Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : I(2001)ACC732; 2000ACJ1440; JT2000(7)SC496; (2000)9SCC224
1. Leave granted.2. We have heard learned Counsel for the Appellant and learned Counsel for Respondent No. 3 - the Insurance Company which is the main contesting party finally in this appeal.3. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case as the claimant because of the motor accident has lost four fingers of the left hand, the award of Rs. 60,000/- by way of compensation granted by the High Court by enhancing the compensation of Rs. 30,000/- granted by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, appears to us to be on a little lower side. The learned Counsel for the Respondent-Insurance Company states that the Appellant was not earning anything by playing Veena and it was only her habit. However, the Tribunal itself held that by playing Veena the Appellant was earning substantial amount and this is the reason why the High Court thought it fit to enhance the compensation to Rs. 60,000/-. Learned Counsel for the Respondent-Insurance Company submitted that if the amount of compensation is t...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : JT2000(7)SC394; (2000)3MLJ85(SC)
1. Leave granted.2. Learned Counsel for the Appellant submits deletion of Respondent No.2. Accordingly, Respondent No. 2 is deleted from the array of the parties, at the risk of the Appellant. Respondent No. 3 is served but has not entered his appearance. Accordingly, we dispose of this appeal ex parte against this Respondent.3. Heard learned Counsel for the Appellant.4. The Appellant has challenged ad interim order dated 16th April, 1999 passed by the High Court by which an earlier order dated 21st December, 1998, appointing the Receiver was vacated. The sole reason was that on the fixed date and time, when the Receiver reached the place to take possession of the property, the Appellant was absent. We do not find this to be any good reason for vacating the order dated 21.12.1998. If on a particular date the Appellant was riot present, another date should have been given by the Receiver to the Appellant. What weighed the court to appoint a Receiver, cannot dissolve only because of abse...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR2000SC2473; 2000(3)ALT42(SC); 2000(3)CTC319; [2000(86)FLR206]; JT2000(6)SC358; (2000)IILLJ935SC; RLW2000(2)SC283; 2000(4)SCALE262; (2000)5SCC621; (2000)2UPLBEC1752
ORDERS. Saghir Ahmad, J.1. Leave granted.2. In pursuance of the scheme for voluntary retirement, the appellant submitted an application dated 18.10.1995 seeking voluntary retirement. The offer was accepted by the respondent-management by their letter dated 30.7.1997. In the letter, it was, inter alia, mentioned as under:In response to Circular No. PD/PERS/ IR/60 (11)/374 dated 5.9.1995 and No. PD/PERS/IR/60 (111 )/400 dated 12.10.1995 and your option for vol. retirement. Under the scheme mentioned in the above circulars, Management has accepted your option for Vol. Retirement. The release memo alongwith detailed particulars will follow.Under the above V.R. Scheme there is a provision for retention of quarter for a period of 5 (five) years for which you are required to enter into an agreement, as such please obtain the format duly typed on non-judicial stamp paper from the office of S.P.O. For completing the agreement paper, the name of your father and quarter/bungalow No. is required, ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : JT2000(7)SC500; (2000)3MLJ154(SC)
1. Leave granted.2. By the order dated 2511 February, 2000 learned Counsel for the Union of India was granted, as a last chance, two weeks' time for filing counter. Neither any counter affidavit has been filed nor any application made explaining any reason for not filing the same. This Court by Order dated 13.12.1999 made it clear that this matter will be finally disposed of on 25th February, 2000. No counter affidavit is filed on this date as aforesaid in spite of last opportunity granted. In spite of indulgence, even today neither any counter is filed nor any application is filed disclosing any reason for not filing the same. So we proceed to dispose of this appeal finally today.3. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.4. In fact, grievance of the Appellant is, Respondents because of their inaction are delaying the legitimate relief to which Appellant is entitled. In the suit proceedings, before the Delhi High Court, the same Respondent has yet not filed any written statement in spit...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : JT2000(7)SC499; (2000)3MLJ153(SC); (2001)10SCC756
ORDER1. Leave granted.2. A limited notice was issued on 3.2.1997 to the Respondents as under:Issue notice for final disposal on the application for condonation of delay and on Special Leave Petition to show cause why the matter be not remanded to the High Court for a fresh decision of the appeal on merits.3. Though the Respondents are served yet no one has appeared to contest the proceedings. The appeal is therefore, being finally disposed of.4. Learned Counsel for the Appellant vehemently contended that he had many arguable points to be urged in the First Appeal before the High Court which has dismissed the same without giving any reason and without considering all the points in the appeal. The impugned order of the High Court reads as under:Heard. No grounds. Rejected.5. Learned Counsel for the Appellant is right when he contends that the High Court in First Appeal has not considered all the relevant points and has not come to a reasoned conclusion for agreeing with the trial court. ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : 2000CriLJ4674; JT2000(7)SC501
