ORDER
Kurdukar, J.
1. This batch of writ petitions filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India raise a common question as regards constitutional validity of Ss. 3 and 13 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act') and certain rules framed thereunder. In some of the petitions challenge is also made to the impugned orders passed by the learned Judges of the Family Court rejecting applications of the petitioners for allowing them to be represented by an Advocate.
2. Before we deal with constitutional challenges, a brief reference to the Statementof Objects of the Act will facilitate to appreciate the rival contentions. The said Act was passed sometime in the year 1984. Statement of Objects and reasons contained in Bill No. XXI of 1984, that several associations of women, other organisations and individuals have urged, from time to time, the necessity of establishing the Family Courts for settlement of family disputes. It was also urged that emphasise should be laid on the conciliation and achieving specially desirable results. Adherence to the right rules of procedure and evidence should be eliminated. The Law Commission in its 59th Report (1974) had also stressed that in dealing with the disputes concerning the family the Court ought to adopt an approach radically different from that adopted in ordinary civil proceedings and it should make reasonable efforts at settlement before commencement of the trial. Prior to coming into force of the Act, on the same lines the Code of Civil Procedure was amended in the year 1976 by adding Order 32-A, but however, desired result did not follow and, therefore, need was felt in the public interest to establish Family Courts for speedy settlement of disputes.
3. The preamble of the Act reads that this Act provides for establishments of the Family Courts with a view to promote conciliation in, and secure speedy settlement of disputes relating to marriage and family affairs and for matters connected therewith. Consistent with this preamble the Act came to be passed sometime in the year 1984. Keeping in view the object of promoting conciliation in and securing speedy settlement of family affairs and other matters connected therewith.
4. Mr. Gole, learned counsel appearing in support of one of the writ petitions urged that S. 3 has created an absurd, irrational, unconstitutional and arbitrary class of litigants although similarly situated in all respects. S. 3 is, therefore, unconstitutional being violative of Arts. 14 and 19(a) of the Constitution of India. S. 3 reads as under :
'3.(1) For the purpose of exercising the jurisdiction and powers conferred on a Family Court by this Court, the State Government, after consulting with the HighCourt, and by notification,--
(a) shall, as soon as may be after the commencement of this Act, establish for every area in the State comprising a city or town whose population exceeds one million, a Family Court;
(b) may establish Family Courts for such other areas in the State as it may deem necessary.
(c) The State Government shall, after consultation with the High Court, specify, by notification, the local limits of the area to which the jurisdiction of a Family Court shall extend and may, at any time, increase reduce, or alter such limits.'
Section 3 makes it obligatory upon the State Government to establish Family Courts in a city or town whose population exceeds one million. The said provision also gives discretion to the State Government to establish Family Courts for such other areas in the State, other than falling in sub-clause (a), if the State Government thinks necessary. According to Mr. Gole, classification based on population is irrational, unconstitutional and arbitrary. The litigants, who are having common cause in respect of marriage and family affairs are treated unequally on the basis of population and, therefore, it offends Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. Mr. Gole in support of this submission firstly drew our attention to paragraph 2 from the Book 'Constitutional Law of India' by H. M. Seervai-III Edition). He drew our attention to page 273 under caption, wherein the learned Author has reproduced a Statement of Law in Hasia's case, : (1981)ILLJ103SC . In Hasia's 'case (supra), the Supreme Court laid down two conditions to uphold the classification under Art. 14 of the Constitution, (i) that the classification is founded on intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and (ii) that the differentia has a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the impugned legislative or executive action. This decision was relied upon by Mr. Gole to contend that S. 3 does not fulfil both the requirements. We areunable to appreciate this contention. In our opinion, S. 3 does not create any classification as such. This provision is consistent with the preamble of the Act. S. 3 of the said Act provides separate forum to the family disputes, falling under sub-sec. (a) but it does not take away the existing forum of Civil Courts relating to family disputes falling outside the said provisions. It is a phasewise application of the Act depending upon the requirement of establishing Family Courts.
