Natural Justice - Definition - Law Dictionary Home Dictionary Definition natural-justice

Definition :

Natural justice, the aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words they supplant the rules of natural justice which are not embodied rules. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the frame-work of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal pointed for the purpose, A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 150: (1969) 2 SCC 262.

Historically, 'natural justice' has been used in a way 'which implies the existence of moral principles of self-evidence and unarguable truth'. In course of time, judges nurtured in the traditions of British jurisprudence, often involved it in conjunction with a reference to 'equity and good conscience'. Legal experts of earlier generations did not draw any distinction between 'natural justice' and 'natural law'. 'Natural justice' was considered as 'that part of natural law which relates to the administration of justice'. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Being means to an end and not an end in themselves, it is not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. During the last two decades, the concept of natural justice has made great strides in the realm of administrative law. Before the epoch-making decision of the House of Lords in Ridge v. Baldwin,1964 AC 40 (196): (1963) 2 All ER 66 (HL), it was generally thought that the rules of natural justice apply only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; and for that purpose, whenever a breach of the rule of natural justice was alleged, courts in England used to ascertain whether the impugned action was taken by the statutory authority or tribunal in the exercise of its administrative or quasi-judicial power. In India also, this was the position before the decision, dated February 7, 1967, of this Court in Dr. Bina Pani Dei case [(1967) 2 SCR 625: AIR 1967 SC 1269]; wherein it was held that even an administrative order or decision in matters involving civil consequences, has to be made consistently with the rules of natural justice. This supposed distinction between quasi-judicial and administrative decisions, which was perceptibly mitigated in Dr. Bina Pani Dei case, [(1967) 2 SCR 625: AIR 1967 SC 1269)], was further rubbed out to a vanishing point in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCR 457: (1969) 2 SCC 262, thus: If the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice one fails to see why those rules should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries. Often times it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates administrative enquiries from quasi-judicial enquiries. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both quasi-judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries. An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far-reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry. In the language of V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. [vide Mohinder Singh Gill case, AIR 1978 SC 851: (1978) 2 SCR 272: (1978 (1) SCC 405]: '... subject to certain necessary limitations natural justice is now a brooding omnipresence although varying in its play .... Its essence is good conscience in a given situation; nothing more - but nothing less.' (SCC p. 434, paras 47 and 48). The rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. They can supplement the law but cannot supplant it (per Hedge, J. in A.K. Kraipak [(1970) 1 SCR 457: (1969) 2 SCC 262)]. If a statutory provision either specifically or by inevitable implication excludes the application of the rules of natural justice, then the court cannot ignore the mandate of the legislature. Whether or not the application of the principles of natural justice in a given case has been excluded, wholly or in part, in the exercise of statutory power, depends upon the language and basic scheme of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power, the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of the exercise of that power, Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 818: (1981) 1 SCC 664.

The term 'natural justice' was often used interchangeably with 'natural law' or jus naturale which means 'certain rules of conduct supposed to be so just that they are binding upon all mankind', Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, AIR 1985 SC 1416 (1451): (1985) 3 SCC 398: (1985) Supp 2 SCR 131.

Natural justice is the administration of justice in a common sense liberal way. Justice is based substantially on natural ideals and human values. The administration of justice is to be freed from the narrow and restricted considerations which are usually associated with a formulated law involving linguistic technicalities and grammatical niceties. It is the substance of justice which has to determine its form, Canara Bank v. Debasis Das, AIR 2003 SC 2041 (2047): (2003) 4 SCC 557.