kumar: (1996) 11 SCC 605, decision of this Court in WP(C) No. 5782/2011 Sanjeev Kumar v. Govt of NCT of Delhi And Others decided on 11.8.2011 as well as the decision of Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 7106/2011 Ram Kumar v. State of UP And Others decided on 19.8.2011. In the case of Sushil Kumar (supra), the admitted position was that the involvement of the respondent in a criminal case came to be known only on verification by the local police, which led to his provisional selection being cancelled. A perusal of the judgment would also show that the respondent in that case was involved in the offences punishable under Sections 304 and 324 of Indian Penal Code read with Section 34 thereof. However, in the case before this Court, there has been no concealment on the part of the respondent and he was not involved in a serious offence such as murder, rape, dacoity, culpable homicide not amounting to murder, hence, the case before this Court is clearly distinguishable and in fact squarely covered by the decision of Supreme Court in Sandeep Kumar (supra). In the case of Sanjeev Kumar (supra), the petitioner before this Court was prosecuted for the offence punishable under Sections 302/307/148 of the Indian Penal Code and he was acquitted on account of certain witnesses having turned hostile. Considering the nature of the offences in which the petitioner in WP (C) No. 5782/2011 was involved, the case of the respondent before this Court cannot be treated at par with him. Moreover, since there is no reference to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sandeep Kumar (supra) and it appears to us that the aforesaid binding decision of the Supreme Court was not brought to the notice of this Court.

In the case of Ram Kumar (supra), the appellant before the Supreme Court, while applying for the post of a Constable had submitted an affidavit stating therein that no criminal case had been registered against him. It was on a report submitted by Jaswant Nagar Police Station in District Etawah that his involvement in a criminal case registered under Section 324/323/504 IPC came to be known. On receipt of the aforesaid report the selection of the appellant was cancelled on the ground that he had submitted an affidavit stating wrong facts and concealing correct facts and therefore his selection was irregular and illegal. The appellant filed a Writ Petition before Allahabad High Court challenging the cancellation of his selection. The Writ Petition was dismissed holding that since the appellant before the Supreme Court had furnished false information in his affidavit, the case was squarely covered by the decision of Supreme Court in Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan And Others v. Ram Ratan Yadav: (2003) 3 SCC 437. The Supreme Court noted that the appellant had been acquitted since the sole eye witness had stated during his examination in the Court that someone from the crowd had hurled abuses and in the scuffle he had got injured when he fell and his head hit a brick platform. Allowing the appeal, Supreme Court set aside the order passed by the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court and directed that the appellant would be taken back in service though he would not be entitled for any back wages for the period he had remained out of service. We fail to appreciate how this judgment can, in any manner, advances the case of the petitioner before this Court. In fact, the Court was of the view that it was the duty of the Senior Superintendent of Police, Ghaziabad as the Appointing Authority to satisfy himself on the point as to whether the appellant was suitable for appointment to the post of Constable, with reference to the nature of suppression and nature of the criminal case. Instead of doing that he had mechanically held the selection to be irregular and illegal merely because the appellant had furnished an affidavit stating the incorrect facts.

In Kendriya Vidyalaya (supra), which the respondent had relied upon in the case of Ram Kumar (supra), the respondent before the Supreme Court had suppressed in the attestation form the fact that a criminal case had been registered against him under Section 323/341/294 and 506-B read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and that case was pending at that time. It was only subsequently that the criminal case was withdrawn. It was on these facts that the Supreme Court, in the case of Kendriya Vidyalaya (supra) held that since he (the respondent Ram Ratan Yadav) was to serve as a Physical Education Teacher he was not suitable for that appointment as his conduct and antecedents will have some impact on the minds of the students of impressionable age and since the authorities had dismissed him from service for suppressing material information in the attestation form, the decisions of the authorities could not be interfered by the High Court. The facts of the case before this court are also materially different from the facts in the case of Kendriya Vidyalaya (supra). In the case before this Court, there has been no concealment on the part of the respondent either in the application form or in the attestation form. Moreover, he had already been acquitted of the charges even before he applied for the post of Constable (Executive) in Delhi Police. Therefore, the decision of Supreme Court in the case of Kendriya Vidyalaya (supra) also does not help the petitioner in any manner.

For the reasons given in the preceding paragraphs, we find no merits in the Writ Petition and the same is hereby dismissed without any order as to costs.â

39. In Dharam Veer Singhs case (supra), the High Court allowed one writ petition and dismissed the other two. The facts in the three cases were as under:-

â1. W.P.(C) No.1694/2011 impugns the order dated 25.11.2010 of the Central Administrative Tribunal (Tribunal), Principal Bench allowing the OA No.164/2010 under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 preferred by the respondent and directing the petitioner Delhi Police to appoint the respondent to the post of Head Constable along with others of the batch for which he had competed, without however giving him the benefit of back wages but entitling him to seniority from the date the person immediately below him in the merit list of Constables for the selection of the year 2006 was appointed. Notice of the writ petition was issued and vide interim order dated 06.04.2011, the operation of the order of the Tribunal stayed.

2. W.P.(C) No.6253/2011 impugns the orders dated 19.03.2010, 27.07.2010 and 16.05.2011 of the Tribunal dismissing the OA No.2372/2009 preferred by the respondent therein impugning the cancellation of his candidature for the post of Constable in the Delhi Police and dismissing the review applications filed by the petitioner. Rule was issued of the said petition also.

3. W.P.(C) No.7811/2011 impugns the order dated 27.07.2011 of the Tribunal allowing the OA No.3384/2010 under Section 19 of the Act preferred by the respondent therein and directing the petitioner Delhi Police to appoint respondent therein to the post of Constable (Executive) in Delhi Police along with others of the batch for which he had competed without however giving him the benefit of back wages but entitling him to count his seniority from the date the person immediately below him in the merit list of Constables for selection of the year 2009 was appointed. Rule DB issued in the said petition also.