5. Assuming that S. 3 results into classification whether does it contravene Art. 14 of the Constitution? Does this section satisfy both tests laid down in Hasia's case. Let us analyse S. 3 of the said Act. S. 3(1)(a) makes it obligatory upon the State Government to establish Family Courts in a city or town whose population exceeds 1 million. At the same time, the State Government is also given discretion to establish Family Courts although condition laid down in sub-sec. (a) is not fulfilled. The rational behind this provision is that if Family Court is established in a city or town, whose population exceeds 1 Million, establishment of Family Courts at such place is viable unit. This is based on statistics of pending cases relating to family disputes in various Courts situated in such cities or towns. Mr. Gole admitted that if Family Courts are established at all taluka places, then question of Art. 14 would not arise. Test this argument from practical view point. If Family Court is established in every taluka place it would be sheer futile exercise in the absence of viability. It is not disputed that variety of cases relating to matrimonial disputes and other family disputes are required to be filed in different Courts. For instance, claim for maintenance under S. 125 of the Cri. P.C. is required to be filed in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class. Claim for maintenance under Hindu Marriage Act is required to be filed in the Court depending upon nature and extent of the claim made therein. A marriage petition under Hindu Marriage Act is required to be filed in the District Court. By virtue of S. 3 of the Act and by reason of establishment of the Family Court in a city or town, whose population exceeds 1 Million, all these disputes wouldcome under one roof i.e. Family Court. This may not be a case where number of such cases may not be sufficient to establish Family Court in every city or town where population does not exceed 1 Million. Can it be said that this classification is 'absurd, irrational, unconstitutional and/or arbitrary.' Applying the test laid down by the Supreme Court in Hasia's case (supra), can it be said that classification is not founded on intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons that are grouped together from others left out and that differentia has no rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by S. 3. Mr. Gole urged that S. 3 does not satisfy either of the test laid down in Hasia's case (supra). Classification under S. 3 is based on population which is artificial. While supplementing challenge to S. 3 under Art. 14 Mr. Gole drew our attention to a decision of the Supreme Court in Kishan Singh v. Rajasthan State, : [1955]2SCR531 . The relevant observations are as under :
'This Court has also repeatedly held that classification might properly be made on territorial basis if that was germane to the purposes of the enactment. Having regard to the facts that the condition of tenants vary from locality to locality, we have no hesitation in holding that a tenancy legislation restricted to a portion of a State cannot be held on this ground alone to contravene Art. 14.'
Relying upon this decision, Mr. Gole urged that litigants covered by the Family Courts Act and outside Family Courts Act form one class and, it is not permissible for the State Government to classify separately a class of litigants on the basis of population. We are unable to see how this decision can advance the case of the petitioners. As indicated earlier, under S. 3 of the Act, initially, the State Government is obliged to establish Family Courts in a city or town having population exceeding 1 Million and may consider establishment of Family Courts in other places, subject to necessity. This judgment, in our opinion, does not help the petitioners in any manner, to brand this classification being irrational, artificial, unconstitutional, absurd and arbitrary.
6. Mr. Gole then drew our attention to another decision of the Supreme Court in re The Special Courts Bill, 1978, : [1979]2SCR476 . He relied upon paragraphs 64 to 73 and in particular, para 73 which deals with Art. 14 of the Constitution. After going through this decision, we are unable to find any statement of law contained therein which would render classification under S. 3 being absurd, irrational, unconstitutional or arbitrary under Art. 14 of the Constitution.
