Srinivasan, J.
1. When we adjourned the matter to enable the parties to produce copies of settlements entered between them by virtue of which payments of part of the bonus awarded by the Tribunal were made to workers other than those covered by the interlocutory order of this Court, the writ petitioners filed a petition for review of our judgment regarding grant of interest by the Tribunal. The same is posted before us as W.M.P. No. 20389 of 1989. The ground urged in the review petition is that the Interest Act of 1978 having come into force only in August, 1981, is not applicable to this case as the proceedings before the Tribunal were pending already. No doubt, we did not notice the fact that the Interest Act of 1978 came into force three years later in 1981 and, therefore, not applicable to this case. But, that will not vitiate our conclusion on the question of interest. We have held that the Industrial Tribunal having powers wider than a civil Court in the matter of adjudication of an industrial dispute, did have jurisdiction to grant interest and we expressed our disinclination to interfere with the award under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. That part of our judgment will stand even if the other reason adduced by us to sustain the grant of interest falls to the ground. Hence, the petition for review has to fail.
2. However, we wish to add that if the Interest Act, 1978 is not applicable, its predecessor Act is applicable. We had earlier proceeded on the footing that the word 'court' in the Act of 1839 had been understood normally as a civil court and we did not consider the question whether an Industrial Tribunal was a Court within the meaning of Interest Act, 1839. We have not come across any authority on that point; nor counsel appearing in this case could refer to any case considering the question. The matter appears to be res integra.
3. In The Reid Co-operative Timber Works Ltd., Madras v. Employees' State Insurance Corporation : AIR1970Mad439 , a Single Judge of this Court held that Interest Act, 1839 did not make any distinction between different categories of Courts and the Employees' Insurance Court had power to award interest to corporation from the Principal employer if he failed to pay contribution. Section 78 of the Employees' State Insurance Corporation Act is analoguous to Section 11 of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Former confers the powers of a Civil Court with reference to matters specified therein on the Employees' Insurance Court while the latter confers similar powers on the Industrial Tribunal. We agree with the reasoning of Maharajan, J. in that case and hold that it will apply with equal force to an Industrial Tribunal.
4. In The Bharat Bank, Ltd., Delhi v. The Employees of the Bharat Bank, Ltd. Delhi. : (1950)NULLLLJ921SC , the Supreme Court held that an Industrial Tribunal had all the trappings of a Civil Court. In Hayles, In Re. I.L.R. 1955 Mad. 1, a Full Bench of this Court held that an Industrial Tribunal though manned by a High Court Judge does not have the powers of the High Court to punish persons for contempt of the Tribunal under Article 215 of the Constitution of India. We do not think it necessary to refer in detail to the above two decision in view of a later judgment of the Supreme Court.
5. The meaning of the word 'Court' in the Contempt of Courts Act came up for consideration in Brajnandan Sinha v. Jyothi Narain : 1956CriLJ156 . In that case, the Supreme Court prescribed the tests for determining what is a 'Court' after discussing the various decisions on the subject at length. The following passage in the Judgment brings out the essence of the judgment in a nut shell;
It is clear, therefore, that in order to constitute a Court in the strict sense of the term, an essential condition is that the Court should have, apart from having some of the trappings of a judicial tribunal, power to give a decision or a definitive judgment which has finality and authoritativeness which are the essential tests of a judicial pronouncement.
6. Applying the principles enunciated in the above case, the Supreme Court held in Thakur Jugal Kishare Sinha v. The Stimarhi Central Co-Operative Bank Ltd., and Anr. : 1967CriLJ1380a that an Assistant Registrar discharging the functions of Registrar under Section 48 of Bihar and Orissa Co-operative Societies Act (6 of 1935) was a Court within the meaning of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. The ratio of the judgment as evident from the following passage places the matter beyond doubt;
A registrar exercising, powers under Section 48 must, therefore, be held to discharge the duties which would otherwise have fallen on the ordinary civil and revenue Court of the land. The Registrar has not merely the trapping of a Court but in many respects he is given the same powers as are given to ordinary civil courts of the land by the Code of Civil Procedure including the power to summon and examine witnesses on oath, the power to order inspection of documents, to hear the parties after framing issues, to review his own order and even exercise the inherent jurisdiction of Courts mentioned in Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In such a case there is no difficulty in holding that in adjudicating upon a dispute referred under S .48 of the Act, the Registrar is to all intents and purposes, a Court discharging the same functions and duties in the same manner as a Court of law is expected to do.