4. xx xx xx

5. The respondent in W.P.(C) No.1694/2011 had in pursuance to the recruitment in the year 2006 to the post of Constable in Delhi Police applied in the OBC category and cleared the Physical Endurance and Measurement Test, Written Test, Interview and Medical Test and was declared provisionally selected subject to the verification of his character and antecedents. The said verification revealed, that he was involved in FIR No.131/99 under Sections 454 and 380 of the IPC and FIR No.145/2004 under Sections 147, 323 and 451 of the IPC; that he was vide judgment dated 17.03.2001 acquitted in the criminal case in FIR No.131/1999 by giving him benefit of Section 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958; that in criminal case in FIR No.145/2004 also, he was acquitted vide judgment dated 01.12.2006 pursuant to a compromise and giving him benefit under Section 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 and clarifying that the same would not have any adverse effect on the respondent. The respondent though had not disclosed the aforesaid criminal cases in the application form but in the attestation form meant for verification of character had made disclosure thereof. The petitioner Delhi Police however after giving a notice to show cause and considering his reply thereto, cancelled the candidature of the respondent. The representation of the respondent also did not find favour. The respondent thereafter filed O.A. No.2083/2008 which was disposed of vide judgment dated 21.04.2009 directing Delhi Police to reconsider the eligibility of the respondent. Delhi Police however vide order dated 17.06.2009 found the respondent unsuitable for a disciplined force like Delhi Police where safeguarding the human right is the utmost priority, giving the following reasons:

âIn case FIR No.145/2004, Sh. Ajit Singh S/o Sh. Ramjilal R/o Jogawar PS Mundawar, Distt. Alwar (Raj.) reported that on the morning of 26.07.2004 at about 5-6 A.M. he along with his father Sh. Ramjilal, mother Smt. Servo, wife Manju, Lekhram and Lekhrams wife Munesh were in their house. While his mother Servo was churning buttermilk, Sube Singh, Kanwar Singh, Sanwal S/o Kunjaram, Dharamveer S/o Sube Singh and their wives attacked them with cane sticks and halberds (Pharsa) and inured all of them. Kanwar Singh and Sube Singh were equipped with halberd while rest were equipped with cane sticks. Sube Singh attacked him with halberd on his back. They vandalized the household articles and robbed Rs.40,000/- cash, gold chain of his wife Manju, gold earring of Munesh. On hearing the noise, the neighbours gathered and intervened. Subsequently, a case under Section 451/341/323 IPC and as such, the court admonished all of them under Section 147 IPC by giving benefit u/s 03 of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, vide order dated 01.12.2006. The Honble Court also passed an order that admonition U/s 147 IPC shall have no adverse bearing on service of Dharamveer U/s 12 of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. In Second case FIR No.131/99, PS Mundawar Sh. Ramji Lal S/o Sh. Laxman R/o Jogawar, PS Mundawar, Distt. Alwar (Raj.) reported that he had a hut (chhappar) in the village in which he had stored âTura and âWheat. On 03.05.99 at about 4:00 PM Sube Singh, Lal Singh, Kanwar Singh S/o Kunja Ram, Rakesh S/o Sube Singh, Dharamveer S/o Sube Singh, Sudesh D/o Lal Singh, Dhamali D/o Sube Singh, Chiriya W/o Sube Singh and Gidoari W/o Kunja Ram came there and broke his hut with the help of wood sticks and halberd. They also stole the wheat, tura and other materials forcibly. When he, his family and other villagers objected to it, they threatened them for dire consequences. Accordingly the case was registered U/s 454/380 IPC. During course of trial the court charged them U/s 147/323 IPC and the accused persons pleaded their guilt. Charges U/s 147/323 IPC were proved against them and the Court fined Rs.100/- each on the five accused persons. However, the Court also given them benefit of Section 03 of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.

Keeping in view the above circumstances, it has been established that you were involved in two criminal cases and played an active role in these cases. In one case FIR No.131/99, U/s 154/380 IPC, P.S. Mundawar, Rajasthan, the Court imposed a fine of Rs.100/- on you extending benefit of Section 03 of Probation of Offenders act, 1958. In other one case FIR No.145/04 U/s 143/323/341/379 IPC, PS Mundawar (Raj.), the Honble Court held all the accused guilty U/s 147 IPC and granted benefit under Section 03 of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. From the facts as explained above, it shows that you are of the habit of picking up quarrel and resorting to violence. This type of attitude renders you unsuitable for a disciplined force like Delhi Police where safeguarding the human right is the utmost priority. As such, you have again been found not suitable for appointment to the post of Constable (Exe.) Male in Delhi Police and your application is considered and rejected.â

The said order was impugned in O.A. No.164/2010 (supra). The Tribunal however in view of the acquittal in the criminal cases with clarification that the probation would not adversely affect the respondent held such rejection to be bad and directed Delhi Police to appoint the respondent therein.

6. The petitioner in W.P.(C) No.6253/2011 had also applied for the post of Constable in Delhi Police in the recruitment of the year 2008; he also cleared all the tests and was provisionally selected but on verification was found to have been involved in case FIR No.134/2003 under Section 3/6 of the Public Examination Act and was convicted with a fine of Rs.1,000/- and given the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act. On such revelation, his candidature was also cancelled. The Tribunal dismissed his challenge holding that he has to suffer for the consequences of his conviction and the conclusion reached by the Delhi Police of his being unfit for service could not be questioned.

7. The respondent in W.P.(C) No.7811/2011 had also applied during the recruitment of the year 2009 for the post of Constable (Executive) in Delhi Police and was provisionally selected; however verification of his antecedents revealed that he was involved in criminal case FIR No.115/2007 dated 16.07.2007 under Sections 341/294/506/34 IPC in which he was convicted but released after admonition under Section 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act for the reason of his being a student and under 21 years of age. His candidature was also cancelled after hearing him. The Tribunal set aside the said order relying inter alia on Commissioner of Police Vs. Sandeep Kumar (2011) 4 SCC 644 and accordingly directed his appointment.â

40. The judgments in these cases were as under:

â8. We have recently had occasion to deal with the questions as raised in these petitions in our judgment dated 16.11.2011 in W.P.(C) No.8752/2011 titled Vinod Kumar Vs. Commissioner of Police and judgment dated 20.12.2011 in W.P.(C) No.6518/2011 titled Commissioner of Police Vs. Ranvir Singh. It was held that though non disclosure by the candidate of his involvement in a criminal case when he was of under age and not expected to behave in a mature manner as elder people expect, cannot be a ground for cancellation of provisional selection but where the Delhi Police as employer makes an assessment as to the suitability for service in its force which is required to constantly interact and render assistance to public and finds a candidate unsuitable, its such decision cannot be lightly interfered with. It was further held that Delhi Police as employer is entitled to consider the factum of the charge against the candidate in assessing his / her suitability for induction in the police force even though the candidate may have been acquitted of the said charge. It was also noticed that the Delhi Police itself has vide Standing Order No.398/10 dated 23.11.2008 framed "Policy for Deciding Cases of Candidates Provisionally Selected in Delhi Police, Involved in Criminal Cases (Facing Trial or Acquitted)" providing reference of such candidates to the Screening Committee to assess suitability for appointment.