7. It was then urged by Mr. Gole that the procedure prescribed under Chapter IV of the Act is discriminatory and, therefore, violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. Special reference is made to S. 3 and S. 3 of the Act. It is contended that under sub-sec. (3) of S. 10, the Family Court has been given powers to lay down its own procedure with a view to arrive at a settlement in respect of subject-matter of the suit or proceedings or at the truth of the facts alleged by one party and denied by other. It was then contended that under S. 14 what is not relevant or admissible under Indian Evidence Act may be admissible under the said provision. As against this, litigation in ordinary Civil Court relating to marriage and family affairs is governed by the Indian Evidence. Act The evidence which is not relevant or admissible under the Evidence Act cannot be laid in proceedings filed and pending before the Civil Court whereas litigants covered by the said Act are put to a great disadvantage by reason of S. 14 of the Act. Thus, there is clear discrimination. It was also urged on behalf of the petitioners that procedure prescribed under the Act is not a just procedure but it is arbitrary and fanciful. The procedure prescribed under Ss. 10, 14, 15 and 16 of the said Act is more drastic and, therefore, violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. The discrimination in the matter of procedure is per se illegal and discriminatory and violative of Art. 14.
8. These submissions again do not appeal to us. It is relevant to note that O.32-A has been added in the Civil Procedure Code in the year 1976 with a view to simplify the procedure and laying emphasis on conciliation inthe matrimonial matters. A bare perusal and comparison of provisions contained in Order 32-A of the Civil Procedure Code with procedure prescribed under Ss. 10 and 14 and other relevant rules framed by the State of Maharashtra and the High Court, it would clearly demonstrate that most of the provisions contained in O. 32-A of the C.P.C. have been incorporated in the procedure prescribed under Ss. 10 and 14 of the Act and the Rules. Some of the provisions are in fact overlapping. It is no more in dispute that provisions of the Civil Procedure Code apply to the proceedings under the Act. The procedure prescribed under the Act, in our opinion, do not suffer from vice of either arbitrariness or being fanciful.
9. To demonstrate that the procedure prescribed under the Act and the Rules is fanciful our attention was drawn to R. 15 framed by the State of Maharashtra. Rule 15 relates to failure to attend counselling. Relevant portion of the Rule 15 reads thus:
'.....on such report being made the Court may proceed with the matter without prejudice to other powers of the Court to take action against a defaulting party.'
Relying upon this part of the procedure it was urged that it gives unfettered power to the Court to take action and in a given case Court may pass an order which would seriously prejudice the case of the defaulting spouse. Reading of Rule 15 may give that impression, but, however, this aspect need not detain any longer. Division Bench of this Court in Leela Mahadeo Joshi v. Dr. Mahadeo Sitaram Joshi, : AIR1991Bom105 has held as under (at page 109 of AIR Bom):
'.....The Counsellors are trained persons and after a session with the parties, a report is put up to the Court often times that the breakdown is complete and beyond repair. The object of such reference to a Counsellor is not to be misunderstood to mean that the parties must be forced even against their wishes to patch up a marriage which cannot be mended or to do something against their wishes.'
We are in agreement with the observations as regards efforts to be initiated by the Court to arrive at amicable settlement through Counsellor between the parties. Reference to the words 'to take action against defaulting party' in Rule 15 does not mean that the Court can pass an order on merits against such defaulting party. Nor it is the intention of the legislature to give such power to the Court to take action against the defaulting party on merits of the case. It must also be emphasised that Rules 3 and 4 of Order 32-A of the Code of Civil Procedure also prescribe identical procedure to bring about a conciliation between the parties to the matrimonial proceedings. As stated earlier, provisions of the Civil Procedure Code apply to the proceedings under the Act and, therefore, it cannot be said that the procedure prescribed under the Act and Rules is discriminatory and, therefore, violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. Object of the Act is to approach the problems with a conciliation efforts so that relations with the parties be not broken and be patched up. Mr. Bhatewara. Counsel appearing for one of the petitioners urged that if there are two sets of procedural Rules and one of them is more drastic and less advantageous, then such set of rules which are drastic and less advantageous be held violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. In support of this submission, he drew our attention to a decision of the Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Dhirandhranath AIR 1961 Sc 1715. This judgment is totally inapplicable. The question that had arisen before the Supreme Court was about Rules framed by the State Government in regard to service conditions. He also drew our attention to another decision of the Supreme Court in 1983 CCLJ 160 . This judgment is again totally distinguishable and not applicable to the present case. The learned counsel for the petitioners were unable to show any of the provisions under the Act or the Rules relating to procedural aspect being arbitrary, oppressive or fanciful.
