Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : 2003(87)ECC246; 2003(154)ELT323(SC); JT2003(4)SC355; 2003(4)SCALE447; (2003)5SCC290
S.N. Variava, J.1. Civil Appeal Nos. 2370-2375 of 2003 are against the Judgment dated 16th May, 2002 passed by the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad. By this judgment CEGAT has disposed of a number of Appeals. Civil Appeal No. 8313 of 2001 is against judgment dated 18th May, 2001 passed by CEGAT. In all these Appeals the question was whether 'Himtaj oil' was classifiable under subheading 3003.30 i.e. Ayurvedic medicaments or 3005.10 i.e. perfumed hair oil. CEGAT has held that 'Himtaj oil' is classifiable as an Ayurvedic medicaments. In so doing it has followed the decision of the larger Bench of CEGAT reported in 2002 (139) ELT 610. We have today delivered a separate judgment in Civil Appeal No. 1512 of 2003 wherein we have also held that 'Himtaj oil' is classifiable as an Ayurvedic medicaments. Thus to this extent the impugned judgment stands confirmed. CEGAT has thereafter referred all the Appeals back to the Adjudicating Authority to recompute the duty...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : 2004(164)ELT4(SC)
ORDER1. These appeals arise out of the common judgment and order dated 3rd July, 2001 passed by the Central Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, Eastern Bench Kolkata (hereinafter referred to as 'the Tribunal') in Appeal No. C/RV-21/98 etc. whereby the Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the appellants and confirmed a penalty of Rs. four lakhs and upheld the allegations contained in the show cause notice issued by the Assistant Commissioner of Customs, Air Cargo Complex (Exports), Kolkata. Aggrieved by the same, the appellants have filed the aforesaid appeals.Heard the learned counsel for the parties.2. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, in our view, the impugned order passed by the Tribunal does not call for interference. However, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that the penalty imposed by the Authority is in violation of Section 114 of the Customs Act, 1962 because it is imposed both on the appellant-Company which attempted to e...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : 2003(87)ECC247; 2003(154)ELT324(SC); JT2003(4)SC353; 2003(4)SCALE445; (2003)5SCC288; [2003]3SCR1041
S.N. Variava, J.1. This appeal is against the Judgment dt. 19th May 2000 passed by Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, Calcutta.2. Briefly stated the facts are as follows:The Respondents are manufacturing a product known as 'Himtaj oil'. The Respondents filed a classification list classifying 'Himtaj oil' as Ayurvedic medicine under subheading 3003.30. A shows cause notice was issued to them as to why their oil should not be classified as 'perfumed hair oil' under subheading 3305.10. The Respondents replied to the show cause notice. The Assistant Collector accepted the Respondents' case that their oil fell under subheading 3003.30. For so holding the Assistant Collector inter alia relied on the following material: (a) Drug licence issued by the Drug Controller.(b) A letter issued by the Superintendent of Ayurvedic Department, Benaras which stated that the product was an Ayurvedic medicine.(c) A study report of the Institute of Postgraduate Education and Research in A...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : 2003(88)ECC225; 2003(154)ELT343(SC); (2003)12SCC150
ORDER1. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties exhaustively. 2. These appeals are filed against the judgment and order dated 12-9-2000 passed by the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, Eastern Bench, Calcutta (hereinafter referred to as 'the Tribunal') in Appeal Nos. C-7-9/97. The Tribunal arrived at the conclusion that on imported low ash coking coal, respondent was not liable to pay additional customs duty under Section 3 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). Feeling aggrieved by the said decision of the Tribunal, the Department has preferred these appeals. 3. The question for consideration in the present appeals is as to whether the respondent is liable to pay additional customs duty as provided in Section 3 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 on the imported low ash coking coal. There is no dispute about the respondent having paid the basic customs duty on the imported item at the rate of 5%. Section 3 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR2003SC2448; 2003(87)ECC233; 2003(154)ELT328(SC); 2003(4)SCALE437; (2003)5SCC60; [2003]3SCR1027; [2003]132STC251(SC)
Variava, J. 1. In all these Appeals facts are common and the question of law is common. Therefore, all are being disposed of by this common judgment. In all these Appeals the question is whether 'Banphool Oil' is classifiable as a 'perfumed hair oil' or as an 'Ayurvedic Medicament'. It must be mentioned that prior to 28th January, 1986, the question was whether 'Banphool Oil' could be classified under Tariff Item 68 i.e. 'Ayurvedic Medicament' or under Tariff Item 14F(ii) i.e. 'Perfumed Hair Oil'. After this date, the question is whether it falls under Tariff Item 3305.10 i.e. 'perfumed hair oil' or 3003.30 i.e. 'Ayurvedic Medicament'. Civil Appeal No. 7610 of 1999 is against the judgment dated 24th June, 1999 passed by the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal (CEGAT). In this case the Judicial Member took the view that Banphool Oil was classifiable as an Ayurvedic medicament whereas the Technical Member took the view that it was classifiable as a perfumed hair oil. In...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : JT2003(4)SC413; 2003(4)SCALE448; (2003)9SCC92; [2003]3SCR1056