9. We shall now proceed to consider each of the aforesaid cases in the light of our conclusions aforesaid.

10. In so far as the respondent In W.P.(C) No.1694/2011 is concerned, we find Delhi Police to have at the level of Deputy Commissioner evaluated the suitability of the respondent and considering the charge against the respondent and disposal of the cases as compromised with admonition and benefit under Section 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act concluded the respondent to be habitual of picking up quarrels and resorting to violence and his such attitude rendering him unsuitable. It is thus not as if the candidature of the respondent was cancelled merely for non disclosure and / or for concealment of the said facts, as was the case in Sandeep Kumar (supra). The Delhi Police as an employer cannot be deprived of making such assessment qua the persons seeking employment with it and persons not found suitable for cogent reasons cannot be thrust upon the Police Force. In this light of the matter, the argument of the counsel for the respondent that the petitioner Delhi Police had in response to the contempt petition filed before the Tribunal sought time to comply with the order and concealed the said fact is of no consequence. Merely because the Delhi police to avoid being hauled up for contempt sought time from the Tribunal to comply with the order cannot deprive it of its right to avail remedies against the said order. In so far as the effect of Probation of Offenders Act is concerned, another Division Bench of this Court in Gokul Ram Meena Vs. GNCTD 177 (2011) DLT 471 has dealt in detail on the said aspect and concluded the same to be a relevant factor in service matters. We are thus of the opinion that W.P.(C) No.1694/2011 of the Delhi Police deserves to be allowed and the order of the Tribunal impugned therein directing Delhi Police to appoint the respondent is set aside / quashed.

11. The case of the petitioner in W.P.(C) No.6253/2011 was also examined in detail by the Screening Committee; he, as a student of B.A. Part-I, was in the examination found copying by unfair means and was prosecuted and convicted under Section 3/6 of the Public Examination Act and given benefit of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act and was thus not found suitable for Delhi Police. Again, the cancellation of the provisional candidature of the said petitioner is not merely on the ground of non disclosure / concealment but on assessment of his suitability. The Tribunal has concurred with the said assessment of the Delhi Police. We, in exercise of powers of judicial review are not inclined to interfere with such decision of the Delhi police of not finding the petitioner suitable for employment and which decision is found to be based on cogent reasons. Accordingly, W.P.(C) No.6253/2011 is dismissed and the petitioner therein not found entitled to employment.

12. However the facts of W.P.(C) No.7811/2011 disclose that the name of the respondent therein was not included in the FIR when filed and was included subsequently and the respondent therein had confessed his guilt during a Lok Adalat and the Court where the said criminal case was pending considering the nature of the offence, character of the respondent and the factum that the respondent was still studying in the School, had released the respondent on probation after admonition. We find the petitioner Delhi Police to have not evaluated the suitability of the respondent considering the said factors. We are further of the view that what was laid down by the Apex Court in Sandeep Kumar squarely applies to the said facts. Accordingly, W.P.(C) No.7811/2011 is dismissed and the order dated 27.07.2011 of the Tribunal directing the Delhi Police to appoint the respondent therein is upheld and the petitioner Delhi Police is directed to now comply with the said order within six weeks. No order as to costs.â

41. In the case of Sandeep (WP (C) No.2848/2012) (supra), the Commissioner of Police was aggrieved by the order dated 20.01.2012 passed by this Tribunal. The said case concerned the cancellation of the candidature of the respondent therein who had applied for the post of Constable (Executive) in the recruitment of 2006 with the Delhi Police. The facts were that the respondent therein had filed an application dated 22.03.2006 seeking appointment as a Constable (Executive) with the Delhi Police. In the said application form, he had disclosed his alleged involvement in a criminal case arising out of the FIR No.104 dated 04.08.2003 registered under Sections 148/149/323/427/452/506 IPC at Police Station Ateli, Haryana. He had also disclosed that the trial in respect of the said criminal case was pending. However, the respondent therein had not disclosed the factum of an earlier criminal case arising out of FIR No.257 dated 09.11.2001 registered under Sections 148/149/323 IPC at Police Station City Narnaul, Haryana. It would be pertinent to note, at this juncture, that insofar as the said FIR No.257 is concerned, the respondent in the aforesaid case had been acquitted by the trial court on 02.12.2003 inasmuch as the prosecution witnesses did not identify the respondent as one of the persons involved in the said offences. As a consequence, because the prosecution was unable to prove its case against the respondent, the said respondent was acquitted by virtue of the said order dated 02.12.2003. Thus, the position was that in the application dated 22.03.2006, the respondent in the aforesaid writ petition had disclosed the pending criminal case but had made any mention of the criminal case in which he had been acquitted about three years back in the year 2003. However, in the attestation form which was submitted by the respondent on 30.12.2006, the respondent therein had disclosed both the criminal cases, namely, the one arising out of FIR No.257 as also the case arising out of the said FIR No.104. The respondent had also indicated that insofar as the case arising out of FIR No.257 was concerned, he had been acquitted by the trial court on 02.12.2003. It should also be mentioned that by the time the attestation form was filled by the respondent on 30.12.2006, the respondent had also been acquitted in the criminal case arising out of FIR No.104 by virtue of the trial courts decision dated 03.10.2006. The respondent had been acquitted after having been given the benefit of doubt. It is, therefore, clear that by the time the petitioner therein submitted the attestation form, he had been acquitted in both the criminal cases by the concerned trial court. It is also clear that in the attestation form the respondent had disclosed both the criminal cases and the entire proceedings in respect thereof leading to his acquittal in both the cases. Dismissing the aforesaid writ petition, the High Court held as under:-

â4. At this juncture, it would be useful to refer to Standing Order No.371/2009 issued by the Delhi Police with regard to âAction to be taken on detection of concealment of information/furnishing false/ bogus/ forged documents during recruitment in Delhi Policeâ. Clause 1 of the said Standing Order indicates that it deals with action to be taken in such cases at the time of filling up the application form/attestation form for recruitment in the Delhi Police and it also indicates that the rules indicated therein shall be applicable for all recruitments conducted by the Delhi Police. Clause 2(A) of the Standing Order prescribes the guidelines in respect of cases of concealment of information/declaration at the time of filling up the application/attestation forms. The same reads as under:

â2. GUIDELINES:- (A) Concealment of information/declaration at the time of filling up application/attestation forms.

(a) If a candidate fails or does not disclose his involvement and/or arrest in criminal case(s), complaint case(s), preventive proceedings etc. in the application form but discloses the same in the attestation form, the candidature will not cancelled only on this ground.

