Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Ltd. and Another Vs. M/S Datar Switchgear Limited and Others - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
arbitration and conciliation act, 1996 – sections 34(2)(b)(ii), 34(2)(a)(iv), 37 – grant of contract – installation of contract objects – fundamental breach of contract - non-supply of lists – award contrary to the public policy - appellant/ mseb was constituted by the state government in accordance with the provisions of section 5(1) of the electricity (supply) act, 1948 and floated a tender for the supply, erection, commissioning and maintenance of load management - respondent/dsl was granted contract for installing additional contract objects - dispute arose between the parties and respondent/dsl served a notice on appellant/mseb that they would not install further gadgets, in view of the breach committed by appellant/ mseb - respondent/dsl invoked arbitration.....oral judgment: (v.m. kanade, j.) 1. the appellant – maharashtra state electricity board which is now known as maharashtra state electricity distribution company limited (msedcl) has filed this appeal under section 37 of the arbitration and conciliation act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as “the said act”) challenging the judgment and order passed by the learned single judge (coram: mrs. r.s. dalvi, j.) dated 18/3/2009. by the said judgment and order, the learned single judge dismissed the petition which was filed by the appellant herein and confirmed the award dated 18/06/2004 which was given by the arbitral tribunal. 2. there is a chequered history of litigation between the parties. for the sake of convenience the appellant shall be hereinafter referred to as.....

Judgment:

Oral Judgment: (V.M. Kanade, J.)

1. The Appellant – Maharashtra State Electricity Board which is now known as Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Limited (MSEDCL) has filed this appeal under section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as “the said Act”) challenging the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge (Coram: Mrs. R.S. Dalvi, J.) dated 18/3/2009. By the said judgment and order, the learned Single Judge dismissed the Petition which was filed by the Appellant herein and confirmed the Award dated 18/06/2004 which was given by the Arbitral Tribunal.

2. There is a chequered history of litigation between the parties. For the sake of convenience the Appellant shall be hereinafter referred to as “MSEB”, though now it is known as MSEDCL and the Respondent M/s Datar Switchgear Ltd shall be hereinafter referred to as “DSL”. The matter travelled to the Apex Court on more than couple of occasions. Criminal complaints were filed by DSL against the Officers of MSEB and one such criminal case is still pending. MSEB also has made counter-allegations against DSL. Aggrieved by the Award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal on 18/06/2004, MSEB filed an Arbitration Petition under section 34 of the said Act which was heard by the learned Single Judge of this Court (Coram: D.K. Deshmukh, J.) and he was pleased to allow the Petition and set aside the Arbitral Award. Against this order, DSL preferred an appeal under section 37 which was partly allowed by the Division Bench (Coram: Bilal Nazki and Kumbhakoni, JJ.) and the matter was remanded to the learned Single Judge. The order of remand was challenged by both, MSEB and DSL. The appeal filed by DSL challenging the order of remand was dismissed. Thereafter, Arbitration Petition was heard by the learned Single Judge Mrs R.S. Dalvi, J., who was pleased to dismiss the Petition and confirm the Arbitral Award by her judgment and order dated 18/3/2009. Thereafter, appeal filed by MSEB was heard by the Apex Court and it was disposed of. Interim orders which were passed during pendency of the Arbitration Petition and the present appeal also were subject matter of further orders which were passed.

3. This appeal was heard before number of Benches, some of them had recused themselves and some of the Division Benches directed that the appeal should be removed from their Board after it was heard at length for number of days. Similarly, allegations have been made by MSEB and by DSL against each other that what was not argued before the Arbitral Tribunal was argued for the first time in the Petition which was filed under section 34 and new grounds were taken in the present appeal which were never urged before the Arbitral Tribunal or before the learned Single Judge. Submissions have been made by both parties on the interpretation of the order of the Apex Court in appeal filed by MSEB against the order of remand passed by the Division Bench headed by Bilal Nazki, J. These facts indicate that the matter was contested tooth and nail by both the parties, before all forums.

4. We have heard both, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant – MSEB and the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of DSL at great length. The matter was initially heard by the Bench of V.M. Kanade and Rais, JJ in April and May, 2013, i.e., before vacation. However, after the vacation, since the Bench was reconstituted, the reconstituted Bench (Coram V.M. Kanade and K.R. Shriram, JJ) again reheard the matter from 19/6/2013 onwards and on daily basis in the afternoon session from 24/6/2013. The submissions made by MSEB and DSL finally concluded on 8/8/2013.

5. We propose to decide this appeal with Notices of Motion taken out therein by DSL and Chamber Summonses filed by MSEB in the following manner:-

1	Brief Synopsis and chronology of events.
2	Remand
3	Submissions and finding on interpretation of the order of Apex Court dated 25/8/2009 passed in SLP filed by MSEB, challenging the order of remand passed by the Division Bench of this Court headed by Bilal Nazki, J
4	Notice of Motion No.3227 of 2010
5	Notice of Motion No.461 of 2010.
6	Scope of interference under sections 34 and 37 of the said Act; the interpretation of the term “public policy” and; power of the Court to interfere on that ground.
7	Points (i) to (vi) extensively urged by MSEB
8	Submissions and finding on Point No.(i) Whether the Arbitral Tribunal and the learned Single Judge were justified in coming to the conclusion that the MSEB hadcommittedbreach of contract by not supplying DTC Lists?
9	Submissions and finding on Point No.(ii) Whether the contract was one complete contract and the same could not be split up as argued by the claimants?
10	Submissions and finding on Point No.(iii) Whether Claimants/DSL waived their right to receive complete lists of locations; and on Point No (iv) Whether the Award is contrary to the public policy as mentionedundersection 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996?
11	Submissions and finding on Point No. (iv) Whether the Award is contrary to the Public Policy as mentioned under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996? (v) Whether the damages were properly awarded? and (vi) Whether the aspect of mitigation was properly considered?
12	Chamber Summonses filed by MSEB
13	Conclusion.

Brief synopsis and chronology of events:

6. MSEB was constituted by the State Government in accordance with the provisions of section 5(1) of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. Later on the distribution arm was hived off and reconstituted as Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Ltd (MSEDCL). The erstwhile MSEB awarded work to DSL which became public limited Company in 1994. DSL had an expertise of manufacturing various electric and electronic gadgets such as Low Voltage Circuit Breakers, Electronic Energy Meters and Electronic Load Management Systems. The work was awarded to DSL for the purpose of installation of gadgets called Low Tension Switched Capacitors (LTSC) on its Distribution Transformer Centres (DTC). The Board which was constituted under the provisions of Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 was concerned about the huge loss caused to the MSEB while undertaking the work of transmission and distribution and, for that purpose, had undertaken installation of LTSC. The second order was placed on 30/9/1993 with DSL for supply of 3425 Capacitors and, thereafter, on 30/9/1994, DSL received an order for supply and installation of 9130 Capacitors. The duration of work order was for a period of six years.

7. MSEB floated a Tender in June, 1996 for the supply, erection, commissioning and maintenance of Load Management System called L.M. System. The Tender contemplated that successful bidder would install these gadgets at his own cost after manufacturing them in his factory and, in return, he would get lease rentals on each gadget for a period of 10 years. As per the Tender the quantity which was to be supplied was 23,760 and the objects were to be matching with technical specifications and commercial terms for the purpose of reducing loss caused during transmission and distribution. DSL submitted their Tender on 15/7/1996. MSEB issued a Letter of Intent in favour of the Claimants on 15/1/1997 for supply of 11,760 gadgets. A further order was given to DSL for replacing LTSC supplied pursuant to work order of the year 1993 and 1994 and the replacement was in respect of 12,555 gadgets and the replacement was to be made with the contract objects of new specification. DSL submitted their package offer by letter dated 24/1/1997. MSEB issued their Letter of Intent on 18/2/1997 and this Letter of Intent was thereafter followed by placement of work order for total quantity of 47,987 gadgets. These gadgets were to be installed in various zones all over Maharashtra. The break up of the gadgets which were to be installed has been mentioned in the work order which is as under:-

i) Annexure B-I of the work order mentions about 11,760 gadgets which were originally allotted on 15/1/1997.

ii) Annexure B-II of the work order gives List of 12,555 gadgets which were to be replaced against the installation pursuant to 1993 and 1994 orders with the new gadgets which were supposed to be installed as per specifications mentioned in the Tender floated in June, 1996 vide Tender No.TD/D/LT/CAP/LR/96/1

iii) Annexure B-III mentions additional 23,672 gadgets which were to be installed by DSL.

Though, initially, the Letter of Intent was in respect of supply of 11,760 gadgets, the second Letter of Intent dated 18/2/1997 mentions the replacement of old gadgets by new gadgets and pursuant to decision taken by the Board, DSL was granted contract for installing additional 23,672 contract objects. This was reflected in a single work order dated 27/3/1997 issued for total quantity of 47,987 contract objects.

8. MSEB had agreed to open a Letter of Credit for each financial year. It was agreed that Letter of Credit would be renewed every year after the end of financial year so that as soon as the gadgets are installed, lease rentals would become payable to DSL and they could en-cash the lease rental amount thereafter from the Letter of Credit after supplying the documents confirming that they were successfully installed.

9. Dispute arose between the parties and, finally, DSL served a notice on MSEB on 19/2/1999 informing MSEB that they would not install further gadgets after December, 1998 in view of the breach committed by MSEB. They, however, offered to continue maintenance of 17,294 objects which were installed by them on the condition that lease rentals for the entire period of 10 years is paid in advance to DSL. On 13/4/1999, DSL invoked Arbitration. On 21/4/1999, the contract was terminated by DSL. Thereafter, the order was passed by this Court under Section 11 of the said Act.

10. DSL filed a claims under various heads aggregating to Rs. 1053,06,78,342/-. MSEB filed a counter-claim, claiming aggregate sum of Rs 1273,70,26,669/-.

11. MSEB examined the following 26 witnesses:-

“(1) Mr. Ghodaskar, Executive Engineer – Head Office

(2) Mr. Bapat, Superintending Engineer – Head Office

(3) Mr. Inamdar, Chief Engineer – Head Office

(4) Mr. Buch (expert witness)

(5) Mr. T. P. Vijay (expert witness)

(6) Mr. Jadhav, Junior Engineer – Nasik

(7) Mr. Kulkarni, Sub Engineer – Nasik

(8) Mr. Lohar, Junior Engineer – Dhule

(9) Mr. T. K. Patil, Executive Engineer – Dhule

(10) Mr. Deshpande, Deputy Executive Engineer – Aurangabad

(11) Mr. Karunan, Deputy Executive Engineer – Jalgaon

(12) Mr. Pathak, Sub-Engineer – Jalgaon

(13) Mr. Sonarikar, Executive Engineer – Jalgaon

(14) Mr. Bhonsale, Junior Engineer – Satara

(15) Mr. Kannawar, Junior Engineer – Ahmednagar

(16) Mr. Mangulkar, Executive Engineer – Nanded,

(17) Mr. Kaulwar Deputy Executive Engineer – Nanded

(18) Mr. Pandilwar, Deputy Executive Engineer – Nanded

(19) Mr. Makkitoya, Sub-Engineer – Nanded

(20) Mr. Kanjalkar, Deputy Engineer – Nanded

(21) Mr. Karanjikar, Sub-Engineer - Nanded

(22) Mr. Dixit, Assistant Engineer – Nanded

(23) Mr. Shaikh Murtaza, Junior Engineer – Nanded

(24) Mr. Dhampalwar, Junior Engineer – Nanded

(25) Mr. Rasool, Junior Engineer – Nanded

(26) Mr. Kaveeshwar, Superintending Engineer - Sangli.”

DSL examined their Managing Director who was in-charge of the project.

12. The Arbitral Tribunal partly allowed the claim of DSL and held that they were entitled to a sum of Rs 185,97,86,399/- out of which an amount of Rs 6,81,99,390 was to be deducted and the said amount of Rs 1,79,15,87,009/- was to be paid with interest @ 10% per annum, payable from the date of Award till realization of the amount awarded. Cost of Rs 1,00,00,0000/- was awarded in favour of DSL. Counterclaim of MSEB was dismissed.

Remand

13. Before we take into consideration the rival submissions made on merits, we would like to first deal with the submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of MSEB, praying that the matter may be remanded to the learned Single Judge principally on the ground that submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel Mr. Rai that Award being against the public policy etc had not been considered.

14. However, in the written submissions which have been submitted, it is urged that if this court allows the appeal filed by MSEB then the matter may not be remanded, however, if this Court is inclined to dismiss the appeal then, in that case, the matter may be remanded. In view of this submission, it will be necessary for us to deal with the said issue.

(Emphasis supplied)

15. After the Appeal No.166 of 2009 was filed by MSEB on 8/4/2009, in the grounds of Appeal viz ground No.61 and 87 it was expressly urged that the Award was liable to be set aside under section 34(2)(a)(iv). During the course of hearing, it was urged that the learned Single Judge had not taken into consideration certain points which were argued by the learned Counsel for the MSEB and, on the contrary, certain points which were not urged by him had been referred to in the impugned judgment. After the case came up before the Bench headed by Mhase, J., liberty was given by the Division Bench to seek clarification from the learned Single Judge. Accordingly, Notice of Motion was taken out by the MSEB, seeking clarification in respect of paras 10, 90 and 91 of the judgment. The principal contention was that though the learned Counsel who had appeared on behalf of MSEB had never made any submissions under section 34(2) (a)(iv), the learned Single Judge had held that Arbitral Award was not illegal and there was no jurisdictional error under section 34(2)(a)(iv). It was then contended that what was argued was that the Award was in conflict with public policy as covered by section 34(2)(b)(ii).

16. Again, there was a controversy as to what was argued before the learned Single Judge and what was considered by the learned Single Judge in the judgment. Allegations and counter allegations were made by both sides. In the Notice of Motion, clarification was sought only in respect of paras 10, 90 and 91. The learned Single Judge issued clarification stating that what was contended by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of MSEB was that the Award was against the law governing parties with regard to breach, if any, committed under contract and damages, if any, were awardable for such breach. The learned Single Judge observed that what was argued by the learned Senior Counsel was considered in paras 10, 90 and 91 of the judgment. The learned Single Judge in her order gave a clarification and did not accept the contention of the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of MSEB and, thereafter, after the order was pronounced, the Notice of Motion taken out by MSEB was withdrawn. Mr. Vikas Singh, the learned Senior Counsel urged that in the Arbitration Petition specific ground was raised that the award was against the public policy. Reliance was placed on Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. vs. Saw Pipes (2003) 5 SCC 705), McDermotInternational vs. Burn Standard Co. (2006) 11 SCC 181 (Para 65)etc. It was contended that it was never urged that the Award was invalid on the ground of section 34(2)(a) (iv) and what was urged was that the Award was invalid on the ground of 34(2)(b)(i) and (ii). He invited our attention to the written submissions and also to the judgments of the Apex Court in Saw Pipes and Mcdermotetc. and other judgments which are referred to in Arbitration Petition. It was contended that there was complete non-application of mind on the part of the learned Single Judge since the learned Single Judge had proceeded to decide the Petition under section 34 on the grounds which were not urged and had failed to take into consideration the submissions of MSEB that the Award was against the public policy. It was contended that a duty was cast on the Court to consider whether it is against the public policy under section 34(2)(b) (ii).

17. In our view, submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of MSEB cannot be accepted. Firstly, it has to be noted that after a direction was given by the Bench headed by Mhase, J., directing MSEB to seek clarification and Notice of Motion was taken out in which clarification was sought on paras 10, 90 and 91, the learned Single Judge (Coram: Mrs. R.S. Dalvi, J.) had given clarification in her order dated 30/4/2009. The learned Single Judge has observed as under:-

“P.C.:-

The Petitioners require clarification of paragraphs 10, 90 and 91 in my order dated 18.03.2009. It is clarified as follows:

(i)The last sentence of paragraph 10 is what the Court has observed. The second last sentence of paragraph 10 is what the counsel of the petitioners has contended.

(ii) The Section of Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 referred to in paragraph 90 is what the Court itself considered with regard to the interference with the award of the Learned Tribunal.