10. Mr. Agarwal, learned counsel appearing for the Union of India vehemently urged that neither S. 3 nor Ss. 10 to 14 and the Rules framed under the Act are violative of Art. 14of the Constitution. He urged that S. 3 makes mandatory on the State Government to establish Family Courts in terms of S. 3(1)(a) of the Act where population of a city exceeds 1 Million. As regards other places where population does not exceed 1 Million, but if circumstances warrant establishment of Family Court, the State Government in consultation with the High Court may exercise powers under S. 3(1)(b) of the Act. Mr. Agarwal urged that while prescribing procedure under the Act, the legislature has simplified the procedure as far as possible and stress has been laid on reconciliation bearing in mind the 59th Report of the Law Commission and the object of the Act, and O. 32-A of the Civil Procedure Code. The procedure has been so simplified with a view to ensure speedy disposal to obviate all technical hurdles. The procedure also provides for efforts on the part of the Court as well as Counsellor to bring about amicable settlement between the parties to a matrimonial dispute and to avoid disaster that might follow by reason of breaking up of matrimonial relations. In our opinion, the submission raised on behalf of the Union of India as regards constitutional validity of S. 3 and the procedure prescribed therein must be accepted. The object of the Act is to bring about settlement between the parties to the matrimonial cause and while doing so, Counsellor's contribution to assist the Court in proper perspective is very relevant. It must also be remembered that the State Government is under an obligation to establish Family Courts in the first instance in the Metropolitan cities having population of 1 Million and above. This is a rational and intelligible differentia made to secure aims and objects of the Act. It is also noticed that metropolitan cities having population of 1 Million and above is a place for various matrimonial disputes. It was noticed that the petitions under the Hindu Marriage Act could not be disposed of within a reasonable time and some matters remained pending for years together. It is with this object in mind the Family Courts have been established in the Metropolitan cities where population exceeds 1 Million. Viewed from this angle, it isclear that what is decipherable and intelligible distinction in each class has been carved out having reasonable nexus with the aims and objects of Act and in order to achieve these aims and objects S. 3 has provided in the first instance, establishment of Courts on the basis of population. In our opinion, S. 3 cannot be challenged as being discriminatory and violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution.
11. Mr. Agarwal rightly drew our attention to a decision of the Supreme Court in Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S. R. Tendolkar, : [1959]1SCR279 . If he Apex Court in paragraphs 11 and 12 has laid down 2 tests to uphold classification. (i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and (ii) it must have rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The Supreme Court has also upheld classification founded on geographical basis. The Supreme Court emphasised that what is necessary is that there must be nexus between the classification and the object of the Act under consideration. Applying tests laid down by the Supreme Court in this reported decision, we are of the opinion that S. 3 cannot be said to be violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. It must also be remembered that the Supreme Court in Sakhawant Ali v. State of Orissa, : [1955]1SCR1004 , has ruled that the legislation enacted for achievement of the object or purposes of the Act need not be all embracing. It is for the legislature to determine what categories it would embrace within the scope of legislation and merely because certain categories which would stand on the same footing as those which are covered by the legislation are left out would not render legislation in any manner discriminatory and violative of the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 14 (see paragraph 10 of the judgment). In the light of the above decision, we are of the opinion that the procedure prescribed under the Act and Rules is neither discriminatory nor arbitrary. It is also neither fanciful nor violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution.
12. Some of the decisions of the SupremeCourt were cited on behalf of the Union of India by Mr. Agarwal, but, in our opinion, it is not necessary to elaborate the case law. Suffice it to make reference to citation viz.:
l) Kishan Singh v. Rajasthan State, : [1955]2SCR531 ; 2) In Re Special Court Bills, 1978, : [1979]2SCR476 ; 3) V. C. Shukla v. State (Delhi Admn.), : 1980CriLJ965 .
