Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : 1998(4)SCALE3; [1998]3SCR508
ORDERNanavati, J.1. The petitioner has filed this petition under Article 32 of the Constitution challenging the order of detention passed against him Under Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act 1974. The order is challenged on three grounds, namely, (1) there was delay in passing the detention order (2) there was delay in execution of the detention order and (3) a copy of the written proposal made by the sponsoring authority to the detaining authority was not supplied to the petitioner.2. It is not necessary to state the facts leading to the passing of the detention order as we are inclined to allow this petition on the second ground raised by Mr. K.K. Mani, learned counsel for the petitioner. The order of detention was passed on 14.3.1996. The petitioner came to be defamed on 7.8.1997. The contention raised by Mr. Mani is that there was undue delay in execution of the order and that clearly indicates that there was no genuine satisfaction on the part of the detaining authority regarding th...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : 1998(2)ALD(Cri)133; 1998(2)ALT(Cri)108; 1998(2)Crimes339(SC); JT1998(4)SC457; (1998)8SCC343
Nanavati, J.1. The petitioner has filed this petition under Article 32 of the Constitution challenging the order of detention passed against him under Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act, 1974. The order is challenged on three grounds, namely, (1) there was delay in passing the detention order, (2) there was delay in execution of the detention order, and (3) a copy of the written proposal made by the sponsoring authority to the detaining authority was not supplied to the petitioner.2. It is not necessary to state the facts leading to the passing of the detention order as we are inclined to allow this petition on the second ground raised by Mr K.K. Mani, learned counsel for the petitioner. The order of detention was passed on 14-3-1996. The petitioner came to be detained on 7-8-1997. The contention raised by Mr Mani is that there was undue delay in execution of the order and that clearly indicates that there was no genuine satisfaction on the part of the detaining authority regarding the n...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : 1999CriLJ3509; (2000)10SCC486
ORDER1. Leave granted. 2. The appellant stood charged under Section 302 IPC but the learned Sessions Judge convicted him under Section 304 Part II IPC and sentenced him to four years' imprisonment. Against the order of the learned Sessions Judge, the State and also the appellant had preferred the appeals but both the appeals were dismissed. In this Court when the matter was listed for admission, a limited notice had been given to find out whether the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act can be given effect to in view of the age of the appellant on the date of the occurrence. On verifying the age of the appellant, Mr Aruneshwar Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the State states that admittedly the age of the appellant was less than 21 years on the date of the occurrence. In view of the aforesaid, we direct that the appellant be released on probation on executing a bond to the satisfaction of the Magistrate concerned for a period of two years,3. The appeal is disposed of accor...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1999SC1524; JT1998(6)SC638; (1998)5SCC596
ORDERThis is a transfer application. The petitioner herein is the wife and the first respondent, the husband. The cause between the parties initially was before the 4th Family Court, Bandra, but at a point of time was transferred to the 7th Family Court. Proceedings before the 7th Family Court remained stagnant because there was no Presiding Judge. The position continues to be the same. The Principal Family Court then transferred the case to the 4th Family Court. The petitioner has certain grievances against the functioning of the 4th Family Court when the matter was before it. Certain unfounded allegations have been made against the Presiding Judge of that Court. The apprehensions of the petitioner that she will not get justice there, are without any basis. All the same, since the family matters are sensitive in character and the Judges of the Family Courts have to play a greater participatory role, that objective can only be achieved if a rapport is established by the Judges of such ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : 1998VAD(SC)637; AIR1998SC2224; JT1998(4)SC212; (1998)IIIMLJ81(SC); 1998(3)SCALE636; (1998)5SCC21; [1998]3SCR497
ORDERMisra, J.1. Since both the aforesaid appeals arise out of a common order, the subject matter of dispute including pleadings and documents being the same with common evidence resulting into a common order, hence they are being disposed of by means of this common judgment.2. The present appellants are the tenants and respondent, the landlord. The short question raised is whether, on the facts and circumstances of this case, the appellants are validly depositing the rent Under Section 9(3) of the Pondicherry Buildings (Lease And Rent Control) Act, 1969, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), could they be treated as defaulters liable for eviction, when they continued to deposit the said rent as aforesaid in spite of inter se dispute between the landlord culminating by dismissal of the suit for default?3. To appreciate this point, it is necessary to dwell on the facts of this case. Out of the two appellants, one appellant is a tenant in respect of the demised premises running the cyc...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : 1998VAD(SC)647; AIR1998SC2216; 1998(3)ALLMR(SC)627; JT1998(4)SC181; 1998(2)MPLJ490; RLW1998(2)SC375; 1998(3)SCALE643; (1998)5SCC381; [1998]3SCR479