(iii) Section 53 and 73 of the Indian Contract Act which the Court considered were substantive provisions of law which were to be considered in the judgment upon the contention of the counsel on behalf of the petitioners that the award was contrary to substantive provisions of law.

Hence notice of motion No.1554 of 2009 is allowed to be withdrawn by the counsel of the petitioners.”

Thereafter, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of MSEB sought leave to withdraw the Notice of Motion. Having thus withdrawn the said Notice of Motion, it is not now open for MSEB to again re-agitate the said question. If MSEB was aggrieved by the clarification which was given by the learned Single Judge, it need not have withdrawn the Notice of Motion. Secondly, perusal of the order passed by the learned Single Judge in the Notice of Motion indicates that the learned Single Judge has stated that what was argued was mentioned in the said paragraphs and she had accordingly answered the said submissions in her order dated 30/4/2009. It is a settled position in law that the observation made by the Court in respect of what is said in the court has to be relied upon and it is not open for the advocate to argue that what the learned Judge has stated is wrong. The position is quite well settled which is evident from the observations made by the Apex court in the following judgments:-

(1) Shankar K. Mandal vs. State of Bihar and Others (2003) 9 SCC 519)(Paras 9 to 12)

(2) JagvirSingh and Others v. State (Delhi Admn) (2007) 5 SCC 359)(Para 4)

(3) Bhavnagar University vs. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd and Others (2003) 2 SCC 111)(Para 61)

(4) State of Maharashtra vs. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak and Another (1982) 2 SCC 463)(Para 4)

The Apex Court in all these cases has consistently held that the statements of fact as to what transpired at the hearing, recorded in the judgment of the Court, are conclusive of the facts so stated and no one can contradict such statements by affidavit or other evidence. It has been held in the State of Maharashtra vs. Ramdas (1982) 2 SCC 463)that if a party thinks that happenings in Court have been wrongly recorded in a judgment, it is incumbent upon the party to bring it to the notice of the said court which has recorded the said fact.

18. Apart from that, the affidavit in support of the Notice of Motion was filed by two Officers of MSEB who claimed to be in court when the said submissions were made. When the proceedings for perjury was taken out, they tendered their unconditional apology and it transpired that, in fact, they were not present in Court, though an affidavit to that effect had been filed by them in the Notice of Motion. Even otherwise, submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel for MSEB that the Award passed by the Tribunal was against the public policy was, in fact, considered and rejected by the learned Single Judge (Coram: R.S. Dalvi, J.). In para 89, the learned Single Judge has observed as under:-

“89 The contention of Mr. Rai on behalf of the Petitioner that the entire effort is worth little and is vitiated by “the law of the land” with regard to the measure of damages is not only unsound but egregiously unjust. His reliance upon a host of judgments with regard to a number of unrelated aspects of waiver, measure of damages etc has not succeeded in a better analogy or arithmetical calculation which could have been adopted in the place and stead of the Learned Arbitrators' sound reasoning and exercise of conservativeness, balance and caution. Indeed, “there is a mighty big difference between good sound reasons and reasons that sound good”!”

(Emphasis supplied)

Similarly, in para 91, the learned Single Judge has observed as under:-

“91. Mr. Rai contended that the Learned Arbitrators erred from the inception in not appreciating that the Respondent had waived the requirement of lists and hence should have proceeded without such lists, (was he expected to go to the spot when the spot was not spotted ?), and consequently there was no breach which would allow repudiation of the contract or claim of damages and further the very measure of damages was seminally faulty being rough and ready and not precise and proper. Hence relying upon the case of Delhi Development Authority Vs. M/s. R.S. Sharma and Co. New Delhi 2008 11 Scale 663 @ 672in paragraph 12 he contended that under Section 34 of the Act, the Award was liable to be set aside. He contended that such an award was contrary to the substantive provisions of law (in this case the Indian contract Act Sections 53 and 73) and patently illegal (being against those provisions of law). Though the principles would certainly govern the considerations of Arbitral Awards, this case does not lend itself to any illegality which would vitiate the award. Further cases referred by him, ONGC Vs Saw Pipes Ltd. (2003) 5 SCC 705, Mc. Dermott International INC vs. Burn Standard Co. Ltd. (2006) 11 SCC 181 go the same way.”

(Emphasis supplied)

The learned Single Judge has made a specific reference to the judgment in ONGC vs. Saw Pipes (2003) 5 SCC 705)and in McDermotvs. Burn Standard (2006) 11 SCC 181 (Para 65). Therefore, it cannot be said that the submission made by Mr. Rai on the ground of public policy was not considered. In this context, it was submitted that in para 91 reference had been made to section 53 and 73 of the Indian Contract Act. It was submitted that the said submission had been made by the learned Counsel for DSL and not by MSEB. It was submitted that MSEB had referred to section 55 and 39 of the Contract Act. The said submission cannot be accepted. What has to be noted is that the contention that the Award was contrary to legal substantive provision and public policy was considered and the submission was rejected. Similarly, in para 90, the learned Single Judge has observed as under:-

“90. The exercise by the Learned Arbitrators in following the law of damages contained in Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act in a case of such fundamental breach of a contract as would prevent a party from performing his part claiming to be damnified under Section 53 of the said Act as enumerated in the aforesaid cases was both worthy and correct. Further, the contract being for panels commissioned specially for the Petitioner which had no market and hence the damages suffered could not be mitigated by sale in open market to a third party. The consideration of both the aspect does not call for interference under Section 34(2)(iv) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.”

19. In our view, the submission of MSEB cannot be accepted. It is not open for a party to refer to a particular sentence or quotation of a particular section and on that basis come to a conclusion that the learned Judge has not taken into consideration the submission. It is always possible that in a matter of this type, a typographical error may creep in the judgment and instead of section 34(2)(b)(ii), the learned Judge may have referred to section 34(2)(iv) or instead of referring to section 55 and 39 in para 91 reference is made to section 53 and 73 inadvertently which also have been made in para 90 of the judgment. The totality of the order has to be taken into consideration. Reliance cannot be placed on stray sentences or paragraphs. Perusal of the Petition which is filed by MSEB under section 34 before the learned Single Judge itself clearly demonstrates that at two places there is a specific reference to section 34(2)(iv). Mr. Dada, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for DSL has also rightly pointed out that though ground No.61 is now sought to be amended, the other grounds where reference is made to section 34(2)(iv) namely ground No 87 is not sought to be amended. Lastly, it is not open for the parties to say that if the order is not passed in their favour then the matter may be remanded. Lastly, we have practically heard both the Counsels at length on merit and on law and have gone through the Arbitral Award, order passed by the learned Single Judge D.K. Deshmukh, J., order passed by the learned Single Judge R.S. Dalvi, J. after remand, and the order passed by Division Bench headed by Bilal Naski J. We have also gone through the record just in order to ensure that parties do not have any grievance. We have had made it very clear to the parties that we would hear the entire matter on merits and also hear independently the Chamber Summonses and Notices of Motion, taking into consideration the chequered history of this case. The submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel for MSEB that this is a fit case for remand cannot be accepted.

Submissions and finding on interpretation of the order of Apex Court dated 25/8/2009 passed in SLP filed by MSEB, challenging the order of remand passed by the Division Bench of this Court headed by Bilal Nazki, J.

20. Another controversy which has been raised by both the parties at the time of hearing of this appeal is regarding interpretation of the order of Apex Court dated 25/8/2009 in SLP(C) CC No.12131 of 2009. As noted hereinabove, the Arbitral Award was challenged by filing an appeal under section 34 which was initially decided by the learned Single Judge (Coram: D.K. Deshmukh, J.) who was pleased to allow the Petition filed by MSEB. This order was challenged by DSL by filing appeal under section 37 before the Bench headed by Bilal Nazki, J., who was pleased to set aside the order passed by D.K. Deshmukh, J. and remanded the matter to the learned Single Judge for fresh disposal.

21. Both the parties, DSL as well as MSEB challenged the said order of remand. SLP filed by DSL was dismissed by the Apex Court. Thereafter, though the SLP filed by MSEB was pending, in the meantime Arbitration Petition which was remanded was finally heard and it was dismissed by the learned Single Judge Mrs. R.S. Dalvi, J. on 18/3/2009. Thereafter, the SLP filed by MSEB challenging the order of remand came up before the Apex Court. Apex Court disposed of the said SLP as it was infructuous. However, following observations were made by the Apex Court in the said order:-

“…......However, whatever observations that have been made either in the impugned order or in the order passed under section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, would not be taken to be final and concluded by the Appellate Court while deciding the appeal.......”

22. The learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of MSEB interpreted the said order to mean that by virtue of the said order, this Court in Appeal could not take into consideration the observation made by Division Bench headed by Bilal Nazki, J. and the order passed by the learned Single Judge Mrs. R.S. Dalvi J. in Arbitration Petition under section 34. It was therefore contended that the order passed by Mr. Justice D.K. Deshmukh was revived by the Apex Court.

23. On the other hand, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of DSL submitted that the Apex Court had held that SLP had become infructuous and disposed of the same and, as such, observations of the Apex Court could only mean that observation of the Bench headed by Bilal Nazki, J. would not be taken as final by the Appeal Court considering the issue of challenge to the Award. It was contended that as the Supreme Court had so directed, it further clarified that observations in the order passed under section 34 of the Act also should not be taken to be final. It was submitted that the said observations of the Supreme Court should not be construed to mean that the said order of the learned Single Judge D.K. Deshmukh, J., which was set aside by the Bench headed by Bilal Nazki, J. should hold the field. Secondly, it was submitted that direction of the Supreme Court could never refer to the judgment of the learned Single Judge Mrs R.S. Dalvi, J. delivered on 18/3/2009 which was the subject matter of the present appeal.

24. In our view submission made by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of MSEB cannot be accepted. The Apex Court in the said SLP has passed the following order:-

“O R D E R

Taken on board.

Delay condoned.

Leave granted.

Heard Learned Senior Counsel for the parties.

This appeal by special leave was filed against order dated 22nd of October, 2008 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Appeal No.672 of 2005 whereby the High Court had allowed the appeal of the respondent herein and set aside the order dated 3rd August, 2005 passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court in Arbitration Petition No.374 of 2004 and remitted the case back for fresh adjudication in accordance with the provisions of Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

At the time of hearing of this appeal, it was brought to our notice by the learned senior counsel appearing for the parties that after remand, the matter has already been finally decided and an appeal has been filed against the order of the learned Single Judge of the High Court, which is now pending before a Division Bench of the High Court Bombay. That being the position, we are of the view that this appeal has now become infructuous. Accordingly, this appeal is disposed of as having become infructuous. However, whatever observations that have been made either in the impugned order or in the order passed under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, would not be taken to be final and concluded by the Appellate court while deciding the appeal.

There will be no order as to costs.”

It has to be noted that when SLP came up for hearing before the Apex Court, the learned Single Judge Mrs R.S. Dalvi, J. had already heard and decided the Petition under section 34. The direction given by the order of remand was, therefore, already complied with and appeal against that order was pending before this Court. Under these circumstances, the said observations were made by the Apex Court. Since the order of remand was confirmed, the question of revival of the order passed by the learned Single Judge D.K. Deshmukh, J. does not arise since the Apex Court confirmed the order of remand. If the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for MSEB is accepted, it would lead to anomalous position viz that though the order of the learned Single Judge, D.K. Deshmukh, J. was set aside and the matter was remanded, which order was confirmed by the Supreme Court, there would be two orders which would be under challenge in appeal viz the 1st order passed by the learned Single Judge D.K. Deshmukh J and the 2nd order passed by the learned Single Judge Mrs. R.S. Dalvi, J. In our view, therefore, it is not possible to accept the said submission made by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of MSEB. The plain reading of the said order of the Supreme Court obviously indicates that the Supreme Court had directed that the Appellate Court should decide the appeal afresh and that all contentions by both the parties were kept open.

Notice of Motion No.3227 of 2010

25. This Notice of Motion was taken out by DSL in appeal and it was prayed that appeal should be dismissed on the ground that MSEB had committed a fraud before the Arbitrators.

26. It was submitted by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of MSEB that the Appellant had questioned the finding given by the Arbitral Tribunal in the Petition under section 34 as well as in appeal and it had been urged that the said finding needs to be expunged. It was submitted that the learned Arbitrators had framed issue about fraud being committed by the Respondents on claimants, i.e., DSL. It was contended that while deciding the said issue the Arbitrators had made certain observations against Officers of MSEB. It was contended that the said observations were made beyond the scope of the issue framed by the Arbitrators and, even on merits, the observations of the Arbitrators were unjustified for various reasons. It was submitted that the Notice of Motion was, therefore, liable to be dismissed.

27. On the other hand, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on the behalf of DSL submitted that the learned Arbitrators had held that MSEB had fabricated documents such as (i) file containing DTC locations to claim that it had been given to DSL, (ii) document styled as “minutes of meeting” pertaining to discussions held on 24/6/1998 to claim that the requirement of DTC locations had been waived, (iii) Commissioning Report of Dhule Circle to claim that DSL had installed panels without intimation / presence of MSEDCL staff and (iv) failure report from Jalgaon Circle to claim that the panels installed by DSL were failing on the very next day. It was contended that although all these documents were held to be fabricated, MSEB continued to rely on those documents in the Petition and Appeal. It was contended that the MSEB had challenged the finding of Arbitrators and false assertion was made by MSEB in the Arbitration Petition No.374 of 2004. Detailed written submissions have been filed by the learned Senior Counsel in this regard which are annexed as Note No.17.

28. It is not possible to accept the submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of DSL. The Arbitral Award which was confirmed by the learned Single Judge Mrs R.S. Dalvi, J. in the Petition filed under section 34 is challenged by MSEB by filing this Appeal No.166 of 2009. The Apex Court, while confirming the order of remand passed by the Bench headed by Bilal Nazki, J., had directed that all contentions should be kept open. It is, therefore, not possible to accept the submissions of DSL that since reliance has been placed by MSEB on the said documents, this appeal itself should be dismissed on the ground of fraud. There is no manner of doubt that fraud vitiates the proceedings and the Apex Court has held in number of judgments that if it is established that the Plaintiff had committed fraud then suit itself can be dismissed on that ground. However, in the present case, the Arbitral Award which was upheld by the learned Single Judge has been challenged in this appeal and, therefore, it cannot be said that the Appellant is precluded from placing reliance on the said documents. There is, therefore, no merit in the submissions made by DSL. Notice of Motion is, therefore, dismissed.

Notice of Motion No. 461 of 2010

29. This Notice of Motion has been taken out by DSL for striking out various grounds on the plea that the said grounds have not been pleaded by the Appellants before the learned Single Judge. In our view, it is not possible to accept the said submission for the same reasons which have been given while dismissing Notice of Motion No.3227 of 2010.

30. Before we take into consideration further submissions, it will be first necessary to see scope of interference under sections 34 and 37 of the said Act and also on the point of interpretation of the term “public policy” and power of the Court to interfere on that ground.

Scope of interference under sections 34 and 37 of the said Act; the interpretation of the term “public policy” and; power of the Court to interfere on that ground.

Since the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of MSEB has emphasized that the Arbitral Award is liable to be set aside as it being opposed to public policy, it will be necessary to briefly see what is the scope of power of the Court in interfering with the Arbitral Award on that ground. This point is quite well settled.

The Apex Court in ONGC Ltd. vs. Saw Pipes Ltd. (2003) 5 SCC 705)has observed in paragraph 31 as under:-

“31. Therefore, in our view, the phrase 'Public Policy of India' used in Section 34 in context is required to be given a wider meaning. It can be stated that the concept of public policy connotes some matter which concerns public good and the public interest. What is for public good or in public interest or what would be injurious or harmful to the public good or public interest has varied from time to time. However, the award which is, on the face of it, patently in violation of statutory provisions cannot be said to be in public interest. Such award/judgment/decision is likely to adversely affect the administration of justice. Hence, in our view in addition to narrower meaning given to the term 'public policy' in Renusagar'scase (supra) it is required to be held that the award could be set aside if it is patently illegal. Result would be--award could be set aside if it is contrary to:--

(a) fundamental policy of Indian law; or

(b) the interest of India; or

(c) justice or morality, or

(d) in addition, if it is patently illegal.