According to Halsbury's Laws of England (Third Edition-Vol. 9) at p.342;
Ordinarily the term 'Court' meant, among other meanings, the Sovereign's palace; it has acquired the meaning of the place where justice is administered and, further, has come to mean the persons who exercise judicial functions under authority derived either immediately or mediately from the Sovereign. All tribunals, however, are not Courts, in the sense in which the term is here employed, namely, to denote such tribunals as exercise jurisdiction over persons by reason of the sanction of the law, and not merely by reason of voluntary submission to their jurisdiction', Again,
The question is whether the tribunal is a Court, not whether it is a Court of Justice, for there are Courts which are not Courts of Justice. In determining whether a tribunal is a judicial body the facts that it has been appointed by a non-judicial authority, that it had no power to administer an oath, that the chairman has a casting vote, and that third parties have power to intervene are immaterial, especially if the statute setting it up prescribes a penalty for making false statements; elements to be considered are (1) the requirement for public hearing, subject to a power to exclude the public in a proper case, and (2) a provision that a member of the tribunal shall not take part in any decision in which he is personally interested, or unless he has been present throughout the proceedings.
It will not be out of place to recapitulate what was said in Cooper v. Wilson (1937) 2 K.B. 309, and referred to in Brajnandan Sinha's case : 1956CriLJ156 . The passage runs thus;
A true judicial decision presupposes an existing dispute between two or more parties, and then involves four requisites (1). The presentation (not necessarily orally) of their case by the parties to the dispute; (2) if the dispute between them is a question of fact, the ascertainment of the fact by means of evidence adduced by the parties to the dispute and often with the assistance of argument by or on behalf of the parties on the evidence; (3) if the dispute between them is a question of law, the submission of legal arguments by the parties; and (4) a decision which disposes of the whole matter by a finding upon the facts in dispute and an application of the law of the land to the facts so found, including where required a ruling upon any disputed question of law.' In our opinion, all the above requisites are to be found in the case.
7. In Shaikh Mohammed Bhikhan Hussainbhai v. The Manager, Chandrabhanu Cinema and Ors. etc. 1986 L.I.C. 1749, a Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court held that Labour Court and Industrial Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act are 'Courts' within the meaning of the Contempt of Courts Act. We have no hesitation to hold that all the above tests are satisfied and an Industrial Tribunal is a Court within the meaning of Interest Act, 1839.
8. Learned Counsel for the petitioner relied heavily on the decision in Executive Engineer Irrigation, Galimala v. Abnaduta Jena : [1988]1SCR253 and contended that in the absence of express statutory power, interest could not be awarded by the Tribunal. That case related to award of interest by an arbitrator to whom reference was made without the intervention of a civil Court. The Supreme Court held that such an arbitrator would not be 'court' within the meaning of Interest Act 1839 but in view of the definition in the later Act, he would be a Court. The ratio of the decision will not apply to the facts of this case.
9. Learned Counsel invited our attention to the various statutory provisions which provide for grant of interest, viz., Section 80, Negotiable Instruments Act, Section 61(2) of the Sale of Goods Acts, Section 23 of the Trusts Act, Sections 351 to 353 of the Indian Succession Act, Section 111-CC of the Motor Vehicles Act and Section 29 of the Arbitration Act. Learned Counsel submitted that the Payment of Bonus Act does not contain a similar provision for grant of interest and, therefore, the workers will not be entitled to get interest on the bonus. As we have taken the view that the Interest Act, 1839, would apply to this case, the Industrial Tribunal is justified in granting interest on the bonus awarded to the workers from the due date. We are of the view that it is wholly unjust on the part of the writ petitioner to contest the grant of interest in this case. Payment of bonus is admittedly a statutory liability. The petitioner, ought to have paid it is 1976 as per the provisions of the Act. Having failed to pay bonus to the workers in accordance with law and utilized the amount for the business, the petitioner company has unjustly enriched itself. The petitioner has not paid any amount even after the award of the Tribunal until 1987 when this Court directed the petitioner to pay 4% by an interlocutory order. Thus, the petitioner had the benefit of the money for about 11 years. In the circumstances of the case, the petitioner is bound to pay interest to the workers but for whose sweat and labour, the petitioner could not have thrived. Hence, the petition for review is dismissed.