It was then contended on behalf of the petitioners that an establishment of Family Court under the Act at Pune in 1989, even pending proceedings came to be transferred to Family Courts and as a result thereof, petitioners' vested right as regards appeal (procedural) is taken away. This submission needs to be only stated and rejected. It is well settled that no party can claim a vested right in the matter of procedure. Pending proceedings will he governed by the procedure made applicable from time to time unless such procedure is found to be oppressive or patently discriminatory.
13. It is also well settled that there is presumption as regards constitutionality of the Act that one asserts contrary must prove the same. After hearing Counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that so far as constitutional challenge based on Article 14 of the Constitution to Section 3 is concerned, it has no force and the same must be rejected.
14. It was contended by Mr. Gole that Section 13 of the Act is violative of Article 19(1)(a), 21 and 39 of the Constitution. He urged that litigant governed by provisions of the Act has got a fundamental right to be represented by a lawyer in any Court of law. This fundamental right to be represented under Article 21 is a part of every litigant's life. Under the said Act, this right is denied, and at any rate effective exercise of such right has been denied. Section 13 of the Act reads thus :
13. 'Notwithstanding anything contained in any law no party to a suit or proceeding before Family Court shall be entitled, as of right, to be represented by a legal practitioner;
provided that if the Family Court considersit necessary in the interest of justice, it may seek the assistance of a legal expert as amicus curiae.'
According to Mr. Gole, Section 13 creates complete bar and prohibits a party to be represented by a legal practitioner. This submission, on plain reading of Section 13 is wholly unfounded. A fair reading of the section indicates that there is no total prohibition of being represented by a legal practitioner. The proviso clearly provides that if the Family Court considers it necessary in the interest of justice, may seek assistance of legal expert as Amicus Curiae.
15. As regards litigants who desire to be represented by a lawyer in the Family Court, they can avail facility as provided by Rule 37. Under this rule, the Court may permit the party to be represented by a lawyer in certain circumstances. This rule, in our opinion, sufficiently takes care of the grievance made on behalf of the petitioners. Mr. Gole's submission that party has no right to be represented cannot be accepted in view of the wording of Rule 37. Rule 37 was considered by two Division Benches of this Court.
l) Leela Mahadeo Joshi v. Dr. Mahadeo Sitaram Joshi, : AIR1991Bom105 ; 2) Kishorilal Govindram Bhihani v. Dwarkabai Kishorilal Bihani 1992 MLJ 997.
This Court has laid down guidelines as regards application to be made by a party for legal assistance. In our opinion, guidelines laid down in these judgments again sufficiently protect the right of a party to be represented by a lawyer. It is needless to reiterate these guidelines.
16. Mr. Gole then drew our attention to a decision of the Supreme Court in Suk Das v. Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh, : 1986CriLJ1084 ,after reproducing the observations in the caseof M. H. Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra, ithas been observed as under :
'It may, therefore, now be taken as settled law that former legal assistance at State Cost is a fundamental right of a person accused ofan offence which may involve jeopardy to his life is implicit in the requirement of reasonable, fair, and just procedure prescribed by Article 21.....'
Mr. Gole also drew our attention to another decision of the Supreme Court in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, : AIR1986SC180 . This decision was relied upon to' contend that right to life includes right to livelihood. Relying upon this judgment it was contended that the procedure prescribed under Section 13 is unjust, unfair and, therefore, unreasonable and violative of Article 21 of the Constitution. He also drew our attention to another decision pf the Supreme Court in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Umed Ram Sharma and Ors., : [1986]1SCR251 .