(b) However, the candidature will be cancelled in case the candidate does not disclose the fact of his involvement and/or arrest in criminal case(s), complaint case(s), preventive proceedings etc. both in the application form and in the attestation form and the fact is subsequently found out from the verification report received from the District authorities or otherwise. Before taking action against the candidate, a show cause notice must be first issued and the candidate be given reasonable opportunity to submit his reply. If sought, a personal hearing must be given. Thereafter a speaking order should be passed regarding cancellation of the candidature.

(c) If a candidate had disclosed his involvement and/or arrest in criminal case(s), complaint case(s), preventive proceedings etc. and the case is pending investigation or pending trial, the candidature will be kept in abeyance till the final decision of the case. After the courts judgment, if the candidate is acquitted or discharged, the case will be referred to the Screening Committee of the PHQ to assess his suitability for appointment in the Delhi Police.

(d) If a candidate had disclosed his involvement and/or arrest in criminal case(s), complaint case(s), preventive proceedings etc. both in the application form as well as in the attestation form but was acquitted or discharged by the court, his case will be referred to the Screening Committee of the PHQ to assess his suitability for appointment in Delhi Police.

(e) As per Section 19(1) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) a juvenile who has committed an offence and has been dealt with under the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act shall not suffer any disqualification on account of conviction in an offence under the said law.

Cases of candidates who have a past record of being âjuveniles in conflict with lawâ who were dealt with under Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act will be decided keeping in mind the above provisions of law, âsuch a juvenile shall have no effect on his recruitment and joining service.â

5. Clause 2(A)(a) clearly indicates that if a candidate fails or does not disclose his involvement and/or arrest in criminal cases in the application form but discloses the same in the attestation form, his candidature will not be cancelled only on this ground. This guideline clearly applies to the case in hand. The respondent had disclosed his alleged involvements in FIR No.104 in the application form but had not disclosed his alleged involvement in FIR No.257 in the said application form. However, he had disclosed his alleged involvements in both the FIRs in the attestation form. Therefore, in view of guideline 2(A)(a), it is evident that this was not a case of concealment of information and the Tribunal was right in holding so.

6. Completing the narration of facts, it would be necessary to note that the petitioners, on becoming aware of the respondents said two involvements, issued a show cause notice to the respondent on 08.08.2007 asking him to show cause as to why his candidature should not be cancelled. The respondent submitted his reply on 17.08.2007 in which he stated that he had not mentioned the criminal case arising out of FIR No.257 in the application form inasmuch as he was under the impression that, as he had already been acquitted in the same in the year 2003, he was not required to mention it in the application form. He, however, stated that since the criminal case arising out of FIR No.104 was pending he had duly disclosed the same in the application form. He also pointed out that he had, in any event, disclosed both the criminal cases in the attestation form and also the fact that he had been acquitted in those cases. However, the petitioner did not accept his reply and cancelled his candidature by an order dated 27.08.2007.

7. Being aggrieved, thereby the respondent filed an original application being OA No.1609/2007 which was disposed of by the Tribunal on 17.12.2007 requiring the petitioner to re-consider the matter. Upon re-consideration also, the petitioner maintained the same stand and cancelled the candidature of the respondent by virtue of the order dated 18.03.2008. Once again, the respondent approached the Tribunal by way of OA No.1715/08 which was disposed of on 24.05.2010 which, once again, required the petitioner to issue a fresh show cause notice to the respondent and to proceed thereafter. Subsequent to the issuance of the fresh show cause notice, the petitioner passed an order dated 22.11.2010.

8. The relevant portion of the said order dated 22.11.2010 reads as under:-

âYour acquittal in both the cases cannot be said to be honorable acquittal as the material witness turned hostile and did not support the prosecution story perhaps due to fear of the reprisal by the accused persons. Despite acquittal in both the criminal cases, it cannot be denied that you were named in the FIRs and formed unlawful assembly, assaulted victims and voluntarily caused injuries to them which exhibits your violent nature and tendency to indulge in serious criminal activities being armed with deadly weapons and taking law into hands for settling personal issues.â

9. It is apparent from the reasoning given in the order dated 22.11.2010 that the petitioners are relying entirely on the contents of the said two FIRs. There is no other independent material available with the petitioners to indicate that the respondent was unsuitable for the job.

10. The respondent being aggrieved by the order dated 22.11.2010 filed an original application No.4298/10 which has culminated in the impugned order dated 20.01.2012 passed by the Tribunal. After considering the entire factual matrix and the law on the subject, the Tribunal has arrived at the conclusion that the candidature of the respondent could not have been cancelled in the facts and circumstances of the case. The Tribunal placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in the case of Commissioner of Police v. Sandeep Kumar: (2004) 4 SCC 644. It also placed reliance on a decision of this Court in the case of Rajesh Kumar v. Commissioner of Police and Another: W.P.(C) No.8223/11 decided on 22.11.2011. We have also examined this aspect in detail in the case of Devender Kumar Yadav v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi and Anr.: (WP(C) 8731/2011, decided on 30.03.2012).

11. We agree with the view taken by the Tribunal. In the first instance, we have pointed out that the Standing Order No.371/2009 which was issued on 05.5.09 clarifies the position insofar as the concealment of information is concerned by virtue of clause 2(A)(a) thereof. Although, the Standing Order No.371/2009 was not there when the initial orders cancelling the candidature of the respondent were passed, however, it had already come into being at the time when the fresh show cause notice was issued to the respondent on 20.08.2010, pursuant to the second round before the Tribunal. In any event, de hors the Standing Order, the logic is absolutely clear that in case a candidate fails to disclose his involvement in a criminal case in his application form but discloses the same in the attestation form, the same cannot be regarded as concealment of information and his candidature cannot be cancelled on this ground alone.

12. Coming now to the second aspect of the matter and, that is, with regard to the pendency of a criminal case at the time of application and submission of the attestation form, it was submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that inasmuch as the criminal case arising out of FIR No.104 was pending, the respondent could not be considered suitable for the post. We find that this aspect has also been dealt with in the Standing Order No.371/09 in clause 2(A)(c). The said clause clearly stipulates that if a candidate had disclosed his involvement in a criminal case and if that case was pending investigation or pending trial, the candidature of such candidate is to be kept in abeyance till the final decision of the case. It was also stipulated that after the courts judgment, if the candidate is acquitted or discharged, the case is to be referred to the Screening Committee of the Police Headquarters to assess his suitability for appointment in the Delhi Police. In the facts of the present case, the criminal case against the petitioner arising out of FIR No.104 was pending on the date on which he had submitted his application form but, by the time he submitted his attestation form, he had been acquitted. Thus, there was no question of keeping his candidature in abeyance.

