Any person, the effect of the 1994 amendment on s. 147 is unambiguous. Where earlier, the words 'any person' could be held not to include the owner of the goods or his authorised representative travelling in the goods vehicle, Parliament has now made it clear that such a construction is no longer possible. The scope of this rationale does not, however, extend to cover the class of cases where gratuitous passengers for whom no insurance policy was envisaged, and for whom no insurance premium was paid, employed the goods vehicle as a medium of conveyance, National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur, (2004) 2 SCC 1 (5): AIR 2004 SC 1340. [Motor Vehicles Act, s. 147(1)(b) (as amended in 1994)]The expression 'any person' can be restricted to those on the managerial or administrative staff only. One cannot arbitrarily cut down the amplitude of an expression used by the legislature, Central Bank of India v. Workmen, AIR 1960 SC 12 (23): (1960) 1 SCR 200. (Banking Regulation Act, 1949, s. 10)Th...
Jurisdiction, is a verbal coat of many colours. Jurisdiction originally seems to have had the meaning which Lord Reid ascribed to it in Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission, (1969) 2 AC 147, namely, the entitlement 'to enter upon the enquiry in question, M.L. Sethi v. R.P. Kapur, (1972) 2 SCC 427: (1973) 1 SCR 697.Jurisdiction, legal authority; extent of power; declaration of the law. Jurisdiction may be limited either locally, as that of a County Court, or personally, as where a Court has a quorum, or as to amount, or as to the character of the questions to be determined.By 'jurisdiction' is meant the extent of the power which is conferred upon the court by its constitu-tion to try a proceedings, Raja Soap Factory v. S.P. Shantharaj, AIR 1965 SC 1449 (1451): (1965) 2 SCR 800.The word 'jurisdiction' is a verbal coat of many colours. Jurisdiction originally means the entitle-ment 'to enter upon the enquiry in question'. If there was an entitlement to enter upon an enquiry, ...
Plant, has been defined as the tools, machinery, fixtures, buildings, grounds, etc. of a factory or business; the apparatus or equipment for a certain mechanical operation or process, Steel City Beverages Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (1996) 1 Pat LJR 868.Plant, has frequently been used in fiscal and other legislation. It is one of a fairly large category of words as to which no statutory definition is provided ('trade', office even 'income' are others), so that it is left to the court to interpret them. It naturally happens that as case follows case, and one extension leads to another, the meaning of the word gradually diverges from its natural or dictionary meaning. This is certainly true for plant, I.R.C. v. Scottish & Newcastle Breweries Ltd., (1982) 1 WLR 322: (1982) 2 All ER 230: 55 TC 252 (HL).Plant, in the relevant sense, although admitted not a term of art, and therefore part of the general English tongue, is not, in this sense, an ordinary word, but one of imprecise application, an...
Building, defined by Lord Esher in Moir v. Williams, (1892) 1 QB 270, as an inclosure of brick or stone covered by a roof, and said by Park, J., in R. v. Gregory, (1833) 5 B. & Ad. At p. 561, not to include a wall; but the definition depends on circumstances, and may include a reservoir, Moran v. Marsland, (1909) 1 KB 744. The London Building Act, 1930 (20 & 21 Geo. 5, c. clviii.), has no definition. The term 'new building' was defined in s. 23 of the (English) Public Health Acts Amendment Act,1907 (c. 53) (now repealed); and see also Southend-on-Sea Corporation v. Archer, (1901) 70 LJ KB 328; South Shields Corporation v. Wilson, (1901) 84 LT 267. An old railway carriage will be a 'new building' if the interior arrangements are altered, Hanrahan v. Leigh Urban Council, (1909) 2 KB 257. An advertisement hoarding is a building within a restrictive covenant, Nussey v. Provincial Bill Posting Co., (1909) 1 Ch 734; Stevens v. Willing & Co. Ltd., 1929 WN 53. See also Paddington Corporation v...
Gift. The old text-writers made a gift (donatio) a distinct species of deed, and describe it as a conveyance applicable to the creation of an estate-tail; while a feoffment they strictly confine to the creation of a fee simple estate. The operative verb was 'give,' which no longer implies any covenant in law (Real Property Act, 1845 (8 & 9 Vict. c. 106), s. 4), replaced by the Law of Property Act, 1925, s. 59(2), and the deed required livery of seisin. It is obsolete. See Jac. Law Dict.A gift is now understood to mean a mere voluntary assurance or transfer of property without any consideration being given for it. Such a transaction is apt to be very jealously scrutinized in a Court of Equity, and will be set aside on proof of undue influence (see that title), or of a fiduciary relationship of the donee to the donor, see Huguenin v. Baseley, (1806-8) 14 Ves 273; W. & T. L.C.; Morley v. Loughman, (1893) 1 Ch 736 (757); Lyon v. Home, (1868) LR 6 Eq 655. In the absence of any such objectio...