Illegality must go to the root of the matter and if the illegality is of trivial nature it cannot be held that award is against the public policy. Award could also be set aside if it is so unfair and unreasonable that it shocks the conscience of the Court. Such award is opposed to public policy and is required to be adjudged void.”

Secondly, the Apex Court in McDermotvs. Burn Standard (2006) 11 SCC 181 (Para 65), has observed in paragraphs 61 to 65 as under:-

61. In ONGC [ONGC Ltd. Vs. Saw Pipes Ltd. (2003) 5

SCC 705], this Court observed: (SCC pp.727-28, para 31)

“31. Therefore, in our view, the phrase "public policy of India" used in Section 34 in context is required to be given a wider meaning. It can be stated that the concept of public policy connotes some matter which concerns public good and the public interest. What is for public good or in public interest or what would be injurious or harmful to the public good or public interest has varied from time to time. However, the award which is, on the face of it, patently in violation of statutory provisions cannot be said to be in public interest. Such award/judgment/decision is likely to adversely affect the administration of justice. Hence, in our view in addition to narrower meaning given to the term 'public policy' in Renusagarcase it is required to be held that the award could be set aside if it is patently illegal. The result would be - award could be set aside if it is contrary to:

(a) fundamental policy of Indian law; or

(b) the interest of India; or

(c) justice or morality, or

(d) in addition, if it is patently illegal.

Illegality must go to the root of the matter and if the illegality is of trivial nature it cannot be held that award is against the public policy. Award could also be set aside if it is so unfair and unreasonable that it shocks the conscience of the court. Such award is opposed to public policy and is required to be adjudged void.”

62. We are not unmindful that the decision of this Court in ONGC (supra) had invited considerable adverse comments but the correctness or otherwise of the said decision is not in question before us. It is only for a larger Bench to consider the correctness or otherwise of the said decision. The said decision is binding on us. The said decision has been followed in a large number of cases. [See The Law and Practice of Arbitration and Conciliation by O.P. Malhotra, Second Edn.- p. 1174.]”

“63. Before us, the correctness or otherwise of the aforesaid decision of this Court is not in question. The learned Counsel for both the parties referred to the said decision in extenso.”

“64. We, therefore, would proceed on the basis that ONGC (supra) lays down the correct principles of law.”

Supervisory Jurisdiction

“65. We may consider the submissions of the learned Counsel for the parties on the basis of the broad principles which may be attracted in the instant case, i.e., (i) whether the award is contrary to the terms of contract and, therefore, no arbitrable dispute arose between the parties; (ii) whether the award is in any way violative of the public policy; (iii) whether the award is contrary to the substantive law in India, viz., Sections 55 and 73 of the Indian Contract Act; (iv) whether the reasons are vitiated by perversity in evidence in contract ; (v) whether adjudication of a claim has been made in respect whereof there was no dispute or difference; or (vi) whether the award is vitiated by internal contradictions.”

Thirdly, the Apex Court in Delhi Development Authority vs. R.S. Sharma and Co. (2008) 13 SCC 80), has observed in paragraph 21 as under:-

“21. From the above decisions, the following principles emerge:

(a) An Award, which is

(i) contrary to substantive provisions of law ; or

(ii) the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ; or

(iii) against the terms of the respective contract ; or

(iv) patently illegal, or

(v) prejudicial to the rights of the parties;

isopen to interference by the Court under Section 34(2) of the Act.

(b) The award could be set aside if it is contrary to :

(a) fundamental policy of Indian Law; or

(b) the interest of India; or

(c) justice or morality;

(c) The Award could also be set aside if it is so unfair and unreasonable that it shocks the conscience of the Court.

(d) It is open to the Court to consider whether the Award is against the specific terms of contract and if so, interfere with it on the ground that it is patently illegal and opposed to the public policy of India.”

From the aforesaid judgments, it is obvious that the Apex Court has held that phrase “public policy of India” used in section 34 is required to be given a wider meaning. It has also laid down what is the concept of public policy and it has further held that, on that ground, Award could be set aside, if it is patently illegal. It has, therefore, laid down that the Award could be set aside if it is contrary to (a) fundamental policy of Indian Law; or (b) interest of India; or (c ) justice or morality; or (d) in addition it is patently illegal. The Apex Court has, however, further clarified these four criteria by observing that illegality must go to the root of the matter and if the illegality is of a trivial nature, it cannot be held that the Award is against the public policy. It has also observed that the Award should be such that it shocks the conscience of the Court.

31. Before we consider the contentions of parties on merits of the case, it is necessary to briefly take into consideration the scope of sections 34 and 37 of the said Act. It will be necessary to take into consideration the relevant provision viz section 37 of the said Act, which reads as under:-

37. Appealable orders. - (1)An appeal shall lie from the following orders (and from no others) to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the Court passing the order, namely :-

(a) granting or refusing to grant any measure under section 9;

(b) setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under section 34.

2.Appeal shall also lie to a court from an order of the arbitral tribunal-

(a) accepting the plea referred to in subsection (2) or sub-section (3) of section 16; or

(b) granting or refusing to grant an interim measure under section 17.

(3) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under this section, but nothing in this section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.”

Perusal of the said section indicates that section 37(1)

(b) speaks about setting aside or refusal to set aside the Arbitral Award under section 34. It was strenuously urged by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of MSEB that the Appellate Court under section 37 had a right to hear and decide the appeal as if it was a First Appeal and could re-appreciate the entire evidence on record and come to its own conclusion. On the other hand, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of DSL had submitted that section 37(1)(b) of 1996 Act was in pari materia with section 39(1)(iv) of 1940 Arbitration Act and, therefore, scope of section 37(1)(b) of 1996 Act would be identical if not narrower than section 39(1)(iv) of the 1940 Act. It was also submitted that it was not open to the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence before the learned Arbitrators at the Letters Patent Appeal stage and come to different conclusion about the performance of obligations and on the aspect of reasonable time. Thirdly, it was submitted that while considering the exercise of power under section 39(1) (iv) of 1940 Act, High Court was not expected to interfere with the Award as a Court of Appeal or re-appreciate the evidence considered by the Arbitral Tribunal . It was then submitted that power under section 34 of the Act itself being a mere supervisory power, the Appeal Court under section 37 would only oversee that supervisory power had been exercised properly and jurisdiction under section 34 had been correctly exercised. Lastly, it was contended that the Court under section 34 itself being barred from exercising the power of appeal, Court under section 37 could not re-appreciate the evidence before the Tribunal.

The learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of MSEB had relied upon the following judgments in support of his contentions:

(1) Mohammed Mamdouh Matwally Ghali vs. Kerala Automobiles Ltd. (ILR 2011 (3) Kerala 283)

(2) Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Wool Spinning Mills Limited and Anr vs. G. Mahanandi and Company Wool Merchants and Ors. (AIR 2003 AP 418)

(3) Anup Kumar Biswas and Ors vs. Babul Kumar Biswas (2004(1)ARBLR 183(Cal)

(4) H. Siddiqui (Dead) by Lrs vs. A. Ramalingam

(5) ONGC Limited vs. Garware Shipping Corporation Limited5

(6) Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited, Mumbai vs. Batliboy Environmental Engineers Ltd1

The learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of DSL had relied upon the following judgments in support of his contentions.

(1) Chief Engineer of BPDP/REO, Ranchi vs. Scoot Wilson Kirpatrick India (P) Ltd.2

(2) Trustees of the Port of Madras vs. Engineering Constructions Corporation Limited3

(3) Ravindra and Associates vs. Union of India4

(4) G. Ramcachndra Reddy and Company vs. Union of India and another5

(5) State of Orissa and another vs. Kalinga Construction Co. (P) Ltd.6

(6) Satinderpal Singh Anand vs. Sharanpal Balmukund Chopra7

The Apex Court in McDermotvs. Burn Standard8, has considered the point of legal scope for interference by the Appeal Court under 1996 Act, the distinction between the jurisdiction of the Court under sections 30 and 33 of 1940 Act and the changes made under 1996 Act. Thereafter, the Apex Court has taken into consideration various earlier judgments on the point and ultimately concurred with the law laid down in ONGC vs. Saw Pipes1. The said discussion can be found in paragraphs 45 to 62 of the said judgment. We would not like to reproduce the said observations. Similarly the Apex Court in Delhi Development Authority vs. R.S. Sharma and Co.2 also in para 7 of its judgment has considered various grounds and circumstances on which the Award can be set aside by the Court and, thereafter, after taking into consideration the observations made by the Apex Court in various judgments in para 21 has summarized the principles which emerged from the said decisions. It would be relevant to reproduce the said paragraph 21 which reads as under:-

“21. From the above decisions, the following principles emerge:

(a) An Award, which is

(i) contrary to substantive provisions of law ; or

(ii) the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ; or

(iii) against the terms of the respective contract ; or

(iv) patently illegal, or

(v) prejudicial to the rights of the parties;

isopen to interference by the Court under Section 34(2) of the Act.

(b) The award could be set aside if it is contrary to :

(a) fundamental policy of Indian Law; or

(b) the interest of India; or

(c) justice or morality;

(c) The Award could also be set aside if it is so unfair and unreasonable that it shocks the conscience of the Court.

(d) It is open to the Court to consider whether the Award is against the specific terms of contract and if so, interfere with it on the ground that it is patently illegal and opposed to the public policy of India.”

Similarly, the Apex Court in Chief Engineer of BPDP/REO, Ranchi vs. Scoot Wilson Kirpatrick India (P) Ltd.1 has held that section 37(1)(b) of the Act is in pari materia with section 39(1)(vi) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1940. Para 5 of the said judgment reads as under:-

“5. Section 37(1)(b) of the Act is in pari materia with Section 39(1)(vi) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (in short “the old Act”). The provisions in the Acts read as follows:-

1996 Act.

“37. (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders (and from no others) to the court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the court passing the order namely-

* * *

(b) setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under Section 34.”

1940 Act

“39. Appealable orders.-(1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act (and from no others) to the court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the court passing the order:

An order-

* * *

(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award:”

Similarly, the Apex Court in G. Ramcachndra Reddy and Company vs. Union of India and another1 has observed in para 19 that if two views are possible, the Court will refrain from interfering. Para 19 of the said judgment reads as under:-

“19. We may, at the outset, notice the legal principles governing the dispute between the parties. Interpretation of a contract may fall within the realm of the arbitrator. The Court while dealing with an award would not re-appreciate the evidence. An award containing reasons also may not be interefered with unless they are found to be perverse or based on a wrong proposition of law. If two views are possible, it is trite, the Court will refrain itself from interfering (See state of U.P. vs. Allied Constructions [2003) 7 SCC 396])

We do not propose to deal with the judgments relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of DSL on the point of scope of the Court under section 39 of the old Act.

Similarly, the learned Senior Counsel for MSEB also relied upon the judgment of Kerala High Court Mohammed Mamdouh Matwally Ghali vs. Kerala Automobiles Ltd. (ILR 2011 (3) Kerala 283). wherein the Kerala High Court in paragraphs 26, 27 has observed as under:-

“26. Precedents have been copiously cited before us about the narrow scope for judicial interference with an arbitral award. We are conscious of the fact that the jurisdiction which the court has under Section 34(2)(b)(ii) is not appellate; nor even revisional. The nature and quality of the jurisdiction has to be alertly perceived. The court under Section 34 of the Act cannot re-appreciate the facts and law. It cannot choose to disagree with the Arbitrators and come to a more reasonable or more correct conclusion. The mere fact that a different view is possible cannot persuade a court to interfere with an award under Section 34. That a better conclusion is possible or even the fact that the Arbitrator had erred in facts or in law is not sufficient to persuade a court to invoke the jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act. The court will have to be convinced that the illegality is patent and that it goes to the root of the matter. The court will have to be satisfied that the award is so unfair and unreasonable that it should shock the conscience of the court. Only then can it be held that the award is opposed to public policy and consequently deserves to be adjudged void.”

“27. A question arises whether the vice of perversity would justify the conclusion that an award is patently illegal as to attract the 4^th limb of the grounds mentioned in ONGC's case. It will be advantageous in this context to refer to the commentary by O.P. Malhotra on the question of perversity with which we completely agree. At page 1194 of 'The Law and Practice of Arbitration and Conciliation' (Second Edition) by O.P. Malhotra the learned author observes thus:

Perversity, though not identical with an 'error of law apparent on the face of award', is very much akin to it. Perversity, therefore, will have the same effect on an award, as an error of law apparent on the face of award. Even if it does not fit in any of the grounds listed in Section 34(2)(a), it is well comprehended in the concept of the expression 'in conflict with the public policy of India' in Section 34(b)(ii) for annulling the award.”

Similarly, the learned Senior Counsel for MSEB had also relied upon the judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Wool Spinning Mills Limited and Anr vs. G. Mahanandi and Company Wool Merchants and Ors. (AIR 2003 AP 418)in which the Andhra Pradesh High Court has observed in para 14 as under:

“14. …..................... The legislative mandate always indicates the public policy of the State; the Courts are bound to give effect to the public policy but not to defeat the public policy on the ground that the defence of such public policy was not specifically pleaded taken. We therefore, respectfully agree with the view taken by Justice Sabhyasachi Mukherjee and hold that the present suit is not maintainable for the reasons discussed above.”

The learned Senior Counsel for MSEB had also relied upon the judgment of Calcutta High Court in AnupKumar Biswas and Ors vs. Babul Kumar Biswas (2004(1)ARBLR 183(Cal)in which the Calcutta High Court has observed in paragraphs 7 and 8 as under:-

“7. Every appeal is required to be set down for hearing under Order 41, Rule 11, CPC whether it is an appeal from decree or from appellate decree or from an order by reason of Order 41, Rule 11, CPC read with Order 42, Rule 1 and Order 43, Rule 2, CPC respectively. But for Rule 17, Chapter V, Clause (a) of the Appellate Side Rules, particular categories of appeal, namely, appeals from original decree or from an order under Article 226 of the Constitution, appeals under Workmens' Compensation act, Indian Railways Act and Motor Vehicles Act are exempted from being set down for hearing under Order 41, Rule 11, CPC, while providing for setting down of appeals other than those specifically provided for in Clause (a) thereof, for hearing under Order 41, Rule 11, CPC in Clause (b), Rule 17, Chapter V itself.”

“8. Thus, unless specifically excluded the application of Order 41, Rule 11, CPC cannot be excluded in respect of an appeal preferred under Sections 37(1)(a) of the 1996 Act.”

The learned Senior Counsel for MSEB had further re lied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in H. Siddiqui (Dead) by Lrs vs. A. Ramalingam (2011) 4 SCC 240)in respect of proper mode of disposal of appeal under Order 41 Rule 31 and 33 and has relied on para 20 and 21 of the said judgments. In our view, observations of the Apex court in the said judgment would not apply to the facts of the present case.

Then reliance was placed by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of MSEB on the judgment of the Apex Court in ONGC Limited vs. Garware Shipping Corporation Limited (2007) 13 SCC 434), particularly on para 30 which reads as under:-

“30. There is no proposition that the courts could be slow to interfere with the the arbitrator's award, even if the conclusions are perverse, and even when the very basis of the arbitrator's award is wrong. In any case this is a case where interference is warranted and we set aside the norms prescribed by the arbitrator as upheld by the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench.”

Reliance was also placed by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of MSEB on the Judgment of this Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited, Mumbai vs. Batliboy Environmental Engineers Ltd (2007 Vol. 109 (4) Bom. L.R. 2440), particularly on para 9 which reads as under:-

“9. Arbitrator is creation of the contract between the parties and he gets jurisdiction under the terms of contract. He is expected to interpret and apply provisions of the contract and pass an award accordingly. While passing the award he has to bear in mind the provisions of Section 28 of the Act, which clearly provides that in case of domestic arbitration in India, the Arbitral Tribunal shall decide the dispute in accordance with substantive law for the time being in force in India. If the Arbitrator ignores the substantive law in force in India and passes an award, it is bound to cause injustice and is liable to be set aside. For example law requires that the claim should be within limitation. If the award is passed on a claim, which is clearly barred by the limitation, that will be against the provisions of law and the award can not be sustained. In the present case, it is the contention of the Petitioner that the learned Arbitrator ignored the terms of the contract, relevant documents as well as the provisions of Section 55 of the Contract Act and, therefore, the award is liable to be set aside. It will be necessary to examine the record to find out in the light of this contention.”