13. This brings us to the question of the reason given in the order dated 22.11.2010 for cancelling the candidature of the respondent. We find that the only reason that has surfaced is the fact that two FIRs had been registered, in which the respondent had been named but, in both those cases the respondent had been acquitted. Once the respondent had been acquitted in those cases which were also not of a grave nature such as a case involving murder, rape and dacoity etc., the mere fact that the respondent had been named in the FIR cannot be held against him unless there is some other independent material available with the petitioner. Such independent material, should indicate that the respondent was unsuitable for the post of Constable (Executive) with the Delhi Police. We do not find any trace of any such independent material in the order dated 22.11.2010.

14. In view of the foregoing, we do not see any reason to interfere with the Tribunals order, which, we find, is in accordance with the law as laid down by the Supreme Court and also as indicated by this Court in the decisions mentioned above.

15. The writ petition is dismissed. There shall be no orders as to costs.â

42.Â We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. We have also perused the various judgments relied upon by both sides. The earlier position in matters as in these cases was that if a candidate makes a declaration in his application form for appointment or the verification form that he was involved in any criminal case, whether the case was going on or he was finally acquitted or convicted, the appointing authority used to declare him unfit for employment and deny the appointment on that ground. Also if a candidate does not disclose his involvement in the criminal case out of fear of loosing employment or even inadvertently, the employer-department would hold inquiry to find out his antecedents mainly with the concerned Police Station and if it is found that he had some involvement in any criminal case, he will again be denied appointment for his act of concealment of material facts from the employer. Such denials of appointments were irrespective of the fact whether it was only an allegation that the candidate was involved in some criminal cases or he was actually innocent; whether and he was acquitted by the criminal court either on merit or on technical ground, or he was found guilty; whether his involvement was in any serious criminal case involving moral turpitude or in any minor offences, etc. However, as held by the Apex Court in Sandeep Kumars case (supra), there shall be altitudinal change in such cases. According to the Apex Court, the modern approach should be more of reform oriented. In other words, all such candidates shall not be branded as criminals in all their life. The Apex Court also wants to have a distinction between ordinary criminals and the young people who are involved in criminal cases but have no violence, dishonesty or vice in them. In other words, gravity of the offence committed by a person shall be the basic consideration. Therefore, the respondents should distinguish the cases of serious offences like murder, decoity, rape, etc. from less serious and trivial cases. A perusal of all the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the parties would show that even though the Delhi Police has set up a Screening Committee for this purpose, they always do not adjudge the suitability of candidates who have been involved / alleged to have been involved in any criminal case for enrolment in Delhi Police in a realistic manner after due application of mind. According to the Honble High Court of Delhi also, whether a candidate has been convicted or acquitted or whether the fact of his involvement has been disclosed or concealed in his application/verification forms etc. are not the ultimate criteria to decide about the suitability of a candidate but each case has to be considered in its individual merit and decision taken, rather than âpaint them with the same brush. In some cases, this Tribunal as well as the High Court held that even in the cases where the candidates have been acquitted in the criminal cases, their suitability in enrolling in the Delhi Police can be again adjudged by the Screening Committee for good and sufficient reasons and once the said Committee decides not to appoint such candidates taking into consideration of the various factors, this Tribunal or the High Court would not interfere in the decision. However, on the other hand, it is also the finding of this Tribunal as well as the High Court in another set of cases that once the criminal court has acquitted the person even on plea bargaining, his candidature cannot be cancelled and he should not be visited with further penalty of denial of appointment in the government service except in cases where the crime alleged to have been committed by him was of extreme nature like murder, rape etc. In both set of cases, emphasis is on the consideration of individual cases on their merit and record the decisions with germane reasons. In cases where one deliberately withholds or suppresses any material information, the respondents are within their right to either cancel the candidature or terminate the services which would be above the pale of review by the court. In other words, in appropriate cases, the administration has the discretion to come to the bonafide finding regarding the suitability of a candidature to be posted in an organization like Delhi Police which is to enforce law and order. But the question is whether the competent authority has been approaching the issue in a very mechanical manner or whether it has been really applying its mind before coming to any conclusion and they can be understood from the reasons which have been recorded by it.

43.Â The condition precedent for appointment of a selected candidate as per the provisions of Delhi Police (Appointment and Recruitment) Rules, 1980 is that he/she shall before appointment furnishes an attestation form, duly certified by two gazetted officers testifying that he/she bears a good moral character and is not aware of anything adverse against him/her. Then he/she may be provisionally enrolled, pending verification of his/her character and antecedents which shall be done by making a reference to the concerned police station. Therefore, a candidate to be enrolled in the police force is to be of âgood moral character. âCharacter, according to âthe Concise Oxford Dictionary, is âthe collective qualities or characteristics, especially, mental and moral that distinguish a person or thing. It also means âreputation, especially good reputation. The opposite of âgood moral is âmoral turpitude. The lists of Moral Turpitude as laid down by A.P. Srivastava, J. in Mangali v. Chhakki Lal and others, AIR 1963 AII 527 quoted in Risal Singh v. Chandgi Ram, AIR 1966 Punjab 393 are:-

â(1) whether the act leading to a connection was such as could shock the moral conscience of society in general;

(2)Â whether the motive which led to the act was a base one; and

(3)Â whether on account of the act having been committed, the perpetrator could be considered to be a depraved character of a person who was to be looked down upon by the society.â

The basic indicia of moral turpitude, as held in the judgment in Sarju Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, 1987 PLJR 285 (Pat), is the following:-

âThe basic indicia of moral turpitude are:

(a)Â Â something contrary to justice, honesty or good morals, involving baseness of mind or attitude;

(b) that which shocks the moral conscience of society in general;

(c) something which will attach a depravity of character to the person guilty thereof. Crime of murder comes within the ambit of moral turpitude.

In Durga Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 Punjab 97, it has held as follows:

âThe term âmoral turpitude is rather a vague one and it may have different meanings in difference contexts. The term has generally been taken to mean to be a conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals and contrary to what a man owes to a fellowman or to society in general. It has never been held that gravity of punishments is to be considered in determining whether the misconduct involves moral turpitude or not.â

In Baleshwar Singh v. D.M. and Collector, AIR 1999 AII 71, it was held that:

âthe expression âmoral turpitude is not defined anywhere. But it means anything done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. It implies depravity and wickedness of character or disposition of the person charged with the particular conduct. Every false statement made by a person may not be moral turpitude, but it would be so, it it discloses vileness or depravity in the doing of any private or social duty which, a person owes to his fellowmen or to the society in general.â

44.Â Mere allegation of involvement in a criminal case or registration of an FIR against a candidate is not a proof of his actual involvement in the criminal case. The trial court alone is the competent forum to record a finding as to the guilt of an accused in a criminal offence. Till it delivers the verdict holding one guilty of offences, one cannot be held as an offender. While acquittal is generally a presumption of one being innocent, it may not be the case always. In such circumstances, the administrative authority may adjudge the suitability of a person but it shall not be in a manner over reaching the findings of the court of criminal jurisdiction.