1. Leave granted. 2. The appellants have been alleged to have committed offence under Sections 420, 406, 468, 467, 471 and 120B, I.P.C. On an application being filed under Section 438 of the CrPC, the High Court of Punjab and Haryana granted anticipatory bail, subject to deposit Rs. 10 crores. The appellants did avail of the order by issuing a cheque of Rs. 10 crores from the IFCI 'No Lien Account'. The earlier order was, however, modified requiring the appellants to deposit Rs. 10 crores from his own account. It is this order which is now being assailed before us. Mr. Jain, the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants contends that requiring to deposit Rs. 10 crores itself is an unjust order and cannot be held to be proper exercise of discretion by the Court for grant of anticipatory bail under Section 438. Ms. Jaiswal, the learned Counsel for the State as well as the learned Counsel appearing for IFCI contend that the Court ought not to have exercised his discretion under ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : JT2000(7)SC399; (2000)9SCC275
ORDERA.P. Misra, J.1. Leave granted.2. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.3. The Appellant has challenged the order of the High Court dated 4th August, 1998 dismissing the writ petition filed by the Appellant rejecting the claim of the Appellant that he is the title holder of the land in question, which is the subject matter of acquisition proceedings under Section 126 of the Monopolies & Restrictive Trade Practices Act_ read with Section 6 of the Acquisition Act.4. The issue for consideration is whether Appellant have any right to claim benefit under the Circular dated 9.2.1988 issued by the Government. This circular gave an offer to the holder of the land in case they surrender 65% of their land free of any encumbrances with absolute title, then the Government would permit such holder to utilize 35% of that land for development as per the scheme. The Appellant case is, he agreed with all such terms and conditions and is fully qualified in terms of the said circular. The submission...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : 2001(49)BLJR2331; 2000(II)OLR(SC)459; (2000)6SCC461
ORDER1. The petitioner stands convicted under Sec. 302 of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 34; IPC. He filed an appeal in 1998 before the High Court of Patna and then applied for suspension of the sentence. The High Court declined to do so. He then moved the High Court taking up his appeal out of turn or to suspend the sentence on which application the impugned order has been passed. It read thus :This is appeal of the year 1998. Earlier the prayer for bail the appellant was rejected on 5.8.1998. The appellant went before the apex Court in SLA No. 23 of 1999 and the prayer for bail of the appellant was dismissed as withdrawn. In this Court the appeal of the year 1994 is being taken up for hearing. No case for grant of bail is made out. Accordingly the prayer for bail rejected. 2. If what the High Court observed is correct, the possibility that appeal being boarded for final hearing can only be in the year 2004 A convicted person being kept in jail pending appeal for such a long ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : 2000(9)SCC418; 2003(1)SCW2922
K.T. Thomas and; R.P. Sethi, JJ.1. Leave granted.2. By the impugned judgment learned Single Judge of the High Court of Karnataka has interfered with the concurrent findings rendered by the trial court and the first appellate court and allowed the second appeal. We have noticed that the jurisdiction of the second appeal had been invoked without formulating any question of law, much less any substantial question of law as required under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This Court has stated time and again that formulation of a substantial question of law is sine qua non for invoking such jurisdiction. (As for example, Kanai Lal Garari v. Murari Ganguly 1999 SC 425 there is a legion of decisions of this Court.) We, therefore, upset the impugned judgment and remand the second appeal back to the High Court for disposal of it according to law. If the High Court finds any substantial question of law the decision of ours will not prevent the High Court from formulating the same afre...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : JT2000(7)SC372; 2000(4)SCALE175
1. Leave granted.2. A suit for specific performance was decreed on August 30,1997 and the Appellant was granted one week's, time to deposit the balance of sale consideration in the Court and the last date for depositing the said amount was September 6, 1997. It is stated that September 5, 1997 was declared to be a holiday and September 6/7, 1997 being Saturday and Sunday were again general holidays and in these circumstances the Appellant made an application to permit him to deposit the amount on September 8, 1997. The trial court declined to grant permission to deposit the amount on September 8, 1997 by stating that the Appellant ought not to have waited till the last date; that if really he had money in his hands, he would have deposited within the four days and not having done so he cannot seek indulgence of the Court now. On that basis the trial court rejected the application for extension of time.3. A Revision petition was filed but the High Court declined to interfere with the or...
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