Keeping in view the observations made by the Apex Court and the various High Courts, it will have to be seen whether the case is made out by MSEB for interfering with he Award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal.

Points extensively urged by MSEB

32. The following points have been extensively urged by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the MSEB while challenging the order passed by the learned Single Judge and the Arbitral Tribunal:-

(i) Whether the Arbitral Tribunal and the learned Single Judge were justified in coming to the conclusion that the MSEB had committed breach of contract by not supplying DTC Lists?

(ii) Whether the contract was one complete contract and the same could not be split up as argued by the Claimants?

(iii) Whether Claimants/DSL waived their right to receive complete lists of locations?

(iv) Whether the Award is contrary to the public policy as mentioned under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996?

(v) Whether the damages were properly awarded?

(vi) Whether the aspect of mitigation was properly considered?

Submissions and finding on Point No.(i)Whether the Arbitral Tribunal and the learned Single Judge were justified in coming to the conclusion that the MSEB had committed breach of contract by not supplying DTC Lists?

33. So far as point No. (i) above is concerned, it was contended that MSEB had, in fact, supplied the Lists to DSL and, therefore, the Tribunal and the learned Single Judge had erred in holding that DTC Lists were not supplied and, therefore there was a breach of contract on the part of MSEB. Alternatively, it was urged that DSL had started work of installation of the contract objects/gadgets after July, 1998 and by December, 1998 had installed 17,294 objects. It was, therefore, contended that there was acquiescence on the part of DSL and waiver of right to receive the Lists in view of section 39 of the Contract Act and since no notice in writing was given by DSL to MSEB of there being a breach of contract for non-supply of DTC Lists, it was now not open for DSL to claim that there was a breach of contract or seek damages. Lastly, it was urged that the case of DSL before the Tribunal was that by non-renewal of Letter of Credit there was a breach of contract and on that ground the contract had been terminated by DSL and, therefore, it was not now open for DSL to claim that on account of non-supply of Lists there was a fundamental breach of contract.

34. On the other hand, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of DSL has vehemently opposed the said submission. It was firstly contended that in a claim which was filed by DSL it was specifically urged that MSEB had all along given the impression when the work order was issued that the DTC Lists were available with respective Superintendents at various Zones though, in reality, the said Lists were never supplied and they were supplied in piecemeal manner which was reflected from the fact that most of the installations were completed in Nasik Zone. It was, therefore, contended that there was neither any acquiescence nor waiver on the part of DSL of their right to get DTC Lists. It was urged that the contract objects/gadgets were ready to be installed and it was in the interest of DSL to get them installed so that the lease rentals would become available to them and there was no reason why they would not install the said contract objects/gadgets despite Lists being available.

35. Non-supply of DTC Lists being primary dispute between the parties, it will be necessary firstly to see what was the averment made by the Claimants in their Claim Petition, the stand taken by the MSEB in their reply, documents filed by both the parties on this point and the reasons given by the Arbitral Tribunal for holding that DTC Lists were not supplied and therefore it was a fundamental breach of contract and, secondly, the finding given by the learned Single Judge in her judgment in Petition under section 34 on this point and the opinion and conclusion of this Court on the said subject.

36. In their Claim Petition in para 6.00 under the heading “READINESS AND WILLINGNESS OF CLAIMANTS TO PERFORM”, DSL has urged that upon receipt of the work order, they had mobilised themselves relying upon the Respondents' reciprocal promise of furnishing the Lists of DTC locations within the stipulated period. In para 6.2, they have referred to the letter of Respondents dated 14/7/1997 thereby they had informed DSL the circle-wise allocation of the quantities of the contract objects in the respective zones and also informed that the lists of distribution on which these panels were to be installed was also ready with the Circle Offices. In para 6.3, DSL has stated that they have written numerous letters (more than 120) requesting MSEB to intimate locations of Distribution Transformers as per format at Annexure E of the Work Order. The first letter, according to DSL, was sent on 8/5/1997 to the MSEB's Zonal Office at Kolhapur with copies to the Circle Offices of Kolhapur Zone. In paras 6.4 to 6.12, the Claimants have made averments as to how Lists of DTC locations were not given and details of letters which were written from time to time have been mentioned in these paragraphs. Then, in para 7 of the Statement of Claim, averments are made regarding willful default by the Respondents/MSEB and non-supply of Lists of DTC locations. In para 7.1 averments are also made as to how non-factual 'Nil' Performance Certificates were issued with opaque motives to deny the Claimants of their just entitlement to the rent. Further details regarding the Lists of DTC locations being not furnished have been mentioned in the paragraphs 7 to 20 of the Claim Petition. Thereafter, further particulars have been given by the Claimants/DSL in respect of the said averments in Part-A to Part-E where, again, the breach of promise for non-supply of the Lists of DTC locations has been mentioned in Ground-I para 10.1 to 10.4. Then in Ground-II, paras 11.1 and 11.2, DSL has mentioned about creation of illusion of performance of their first promise by the Respondents/MSEB regarding non-supply of DTC Lists. In Ground No.III, paras 12.1 and 12.2 averments are made regarding MSEB willfully withholding the Lists of DTC locations.

37. MSEB in their Written Statement to the Claim have firstly denied the contention that the Lists were not supplied and it was urged that DSL had played fraud on MSEB by deliberate withdrawal of excess amounts of money. In para 5 of the Written Statement, it was also alleged that the DSL had illegally and fraudulently got the irrevocable letter of credit issued by the Respondents and had committed breach of various terms and conditions of the contract and, therefore, were not entitled to any reliefs equitable or otherwise. Secondly, it was urged that the Claimants/DSL had waived right to contend that there was a breach of contract and that they were entitled to damages. In clause (z) of para 6 of the Written Statement, it was contended that locations of the equipments covered by Part B-II were always known to and available with the Claimants and so far as locations of the DTC Lists under Parts B-I and B-III were concerned it was averred that MSEB had by their various letters given the locations of 10092 distribution transformers falling under Part B-I and 149926 under DTC under List B-III. It was, therefore, contended that the Claimants had with them locations of distribution transformers which were more than the quantity of LTMS systems manufactured by them. It was contended that the Claimants/DSL were unable to fulfill their obligation under the contract and had made a false excuse regarding non-supply of DTC Lists only to cover various breaches of contract committed by them. In para 21 of the Written Statement, it was contended that after the work order was issued to the Claimants/DSL, a few copies of the Lists of DTC locations which were received by the MSEB's Head Office, were handed over to the Claimants and the copies were handed over without any letter to the representative of the Claimants/DSL (Mr. Mathew) who frequently visited the MSEB's Head Office. It was contended that the Claimants/DSL has started raising dispute regarding non-furnishing of DTC Lists in May, 1998 i.e. much after the work had commenced and various contract objects had already been installed and only thereafter they started writing various letters to various Officers and offices of the Respondents/MSEB. It was contended that by May, 1998 90% of the work in Schedules B-I and B-II in the Nasik circle had already been completed by the Claimants. It was, therefore, contended that non-supply of DTC Lists was an afterthought on the part of the Claimants/DSL which was made to cover-up their inability to proceed expeditiously in the matter and also to cover-up financial difficulties which they were facing. Parawise reply was given in the Written Statement denying the allegations regarding non-supply of DTC Lists.

38. On these pleadings regarding non-supply of DTC Lists, it has to be seen as to what is the finding given by the Arbitral Tribunal. The Arbitral Tribunal in para 9 of the Award has observed as under:-

“9............. The two basic breaches relied upon by the Claimants are -

(a) failure to supply lists of DTC locations where contract objects were to be installed; and

(b) failure to renew Letter of Credit which expired on April 30, 1999”.....

The Tribunal, thereafter, in the same paragraph has observed as under:-

“The Claimants sought diverse amounts by making seven claims and the amounts are sought under the heads of Agglomerated lease rent, fair price for contract objects, loss of installation cost for 17,294 objects, compensation for loss of depreciation, damages, compensation for loss of business profit and cost. The total amount claimed is Rs 1053,06,78,342/-”....

(Emphasis supplied)

39. The Tribunal framed following points for determination and gave its answers to the said points as under:-

POINTS	FINDING
A) Whether the Claimants were ready and willing to perform their part of the contractandif so, whether Respondents prevented the Claimants from doing so?	Yes. On both the counts.
B) ….........................	………………..
C) …........................	………………..
D) Whether the Respondents proved thattheClaimants abandoned the contract while Respondents were ready and willing to perform?	No, on both the counts.
(E)......to (I) …...	…..…...

Point No. A is discussed in two parts (i) whether the Claimants were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract? So far as this point is concerned, the Tribunal, after taking into consideration the evidence of Datar regarding financial assistance sanctioned to the Claimants/DSL by ICICI Limited and also taking into consideration the evidence regarding technical expertise of the Claimants and total investment made by DSL to the tune of Rs.163,08,02,950/- held that the Claimants were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract. The Tribunal in para 13 also observed as under:-

“13........ The large number of letters written by the Claimants from time to time to the Respondents seeking lists of DTC locations is a telltale circumstance to indicate that the Claimants were keen to execute the contract. Indeed, it was in the interest of the Claimants to execute the contract because the contract being a lease contract, the entitlement of the Claimants to seek lease rent arises only from the date of installation of the contract objects. The Claimants could by no stretch of imagination be interested in keeping as many as 14,206 contract objects stranded in their factory.”

It was also observed that Datar was not cross-examined in respect of aspect of readiness and willingness to perform the contract and various steps were taken in furtherance thereof. On the second point viz. whether the Respondents/MSEB prevented the Claimants from doing so, Tribunal has taken into consideration the evidence on record at great length on the question whether Respondent/MSEB was responsible for non-supply of DTC Lists as urged by the Claimants/DSL. The Tribunal while considering this issue at great length, has considered the contention raised by both the parties and has examined the evidence on record and came to the conclusion that MSEB was responsible for non-supply of the Lists of DTC locations and further held in para 23 as under:-

“23........... From the discussion hereinabove, it is clear that the installation of contract objects was dependent on supply of lists of locations where contract objects were to be installed. The claimants were not only to manufacture the contract objects but were to install them on distribution transformers spread over large area in different Circles. The work order was not only in favour of the Claimants but two other agencies and it was impossible for the Claimants to identify the locations where contract objects were to be installed. The work order specifically provides that lists of all locations would be supplied and taking into consideration the urgency a completion of the project within two years, the Respondents had issued direction to the Superintending Engineers to supply the lists within fortnight from the date of receipt of copy of the order. The Officers placed at field level did not carry out the instructions in spite of various reminders from the Head Office. It is unfortunate that Head Office lack control over the field Officers and which ultimately led to the failure of the project. In these circumstances, it is futile to even suggest that the breach was not a fundamental breach.”

The finding which has been given by the Arbitral Tribunal after taking into consideration the rival contentions raised in the Claim and in the Written Statement on the aspect of non-supply of Lists of DTC locations is a finding of fact. The said finding has been given by the Tribunal after examining the material on record. This finding has been confirmed by the learned Single Judge in her judgment in the Arbitration Petition filed under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.

40. We will briefly examine the finding given by the learned Single Judge in her judgment delivered in Arbitration Petition under section 34 of the said Act. The learned Single Judge in her judgment dated 18/3/2009 in Arbitration Petition No.374 of 2004 in para 9 has observed as under:-

“9. In this Petition, therefore, the seminal aspect for consideration is the breach, if any, of giving the list of the DTC locations by the Petitioner to the Respondent, such as to constitute it such a fundamental breach, that the Respondent would not be able to perform its part of the contract enabling it to terminate the contract and claim damages.”

In para 11, the Court observed as under:-

“11. It will be fruitful to see the relevant and important clauses of the contract between the parties which have been considered by the Learned Arbitrators.”

The learned Single Judge, thereafter, has considered Clauses 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 of the work order. The learned Single Judge, therefore, in para 16 of her judgment has observed as under:-

“16. Considering the mandate under clause 5.1 of the contract between the parties the requirement of providing the list of DTC locations was seminal..............”

The learned Single Judge has taken into consideration the chronology of events, submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of MSEB, findings given by the Tribunal in various paragraphs of the Award, the evidence adduced by the parties and, thereafter, has observed in para 46 that the Arbitral Tribunal was justified in coming to the said conclusion. The learned Single Judge in para 46 has observed as under:-

“46. The conclusion by the Learned Arbitrators that it was impossible for the Respondent to install the panels in the scenario provided by the Petitioner is, therefore, not only justified but could be the only conclusion. In that scenario the allowance for simultaneous installations being withdrawn and the insistence upon the strict performance of the contract being made has been held not to be “rational” in paragraph 22 of the Award.

Then the learned Single Judge has taken into consideration whether this was fundamental breach of contract entitling the Respondent to rescind the contract and claim damages and after taking into consideration various judgments, the learned Single Judge in para 53 has observed as under:-

“53. Hence in this case the Learned Arbitrators have accordingly, rightly held that there was fundamental breach of the terms of the contract by the Petitioner in paragraph 23 of the Award. Once that is seen to have been correctly concluded no further consideration arises. It, therefore, must be taken to be the fundamental breach that entitled the Respondent to terminate the contract.”

41. In our view, both, the Tribunal as well as the learned Single Judge (Coram R.S. Dalvi, J.) in their judgments have come to the conclusion that MSEB has committed fundamental breach by non-supply of the Lists of DTC locations. The Arbitral Tribunal and the learned Single Judge, therefore, have firstly held that contention of Claimants/DSL in their Claim Petition that MSEB had not supplied the Lists of DTC locations was accepted and the contention of MSEB that the Lists were supplied and were available was not accepted. Both, the Tribunal as well as the learned Single Judge did not accept the contention of MSEB that Lists had been supplied.

42. We are also of the view that MSEB had failed in supplying the Lists of DTC locations and had committed fundamental breach of contract for non-supply of the Lists. We shall elaborately consider the said issue and give reasons why we have come to the said conclusion. However, before we do that, we would like to point out that, even other wise, it is not possible for this Court to substitute its own views to the views taken by the Tribunal or the learned Single Judge and arrive at a different conclusion. If two views are possible and if the Tribunal in its Award and the learned Single Judge in her judgment in Petition under section 34 have accepted one view, in appeal under section 37 it is not open for this Court to substitute that view by the other probable view.

43. Before we give our reasons on this issue, it will be necessary to see the chronology of events. On 27th March, 1997 MSEB issued Work Order to DSL in respect of 47,987 LTLMS on the distribution transformers of MSEB's distribution net work. The contract was an operating lease contract for 10 years. DSL was entitled to get lease rent from the date of installation of the contract objects/gadgets after the installation was confirmed by the MSEB. Clauses 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 of the said Work Order are relevant. We, therefore, reproduce the same as under:-

“5.1. The supply and installation of the L.M. systems shall commence within four months from the date of this work order or opening of Letter of Credit or receipt of complete list of locations of DTC whichever is later. The entire supply and installation of L.M system covered under schedules at Annexure-B-I, Annexure-B-II and Annexure-B-III shall be completed within twenty months thereafter.”

“5.2 Lessor shall commence the installation of (I) new L.M. Systems, (ii) replacement of old L.T switched capacitors using contactor switching by new L.M systems using thyristor switching as per the quantities indicated in the schedule at Annexure-B-I, Annexure-B-II and (iii) additional quantities as at Annexure B-III respectively zone-wise. The quantities indicated in Annexure-B-I shall be completed first followed by the quantities indicated in Annexure-B-II and B- III. Installation/replacement work in other zones shall be commenced only on completion of work in the first zone. Sequence of zones in which work will be carried out by you will be -

(a) 1st … Kolhapur Zone

(b) 2nd … Nasik Zone. Work to be commenced on completion of work in Kolhapur Zone.