Shah, J.1. The High Court of Himachal Pradesh by judgment and order dated 10.12.1990 allowed Civil Writ Petitions No. 58 of 1978 etc. filed by the respondents challenging the validity of the provisions of the H.P. Taxation (On certain Goods carried by Road) Act, 1976 (No. 34 of 1976) (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1976 Act') and held that the said provisions were unconstitutional and invalid. The Court held thus:--'We have seen earlier that by the impugned provision, there is a direct levy upon the carriage of goods by road and water ways. It is not the case of the respondent State that the levy was compensatory or regulatory in character. In any case, we do not find any mention in the reply filed by the State of any facts which may bring the levy in either of the two categories.On the averments made in the petition, noticed by us earlier, which have not been effectively denied on behalf of the State, there is hardly any scope for saying that the levy does not amount to restriction w...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR2003SC2455; 2003(2)CTC619; JT2003(4)SC321; 2003(4)SCALE458; (2003)9SCC534; [2003]3SCR1045
Ruma Pal, J.1. The appellants gather and trade in seashells. The seashells are collected from lands belonging to private individuals along the seashore near Tuticorin in the state of Tamil Nadu. The question to be decided is whether sea shells can be termed to be 'mineral' within the meaning of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 (referred to as the Act). 2. The Act was enacted by the Central Government in exercise of its power under Entry 54 of List I of the Seventh Schedule read with Article 246 of the Constitution. Under Section 2 of the Act it was declared that it is expedient in the public interest that the Union should take under its control the regulation of mines and the development of minerals to the extent provided in the Act. The word 'minerals' has been, somewhat un-helpfully, defined in Section 3(a) as including 'all minerals except mineral oils'. Despite the generality of this definition, from the provisions of the Act it is clear that there are ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR2003SC2467; 2003(4)ALD50(SC); [2003(3)JCR55(SC)]; JT2003(4)SC407; 2003(4)SCALE432; (2003)5SCC555; [2003]3SCR1019
K.G. Balakrishnan, J.1. Both these appeals raise common questions of law; hence they were heard jointly and are being disposed of by a common judgment. Under Section 4 of the Wakf Act, 1954, the Survey Commissioner of the State of Karnataka conducted a survey of Wakf properties existing in the State of Karnataka. After the survey was over, a list of properties of Wakf was prepared under Section (5) of the Act and the same was published in Official Gazette by Notification on 8.7.1976. In the said notification, property comprising CTS No. 34B in Ward No. VI of Bijapur city was included as an item of Wakf property. So also, property bearing Survey No. CTS 34/A2 situated in Ward No. VI in Bijapur city with a building thereon was included as an item of Wakf property. After this notification, the Department of Education, represented through Deputy Director of Public instructions of the State of Karnataka, filed Original Suit No. 1/1981 on the file of the Additional Civil Judge, Bijapur, agai...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : JT2003(4)SC294; RLW2003(3)SC424; 2003(4)SCALE402; (2003)9SCC673; 2003(2)LC993(SC)
Santosh Hegde, J.1. All these appeals arise out of a common judgment of the Designate Judge at Ajmer, Rajasthan, made in TADA Special Case No. 8 of 1992. In the said case, the appellants herein along with some other accused were charged by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, CBI/SIC.II, New Delhi for offences under Sections 3(3) and 6 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as 'the TADA Act'), Section 120B IPC; and Sections 5 and 6 of the Explosive Substances Act and Section 9B and 9C of the Explosive Act. After trial the Designated Court held the appellants guilty of offences punishable under Section 120B IPC, Sections 3(3) and 6(1) of the TADA, Section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act read with Section 120B of the IPC and Section 6 of the Explosive Substances Act. Learned Judge also held A-5 guilty of offences punishable under Sections 9B(i)(b) and 9C of the Explosives Act. Based on the said conviction, he imposed a sentence of 5 y...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : 2003(3)AWC2341(SC); 2003(51)BLJR1650; [2003(97)FLR904]; JT2003(4)SC373; 2003(4)SCALE385; (2003)9SCC106; [2003]3SCR1013
Arijit Pasayat, J.1. A controversy which could have been solved long back has been blown out of proportion, making the parties travel through the corridors of various courts and has finally landed in this Court. Whenever there is prolongation of litigation, ultimate sufferers are the litigating parties, and inevitably justice delivery system. Resultant is miscarriage of justice.2. It is painful to notice that the arduous journey of litigating parties started about two decades back in an educational institution, named Goodwill Girls' High Court. Ironically, the controversy started because of alleged 'ill will' amongst the parties. Helen Keller, the great humanist had once said: 'The highest result of education is tolerance.' But the foundation of the dispute was alleged intolerance by those who matter, in the concerned educational institution.3. Steering clear of the red herrings, the factual scenario is as follows: Smt. J. Mary Susheela-respondent No. 1 in this appeal filed a suit No. ...
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