CRM not M-11737 of 2013 (O&M) 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH CRM not M-11737 of 2013 (O&M) Date of Decision:-12.4.2013 M/s Construction Engineers & Anr. ...Petitioners Versus M/s V.K.Sood ...Respondent CORAM: HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE MEHINDER SINGH SULLAR Present: Mr.Vijay K.Jindal, Advocate for the petitioners. Mehinder Singh Sullar, J.(Oral) Tersely, the facts & material, which need a necessary mention for the limited purpose of deciding the core controversy, involved in the instant petition and emanating from the record, are that, initially, the complainant-respondent M/s V.K.Sood Engineers and Contractors (for brevitsy “the complainant”.) has filed the complaint (Annexure P1) against the petitioners-accused under Sections 138 & 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 as amended by the Banking, Public, Financial Institutions and Negotiable Instrument Laws (Amendment) Act, 2002 (55 of 2002), (hereinafter to be referred as “the NI Act”.), inter-alia, pleading that the parties have entered into a joint venture agreement dated 20.6.2002 for completion of balance/additional works of 9 Single Line Railways Bridges across river etc. in question. They have also entered into a memorandum of understanding dated 10.7.2005 in this regard. In pursuance of memorandum of understanding, CRM not M-11737 of 2013 (O&M) 2 an amount of ` 80 lacs was due towards the accused. It was claimed that the petitioners-accused, in order to meet the legal liability in this respect, issued four impugned cheques, mentioned therein in the complaint (Annexure P1).
2. Sequelly, the complainant has presented one cheque, bearing No.10971022 dated 16.3.2006 for the amount of ` 10 lacs in the Union Bank of India, Sector 35-C Branch, Chandigarh for encashment, but the same was returned unpaid with the remarks “payment stopped by drawer”., vide cheque return memo dated 15.7.2006, which was, in turn, forwarded to the complainant by the Union Bank of India, Chandigarh, by way of forwarding letter/memo dated 21.7.2006.
3. Likewise, the complainant, inter-alia, claimed that the impugned cheque issued by the petitioners was presented in the Union Bank of India, Sector 35-C Branch, Chandigarh for encashment, which was dishonoured. They (accused) have intentionally stopped the payment with mala fide intention. They have not made the payment of impugned amount despite receipt of legal notice. Inter-alia, in the background of these allegations, the complainant has filed the impugned complaint (Annexure P1) against the petitioners-accused in the manner depicted here-in-above.
4. Having considered the preliminary oral as well as documentary evidence on record, the trial Court summoned the petitioners -accused to face the trial of an offence punishable u/s 138 of the NI Act, by means of impugned summoning order dated 9.10.2006 (Annexure P2). CRM not M-11737 of 2013 (O&M”
5. Sequelly, the application filed by the petitioners-accused for the return of complaint was dismissed by the trial Magistrate, by virtue of impugned order dated 21.7.2011 (Annexure P6).
6. Aggrieved thereby, the revision petition (Annexure P7) filed by the petitioners-accused was dismissed as well, by the revisional Court, vide impugned judgment dated 18.12.2012 (Annexure P8).
7. The petitioners-accused still did not feel satisfied and preferred the present 2nd revision petition, (which is otherwise legally barred) in the garb of petition u/s 482 Cr.PC) to quash the impugned complaint (Annexure P1) and orders/judgment (Annexures P2, P6 and P8). That is how I am seized of the matter.
8. After hearing the learned counsel for the petitioners-accused going through the record & legal provisions with his valuable help and after considering the entire matter deeply, to my mind, there is no merit in the instant petition in this context.
9. Ex facie, the solitary argument of learned counsel that the impugned cheque was issued from Sri Nagar and since the Courts at Chandigarh did not have the territorial jurisdiction, so, the impugned complaint and all other subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, are liable to be quashed, is not only devoid of merit but misplaced as well.
10. As is evident from the record that the complainant has presented the impugned cheque in the Union Bank of India, Sector 35-C Branch, Chandigarh for encashment, which was dishonoured. The petitioners-accused were stated to have intentionally stopped the payment with mala fide intention. It was conveyed to the complainant, vide letter CRM not M-11737 of 2013 (O&M) 4 dated 21.7.2006 at Chandigarh. In that eventuality, the Court at Chandigarh definitely has the jurisdiction to entertain and try the complaint. Moreover, all the contentions, not sought to be urged on behalf of the accused, have already been considered and negated by this Court in case M/s Rattan Industries Ltd. and another v. Shruti Gupta 2012 (4) RCR (Criminal) 343 (upheld by Hon'ble Apex Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.8020 of 2012), wherein while interpreting the provisions of Sections 138 and 142 of the N.I.Act, it was ruled that question of territorial jurisdiction has to be considered from the view point of the payee/complainant for the purpose of filing the complaint and not as per wishful thinking of defaulter accused. Sequelly, it was also held that, Court has the territorial jurisdiction to entertain and decide the complaint, where the cheque was presented for encashment and dishonoured. As indicated here-in-above, it is not a matter of dispute that in the instant case, the impugned cheque was presented for encashment by the complainant at Chandigarh, which was dishonoured and was conveyed to the complainant at Chandigarh. Therefore, the Court at Chandigarh has definitely the territorial jurisdiction to try the impugned complaint. Thus, the ratio of law laid down in the aforesaid judgment “mutatis mutandis”. is applicable to the facts of the present case and is the complete answer to the problem in hand and contrary arguments of learned counsel for petitioners deserve to be and are hereby repelled under the present set of circumstances.