45. Another important aspect of these cases is that enforcement of law and order in public being an essential role of the Police Force, it is the duty and responsibility of the State to ensure that each individual recruited shall have the essential of attributes in terms of physical, psychological, moral and intellectual qualities. While verifying the antecedents of a candidate, the department is in fact ensuring that the candidate concerned has good moral character and integrity which are among such important attributes. In order to ensure that only such individuals are recruited, in the application form for appointment itself, the candidates are required to declare about their involvement in criminal cases, if any. Again, after the applicant qualifies in the selection process which gives more emphasis on his intellectual aspect, he has to give similar declarations in the verification form. The information given by the candidates are actually verified to find whether the declarations given by them in those forms are correct or not. It is on the basis of the reports received in their cases, their suitability for appointment / continued retention in service is finally adjudged. In order to do so, the Delhi Police themselves have issued their Standing Order No. 371/2009, which reads as under:-

âa) If a candidate fails or does not disclose his involvement and/or arrest in criminal case(s), complaint case(s), preventive proceedings etc. in the application form but discloses the same in the attestation form, the candidature will not cancelled only on this ground.

46. Now, we may consider some more cases decided by the Apex Court and the Honble High Court of Delhi on the issue of determination of suitability of the candidates by the Screening Committee. In Pawan Kumars case (supra), the Apex Court held that conviction under Section 294 IPC per se would not involve moral turpitude depriving the candidate an opportunity to serve the State. The Apex Court further held that the summary trials closing the case by levying small amounts of fine, more often than not, as a measure of plea-bargaining, shall not result in the end of the career as life is too precious to be staked over petty incidents. Further, according to the Apex Court, provision needs to be made that punishment of fine up to a certain limit, say up to Rs.2000 or so, in a summary/ordinary conviction shall not be treated as conviction at all for any purpose and all the more for entry and retention in government service. In Sushil Kumars case (supra), the candidate was involved in a case under Sections 304, 324/34 IPC but he concealed those facts from Delhi Police. It was in the said background that the Honble Supreme Court held that the view taken by the appointing authority that he was not a suitable for appointment in Delhi Police, could not be seen to be unwarranted. In R. Radhakrishnans case (supra), the candidate in reply to a question in the application form whether he had ever been convicted in any criminal case as an accused had stated that he had not been involved in any case and subsequently it had transpired that he had suppressed the material fact and consequently, his candidature was cancelled. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2008) 10 SCC 450, the Apex Court held that if a candidate was merely involved in a criminal case and he was acquitted much before his date of appointment and for which he had given all information to the authorities as is required under the law, his candidature cannot be cancelled because the accused is presumed to be innocent until proves guilty and the trial courts acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. In Sandeep Kumars case (supra), the Apex Court held that even in certain cases of concealment of involvement in criminal cases, cancellation of selection or denial of selection has to be considered as illegal. In the said case, the Apex Court relied upon the judgment in the case of Morris v. Crown Office (supra) and observed that young people often commit indiscretions and such indiscretions are often condoned rather than to brand them as criminals for the rest of their lives. In Omveer Yadavs case, the High Court made a distinction in matters of cases under Sections 302, 304, 324/34 IPC. The offence under Section 302 IPC is murder, under 304, it is culpable homicide not amounting to murder, under 324, it is voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons. They are all very serious and heinous crimes. The Apex Court in Sushil Kumars case (supra) and R. Radhakrishnans case (supra) supported the plea of the Department, as the cases against those candidates were under Sections 304, 324/34 IPC and held that the view taken by the appointing authority in the background of the case could not be said to be unwarranted. But in Omveer Yadavs case (supra) his name was not even included in the FIR. The High Court has, therefore, held that the ratio in both R. Radhakrishnans case (supra) and Sushil Kumars case (supra) could not have been relied upon by the Department. The respondents have dealt with the case of Jai Prakash (supra) also on the basis of judgment in Sushil Kumars case (supra). In Sunil Kumars case (supra), the charge against the accused was under Sections 323/504/506 IPC for voluntarily causing hurt, insult intended to provoke breech of the peace and false statement, rumour, etc. circulated with intent to cause mutiny or offence against the public peace etc. It was similar to W.P. (C) No.2068/2010- Govt. of NCT of Delhi and another v. Robin Singh, 171 (2010) DLT 705 where the accused was acquitted. This Tribunal originally allowed the OA challenging the order of the respondents terminating his service and the High Court upheld the said order. In Dinesh Kumars case (supra), the alleged offences committed by the respondents were again under Sections 323, 504, 506 IPC. The Honble High Court observed that all those offences are non-cognizable and bailable. Referring to its earlier judgment in Robin Singhs case (supra), the High Court examined whether a conviction of competent court of law in those cases would justify non-grant of public appointment. Answering the question in the negative, the High Court held that the primary consideration was whether public interest/public good would be jeopardized, if person with a criminal background is inducted in public service. In Het Ram Meenas case (supra) also, the offence committed was under Section 336 IPC (doing any act which endangers human life or the personal safety of others) which is again a bailable one. The High Court held that the petitioner did not suppress any information when he applied for the job. He rather disclosed that he was convicted but let-off on probation. Referring to Robin Singhs case (supra) again, the High Court observed that today with plea bargaining, a well recognized facet of the administration of criminal law and part of criminal jurisprudence in India, large number of cases involving thousands and thousands of people through out the country appear before summary courts and pay small amounts of fine. The High Court also observed that there should be a difference between penal offences of grave, serious and involving moral turpitude or offences belonging to other categories. For example, the State of Haryana has made list of such offences and they are: Sections 120-A, 121-A, 122 to 124, 161, 161-1A, 165, 167, 181, 182, 193 to 201, 205, 209, 293, 302, 304, 307, 354, 359, 362, 363 to 366, 366-A, 366-B, 367 to 373, 376, 377, 379, 380, 391, 392, 398 to 400, 403, 404, 406 to 409, 417 to 421, 449, 450, 453 to 458, 465 to 468, 471 to 476, 477-A, 489-A, 489-B, 489-C, 489-D, 489-E, 493 to 498 of the Penal Code. They are offences which do not carry any mandatory sentence of imprisonment but if at all to be imprisoned, the term is less than three years and the offender can be let-off, with payment of fine. The orders of the Tribunal in Anoop Kumars case (supra), Samraj Singhs case (supra), Mandeeps case (supra) and Shani Kumars case (supra) fall within the aforesaid category. On the other hand, the judgments of the High Court of Delhi relied upon by the respondents are those cases where the candidates for the posts in Delhi Police were involved in heinous crime, moral turpitude and their acquittals were due to the eye witness turning hostile as in the case of Sushil Kumar (supra). In the case of Mahesh Dahiya (supra), the petitioner was involved in Sections 363/364A/506/34 IPC (kidnapping, kidnapping for ransom and criminal intimidation). The High Court, therefore, held that the view taken by the appointing authority in the said background of the case could not be said to be unwarranted. Again, in Gokul Ram Meenas case (supra), the High Court observed that a person seeking employment in Police requires utmost integrity, propriety and uprightness of character. The judgments of the High Court in the cases of Sanjeev Kumar, Dharam Vir Singh and Sandeep fall under the same category.