10. That leaves us with the question as to whether there should be a direction to the workers to refund to the petitioner the excess payment of bonus. It is not now in dispute that as per our judgment, the bonus payable to the workers is 7.1% in all, out of which the petitioner has already paid 4%. The balance payable is 3.1%. Pursuant to an order of this Court in W.M.P. Nos. 4514 and 7709 of 1982 and 2344 of 1987 dated 26.3.1987, the petitioner paid another 4% to the workers covered by the interlocutory order. The other workers who were not covered by the orders, entered into settlements with the petitioner and by virtue of these settlements, they got another 4% with interest thereon. The order passed by this Court contained a provision with regard to the refund of excess payment in the event of the petitioners success in the writ petition. The relevant portion of the order reads thus:
Learned Counsel for the Management submits that suitable safeguards should be provided for the recovery of the amounts paid pursuant to this order, in the event of the success of the Management in the writ petition. This is a reasonable request. With reference to those workman, who are likely to remain in service or whose services are continued till the disposal of the writ petition, there may not be any difficulty, for, the payments made to them pursuant to this order, can always be adjusted against such amounts, as may become payable to them on their retirement, in the event of the success of the Management in the writ petition. However, as regards those workmen, who are likely to either retire or cease to be in service, prior to the disposal of the writ petition, the Management will be entitled to withhold the amounts paid pursuant to this order from out of the amounts payable to them on their retirement or their ceasing to be in service. In the event of the success of the Management in the writ petition, the amounts so withheld need not be disbursed to those workmen, but in the event of the dismissal of the writ petition, the amounts withheld should also be paid to the concerned workmen. The aforesaid safeguards, in my view would be adequate to protect the interest of the workmen as well as the Management.
11. As regards the other workers, they wrote to the petitioner through their respective unions that payment may be made to them also as per the conditions stipulated in the High Court order of 26.3.1987. Pursuant to such letters, payments were made to these workers after memoranda of settlements under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act and Rule 25(1) of the Tamil Nadu Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 were entered into between the petitioner and the respective unions. The following clauses in the settlements provide for a refund of the amount:
The condition stipulated in the Order of the Madras High Court in W.M.P. Nos. 4514 and 7709 of 1982 and 2344 of 1987 dated 263.1987 are applicable to those workmen also. If any of the workmen retire or cease to be in service prior to the disposal of the Writ Petition No. 2979 of 1982, the Management will be entitled to withhold the bonus and interest paid to them as recorded in Clause 1.0 above from out of the amounts payable to them on their retirement or ceasing to be in service including Gratuity and Bonus, etc.
Should the High Court, Madras, decide the Writ Petitions 2979, 2980, 2981 of 1982 in favour of the Management, or should other Courts decide in favour of the Management or ultimately it is decided that the Management have to pay no additional bonus, the bonus with interest paid as per Clause 1.0 shall be recovered immediately by the Company from the wages and/or/any other payment including Gratuity, Bonus Payable to the respective workmen.
12. In view of the express agreement in the settlements and the express direction contained in the order of this Court, the workers have to refund the excess of 9% paid to them during the pendency of the writ petition. It will be certainly open to the petitioner to recover the excess in the method provided for in the order of this Court as well as the respective settlements as between them and the workers from out of the future payments to be made to the concerned workers.
13. The petitioner is also entitled to recover the interest paid by them on that 9% from 1.9.1976 to 28.2.1987. They will also be entitled to recover interest at the rate of 12% on the said 9% from 1.3.1987 to 31.12.1989 or the date or recovery whichever is earlier. Both Parties will bear then-own costs.
14. When we pronounced the judgment, both parties orally applied for leave to file appeal to the Supreme Court of India under Article 133 of the Constitution of India. As we are of opinion that the case involves substantial questions of law of general importance and the questions need to be decided by the Supreme Court, we grant leave to both parties to file appeals in the Supreme Court of India. A certificate under Article 133 (1) of the Constitution of India will be issued accordingly.