11. Likewise, there is yet another aspect of the matter, which can be viewed entirely from a different angle. As depicted here-in-above, CRM not M-11737 of 2013 (O&M) 5 after considering the preliminary oral as well as documentary evidence on record, the trial Court summoned the petitioners-accused to face the trial of pointed offence, vide impugned summoning order (Annexure P2). Similarly, the application filed by them for the return of complaint was dismissed by the trial Court, through the medium of impugned order (Annexure P6). not only that, the revision petition (Annexure P7) filed by them was dismissed as well, by the revisional Court, vide impugned judgment (Annexure P8), which, in substance, is as under (paras 9 and 11) :-
“9. After having heard both the sides, I find no merit in any of the contentions of learned counsel for the petitioners. An identical question came to be decided by the Hon'ble Apex Court in case K.Bhaskaran Vs. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan 1999(4) RCR (Criminal) 309 wherein having interpreted the provisions of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, Sections 178(3), 177 and 179 Cr.PC, it was ruled that :- “The complainant can choose any one of those courts having jurisdiction over any one of the local areas within the territorial limits of which any one of the following five acts, the components of the offence, took place: (1) drawing of the cheque; (ii) presentation of the cheque to the bank; (iii) returning of the cheque unpaid by the drawee bank; (iv) giving of notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque demanding payment of the cheque amount; (v) failure of the drawer to make payment within 15 days of the receipt of the notice. It may, therefore, be an idle exercise to question jurisdiction relating to this offence. High Court in appeal rightly set aside the finding of the trial court that it had no territorial jurisdiction because the cheque had been dishonoured in a different district, outside its jurisdiction. Further on facts, High Court rightly held that trial court had jurisdiction as the cheque had been issued at a shop within its jurisdiction.”
. The Hon'ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in case M/s Rattan Industries Ltd. And another Vs. Shruti Gupta 2012(4) RCR (Criminal) 343, while distinguishing the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Harman Electronics (P) Ltd. And anr. Vs. National Panasonic India Ltd. 2009(1) RCR (Criminal) 458 and relying upon the observations CRM not M-11737 of 2013 (O&M) 6 made in K.Bhaskaran's case (supra) has held that :- “As indicated here-in-above, the petitioners-accused have purchased the hosiery items from the complainant at Ludhiana. The impugned cheques were presented by the complainant at Ludhiana. She received the information of dishonour of cheques at Ludhiana. She issued statutory legal notice to the petitioners-accused for making the payment from Ludhiana. In that eventuality, it cannot possibly be saith that the Court at Ludhiana did not have the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the impugned complaint, as urged on behalf of petitioners-accused. Therefore, the contrary arguments of their learned senior counsel “stricto sensu”. deserve to be and are hereby repelled under the present set of circumstances, as the law laid down in K.Bhaskaran's case (supra) “mutatis mutandis”. is applicable to the facts of the present case and is the complete answer to the problem in hand.“ 11. Coming to the facts of this case, the petitioners issued the cheque in question drawn on Jammu and Kashmir Bank Limited, Srinagar Brnach to the complainant. The complainant presented the said cheque for collection through its banker Union Bank of India Chandigarh but the same was received back dishonoured with remarks that “payment stopped by drawer”.. Thus, the cheque in question was presented by the complainant to its banker at Chandigzrh which was returned back unpaid to the complainant at Chandigarh. Thus, in view of the law laid down in K.Bhaskaran's case (supra) and M/s Rattan Industries Ltd. And another's case (supra), the Courts at Chandigarh have the jurisdiction to try and entertain the impugned complaint.”
12. Meaning thereby, both the Courts below have examined the matter in right perspective and recorded the cogent grounds in this relevant connection. The learned counsel for petitioners did not point out any material/ground, muchless cogent, so as to warrant any interference in the impugned orders. Such well-articulated impugned orders/judgment, containing valid reasons, cannot possibly be interfered with by this Court, in the present 2nd revision petition (which is otherwise legally barred under section 397(3) Cr.PC), in the garb of petition under section 482 Cr.PC, unless and until, the same are illegal, perverse and without CRM not M-11737 of 2013 (O&M) 7 jurisdiction. Since no such patent illegality or legal infirmity has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioners, so, the impugned orders (Annexures P2 & P6) & judgment (Annexure P8) deserve to be and are hereby maintained in the obtaining circumstances of the case.
13. No other point, worth consideration, has either been urged or pressed by the learned counsel for the petitioners.
14. In the light of aforesaid reasons and without commenting further anything on merits, lest it may prejudice the case of either side during the course of trial of main complaint (Annexure P1), the instant petition filed by the petitioners is hereby dismissed as such.
15. Needless to mention that nothing observed, here-in-above, would reflect on the merits of the complaint case, in any manner, during the course of trial, as the same has been so recorded for a limited purpose of deciding the present petition in this relevant direction. 12.4.2013 (Mehinder Singh Sullar) AS Judge Whether to be referred to reporter ?.Yes/No