(c) 3rd … Aurangabad Zone. Work to commence on completion of work in Nasik Zone.”

“5.3 The L.T load management systems consisting of L.T shunt capacitors, automatic control unit and other associated equipments shall be supplied, erected at site and commissioned for the purpose of operation within stipulated time. The time being the essence of the contract, the period of supply, erection and commissioning shall be strictly adhered to. For any delay in performance due to labour trouble or lockout, breakdown or accident to machinery or accident of any nature or failure on the part of the railway to supply sufficient wagons to carry essential raw materials etc. and finished products, subject to the provision and stipulation under liquidated damages, Board shall not be responsible.”

Clause 12 of the Work Order speaks about installation which reads as under:-

12.0 Location of installation :

The Superintending Engineer (O and M) Circle Office shall issue detailed instructions on locations of Distribution Transformer Centres as per the format enclosed on which L.M. Systems are to be installed. The lease contract shall generally operate under the supervision of the concerned Superintending Engineer of O and M Circle. It is incumbent upon the lessor to install the L.M. Systems as per final locations approved by the Superintending Engineer of the circle Office. As far as possible the location plan shall not be changed by Superintending Engineer Circle Office. However, in exceptional cases if the location is required to be changed for valid reasons the same shall be informed in writing by the concerned Superintending Engineer and shall be carried out by the lessor at the additional cost of Rs. 100/- per panel to be paid by Superintending Engineer separately. However, the shifting shall be completed within a period of one month from the date of removing the L.M. Systems. The lease rent shall be payable during the shifting period but not beyond one month.”

44. Perusal of the said clauses indicates that under clause 5.1, the date of commencement of the supply and installation of the L.M. systems was to commence within four months from (a) the date of the work order or (b) opening of Letter of Credit or (c) receipt of complete list of locations of DTCs whichever is later. The said clause further stipulated that the complete installation was to be done within 20 months thereafter. The period of contract obviously therefore was 24 months from 21/4/1997.The Letter of Credit was opened by MSEB on 2/5/1997. On 14/7/1997, MSEB issued a letter to DSL representing that Lists of DTC locations for installation of LTLMS were ready with Circle Offices and DSL should collect the same.

45. As per Clause 5.1, therefore, either 20 months would be calculated from the date of the work order which is 27/3/1997 or opening of Letter of Credit which is 2/5/1997 or from receipt of complete Lists of DTC locations which, according to MSEB, were given by letter dated 14/07/1997. Thus, 14/7/1997 is the last date and the contract was to be completed within two years thereafter that is by 14/7/1999. The learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of MSEB and the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of DSL have argued at length as to what was the correct date for completion of the contract and it has also been argued that Arbitral Tribunal also has wrongfully calculated the date for completion of contract. In our view, the date on which the said contract was to be completed is not really very material for the purpose of determining whether there was a breach of contract on the part of MSEB and whether DSL was entitled to claim damages. We shall, however, give our reasons later on this aspect, if necessary.

46. Clause 5.2 is also relevant since it stipulates about the manner in which installation/replacement work was to be carried out by DSL. The work was to be completed in three Zones viz Kolhapur Zone, Nasik Zone and Aurangabad Zone.

In clause 5.2 sequence of Zones was mentioned in which the work was to be carried out and it was as under:-

(a) Kolhapur Zone

(b) Nasik Zone. Work to be commenced on completion of work in Kolhapur Zone.

(c) Aurangabad Zone. Work to commence on completion of work in Nasik Zone.

The sequence therefore was that, first in Kolhapur Zone B-I, B-II, B-III objects were to be installed and, thereafter, in Nasik again B-I, B-II, B-III objects were to be installed and finally in Aurangabad, B-I, B-II and B-III objects were to be installed. The said schedule of completion of work, however, was changed from time to time and, finally, again, in December, 1998 MSEB informed DSL to follow the schedule as per clause 5.2.

47. Clause 5.3 lays down that supply, erection at site and commissioning of the contract objects was to be done within a stipulated time. It also clarified that time is the essence of the contract and if there was delay in performance due to any reason MSEB would be entitled to claim liquidated damages. The chronology of events indicates that on 14/7/1997, MSEB by its letter informed DSL that Lists of DTC locations were ready with the Circle Offices and DSL should collect the same. The case of DSL in brief is that though it was represented by MSEB that Lists were ready and available on 14/7/1997, Lists were not supplied and, as a result, installations could not be done and as many as 120 letters had to be written by DSL to MSEB, requesting them to supply the Lists. Secondly, sequence of completion of work also was changed from time to time and suddenly on 21/12/1998 Circle Engineer informed DSL that sequence as per clause 5.2 of the work order had to be adhered to and, DSL was therefore constrained to send a letter of termination dated 19/02/1999 and even thereafter in a meeting which was held on 11/3/1999 between the Chairman of the MSEB, DSL and other two parties who were awarded the contract, as mentioned in clause 17 of the minutes of the meeting, the Chairman informed DSL that the Lists were readily available in Kolhapur Zone and asked Mr. Datar to take up the work under B-II and B-III schedule immediately and the Chairman directed that CEs present in the meeting that it was the Board's responsibility to give the list with maps to the agencies and expeditious steps should be taken in that regard. It was, therefore, contended that as late as 11/3/1999, the Chairman himself had conceded that the Lists were not made available to DSL. In this context, certain letters assume importance regarding change of sequence of work. The work order dated 27/3/1997 shows that the work initially had to be done in Kolhapur Zone, then in Nasik Zone and finally in Aurangabad Zone. Thereafter, Chief Engineer, MSEB by his letter dated 4/11/1997 changed the sequence and directed that the work should be completed initially in Nasik Zone in respect of B-I, B-II, B-III Lists, then in Kolhapur Zone and finally in Aurangabad Zone. This sequence was again modified by the Chief Engineer's letter dated 25/5/1998 and modification was made in the sequence of schedule and sequence of zone continued and work could be completed at any stage in any Zone. Again, third modification was made by Chief Engineer's letter dated 17/6/1998 and there was modification in respect of Zones and work could be carried out in any Zone in any sequence. Then there was fourth modification by Chief Engineer's letter dated 21/12/1998 and direction was given to strictly adhere to the original work order sequence. According to DSL, because the Lists were not supplied though the contract objects/gadgets were ready for installation and though they were taken to the sites at the respective Zones, they could not be installed and were lying stranded causing monetary loss on account of transportation, manual labour etc. and non-installation of contract objects resulted in DSL not getting benefit of lease rentals.

48. It must be noted here that before the learned Single Judge and before this Court, some of the points which were never urged before the Tribunal had been sought to be urged. In the written submissions which have been tendered before us and what was urged before us was that the Arbitral Tribunal had committed serious error by holding that non-supply of DTC locations amounts to breach of fundamental term of contract which led to termination of contract by Respondents/Claimants. It has been contended before us that since each contract object was a separate lease contract, the Arbitrator's Award has to be considered in three parts (i) qua uninstalled objects, (ii) qua installed objects and (iii) damages in respect of the objects not even manufactured and it has to be noted here that Tribunal has framed one of the points as under:-

(A) Whether the Claimants were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract and if so, whether Respondents prevented the Claimants from doing so?

While answering this point, the point was discussed in two parts. Firstly, whether the Claimants were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract and, secondly, whether Respondents have prevented the Claimants from doing so. In this context, after having held that Claimants were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract, while considering the second point, the Tribunal had taken into consideration the question of supply of DTC Lists and whether it was a fundamental term of the contract. After having held that MSEB had prevented DSL from performing their part of the contract even though they were ready and willing to do so, the question of damages has been thereafter separately considered and on that point Tribunal has adopted a particular method of calculation of damages. In our view, it is not permissible for MSEB to now change their submissions in this manner. However, even if the submissions, as advanced before us by MSEB, are taken into consideration, they are devoid of merits.

49. An attempt was also sought to be made to argue that the contract was terminated by DSL on account of nonrenewal of Letter of Credit. Reliance, therefore, was placed on letter dated 19/2/1999. It was urged that the Tribunal and the learned Single Judge had held that MSEB had not erred in not renewing the Letter of Credit. It was then sought to be urged that under the circumstances it was not proper for the Tribunal to have calculated damages on the installed objects of 17,294. It was urged that since objects were installed and DSL had refused to maintain them there was no reason why lease rentals in respect of these installed objects should be calculated as part of the damages payable to DSL. It must be noted that, though, at the first blush, this argument appears to be very attractive, on closer scrutiny the fallaciousness of the argument can be discerned. It must be pointed out here at this stage that Tribunal while calculating the damages has taken into consideration various judgments of this Court and other Courts wherein it has been held that it is for the Tribunal to decide which method of awarding damages should be adopted. Tribunal has, thereafter, come to the conclusion that since the contract was for installation of contract objects and leasehold rights were created in respect of installed objects, damages should be calculated on the basis of loss caused to DSL on lease rentals and, thereafter, the Tribunal has proceeded to calculate the damages after taking into consideration the lease rentals payable on the installed objects, uninstalled objects and damages payable for the objects which were not manufactured. The submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel for the MSEB on this point, therefore, cannot be accepted.

50. It was also urged that DSL themselves in their letter dated 19/2/1999 had clubbed the contract into installed objects and uninstalled objects. By terminating the contract qua uninstalled objects and agreeing to keep the contract alive qua installed objects on the condition that lease rent of the same were to be paid to them upfront and seeking response within seven days thereafter, it has been contended that DSL continued to maintain the installed objects till 31/3/1999 much after expiry of 7 days period stipulated in notice dated 19/2/1999. Before we deal with the said submission, it is necessary to take a look at the factual background of the case. Firstly clause 5.0 of the Work Order dated 27/3/1997 envisages supply and installation of the contract objects and clause 5.1 states that this supply and installation should commence within four months from the date of the Work Order or opening of Letter of Credit or receipt of complete list of location of DTCs whichever is latter and all the installations should be completed within twenty months thereafter. The letter given by MSEB dated 14/5/1997 states that entire list of DTC locations is available with the Superintendent of respective Zones. This sequence was subsequently changed or modified on four different occasions and the dates of which are given as follows. Initially, on the date of the Work Order, contract objects were to be installed firstly in Kolhapur Zone then in Nasik Zone and then in Aurangabad Zone. Thereafter, by letter dated 4/11/1997, sequence was changed and then Nasik Zone was to be completed first, then Kolhapur Zone was to be completed and after that Aurangabad Zone was to be completed. Then by letter dated 25/5/1998, Chief Engineer had modified the sequence of schedule though sequence of Zone continued. Then third modification was made by Chief Engineer by letter dated 17/6/1998 under which DSL was allowed to execute the installation work feeder-wise irrespective of sequence of schedule B-I, B-II and B-III. This was again sought to be changed by Chief Engineer's letter dated 21/12/1998 and the sequence as indicated by Work Order dated 27/3/1997 was to be adhered to. The stand taken by the MSEB was that the lists were supplied and, therefore, they had performed their part of the contract. Alternatively, it was submitted that if it is the case of DSL that lists were not supplied then, in that case, they had, on their own, started installation of contract objects without lists being available and, therefore, waived their right in respect of supply of lists and therefore were not entitled to claim damages in view of sections 55 and 63 of the Contract Act. Then it was contended that lists were given to one Mathew of DSL and reliance was placed on the minutes of the meeting in which in clause 2 DSL has supposedly given up their right of supply of lists. Then it was contended that lists were already available. Reliance was placed on some correspondence and then it was lastly contended that location for B-II Lists for installation was already known to DSL and reliance was placed on two letters written by Datar of DSL wherein he had acknowledged that he knew B-II locations. Lastly, it was contended that number of locations were available and in spite of that DSL did not install the contract objects.

Finding on Point No. (i) above

51. All these contentions have been individually taken into consideration by the Tribunal and the contentions have been repelled. The Tribunal has given a finding that firstly lists were not supplied and this fact had been acknowledged by the Chairman in the meeting which was held on 11/3/1999 after first letter of 19/2/199 was given by the DSL. Tribunal has, thereafter, given detailed reasons as to why reliance could not be placed on the minutes of the meeting and also reason why it felt that this was a got up document. The Tribunal has extensively considered the evidence of Ghodaskar who had given several admissions and, therefore, discarded the theory of supply of lists to Mathew, an employee of DSL or minutes of the meeting. Tribunal also took into consideration the evidence of linesmen of MSEB and particularly of Mr. Lohar – Witness No.6 who had deposed that instructions to prepare lists were received only on May 19, 1998 and the lists were prepared by May 30, 1998. Then it has taken into consideration the evidence of Mr. Kawlekar – Witness No.9 from Nanded Circle who had deposed that instructions to prepare lists were received on December 19, 1998 and Witness No.10 – Deshpande who had deposed that instructions to prepare lists were received in November, 1998 and then of Witness No.11 – Pandelwar who had deposed that instructions to prepare lists were received around September 14, 1998, while Dixit – Witness No.16 from Nanded Circle claimed that the instructions were received by May 1998. Similarly, Mr. Bhonsale – Witness No. 17 from Satara Circle deposed that the instructions were received by September, 1998 while P.K. Patil – Witness No.18 deposed that he became aware of the Work Order in April 1998. Tribunal, after taking into consideration testimony of these witnesses has observed that either lists were not ready though it was so claimed by letter dated 14/6/1997 from the Head Office of the Respondents/MSEB or testimony of these witnesses is not truthful. Tribunal rightly came to the conclusion that either lists were not ready or that claimants DSL were given false impression that lists were ready and the contract should be performed within 20 months from the date of commencement of the installations. Tribunal has also taken into consideration the submission of MSEB and has observed that even assuming that lists were available, the said installations could not have been completed on account of several changes made by the Chief Engineer from time to time regarding installations at various Schedules and Zones.

52. In our view from the material on record, it is abundantly clear that supply of DTC Lists was a fundamental term of the Work Order and MSEB had miserably failed in complying with the said fundamental term and there was a breach on the part of the MSEB in supplying the DTC locations which eventually prevented DSL from installation of contract objects. It has to be noted here that after the work order was issued by MSEB, DSL had to make necessary arrangements for the purpose of carrying out the process of installation of the contract objects. This included procurement of raw material from a foreign country, starting the process of manufacturing gadgets, making arrangements for transportation of these contract objects to the places where the said gadgets were to be installed, employment of trained, skilled and other staff, making available vehicles for transporting these contract objects to the DTC location where they were to be installed and, finally, co-ordinating with the Officers of MSEB so that after the contract objects were installed, a Certificate of installation could be given by the Officers of MSEB so that from that point onwards, lease rentals could become payable to DSL. It has to be borne in mind that the nature of the Work Order was such that it was in the interest of DSL to ensure that the contract objects are installed and certificates to that effect are obtained from the Officers of MSEB. It does not sound to reason that after having invested huge amount of almost Rs.163 crores, as observed by the Tribunal in the Award, DSL would not install the objects because it was in their interest to get the objects installed so that returns on their huge investment would start thereafter. It is inconceivable therefore that though DTC Lists were available, DSL would not install the contract objects. Various facts and figures were given by MSEB to show that DTC locations were known to DSL and yet they had failed in installing the contract objects is without any substance. It cannot be forgotten that, initially, the sequence of installation was Kolhapur, Nasik and Aurangabad. This sequence was later on changed to Nasik, Kolhapur and Aurangabad. This was again changed and permission was given to DSL to install the objects at any time at any place and, lastly, again, this was changed and direction was given to DSL to adhere to the sequence as per the Work Order. This being the position, even assuming that B-II Lists were available, DSL could not have installed these contract objects because they were asked to follow the schedule again by letter dated 21/12/1998 and, therefore, even if the lists were available, it was not possible for DSL to simultaneously install all those objects since they were told to adhere to the sequence in the Work Order if the lists of locations under B-I were not given, even assuming that they had B-II lists of locations they could not have and were not actually allowed to install at the said B-II locations. It has come on record that more than 10,000 objects were manufactured and ready for installation. There is no earthly reason why DSL would fail to install the objects which were inspected and ready for installation. The only obvious reason would be that they were unable to do so on account of various orders which were passed by MSEB from time to time preventing them from performing their obligation. MSEB has not examined any of its Superintending Engineers who were in charge of supplying the Lists. The cumulative effect of all the material which has been brought on record is that it clearly demonstrates the failure on the part of MSEB in supplying the Lists of DTC locations which was a fundamental term of the contract.