47.Â To summarize, there are no hard and fast rule to be applied in such cases. Each case has to be examined considering its peculiar facts and circumstances with application of mind and decision taken. However, the following are some of the relevant points to be considered by the respondents while denying appointment to a candidate/canceling the appointment of an employee:

(i) The modern approach should be to reform a person instead of branding him as a criminal, all his life.

(ii) The approach and attitude in considering the cases of applicants who have been convicted in any criminal case should have a change; the minor indiscretions made by the young people shall be condoned,

(iii)Â Filling up the application forms truthfully, disclosing that the candidate was prosecuted and convicted alone by any criminal court does not entitle a person to be appointed in the Police service. The administrative authority may adjudge his suitability based on the grave and serious offence and the moral turpitude in which he is involved,

(iv) Merely because one was involved in a criminal case but acquitted before the date of appointment for which he has given all information to the authorities required under the law, he cannot be denied employment,

(v) Merely because an FIR was lodged against a person, it cannot ipso facto lead to the conclusion that he cannot be treated unsuitable for public service.

(vi) Merely because a person has been prosecuted in respect of any criminal offence but has been acquitted of those offences alleged against him, he cannot be disqualified for public appointment,

(vii) Conviction, not on account of any moral turpitude shall not be treated as conviction for the purpose of disqualifying a candidate for his entry into service and his further retention in service,

(viii) Mere involvement in a criminal case or registration of an FIR is not a proof of involvement in a criminal case, unless the trial court delivers the verdict holding one guilty of the offences,

(ix) A person with stigma cannot be enrolled but an innocent person cannot be denied the right for public employment, if he has been falsely implicated and there is no incriminating material against him,

(x) A candidate who has been convicted in heinous crime and who concealed those information in the application and attestation forms shall not be enrolled,

(xi) The case of a candidate who has been acquitted in the criminal case but concealed that information in the application and attestation forms should be carefully examined by the Screening Committee and appropriate decision shall be taken, particularly from the point of view his moral character and any other cases pending against him,

(xii) Once the findings of the trial court are based on the fundamental principles of the criminal jurisprudence, the acquittal is the presumption of one being innocent,

(xiii) Administrative authorities should not overreach or override whatever is recorded on judicial side by the court of criminal jurisdiction,

(xiv) If the acquittal by the trial court is not challenged by the prosecution in the higher forum by making an appeal against the acquittal, the decision of the trial court acquitting the accused stands final and cannot be questioned or interpreted otherwise by the administrative authority,

(xv) In order to minimize discretionary powers disentitling the persons convicted for offences to public employment, such offences shall be of grave and serious nature and involving moral turpitude,

(xvi) Guidelines issued by the Executive authorities in their Standing Orders shall be followed strictly and there shall be specific reasons on record for departure from them,

(xvii) Plea bargaining and concept of summary trials shall be given due consideration and the persons concerned shall not be made disentitled for public employment notwithstanding that he has been acquitted,

(xviii) The primary consideration shall be, whether public interest and public good would be jeopardized if a person with a criminal background is of inducted in public service,

(xix) Whether the accused has been acquitted by giving benefit of doubt or it is a clean acquittal has to be seen after going through the judgment of the criminal court fully. Here also the nature of offences has to be considered properly,

(xx) In the case of acquittal from the charge by the court pursuant to the compromise arrived at between the parties and the witness did not support the prosecution, the nature of the offence has to be gone into; and

(xxi) In the case of compounding offence also, what is important is the nature of the offence.

(xxii) Respondents are within their right either to cancel the candidature or to terminate the service of one who deliberately withhold or suppressed relevant information.

(xxiii) The Screening Committee shall consider each issue with due application of mind and not in a routine or mechanical manner. It shall also give detailed and reasoned order while rejecting the candidature of any person observing the principle of natural justice,

In the light of the above illustrations, we may now examine the individual cases in this common order.

O.A. No. 4219/2011 - Prem Singh Choudhary v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi and others

48.Â In this case, the applicant belongs to village Mahalakpur, Post Barodameo, Tehsil Laxmangarh, Distt. Alwar (Rajasthan) and he was involved in FIR No.39/2007 dated 15.02.2007 under Sections 143/323/341 IPC. The offence under Section 143 is âBeing a member of an unlawful assemblyâ. It is a bailable offence and necessary punishment prescribed for the offence is âimprisonment for 6 years. The offence under Section 323 is âvoluntarily causing heart which is also bailable. The maximum punishment awardable for the said offence is âimprisonment for 1 year or fine of Rs.1000/- or both. The offence under Section 341 is âwrongfully restraining any person which is bailable and the prescribed minimum punishment is âsimple imprisonment of 1 year, or fine of Rs.1000/- or both. According to the respondents themselves, the applicant was acquitted vide judgment/order dated 04.12.2009 and he had disclosed those facts in both the application as well as the attestation forms. According to the impugned order, the Screening Committee considered the gravity of his offence and the nature of his involvement found him not suitable for police service. The Screening Committee has also stated that though the matter was compromised but the applicants criminal intention incapacitated the victim. In our considered view, the Screening Committee has not properly applied its mind. The applicant was involved in relatively minor offences. The parties have compromised and thereby he was acquitted by the Court. In such cases, the Screening Committee is expected to see only the nature of the charge. However, without going into any such aspects, the Screening Committee in an arbitrary and mechanical manner held him unsuitable. In effect, the Screening Committee has declared him as criminal despite the fact that Court has acquitted him. Undisputedly the involvement of the applicant is not in any heinous crime involving moral turpitude. Hence we are of the firm view that the cancellation of candidature of the applicant was absolutely unwarranted and arbitrary.