17. Mr. Agarwal, learned Counsel appearing for the Union of India urged that Section 13 does not prohibit the party from availing services of the lawyer. Such permission can be granted on an application if made by a party and if the Court comes to the conclusion that it is necessary to do so. He however, urged that there is no fundamental right to a citizen/litigant to appear through a lawyer save and except in case of Art. 22(1) of the Constitution of India. In support of this submission, he relied upon decision of the Supreme Court in Paradip Port Trust v. Their Workmen, : (1976)IILLJ409SC . While construing S. 36(4) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Supreme Court held as under (at page 44) :--
'We have given our anxious consideration to the above submission. It is true that 'and' in a particular context and in view of the object and purpose of a particular legislation may be read as 'or' to give effect to the intent of the legislature. However, having regard to the history of the present legislation, recognition of law of the unequal strength of the parties in adjudication proceedings before a Tribunal, intention of the law being to discourage representation by legal practitioners as such, and the need for expeditious disposal of cases, we are unable to hold that 'and' inS. 36(4) can be read as 'or'.
This ratio, therefore, indicates that no partycan claim as a matter of right, a right to be represented through lawyer. It is open to the legislature to put restrictions on such representation by legal practitioner, having regard to the aims and object of the Act. On an identical issue the Supreme Court in Lingappa Pochanna v. State of Maharashtra, : [1985]2SCR224 , reiterate the same principle. It was a case under the Maharashtra Restoration of Lands to Scheduled Tribes Act, 1971. Section 9-A has laid down a restriction of appearance of Advocate on behalf of non-Tribal in proceedings under the said Act. Challenge was given under Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. While dealing with this challenge, the Supreme Court in paragraph 35 held as under (at page 404):
'Now it is well-settled that apart from the provisions of Art. 22(1) of the Constitution, no litigant has a fundamental right to be represented by a lawyer in any Court. The only fundamental right recognised by the Constitution is that under Art. 22(1) by which an accused who is arrested and detained in custody is entitled to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice. In all other matters, i.e. suits or other proceedings in which the accused is not arrested and detained on a criminal charge, the litigant has no fundamental right to be represented by a legal practitioner.'
The Supreme Court has recognised only fundamental right under Constitution to be represented by a lawyer is under Art. 22(1) of the Constitution. In view of this authoritative pronouncement by the Supreme Court, we are not impressed by the challenge raised by the petitioners to S. 13.
18. Mr. Agarwal then drew our attention to the order dated 4-1-1988 of the Supreme Court in Writ Petition No. 1142 of 1987 (Kanpur Bar Association v. Union of India. The issue before the Supreme Court was relating to S. 13 of the Act. While negating the right of a party to be represented by a lawyer, the Supreme Court has observed that no party has a right to claim to be represented by a legal practitioner. With this observation) the Supreme Court rejected the petition. In view of this settled position of law, contentionraised on behalf of the petitioners by Mr. Gole that the petitioners have fundamental right under Arts. 21, 19(1)(g) and 39-A of the Constitution of India to be represented by legal practitioner, must be rejected.
19. In view of our above discussion, we may only reproduce the argument of Mr. Anturkar which, in our opinion, stands concluded on our aforesaid reasoning. The argument of Mr. Anturkar is :
'Following judgment of the Supreme Court in : [1992]3SCR595 , Art. 19(1)(a) of the Constitution has to be construed liberally which includes litigant's right to put up his case more effectively by engaging Advocate and exercise of that right by the litigant can be put to restriction only on the ground mentioned in Art. 19(2).'
He, however, conceded that Section 13 contains reasonable restriction, but the same isnot in conformity with Art. 19(2). He alsourged that Art. 39A has to be read withArt. 19(1)(a). In support of this submission,he relied upon decision of this in PerfectPaper and Steel Converers P. Ltd. v. TheBombay National General Workers Union1989 MLJ 518.