Submissions and finding on Point No.(ii) Whether the contract was one complete contract and the same could not be split up as argued by the Claimants?

53. So far as point No.(ii) above is concerned, in this appeal which is filed under section 37 of the said Act, it was urged for the first time that the contract was one complete contract and the same could not be split up as argued by the Claimants. We have already referred to the averments made in the Claim Petition and the reply given by MSEB and their written statement and also arguments advanced by both the parties before the Tribunal. This submission was never made before the Tribunal or before the learned Single Judge and it was advanced for the first time before this Court. MSEB, therefore, cannot be permitted to take a new stand for the first time in appeal which is filed under section 37. Reliance was placed by MSEB on Clause 2.00 of the Work Order and it was urged that in terms of the said clause each individual panel was a separate contract between the Respondents and the Appellants having a separate period of commencement and separate period of tenures from the date of commencement and the separate lease rentals determined by the said tenures. It was urged that DSL by issuing notice dated 19/2/1999 had sought to club the contract themselves by agreeing to maintain the installed objects on certain conditions and of terminating the contract qua the uninstalled objects. This submission cannot be accepted since it was raised for the first time in this Court. It was also further contended that in para 8.2 of the Claim Petition the Claimants had urged that on account of non-renewal of Letter of Credit the Contract was being terminated. It was then contended that in view of these pleadings, it was not permissible for DSL to lead any contrary evidence to the said pleadings and if any evidence was so led the same has to be ignored. Reliance was placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in KishorKirtilal Mehta and Others vs. Lilavati Kirtilal Mehta Medical Trust and Others (2007) 10 SCC 21)(paras 13 and 14). This submission is also without any substance since the Claimants in the Claim Petition in paras 6 and 7 have specifically urged about the MSEB not supplying the Lists of DTC locations. The said averments have been mentioned hereinabove. It is not open for the MSEB to rely on one paragraph in the Claim Petition and claim that this was their claim before the Tribunal. For the same reason the ratio of the following judgments on which the reliance was placed by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of MSEB would not be applicable to the facts of the present case:-

(1) Firm Bhagwandas Shobhalal Jain, a Registered firm and Anr. vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1966 MP page 8 (bottom)

(2) Shin Satellite Public Co. Ltd. vs. Jain Studios Ltd (2006) 2 SCC 628 (paras 14, 15, 17, 19, 27)

(3) BeedDistrict Central Coop. Bank Ltd. vs. State of Maharahstra and Others (2006) 8 SCC 514 (paras 10-12)

(4) M/s. Darukaand Co. vs. Union of India and Others (1973) 2 SCC 617 (para 24)

(5) Food Corporation of India vs. Yousuff and Co. (Kerala High Court (DB) (1711.1980) A.S. No.31 of 1976)

It has to be remembered that the Claim Petition has to be read as a whole and it is not now open for the MSEB to challenge the Award passed by the Tribunal by making new submissions for the first time in this Court.

54. We would like to deal with the submissons of MSEB on point No (iii) whether Claimants/DSL waived their right to receive the complete lists of DTC locations and point No. (iv) whether the award is contrary to public policy.

Submissions and finding on Point No.(iii)Whether Claimants/DSL waived their right to receive complete lists of locations and on Point No. (iv)Whether the Award is contrary to the public policy as mentioned under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996?

55. In support of the submission on point No.(iii) above, reliance was placed by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of MSEB on sections 39 and 55 read with section 63 of the Contract Act. He has also placed reliance on the following judgments:

(1) WamanShriniwas Kini vs. Ratilal Bhagwandas and Co. (1959 Supp (2) SCR 217)(para 13)

(2) JagadBandhu Chatterjee vs. Smt. Nilima Rani and Ors (1969) 3 SCC 445) (para 5)

(3) MakineniNagayya and Ors. vs. Makineni Bapamma (AIR 1958 AP 504)(paras 13 and 14)

(4) State of Kerala Vs. Cochin Chemical Refineries Ltd (AIR 1968 SC 136)Para 6)

(5) MotilalSrinivasa Sarda vs. The Netha Co-op Spinning Mills Ltd (AIR 1975 AP 169) (Para 16, 17)

(6) Union of India vs. S. Kesar Singh (AIR 1978 J and K 102)(Para 6)

(7) RamdeoFood Products (P) Ltd. vs. Arbindbhai Rambhai Patel and Ors (2006 8 SCC 726)(Paras 73-76)

(8) Claude-Lila Parulekar (Smt.) vs. Sakal Papers (P) Ltd and Ors (2005) 11 SCC 73)(para 52)

He has also relied on Halsbury's Law of England Vol IV Page 1179.

It was also urged that once the DSL had agreed to start installation without receipt of complete lists of locations, DSL had to proceed with the contract as and when Lists were made available to them and they could not terminate the contract only by giving MSEB a notice if at some stage no further Lists were forthcoming to stipulate a time frame for the balance lists to be give in terms of Section 55 of the Contract Act. Reliance was placed on the judgments of the Apex Court in G.M. Northern Railway vs. Sarvesh Chopra (2002) 4 SCC 45)(para 15) and in State of Kerala vs. M.A. Mathai (2007) 10 SCC 195)(Para 7) and also on the judgment of the Privy Council in Burn and Co. vs. His Highness Thakur Sahib Sree Lukudhirji of Morvi State (AIR 1925 Privy Council 188). It was also urged that the argument that without feeder-wise information, the installation could not be made is also an aspect which was not pleaded by DSL in the Claim Petition before the Arbitrators and, therefore, DSL could not be permitted to make the said submission before this Court.

56. So far as point No.(iv) whether the award is contrary to public policy is concerned, it was vaguely urged that the award was contrary to public policy under section 34 of the said Act and in terms of the Judgment in ONGC vs. Saw Pipes (2003) 5 SCC 705)and McDermotvs. Burn Standard (2006) 11 SCC 181 (Para 65). It was urged that by awarding damages to the tune of Rs.109 crores qua the installed objects, the Award had become patently illegal and was in violation of public policy also when the Arbitrators had held that the Appellants were not in default in renewing the Letter of Credit which was the only default attributable to the installed objects. Secondly, it was urged that the Arbitrators had committed grave mistake in awarding damages for the objects not even manufactured and, therefore, the same was patently illegal and in violation of the public policy as mentioned under section 34 of the said Act. Reliance was placed on the following judgments.

(1) ONGC vs. Saw Pipes (2003) 5 SCC 705)(Paras 1, 13, 15, 22, 31, 72, 74)

(2) Delhi Development Authority vs. R.S. Sharma and Co. (2008) 13 SCC 80)(Paras 20, 21)

(3) Steel Authority of India Limited vs. Gupta Brother Steel Tubes Ltd. (2009) 10 SCC 63)(Paras 17, 18)

(4) J.G. Engineers Private Limited vs. Union of India and Anr. (2011) 5 SCC 758)(Paras 27, 28).

(5) Security Printing and Minting Corpn of India Ltd. vs. Gandhi Industrial Corpn (2007) 13 SCC 236)(Paras 14, 16)

(6) McDermotInternational Inc. vs. Burn Standard Co. Ltd. (2006) 11 SCC 181)(Para 61)

(7) Hindustan Zinc Ltd. v. Friends Coal Carbonisation (2006) 4 SCC 445)(Paras 14, 15).

Finding on Point No.(iii) above

57. So far as point No.(iii) above regarding waiver of right by DSL is concerned, before taking into consideration the submission of DSL on the said point, it would be profitable to see the relevant provisions of section 39 read with section 55 of the Contract Act. Section 39 reads as under:-

“39. Effect of refusal of party to perform promise wholly.- When a party to a contract has refused to perform, or disabled himself from performing, his promise in its entirety, the promisee may put an end to the contract, unless he has signified, by words or conduct, his acquiescence in its continuance.”

Before interpreting the said provision, it will be useful to refer to one of the illustrations below section 39. The illustration (a) reads as under:-

“(a) A, a singer enters into a contract with B, the manager of a theatre, to sing at his theatre two nights in every week during next two months, and B engages to pay her 100 rupees for each night's performance. On the sixth night A wilfullyabsents herself from the theatre, B is at liberty to put an end to the contract.

Perusal of the said illustration indicates that promisee can put an end to the contract if the promisor has refused to perform or disabled himself from performing his promise in its entirety. In order to claim that promisee has waived his right, it has to be first established that promisor has failed to perform his promise in its entirety. Illustration (a) which is given above of section 39 clearly indicates the position. In the present case, facts are that under clause 5.1, MSEB had promised to supply Lists of DTC locations within a specified period. The clause indicates, therefore, that time was an essence of the contract. MSEB in its series of letters written by them to DSL starting from 14/7/1997 gave an impression that Lists were ready. DSL believed in the said representation and started work on the basis of the locations which were made available by the Officers of MSEB by giving chits and/or letters. Supply of DTC Lists was a fundamental term of the contract and unless the Lists were made available it would not have been possible for DSL to install the contract objects feeder-wise from the farthest point of the location to the generator. DSL kept on demanding the Lists by writing more than 100 letters. MSEB in their Written Statement to the Claim has also stated that they were supplying lists from time to time. Taking into consideration the aforesaid facts, it cannot be said that MSEB had either refused to perform or disabled themselves from performing promise in its entirety at least till they wrote a letter to DSL on 21/12/1998.

58. There is much substance in the submission made by Mr. R.A. Dada, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of DSL that when a letter dated 21/12/1998 was written by Chief Engineer, MSEB informing DSL that work had to be carried out as per the original schedule given in Work Order viz Kolhapur, Nasik and Aurangabad and a further direction was given not to install objects at B-III locations, only at this stage the MSEB had refused to perform their part of the promise and only thereafter notice was given by DSL on 19/2/1999 and, finally, contract was terminated on 21/4/1999. There is, therefore, no substance in the submission made by Mr. Vikas Singh, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of MSEB that there was waiver of right or acquiescence on the part of DSL and, therefore, they were not entitled to terminate the contract.

59. Apart from that, it has been consistently held that question of waiver or acquiescence is a question of fact which is evident from the following judgments:-

(1) V.M. Salgaocar vs. Board of Trustees (2005) 4 SCC 613)(para 23)

(2) P. Dasa Muni vs. P. Appa (1974) 2 SCC 725)(para 13)

(3) Rash Behary vs. Nrittya (1906 ILR 33 Cal. 477)(para 11)

(4) Steel Bros. vs. Dayal Khatav (AIR 1924 Bombay 247)(page 251)

60. On the other hand, in our view, ratio of the judgments on which reliance was placed by the learned Senior Counsel for MSEB would not apply to the facts of the present case.

61. Moreover, both, Arbitral Tribunal as well as the learned Single Judge under section 34 have given a concurrent finding of fact that there was no waiver or acquiescence on the part of DSL. Even otherwise, in appeal under section 37 of the said Act, it will not be possible to set aside the said finding of fact by taking a different view, as has been held by the Apex Court in several judgments.

62. The second limb of the argument is that the consequence of waiving the right of receiving the complete lists of DTC locations would be as provided under section 55 read with section 63 of the Indian Contract Act. Before we take into consideration the said submission, in our view, it would be necessary to refer to the relevant part of section 55 which reads as under:-

“55............

Effect of acceptance of performance at time other than that agreed upon.- If, in case of a contract voidable on account of the promisor's failure to perform his promise at the time agreed, the promisee accepts performance of such promise at any time other than that agreed, the promisee cannot claim compensation for any loss occasioned by the non-performance of the promise at the time agreed, unless, at the time of such acceptance he gives notice to the promisor of his intention to do so.”

It was submitted that as a consequence of waiver of right to receive Lists of DTC locations the only option which was available to DSL was to have given notice to MSEB that it was accepting the performance of the promise other than at the time agreed upon. It was contended that, DSL, not having given such notice, they were not entitled to claim compensation. Section 63 also has to be read with section 55, which reads as under:-

“63. Promisee may dispense with or remit performance of promise.- Every promisee may dispense with or remit, wholly or in part, the performance of the promise made to him, or may extend the time for such performance, or may accept instead of it any satisfaction which he thinks fit.”

The submission made by MSEB will have to be taken into consideration in relation to the facts and in the context of the circumstances of the present case. It is evident from the material on record that MSEB never gave complete lists to DSL and, therefore, as rightly submitted by Mr. R.A. Dada, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of DSL, that question of acceptance of performance belatedly or otherwise does not arise. Again, it will be relevant to take into consideration the documentary evidence. Letter dated 14/7/1997 written by MSEB to DSL indicates that complete lists were not available with the Superintending Engineers and it is evident that period of completion of contract commenced from the said date. As per the terms of the contract, from this date within four months DSL would start the work of installing the contract objects and it had to be completed within 20 months. In our view, therefore, the said section 55 read with section 63 will not be applicable to the facts of the present case. In this context, ratio of the following judgments relied upon by DSL would squarely apply to the facts of the present case:-

(1) Anandramvs. Bholaram (AIR 1946 Bom. 1 (DB)

(2) MakineniNagayya vs. Makineni Bapamma (AIR 1958 AP 504)

The submission made by Mr. Vikas Singh, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of MSEB on point No.(iii) regarding waiver of right to receive complete lists of locations, therefore, cannot be accepted.

Finding on Point No.(iv) above

63. So far as point No.(iv), regarding the award being against the public policy is concerned, to some extent submissions made on Point Nos.(iii) and (iv) are interlinked. What was argued during the course of arguments was that DSL had opted to continue with the contract under section 39 and, therefore, they were not entitled to terminate the contract in spite of the breach. Secondly, it was contended that since no notice as required under section 55 of the Contract Act was given, DSL had no right to terminate the contract. It was also contended that an effort of mitigation was before the breach and, therefore, it could not be said to be the mitigation within the meaning of section 73 of the Contract Act. Lastly, it was contended that the Arbitral Tribunal had erred in awarding damages on the non-manufactured goods and, further, there was no question of awarding damages in the form of lease rentals in respect of installed objects since DSL had refused to maintain those installed objects and for these reasons, therefore, the Award was contrary to the provisions of the Contract Act and, therefore, it was patently illegal so as to shock the conscience of the Court and, therefore, it was the bounden duty of the Court to set it aside under section 34(2)(b) of the said Act, 1996.

64. It is interesting to note that in this appeal MSEB has taken two grounds viz. Ground Nos.61 and 87 which are expressly under section 34(2)(a)(iv) of the said Act, 1996. The Chamber Summons has been filed by MSEB vide Chamber Summons No.727 of 2009 to amend Ground No.61 by substituting reference to section 34(2)(a)(iv) with section 34(2)(b)(ii) of the said Act, 1996. Surprisingly, in respect of Ground No.87, no such application for amendment has been made. The said Chamber Summons was disposed of vide order dated 2/3/2010 and the following observation was made by the Court:-

“We make it clear that Appeal No.166 of 2009 shall be heard and decided on the issues as were submitted before the learned Single Judge on remand and as they appear from the record.”

65. We have already held that provisions of sections 39 and 55 read with section 63 are not attracted in the present case and, as such, submission of MSEB that the Award being contrary to sections 39 and 55 read with section 63 has not been accepted. In view of the said finding, submission that the Award is, therefore, contrary to public policy or that it shocks the conscience of the Court is devoid of merits. So far as the question of award being contrary to public policy on the ground of damages being awarded on non-manufactured objects as also on installed objects and secondly on the point of mitigation, the said aspects will be dealt with while considering the submission on damages and mitigation. The submission made Mr. Vikas Singh, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of MSEB on point No.(iv) above cannot be accepted.