O.A.No.4499/2011 - Rajesh Kumar Meena v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi and others

49. In this case, the applicant is a resident of village Kherhi Mundawar, Distt. Dausa, Rajasthan. The allegation against him was that he committed offences under Sections 341, 323, 354 and 379 of IPC. The offence under Section 341 is âwrongfully restraining any person which is bailable and the prescribed punishment is âsimple imprisonment of 1 year, or fine of Rs.1000/- or both. Offence under Section 323 is âvoluntarily causing heart which is also bailable carrying the punishment of âimprisonment for 1 year, or fine of Rs.1000/- or both. Offence under Section 354 is âassault or use of criminal force to a women with intent to outrage her modesty which is bailable and carrying the punishment of âimprisonment for 2 years, or fine, or both. Offence under Section 379 is âtheft which is a non-cognizable and carrying the punishment of âimprisonment of 3 years or fine or both. It is seen that the Screening Committee has taken into consideration the involvement of the applicant for the offence under Section 354 of IPC which is a heinous crime. He was involved in âtheft which is also an offence of serious gravity. He secured acquittal from the criminal court only on account of compromise. Hence one can legitimately say that with the stigma attached the applicant has not been removed and he has not come out clean in criminal trial. Hence we do not find fault with the findings of the Screening Committee and the consequential cancellation of the candidature of the applicant.

O.A.No.958/2012 - Raj Kumar v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi and another

50.Â The allegation against the applicant in this case is that he was involved in FIR No.283/2007 in P.S. Srimadho Pur, Distt. Sikar (Rajasthan) under Sections 143, 323, 451 and 336 of IPC. In the said case, he was acquitted by the court vide order dated 22.05.2008. The offence under Section 143 IPC is âbeing a member of an unlawful assembly, offence under Section 323 is âvoluntarily causing heart, offence under Section 451 is âHouse-trespass in order to the commission of an offence punishable with imprisonment and the offence under Section 336 IPC is âdoing any act which endangers human life or the personal safety of others. According to the applicant, he was innocent and he had no connection with the criminal case. Rather the FIR against him was out of family dispute between his father and his elder brother. Later the dispute was settled and criminal case ended in his acquittal. But the Screening Committee did not find him suitable for appointment to the post of Constable (Executive) Male in Delhi Police. While arriving at such a conclusion, the Screening Committee considered the nature of the applicants involvement in the aforesaid criminal case against him. In fact, the Screening Committee came to a different conclusion that the applicant tried to outrage the modesty of the daughter-in-law of the complainant. On the contrary, there is no such case against him even before the criminal court. In such circumstances and in our considered view, the Screening Committee arbitrarily decided to cancel the candidature of the applicant. Hence we are of the view that he said cancellation of the candidature of the applicant was absolutely unwarranted and hence not sustainable.

O.A.No.245/2012 - Smt. Deepa Tomar v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi and another

51. The applicant in this O.A., Ms. Deepa Tomar disclosed in her application form and the attestation form that case No.198/2003 under Section 364 IPC was registered against her and it was pending in the court of CJM, Bhagpat, UP. Her candidature was, therefore, kept pending. Later on, she was acquitted in the case vide judgment dated 04.05.2011. The offence under Section 364 IPC is âkidnapping or abducting in order to murder. She underwent the trial and the court of Additional District Judge, Bhagpat vide judgment dated 04.01.2011 acquitted her from the charges. The applicant has also explained that she was falsely implicated in the aforesaid case as an offshoot of the matrimonial problem between her and the family of the in-laws to avoid proceedings under Section 498-A IPC. The Screening Committee did not consider those aspects at all. On the other hand, the Screening Committee did not consider her suitable for appointment in Delhi Police on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove the charges and thereby she got benefit of doubt. In our considered opinion, the Screening Committee is only trying to overreach the findings of the Judge in the criminal case. When there is no evidence against an accused, naturally the prosecution case has to fail. Therefore, in our considered opinion, the denial of appointment to the applicant is absolutely unjustified.

O.A.No.2503/2011 - Shiv Singh v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi and others

52.Â The applicant, Shri Shiv Singh, in the OA, has disclosed in his application form as well as in the attestation form that he was involved in FIR No.410/2009 under Sections 143/323/341/379 IPC. Offence under Section 143 IPC is âBeing a member of an unlawful assembly, offence under Section 323 IPC is âvoluntarily causing hurt, offence under Section 341 IPC is âwrongfully restraining any person, and offence under Section 379 is âtheft. In the aforesaid case, the applicant was acquitted by the court vide order dated 10.12.2009 as both the parties had compromised the matter. However, the Screening Committee observed that he along with his associate armed with deadly weapons, criminally trespassed into the house of the complainant and assaulted the members of the family and the applicant was also involved in a case of theft. However, it is seen that what the Screening Committee considered against the applicant are the allegations made against him in the FIR which has not been proved. Allegations remain allegations till they are proved. Therefore, there is no justification on the part of the Screening Committee that he has a propensity in indulging in crime without fear of law. The said conclusion is also based on surmises and without any foundation.

53. In the above facts and circumstances of these cases, we allow O.A.Nos.4219/2011, O.A.No.958/2012, O.A.No.245/2012 and O.A. No.2503/2011. Consequently, the respective impugned show cause notices and the orders canceling their candidature are quashed and set aside. Further, we direct the respondents to issue letters of appointment to them for the posts in question, with all consequential benefits which are enjoyed by their batch-mates except back-wages, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In case the respondents fail to do so, the applicant will be entitled for the full pay and allowances from the expiry of the aforesaid period of two months. The respondents shall also pass appropriate orders in those cases within the aforesaid period under intimation to the applicants and all other concerned. There shall be no order as to costs.

54.Â As regards O.A.No.4499/2011 is concerned, it fails and, therefore, the same is dismissed with no order as to costs.

Let a copy of this order be placed in each file.

Court	Central Administrative Tribunal CAT Principal Bench New Delhi
Decided On	Mar-06-2013
Case Number	O.A. Nos. 4219, 4499 & 2503 of 2011 & 958, 245 of 2012
Judge	G. GEORGE PARACKEN, MEMBER (J) & THE HONOURABLE MR. MANJULIKA GAUTAM, MEMBER (A)
Appellant	Prem Singh and Others
Respondent	Govt. of Nct of Delhi Through Commissioner of Police and Others

Prem Singh and Others Vs. Govt. of Nct of Delhi Through Commissioner of Police and Others - Court Judgment