20. It was then contended on behalf of the petitioners that S. 13 is discriminatory on the ground that litigants falling outside the jurisdiction of the Family Courts are permitted to be represented by a lawyer whereas litigants covered by the jurisdiction of the Court are not permitted. This argument is again devoid of any merit because once it is held that classification made by S. 3(1)(a) of the Act, is reasonable classification, then the same reasoning must hold good as regards S. 13 also. It must also be emphasised that S. 13 does not create absolute bar and it is open to the party to make an application to the Family Court in the circumstances stated in S. 13 for being represented by a lawyer. Moreover, this Court in Kishorilal v. Dwarkabai 1992 MLJ 997, has laid down guidelines in this behalf.
21. Mr. Anturkar also urged that excluding the litigants to be represented by lawyers, the object sought to be achieved by the Act isfrustrated. He urged that there is no rational nexus. He also urged that it is not impossible for the Court to keep control over the matter. In view of these circumstances, Counsel urged that S. 13 be struck down being viola live of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. We are unable to accept any of the challenges to S. 13 based on Art. 14 of the Constitution.22. Mr. Agarwal drew our attention to a decision of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Bansidhar v. Seema . This judgment is directly on S. 13 of the Act. In this decision, the Allahabad High Court has held that S. 13 is valid and does not offend Art. 22(1) of the Constitution. It is true that Allahabad High Court has based this judgment on the decision of the Supreme Court in A. K. Roy v. Union of India, : 1982CriLJ340 . Mr. Agarwal also drew our attention to another judgment of the Rajasthan High Court in Vijay Kaur Radhyesham . This decision again supports the contentions raised on behalf of the Union of India.
23. It must also be emphasised that the Family Court Act is a central statute having its application throughout India. Two High Courts in India have upheld constitutional validity of S. 13 of the Act. In this view of the matter, it would be keeping with judicial discipline to follow the decision rendered by other High Courts. In this behalf, Mr. Agarwal drew our attention to a decision of this Court in Kanak Mehta v. Vinod Mehta, : AIR1991Bom337 . In this judgment, the Division Bench has indicated what should be the approach in respect of interpretation of central statute when it is already interpreted by other High Courts.
24. Mr. W. N. Yande, learned Additional Government Pleader appearing for the State of Maharashtra adopted the arguments of Mr. Agarwal and urged that the State Government has already established Family Courts at Bombay and Pune and is likely to establish Family Courts at Aurangabad and Nagpur very soon. He also urged that the Government of Maharashtra is very much interested in establishing Family Courtskeeping in mind the object of the Act.
25. Thus, there is no substance in any of the constitutional challenges to the said Act and Rules raised in this petition. All the challenges must fail.
26. Bar Council of Maharashtra also adopted the arguments raised on behalf of the petitioners as regards S. 13.
27. Coming to the impugned order in writ petition No. 1636 of 1989, Mr. Gole for the petitioners urged that the petitioner's application under S. 13 of the Act was rejected by the Family Court without giving any reasons. He urged that the petitioners in her application has stated that she is illiterate and she does not know Court procedure. The question involved therein is as regards custody of minor daughters. There is no valid opposition to the said application on behalf of the husband. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that the petitioner has made out sufficient cause for permitting her to be represented by an Advocate. We accordingly set aside the impugned order dated 18-3-1989 and grant application Ex.67 in the record of the trial Court and direct that the petitioner be permitted to be represented by a lawyer. In view of this order, it is not necessary to pass any further directions as regards order at Exh. B.
28. As far as Writ Petition No. 3393/89 is concerned, the petitioner has challenged the order passed by the Family Court on 16-7-1989. The issue involved in that case is simple and does not require any assistance of the lawyer. The learned Judge has exercised jurisdiction in accordance with law and no interference is called for. The order dated 16-7-1989 is accordingly confirmed.
29. In the result, writ petition Nos. 1699/ 89, 2693/89, 3363/89 and 3859/89 are dismissed and rule in each of this petition is discharged. Interim or ad interim order it any to stand vacated.
30. Writ Petition No. 1636/89 is partly allowed. Rule made absolute to the extent of setting aside the impugned order and granting permission to the wife to be represented by alawyer. As regards rest, rule to stand discharged. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
31. Certified copy expedited.