DAMAGES

66. Point No.(iv) regarding award being against the public policy on the aspect of damages which were awarded, point no (v) regarding damages and point (vi) on the aspect of mitigation mentioned above will be considered together. So far as these points are concerned, it will be useful to take into consideration the Claim of DSL which is set out by the Arbitral Tribunal in para 50 of its judgment, which is as under:-

“50.......... In paragraph 20.7 of the Statement of Claim, the Claimants have set out relief No.1 to 7 and the total amount claimed is Rs 1053,06,78,342/-. The break-up of claims No.1 to 7 is as follows:-

Claim No. 1	Claim for agglomerated rent	Rs.439,81,62,990/-
Claim No. 2	Claim for fair price forinstalled contract objects	Rs.313,32,62,000/-
Claim No. 3	Loss of installation cost for 17294 contract objects installed.	Rs 3,60,14,755/-
Claim No. 4	Claim for compensation loss of depreciation underIncome Tax Act.	Rs.226,27,79,338/-
Claim No. 5	Claim for damages	Rs.47,99,83,259/-
Claim No. 6	Claim for Compensation loss of business profit	Rs 21,99,26,000/-
Claim No. 7	Claim for costs of legal proceedings	Rs 5,50,00,000/-

Claim No.8 was for discharge of bank guarantees.....”

67. Out of these claims, DSL did not press Claim Nos. 3, 5 and 6. Claim No.7 being claim for costs, it was to be determined by the Tribunal in its discretion. So far as Claim No.8 is concerned, it was contended that since the said issue was pending in Suit No.3761 of 2000 filed by MSEB in this Court, it was not open for the Claimants to claim discharge in these proceedings. The Tribunal observed in its Award that lease rent is one of the measures for ascertaining damages and so far as quantum of damages is concerned, it relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in (1976) 3 SCC page 32 (Union of India v/s. Sugavali Sugar (Pvt) Ltd.) and particularly on the following observations:-

“One of the principles for award of damages is that as far as possible he who has proved a breach of a bargain to supply what he has contracted to get is to be placed, as far as money can do it, in as good a situation as if the contract has been performed the principle is that as far as possible the injured party should be placed in as good a situation as if the contract has been performed. In other words it is to provide compensation for pecuniary loss which naturally flows from the breach.”

Thereafter, after referring to the decision reported in (1851) 17 QB 127 (Cart and Gee v/s. Ambargate Notingham and Bostan and Eastern Junction Railway Co.) relied upon by the Claimants/DSL the Tribunal came to the conclusion that it was not possible to award the lease rent for the entire number of contract objects and for the entire period of 10 years. The Tribunal relied upon the decision in (1957) 3 All England Reports 479 (Interoffice Telephones Ltd. V/s Robert Freeman Co. Ltd.) and came to the conclusion that the damages which the Claimants/DSL were entitled to were required to be determined on the principles laid down in the said decision and it observed as under in para 52:-

“52.............In respect of the present contract, it is necessary to examine the question of quantum of damages with reference to :-

(a) Installation of contract objects – 17,294

(b) Stranded objects - 14,206

(c) objects not manufactured - 16, 487

The Tribunal, thereafter, observed that only difference between the contract objects installed and contract objects stranded was that expenses for installed objects were incurred in the first category while in later category, those expenses were yet to be incurred. The Tribunal, thereafter, proceeded to determine the damages payable to the Claimants/DSL in respect of lease rent for duration of 7 years in respect of 17,294 contract objects which were installed and, therefore, held that damages towards these installed objects which were payable to the Claimants were to the tune of Rs 108,02,53,173/-. In respect of 14,206 stranded objects, it held that the said damages which were payable towards the said stranded objects were to the tune of Rs 14,28,55,536/- for a period of one year @ Rs 10,056/- per year for each contract object and for a duration of five years Rs 71,42,77,680/- and so far as objects which were not manufactured are concerned, the Tribunal took into consideration the approximate value of imported material used in the contract objects after taking into consideration the value of unused imported raw material and, therefore, came to the conclusion that quantum of damages in respect of imported raw material left unused for 16,487 contract objects was Rs 6,52,55,546/- and the total of the three namely (a) + (b) + (c ) was Rs 185,97,86,399/- after deducting Rs 6,81,99,390/- paid by MSEB to the Claimants/DSL pursuant to the interim orders passed by the Tribunal.

68. So far as Claim No.2 is concerned viz claim for fair price for installed contract object, it was rejected by the Tribunal. Similarly Claim No.4 towards loss of depreciation under Income Tax Act was also rejected by the Tribunal.

Submissions and finding on Point Nos. (iv)Whether the Award is contrary to the public policy as mentioned under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; (v)Whether the damages were properly awarded and (vi)Whether the aspect of mitigation was properly considered.

69. Mr. Vikas Singh, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of MSEB firstly submitted that since there was no breach committed by MSEB and since DSL had no right to terminate the contract, no damages were payable. Secondly, it was submitted that since the cost of the contract objects was on an average Rs 9,000/- per object as disclosed in the Gate Pass of DSL to the Excise Department, they were at the best entitled to nominal profit of 10% to 15% over the said cost and the Award was liable to be set aside on this ground for granting excessive damage to DSL. Thirdly, it was contended that the Arbitrators had committed grave mistake in awarding damages for objects not even manufactured and this was patently illegal and in violation of public policy as mentioned in section 34 of the said Act. Fourthly, it was contended that, according to the understanding of the DSL, contract was coming to an end on 19/3/1999 and the contract objects therefore should have been manufactured by them and failure to manufacture the same did not entitle them to claim any damages qua the objects not manufactured. Fifthly, it was contended that since the contract had already been novated, DSL was obliged to manufacture the objects as and when the lists were supplied to them and, therefore, the question of payment of any compensation qua the objects not manufactured did not arise. Sixthly, it was contended that there was no default qua the installed or qua the uninstalled objects and, therefore, Arbitral Tribunal was not justified in granting any compensation whatsoever. Seventhly, it was contended that in respect of the installed objects, the only breach was nonrenewal of Letter of Credit and in respect of uninstalled objects, the only breach was non-submission of list of locations. It was contended that so far as non-renewal of Letter of Credit is concerned, the Arbitral Tribunal decided in favour of MSEB and, therefore, no damage was awardable and in respect of uninstalled objects DSL had 16,473 list of locations and they were obliged to maintain 2500 buffer stock and since they had only manufactured 14,206 objects, there was no question of payment of any damages qua the uninstalled objects.

MITIGATION

70. Mr. Vikas Singh, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of MSEB then submitted that in view of section 73 of the Contract Act, damages could only be granted if the party claiming the same establishes that it has taken sufficient steps to remedy the inconvenience arising from the breach that it can claim any damages under the contract. It was contended that, according to DSL, the breach if at all, took place only on 21/12/1998 when the permission for simultaneous installation in B-III was withdrawn and no steps whatsoever to remedy the breach thereafter were taken by DSL. It was contended that the affidavit and the documents filed by DSL do not disclose the result of the efforts made by the DSL to sell the products to Andhra, Rajasthan and Karnataka Electricity Boards. As such, therefore, DSL had not tried to mitigate their loss and were not entitled to get damages. Reliance was placed on the judgments in MurlidharChiranjilal vs. Harishchandra Dwarkadas (AIR 1962 SC 366)(Para 9); PannalalJugatmal vs. State of MP (AIR (1963) MP 242)(Paras 14 and 15) and in A.K.A.S. Jamal vs. Moola Dawood Sons and Co. (AIR 1915 Privcy Council 48).

71. On the other hand Mr. R.A. Dada, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of DSL firstly submitted that award of damages by learned Arbitrators had been considered at great length by the learned Single Judge and the learned Single Judge had given a finding that damages awarded were just and proper and, therefore, no case was made out to interfere with the Award under section 34. Secondly, it was contended that damages had been awarded for breach of the entire contract which was treated as one contract which had been breached. It was contended that even the MSEB in their counter-claim had sought damages and return of the amounts paid under the contract on the basis that single contract was wrongfully terminated. It was submitted that it was open for the Arbitrators to award damages for entire lease period of 10 years. However, the Arbitrators separately calculated the damages for installed objects, uninstalled objects and unmanufactured objects. It was submitted that it could not be concluded therefore that the contract was in any way split into two or three parts. It was contended that the calculation was only for the purpose of agglomeration of damages which was essentially within the domain of the Arbitral Tribunal. Thirdly, it was submitted that the award of damages could not be challenged under section 34 of the said Act as held by the Supreme Court in McDermott vs. Burn Standard (2006 (11) SCC 181). The learned Senior Counsel invited our attention to paras 102, 106, 110 and 113 to 115 of the said judgment. It was submitted that the Apex Court had held that computation of damages is a matter which falls for the decision of the Arbitrators and, therefore, this Court should not exercise its jurisdiction in that regard.

Findings on Point Nos. (iv), (v) and (vi) above

72. In our view, there is no substance in the submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of MSEB.

73. We agree with the submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of DSL for the following reasons:

First of all, it has to be noted that Arbitral Tribunal in its Award has recorded a finding of fact that MSEB had committed breach of the contract by not supplying the lists of DTC locations and this breach was a fundamental breach of the agreement. Secondly, it is held that MSEB had prevented DSL from performing its part of the contract and, therefore, they were entitled to get damages. The Arbitral Tribunal, thereafter, relying on the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India v/s. Sugauli Sugar (Pvt) Ltd. (1976) 3 SCC 32)has observed that innocent party who has proved the breach of contract to supply what he had contracted to get, such a party should be placed in as good a situation as if the contract had been performed and, therefore, damages which the Claimants/DSL were entitled to have to be determined on the said principle. The Tribunal has then held that lease rent is one of the measures for ascertaining damages and, in that context, after relying on the Work Order, came to the conclusion that entitlement of the Claimants was to secure lease rent accrued from the date of installation of the contract objects. In this context, therefore, for the sake of convenience the question of quantum of damages was considered with reference to (a) installation of contract objects, (b) stranded objects and (c) objects not manufactured. The submission of the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of MSEB that the Arbitral Tribunal had split up the contract into three parts, though the contract was one single contract, is without any substance. It has to be noted that the Arbitral Tribunal first came to the conclusion that there was a breach on the part of MSEB in supplying the lists of DTC locations. Having held, that there was a breach and that the Claimants/DSL were entitled to claim compensation, while ascertaining the amount of compensation, for the sake of convenience, it has considered the aspect of granting damages in the above manner. The entire thrust of the argument of MSEB, therefore, is misconceived. MSEB has tried to give a twist to their tale by contending that 17,294 contract objects being installed, there was no question of awarding damages for the installed objects and, secondly, since termination of Letter of Credit was held not to be illegal, it was not open for the Arbitral Tribunal to have awarded damages for the uninstalled objects and the objects which were not manufactured. This submission is totally misconceived, firstly because it has been consistently held that the Arbitral Tribunal alone is competent to decide the manner of calculation of damages which are to be awarded as also the method which is to be adopted by the Tribunal. In the present case, the Arbitral Tribunal has held that lease rent is one of the measures for ascertaining damages. The Apex Court in McDermott vs. Burn Standard 2006 (11) SCC 181)has observed as under:-

“106. We do not intend to delve deep into the matter as it is an accepted position that different formulae can be applied in different circumstances and the question as to whether damages should be computed by taking recourse to one or the other formula, having regard to the facts and circumstances of a particular case, would eminently fall within the domain of the arbitrator.”

“110. As computation depends on circumstances and methods to compute damages, how the quantum thereof should be determined is a matter which would fall for the decision of the arbitrator. We, however, see no reason to interfere with that part of the award in view of the fact that the aforementioned formula evolved over the years, is accepted internationally and, therefore, cannot be said to be wholly contrary to the provisions of the Indian law.”

Similarly, the Apex Court in DwarkaDas vs. State of M.P. And another (1999) 3 SCC 500)(Para 9) has held that Court should make a broad evaluation instead of going into minute details when estimating damages for breach of contract. Similarly, in ONGC vs. Comex (2003(5) Bom.C.R. 146), in para 12 it is held that it is open for the Arbitrator to give lump sum Award. Similarly, in Interoffice vs. Robert Freeman (1957) 3 ALL ER 479), it has been held that measure of damages in respect of hire of goods was the loss of rental for the unexpired term of hiring less appropriate deductions to place the owners in as far as possible in a position as if the contract had been performed.

(Emphasis supplied)

In PrakashKharade vs. Dr. Vijay Kumar Khandre and Others (2002) 5 SCC 568)(Paras 52 and 53), the Apex Court observed that the contract is discharged by breach on part of one party, the entire contract necessarily goes and along with it agreement, if any, with regard to maintenance must necessarily go. It has been urged by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of MSEB that the said observations have been made only in the context of provisions of Representation of the People Act, 1951. In our view, the said submission cannot be accepted. Though the said observations have been made in the said judgment in the Petition arising out of the Election Laws, the observations of the Apex Court in respect of breach of contract would still be relevant and equally applicable in the facts of the present case.

Similarly, in Grandhivs. Vissamestti(AIR 2002 AP 71 (FB), (para 13) it has been held that rescission of a contract discharges both parties from any further liability to perform their respective primary obligations under the contract and, lastly, in MirzaJaved Murtaza vs. U.P. Financial Corporation Kanpur and another (AIR 1983 Allahabad 234(1)it has been held that claim for compensation under section 75 of the Contract Act is maintainable when the right to repudiation of the contract has been exercised under sections 39, 53, 54 or 55 of the Contract Act. Para 13 of the said judgment reads as under:-

“13. The situations in which one of the parties to a contract, may rightfully rescind and put an end to it are dealt with u/s. 39, 53, 54, 55 and 64 of the Contract Act. Section 39 states that when a party to a contract has refused to perform, or disabled himself from performing, his promise in its entirety, the promisee may put an end to the contract, unless he has signified, by words or conduct, his acquiescence in its continuance. The rightful rescinding of a contract involving reciprocal promises has been dealt with under Section 53 of the Act which provides that when a contract contains reciprocal promises and one party to the contract prevents the other from performing his promise, the contract becomes voidable at the option of the other party so prevented; and he is entitled to compensation from the other party for any loss which he may sustain in consequence of the non-performance of the contract. Section 54 deals with the effect of default as to the promise which should be first performed, in a contract consisting of reciprocal promises. The section provides that when a contract consists of reciprocal promises such that one of them cannot be performed, or that its performance cannot, be claimed till the other has been performed, and the promisor of the promise last mentioned fails to perform it, such promisor cannot claim the performance of the reciprocal promise, and must make compensation to the other party to the contract for any loss which such other party may sustain by the nonperformance of the contract. Section 55 deals with the effect of failure to perform at fixed time, in a contract in which time is essential. Section 64 concerns the consequences of rescission of voidable contracts stating that when a person at whose option a contract is voidable rescinds it, the other party thereto need not perform any promise therein contained in which he is promisor. The party rescinding a voidable contract shall, if he has received any benefit there-under from another party to such contract, restore such benefit, so far as may be, to the person from whom it was received. Thus the general conditions in which a contract can be rightfully rescinded have been first contemplated under Section 39. Sections 54 and 55 are applicable to those general conditions in the particular field of reciprocal promises. Section 55 then seeks to apply the same conditions in the field of such contracts in which time is essence of their performance. Section 64 dealt with the consequences of repudiation of a contract by such party at whose option it was repudiable. Section 75 on the other hand enables the person rightfully rescinding a contract to get compensation from the party at whose fault the repudiation had to be brought about. Section 64 in this way deals with some sort of liabilities, and does not deal with claims so directly. Since it makes a person liable, the very liability of that person may legitimately give rise to the claim of another person. So, when Section 64 says that the party who lawfully rescinds a contract must, return the benefit which he has under the contract received from the party for whose conduct the contract had to be repudiated, it has the implication in it of giving birth to the claim of the other party to insist upon the repudiating party to make restoration of the benefit which he has hitherto received or enjoyed under the contract. The peculiarity about this claim is that it is not after all a claim of compensation. It is obviously that type of claim which can better be called as claim for restoration or restitution. The aim is to bring the parties to a position as if there had been no contract. In its aim and intent, the claim for compensation is quite the reverse of a claim of restitution. A claim for compensation aims not at bringing the parties in a position as if no contract had been entered into but in a position as if the contract had been performed. The one restores the benefit, the other recoups the loss. The person who lawfully rescinds a contract is, on the one hand, under a legal liability to restore the benefit, if any received by him under the contract to the person from whom he has received it, and gives him at the same time and on the other hand, a legal right to claim compensation for the damage, if any, he has suffered through the non-fulfilment of the contract (see 'Law of Claims' by Dr. R.G. Chaturvedi, pages 454 and 455). The kind of refusal contemplated in Section 39 of the Contract Act is one which affects the vital part of the contract and prevents the promisee from getting in substance what he bargained for. The claim for compensation under Section 75 is maintainable when the right of repudiation of the contract has been exercised under either of the Sections 39, 53, 54 or 55 of the Contract Act.”