ORDERM. Jagannadha Rao, J.1. The appellant is the plaintiff. He filed the suit O.S No. 50 of 1985 for specific performance of an agreement of sale of house property located at Shimoga, Karnataka State executed in his favour. He succeeded in the trial court but on appeal by the Vendors-defendants, the Judgment of the trial court was set aside by the High Court and the suit was dismissed. Against the said Judgment of the High Court, this appeal was preferred.2. The case of the appellant in the suit filed on the file of the Civil Judge, Shimoga was as follows : The defendants 1 to 3 are three brothers and are joint owners of the house at Shimoga. The Ist defendant who was a Professor was working at Delhi (now retired); the 2nd defendant was at Madras and the third defendant was at Bangalore. The defendants 2 and 3 gave powers-of-attorney to the Ist defendant. There were consultations between plaintiff and the Ist defendant which started in 1983 by way telephone calls and letters and 'afte...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1999SC1498; 1998(4)SCALE15
ORDER1. We have perused the Office Report dated May 13, 1998. From the Office Report it appears that in pursuance of the affidavit filed by V.K. Tiwari, certain properties have been attached by the District Judges of Mathura and Meerut and letters in that regard have been received. No communication has been received from the District Judges of Lucknow, Mainpuri and Amreli with regard to the attachment of the properties within their jurisdiction. The said District Judges be sent an urgent reminder to send the compliance reports within three weeks from the date of this Order.2. In the affidavit of V.K. Tiwari dated April 28, 1998, the full particulars of the property at Pipavav Port are not given. The name of the person in whose name the property stands has not been disclosed and it is also stated as to what are the rights of the company or the directors of Respondent No. 12 in the said property. Shri Mahesh Srivastava, the learned counsel appearing for V.K. Tiwari and the company (Respo...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1998SC2343; JT1998(4)SC223; 1998(3)SCALE613; (1998)5SCC202; [1998]3SCR471
ORDERNanavati, J.1. The correctness of the judgment of the Delhi High Court in Civil Revision Application No. 379 of 1997 is questioned in this appeal. The High Court dismissed the revision application filed by the landlord against the order passed by the Rent Controller granting leave to the respondents to defend the eviction petition.2. The appellant is the owner of the premises which are now in possession of the respondents. As he was to retire from Central Government service on 30.11.96 he filed an eviction petition against both the respondents, in the Court of the Rent Controller, Delhi Under Sections 14(l)(e) and 14C of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 on the ground that he requires the premises bona fide for his residence. In his petition he has stated that Respondent No. 1, Jai Devi is his tenant but as Respondent No. 2, her husband, has been claiming that he and not his wife is the tenant of the premises the eviction petition is filed against both of them to avoid any technica...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : 1998IVAD(SC)532; AIR1998SC2309; (1998)147CTR(SC)1; [1998]231ITR793(SC); JT1998(4)SC133; 1998(3)SCALE606; (1998)5SCC29; [1998]3SCR458
ORDERMrs. Sujata V. Manohar, J.1. The assessee is the ex-Ruler of the erstwhile Holkar State. The assessee was assessed as an individual and the assessment year involved is 1972-73.2. In 1949, the Ministry of States, New Delhi had accepted certain heirloom jewellery as private properties of His late Highness Maharaja Keshaw Rao Holkar of Indore. These included a 'Sirpech' and a Ceremonial belt. All the listed jewellery and gold in the Huzur Jawahirkhana at Indore in 1949 and used by the Ruler of Indore on ceremonial occasions as in the past, were exempt under the provisions of Section 5(l)(xiv) of the Wealth-Tax Act.3. During the accounting year relating to the assessment year 1972-73, the assessee sold two items of heirloom jewellery for Rs. 13,80,001. The assessee claimed before the Tribunal that the heirloom jewellery constituted personal effects of the assessee within the meaning of Section 2(14) of the Income-Tax Act, 1961, and, therefore, the sale of this jewellery did not give r...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : JT1998(4)SC110; (1998)IIIMLJ86(SC); 1998(3)SCALE617; (1998)5SCC468; [1998]3SCR463
ORDERMrs. Sujata V. Manohar, J.1. Leave granted.2. On 29th June, 1982 the State of Andhra Pradesh promulgated the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Ordinance, 1982. It was subsequently replaced by the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohobition) Act, 1962. The Act has since been amended twice -- once by Andhra Pradesh Act 16 of 1987 and again by Andhra Pradesh Act 6 of 1988.3. In 1996 a practising advocate filed a writ petition before the Andhra Pradesh High Court challenging the constitutional validity of the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982. One N. Vekatesh also addressed a letter to the Chief Justice of the Andhra Pradesh High Court with a press clipping relating to the appointments to the Special Court constituted under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982, which was treated as a writ petition. Both these petitions were heard together. By the impugned judgment, the Andhra Pradesh High Court gave certain directions which can be summaris...
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