Speculative transaction, a transaction is not 'speculative' within the meaning of sub-s. (5) of s. 43, Income Tax Act, 1961 where there is a breach of the contract and on a dispute between the parties damages are awarded as compensation by an arbitration award. The definition of 'speculative transaction' in s. 43(5) has to be interpreted by importing the sense conveyed by the law relating to the contracts, Commissioner of Income Tax v. Shantilal Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1983 SC 952 (954): (1983) 3 SCC 561: (1983) 3 SCR 470. [Income Tax Act, 1961, s. 43(5)]Explanation 2 to s. 24(1) of the Income Tax Act defines a speculative transaction as 'a transaction in which a contract for purchase and sale of any commodity including stocks and shares is periodically or ultimately settled otherwise than by the actual delivery or transfer of the commodity or scrips .......'. It is apparent that what is contemplated is a real or factual delivery or transfer, and not a notional delivery or transfer, Jute Invest...
Wholly and exclusively, the expression 'wholly and exclusively' used in s. 10(2)(xv) of the Income Tax Act, 1922 does not mean 'necessarily'. Ordinarily it is for the assessee to decide whether any expenditure should be incurred in the course of his or its business. Such expenditure may be incurred voluntarily and without any necessity and if it is incurred for promoting the business and to earn profits, the assessee can claim deduction under s. 10(2)(xv) of the Act even though there was no compelling necessity to incur such expenditure. It is relevant to refer at this stage to the legislative history of s. 37 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 which corresponds to s. 10(2)(xv) of the Income Tax Act, 1922. An attempt was made in the Income Tax Bill of 1961 to lay down the 'necessity' of the expenditure as a condition for claiming deduction under s. 37. S. 37(1) in the Bill read 'any expenditure . . . laid out or expended wholly, necessarily and exclusively for the purposes of the business or ...
Assessment, includes provisional assessment, reassessment and any order of assessment in which the duty assessed is nil. [Customs Act, 1962 (52 of 1962), s. 2 (2)]Includes re-assessment. [Wealth-tax Act, 1957 (27 of 1957), s. 2 (cb)]The word 'assessment' can bear a very comprehensive meaning, it can comprehend the whole procedure for ascertaining and imposing liability upon the tax-payer, Kalawati Devi Harlalka v. CIT, AIR 1968 SC 162 (167): (1967) 3 SCR 833. [Income-tax Act, 1961 s. 297 (2)(a)]The word 'assessment' is used in the Income-tax Act in number of provisions in a comprehensive sense and includes all proceedings, starting with the filing of the Return or issue of notice and ending with determination of the tax payable by the assessee, S. SanKarappa v. I.T.O., AIR 1968 SC 816 (818): (1968) 2 SCR 674. [Income-tax Act, 1961 s. 35(1) & (5)]...
Consideration. Any act of the promisee (the person claiming the benefit of an obligation) from which the promisor (the person burdened with the obligation) or a stranger derives a benefit or advantage, or any labour detriment or inconvenience sustained or suffered by the promisee at the request, express or implied, of the promisor. See Laythoarp v. Bryant, 3 Scott 250; 2 Wms. Saund 137 h; Currie v. Misa, (1875) LR 10 Exch 153.Consideration is one of the facts which the courts require as evidence of intention, (a) that a person intends his promise to be binding on him, or (b) that he intends to divest himself of a beneficial interest in property. In its widest sense consideration is the price, motive or inducement for a promise or for a transfer of property from one person to another. The nature or quality of the consideration which will be sufficient for these purposes varies with the nature of the transaction and in the absence of consideration the Courts will, except in the case of s...
Business, 'business' is a word of wide import. It has no definite meaning. Its perceptions differ from private to public sector or from institutional financing to commercial banking, Mahesh Chandra v. Regional Manager Uttar Pradesh Financial Corpn., AIR 1993 SC 935 (939): (1993) 2 SCC 279. [State Financial Corporation Act, (63 of 1951), s. 24]--Business would undoubtedly be property, unless there is something to the contrary in the enactment, J.K. Trust Bombay v. CIT, (1958) SCR 65: 1957 SCJ 845: AIR 1957 SC 846.Business includes the activities carried on by any public body, Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 20, 4th Edn., Para 546, p. 357. The term 'business' includes every trade, occupation and profession. The word 'business' has no technical meaning, but is to be read with reference to the subject and intent of the Act in which it occurs. The term 'business' means an affair requiring attention and labour as the chief concern; mercantile pursuits, that one does for livelihood, occupati...