The Arbitral Tribunal, therefore, after having adopted the lease rent as one of the methods of ascertaining damages has thereafter considered what damages should be awarded by way of lease rentals on installed objects, stranded objects and the objects not manufactured. In our view, it is not possible to find fault with the finding of the Arbitral Tribunal on the measure and method for ascertaining and calculating the damages which have been adopted by it to arrive at the final figure of compensation to be payable to the Claimants/DSL.

It is also quite well settled position in law that once it is established that the party was justified in terminating the contract on account of fundamental breach of contract then, in that event, such an innocent party is entitled to claim damages for the entire contract, i.e., for the part which is performed and also for remaining part of the contract which it was prevented to perform. This principle is quite well settled in number of cases. The Tribunal, therefore, was perfectly justified in calculating the damages in the aforesaid manner. In this view of the matter we do not propose to deal with the judgments on which reliance is sought to be placed by MSEB.

So far as the question of mitigation is concerned, the Tribunal has specifically held that the contract objects were unique objects which had to be manufactured according to the specifications laid down by the MSEB and, therefore, these contract objects could not be disposed of in the open market. Even if the said contract objects were dismantled, value would become nil. The Tribunal also observed that Datar deposed with reference to Exhibit-C-16 that efforts were made to sell the contract objects stranded in the factory to other Electricity Boards but those efforts did not succeed. The question of mitigation, therefore, was considered by the Tribunal and the submissions of MSEB were not accepted. In our view, reasoning given by the Tribunal cannot be faulted.

The learned Single Judge also has concurred with the finding given by the Tribunal on the aspect of damages and mitigation.

In our view, there is no infirmity in the finding arrived at by the Tribunal or the learned Single Judge. The MSEB relied on the Judgments in MurlidharChiranjilal vs. Harishchandra Dwarkadas (AIR 1962 SC 366)(Para 9); PannalalJugatmal vs. State of MP (AIR (1963) MP 242)(Paras 14 and 15) and in A.K.A.S. Jamal vs. Moola Dawood Sons and Co. (AIR 1915 Privcy Council 48). In our view, ratio of the said judgments will not apply to the facts of the present case.

It cannot be forgotten that after the Work Order was issued by MSEB, DSL had invested Rs. 163 crores for the purpose of procuring the material by importing it from foreign countries and manufactured those objects and had equally made investments for the purpose of employing trained and skilled staff and procured vehicles for the purpose of installation of these objects all over Maharashtra. The Arbitral Tribunal had awarded damages in most conservative manner and the total damages which were awarded were to the tune of Rs. 183 crores and that too at the rate of reasonable interest of 10% which would barely cover the investments made by DSL to repay the loan taken from the Financial Institutions. DSL also has been declared a sick Unit and the case has been referred to BIFR. The Arbitral Tribunal, therefore, had awarded only the cost incurred by DSL on the unmanufactured objects.

Another aspect which is relevant is that the learned Arbitrators in the Award have recorded the submissions of MSEB as under:-

“51................ Alternatively it was submitted that the Claimants would be entitled to lease rent for reasonable period after deducting the cost of maintenance and taking out of printouts.......”

The learned Arbitrators having accepted the said submission, it is not now open for MSEB to make grievance for the same.

One more angle which needs to be taken into consideration as rightly pointed out by the learned Senior Counsel Mr. R.A. Dada appearing on behalf of DSL is provisions of section 28(3) of the said Act which reads “In all cases the Arbitral Tribunal shall decide in accordance with the terms of the contract and shall take into account the usages of trade applicable to the transaction”. The practice of the leasing trade even at the international level qua damages is embodied in Art 13 of UNIDROT Model Code for Cross Border leasing. In our view, therefore, as rightly submitted by the Claimants, the learned Arbitrators have adopted the approach which is consistent with the said trade norm and have accordingly decided the damages properly.

Another submission which was made by the MSEB was that the damages should have been awarded on the basis of cost of the equipment shown in the Excise Gate Pass. The said submission is completely misconceived. The learned Arbitrators have considered the said aspect and have rejected the said contention by giving cogent reasons. The learned Arbitrators have held that the lease rent was a proper measure for awarding damages and have calculated the damages on that aspect. The learned Single Jude also has confirmed the said finding. The said submission of MSEB is, therefore, devoid of any substance and cannot be accepted.

74. Since we have already held that there is no illegality committed by the Tribunal in awarding damages to the claimants by using lease rent as measure of calculating damages on the installed contract objects, stranded contract objects and also in awarding cost so far as the objects which are not manufactured are concerned, in our view, it cannot be held that the award is against the public policy or contrary to the law of the land or that it shocks the conscience of the Court. Hence, the submission made by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of MSEB that the Award is contrary to the public policy is without any substance. The said submission, therefore, cannot be accepted.

Chamber Summonses filed by MSEB:

75. MSEB has filed three Chamber Summons. So far as Chamber Summons (L) No.1467 of 2012 and Chamber Summons (L) No.1474 of 2012 are concerned, both these Chamber Summons pertain to amendment seeking to incorporate identical grounds. Chamber Summons (L) No.1467 of 2012 proposes amendment of the appeal and Chamber Summons (L) No.1474 of 2012 proposes to amend the Arbitration Petition. In the Chamber proposing to amend the memorandum of appeal, the following amendment has been sought:-

Add ground No.166(a) and 166(b) after ground No.166 of the Memorandum of Appeal by the following words and figures:-

“166(a) because the respondent under the original tender of 1996 was only entitled to supply and maintain 11760 contract objects and 12555 replacement of 1993/94 contract was a package, with 23672 supply of contract objects and, failure to replace the contract objects of 1993/94 completely disentitles the respondent from the rights to supply any contract object under the additional quantities of 23672 contract objects awarded as package.

166(b) Because the respondent in the facts and circumstances of this case was only entitle to supply 11760 contract objects and the balance supply was to be in the ratio of 12555 replacements vis-a-vis 23672 additional contract objects and, since, the respondent replaced only 2014 in the B-II location, his right to be informed of locations for fresh contract objects in respect of additional quantity were only of 3797, out of which the respondent has actually installed 3520 contract objects and hence, no right accrued to the respondent to claim any further locations without first replacing more contract objects in the B-II locations. This calculation has been done by taking total amount of installed contract objects which was 17294 and deducting 11760 from the same which is B-I location in order to get the figure of 5534 and, if 2014 of B-II installed objects were to be further deducted the figure of B-III actually installed would be 3520 which is very near to the entitlement of the respondent in the package ie 3797.:

Similar amendment has been sought to amend the Arbitration Petition by filing Chamber Summons (L) No.1474 of 2012.

So far as third Chamber Summons No 1544 of 2012 is concerned, in the said Chamber Summons the following amendment has been sought by MSEB:-

“Add ground no.rrr(c) to rrr(d) after ground no.rrr of the Petition by the following words and figures:-

rrr(c) That the Learned Arbitral Tribunal failed to appreciate that there was no occasion for award of damages qua the installed objects as clearly the Respondents were in breach for not maintaining the same as the Respondents had not been able to prove any default whatsoever by the Petitioner giving them the right to terminate the contract qua the installed objects.

rrr(d) That the Learned Arbitral Tribunal failed to appreciate that the only breach referable to the installed objects was the allegation regarding non renewal of Letter of Credit which was relatable to the installed objects and once the finding was recorded by the Arbitral Tribunal that there was no breach in not renewing the Letter of Credit there was no occasion whatsoever, for the Arbitral Tribunal to award any damages to the Respondents for terminating the contract qua the installed objects.”

76. It was submitted by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the MSEB that since the facts have been culled out from the stand taken by DSL, no prejudice whatsoever would be caused to them if the Chamber Summons are allowed. It was contended that by virtue of the said amendment, new ground is not pleaded and, therefore Chamber Summons qua the package deal deserves to be allowed. Reliance was placed on the judgment of the Kerala High Court in Mohammed Mamdouth Matwally Ghali vs. Kerala Automobiles Ltd (ILR 2011 (3) Kerala 283). So far as this third Chamber Summons is concerned, it was contended that the said issue had been pleaded before the learned Arbitrators and also before the learned Single Judge that the Respondents/DSL were not entitled to claim any lease rent for the contract objects which they failed to maintain. It was contended that the amendment is thus technical amendment of including the said ground in section 34 Petition. It was contended that the said ground had been considered by the earlier learned Single Judge D.K. Deshmukh, J. while deciding earlier section 34 Petition in this Court. Reliance was placed by the MSEB also on the following judgments:-

(1) The National Textile Corporation Ltd. vs. Nareshkumar Badrikumar Jagad and Ors. (2011) 12 SCC 695)(Paras 1, 2, 14 and 19)

(2) Tarini Kamal Pandit and Ors vs. Prafulla Kumar Chatterjee (Dead) by Legal Representatives (1979) 3 SCC 280)(Para 14)

(3) State of Maharashtra vs. M/s Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. (2010) 4 SCC 518)(Paras 7, 15, 23, 29 and 30)

77. On the other hand, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of DSL vehemently opposed the said three Chamber Summons for amendment. It was submitted that the amended provision of Order VI Rule 17 of the Civil Procedure Code prohibits amendment after a trial is commenced. It was submitted that the Arbitration Petition No.374 of 2004 is already disposed of and the trial has been concluded after remand. Secondly, it was submitted that there is no averment in the Chamber Summons that the proposed grounds are relatable to any grounds set out under Section 34 of the said Act. It was submitted that none of the Chamber Summons are accompanied by any prayer for condonation of delay and no reasons have been given for filing Chamber Summons after eight years and two rounds of final disposal of Arbitration Petition. It was submitted that the said Chamber Summons were filed to circumvent the order dated 02/03/2010 passed by this Court which in terms states that in appeal only those points which were urged before the learned Single Judge could be urged. It was then submitted that the amendment which has been sought to be made is exactly contrary to the admissions given by the MSEB. Reliance was placed by DSL on the following judgments:-

(1) Ganga Bai vs. Vijay Kumar (AIR 1974 SC 1126)(Paras 20, 21, and 22)

(2) ONGC v. McClelland (1999) 4 SCC 327)(Para 5)

(3) Thanikkudam vs. Reena (2007) 4 BCR 21)

(4) Patel Engineering vs. Konkan Railway (2009) 5 BCR 256)

(5) Union of India vs. Popular Construction (2001) 8 SCC 470

78 Before we take into consideration the rival submissions, it will be necessary to take into consideration the brief chronology of events again, for the purpose of deciding these Chamber Summonses which is as under:-

Date	Events
17/05/1999	Statement of Claim was filed by the DSL before the Arbitral Tribunal.
20/09/1999	Written statement and Counter Claim were filed by MSEB beforetheArbitral Tribunal.
07/02/2000	MSEB amended the Written Statement and Counter Claim whichwere filed before the Arbitral Tribunal
18/06/2000	Arbitral Award was passed in favour of DSL
August,2004	Petition under Section 34 of the said Act was filed.
03/08/2005	The learned Single Judge (Coram : D.K. Deshmukh, J.) set aside the Award.
23/08/2005	DSL filed Appeal under section 37 of the said Act.
23/10/2008	The Division Bench of this Court set aside the Award and remanded the matter for fresh consideration.
18/03/2009	The learned Single Judge (Coram: Smt. R.S. Dalvi, J.) dismissed the Petition filed by MSEB and upheld the Arbitral Award.
14/04/2009	MSEB filed the present Appeal No.166 of 2009.
29/04/2009	MSEB filed first Chamber Summons for amendment of AppealMemorandum.
2/03/2010	Division Bench of this Court while deciding the Chamber Summons,observed as under:- “We make it clear that Appeal No.166 of 2009 shall be heard and decided on the issues as were submitted before the learned Single Judge on remand and as they appear from the record.” [Per Court:It is thus obvious that Division Bench while deciding the Chamber summons made it clear that appeal shall be heard and decided on the issues as were submitted before the learned Single Judge, and disposed of the said Chamber Summons]
17/09/12	MSEB filed 2nd Chamber Summons being No (L) 1467 of 2012 afterthreeand half years after filing of the appeal, for amendment of the Appeal.
18/09/2012	MSEB filed 3rd Chamber Summons being (L) No.1474 of 2012 foramendmentof the Arbitration Petition after eight years.
09/10/2012	MSEB filed 4th Chamber Summons being (L) No.1544 of 2012 foramendmentof the Arbitration Petition.

79. It has to be noted here that when the first Chamber Summons was dismissed on 02/03/2010, this Court had observed that the appeal would be heard and decided on the issues as were submitted before the learned Single Judge. Almost after three and half years, the second Chamber Summons has been filed and the third and fourth Chamber Summonses have been filed thereafter. It is obvious that there is gross delay in filing these Chamber Summonses. Before this appeal was heard, we made it clear that we would hear the appeal and would permit the parties to argue all the grounds on merits and we would dispose of the Chamber Summonses along-with the appeal. We have accordingly heard the parties on all points including the points raised in these Chamber Summonses. This had become necessary in view of the directions given by the Apex Court to decide the appeal on or before 15/07/2013 and, secondly, if we would have heard the Chamber Summons and had given the decision one way or the other, there was always a possibility of either party seeking time to challenge the said order in the Apex Court in which case, hearing of the appeal would have been further prolonged.

80. In our view, there is much substance in the submission made by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of DSL that there is gross delay in filing these Chamber Summonses. Both the parties have given Charts which indicate that the grounds raised in these Chamber Summons were already raised before the Arbitral Tribunal as also in the Petition which was heard by the learned Single Judge and, therefore, we do not wish to go into those minute details as to whether, in fact, these grounds were raised or not as it would unnecessarily add to the pages of this judgment.

81. So far as the judgments on which reliance has been placed by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of MSEB are concerned, there cannot be any dispute regarding the ratio of the said judgment. In State of Maharashtra vs. M/s Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. (2010) 4 SCC 518), the Apex Court has observed that if material facts are pleaded then material particulars may be allowed to be amended. In our view, however, at such a belated stage, it is not possible to accept the plea for amendment of the Arbitration Petition and the Appeal, firstly on the ground that there is gross delay and secondly on the ground that even otherwise we had permitted the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of MSEB to make those submissions and we have considered those submissions. Division Bench of this Court in the first Chamber Summons had made it clear that Appeal No.166 of 2009 shall be heard and decided on the issues as were submitted before the learned Single Judge on remand and as they appear from the record. This order passed on the first Chamber Summons has not been challenged by the MSEB in the Apex Court and the said order has become final. If the Chamber Summonses taken out by the MSEB are allowed, the effect would be to permit the MSEB to circumvent that order and to bring on record the additional grounds. We do not propose to examine for this reason as to what was pleaded before the Arbitral Tribunal or learned Single Judge. For the aforesaid reasons, the Chamber Summonses taken out by the Appellants/MSEB are dismissed.

CONCLUSION:

82. In our view, therefore, the MSEB has miserably failed in establishing that the Award passed by the Tribunal is contrary to the public policy or is patently illegal and the same is therefore liable to be set aside on that ground. It is also not established that the findings given by the Tribunal and confirmed by the learned Single Judge are perverse. No case whatsoever has been made out for interfering with the findings recorded by the Arbitral Tribunal in the Award or the Judgment by the learned Single Judge in Arbitration Petition. Appeal is therefore dismissed with costs.

83. Appeal and the Chamber Summonses and Notices of Motion are accordingly disposed of. All other Chamber Summons or Notices of Motion, if pending, do not survive and they are also disposed of accordingly.