Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : (1994)1SCC372
R.M. Sahai and; N. Venkatachala, JJ.1. By this petition the tenant challenges validity of Section 3(c) of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. It is claimed that similar petitions are pending in this Court.2. Normally there would have been no difficulty in entertaining this petition but we find that the petitioner had approached this Court earlier by way of petition under Article 136 and his petition was directed to be tagged with other petitions and interim order, too, was granted. Later on at the instance of the landlord the leave was revoked and the petition was dismissed.3. To overcome this hurdle the learned counsel has placed reliance on Hari Singh v. State of Haryana1 and A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak2. He urged that a citizen of India has a constitutional right to be treated alike. According to him this Court committed a mistake in revoking leave and depriving the petitioner to avail of his constitutional remedy. Therefore, this Court is constitutionally obliged to grant her protection.4...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1993SC1947; JT1993(3)SC270; 1993(2)SCALE825; (1993)3SCC677; [1995]96STC130(SC)
ORDERS.C. Agrawal, J.1. These appeals and special leave petition raise common questions relating to the constitutional validity of Sections 4 and 5 of the Andhra Pradesh Entertainments Tax Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), as amended by Act 24 of 1984, providing for imposition of entertainment tax in respect of entertainments held in cinema theatres located in the State of Andhra Pradesh.2. The Act has been enacted to provide for the levy of taxes on amusements and other entertainments. Prior to January 1, 1984, Section 4 of the Act provided for levy of entertainment tax at a rate fixed on the basis of percentage of the payment made by a person for admission to any entertainment. In addition, there was a provision in Section 4-A for levy of a fixed amount, by way of 'show tax', for each show. By Act 58 of 1976, Section 4-C was introduced in the Act and Section 5 of the Act was substituted. Under Section 4-C, it was provided that in respect of entertainments held within ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : 1994Supp(1)SCC249
R.M. Sahai and; N. Venkatachala, JJ.1. Validity of the order passed by the Delhi High Court directing eviction of the petitioner on an application filed under Section 14-D by the landlady, a widow, has been challenged in this Court. It is claimed that leave to defend having been granted in an earlier petition filed under Section 14(1)(e) the Rent Control Officer was not justified in rejecting the petitioner's application. We do not find any merit in the submission as the landlord under Section 14-D is a classified landlord with special rights. It was then urged that since an application under Section 14(1)(e) was pending the second application for the same purpose could not have been entertained. The submission is again devoid of any merit as the earlier application under Section 14(1)(e) was filed under unamended Act whereas the latter application was filed after a special right was conferred on the landlord.2. It was vehemently argued that since the landlady and her son were co-owner...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : (1994)IILLJ357SC
ORDERP.B. Sawant, J.1. Special leave granted.2. There is no dispute that the teachers namely K.N. Nagi Reddy, S.Poli Naidu, B. Ramakrishnath and N. Dattatreyulu were serving in a school belonging to the appellant-institution. That school, it appears, was closed and instead of transferring the said teachers to the present school, the appellants retrenched them. However, immediately thereafter, they re-employed them in the present school. But, at the time of the re-employemnt, their salary which they were drawing at the closed school, was protected. They were not given the benefit of their earlier service even for the purpose of seniority in the present school. The respondent-writ petitioners are the teachers in the present school. They approached the High Court by the present writ petition making a grievance that the said four teachers though junior to them were paid salary which was higher than their's. The learned Single Judge accepted the plea and granted the respondents the same sal...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1994SC502; (1994)IILLJ30SC; (1993)4SCC49
ORDER1. The petitioner has challenged the appointment of D.K. Agarwal to the office of Vice-Chairman, Central Administrative Tribunal. The only point raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the appointment of Agarwal is in violation of Section 6 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (the Act). Section 6 of the Act provides 'a person shall not be qualified for appointment as the Vice-Chairman, unless he is(a) is, or has been, (or is qualified to be) a Judge of a High Court; or(b) has, for a period of not less than three years, held office as a Judicial Member of an Administrative Tribunal.2. Agarwal was appointed Vice-Chairman, Central Administrative Tribunal by the order dated May 15, 1992. He had attained the age of 62 years on February 27, 1992. The precise argument is that having crossed the age of 62 years, Agarwal could not be considered for appointment as a Judge of the High Court under Article 217(1) of the Constitution of India and as a consequence he becom...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1994SC1232; JT1993(4)SC107; (1994)ILLJ339SC; 1993(2)SCALE800; 1993Supp(3)SCC234; [1993]3SCR593; 1993(3)SLJ21(SC)
ORDERS.C. AGRAWAL, J.1. This appeal relates to the inter se seniority of the appellant and respondent No. 3 in the Punjab Superior Judicial Service (hereinafter referred to as 'The Service'). The appellant and respondent No. 3 were both appointed to the Service on May 26, 1986 on the basis of selection by direct recruitment. The appellant belongs to the general category whereas respondent No. 3 is a Mazhabi Sikh, which is a Scheduled Caste in Punjab.2. The recruitment to the Service is governed by Punjab Superior Judicial Service Rules, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as 'The Rules'). By Rule 8-A, which was inserted in the rules by notification dated June 14, 1977, the instructions issued by the State Government from time to time in relation to reservation of appointments or posts for Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes were made applicable for the purpose of making appointments to the posts in the Service. The orders of the State Government relating to persons belonging to Schedule Ca...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1993SC1751; (1993)112CTR(SC)247; [1993]201ITR1063(SC); JT1993(3)SC526; 1993(2)SCALE896; (1993)3SCC252
ORDERB.P. Jeevan Reddy, J.1. These appeals are preferred against the judgment of the Karnataka High Court answering the question referred to it, at the instance of the revenue, in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. The question referred under Section 256 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, read as follows: 'Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the sum of Rs. 1,79,742/- could not be disallowed under Section 40(c) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.' (The above question related to Assessment Year 1974-75. The question referred for A.Y. 1975-76 was identical except in the matter of amount). Since the facts in all the appeals are identical it would be sufficient to notice the facts in C.A.Nos.6092 and 6092A/90 (Prakash Beedies (P) Ltd.v. Commr. of Income Tax, Karnataka, Bangalore).2. Prior to 15.7.1972, a partnership firm called K.M. Anand Prabhu & Sons, Mangalore, consisting of three partners - K.M.Vishnudas Prabhu, K.M.Ramdas Pr...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : 1994Supp(1)SCC573
P.B. Sawant and; B.P. Jeevan Reddy, JJ.1. Special leave granted.2. The Tribunal while reducing the punishment and reinstating the workman, had denied the back wages to him. However, in writ petition the High Court interfered with the order denying the back wages, and while affirming the punishment, directed that the respondent would be entitled to the back wages. We find that the High Court's order is self-contradictory. When the High Court had found that the respondent-employee deserved punishment on account of his misconduct, the High Court could not have rewarded the employee by granting him the back wages particularly when the Tribunal had converted the order of dismissal into that of the stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect. We, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside that part of the order of the High Court whereby the respondent-employee has been given the benefit of back wages. The rest of the order is maintained. The appeal is allowed accordingly with no order a...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : JT1993(3)SC617; (1993)IILLJ696SC; 1993(3)SCALE39; (1993)3SCC259; [1993]3SCR930
K. Ramaswamy, J.1. This appeal by special leave is against the award of the Labour Court, Haryana at Faridabad dated April 19, 1982 which was published in the State Gazette on August 10, 1982. It upheld the termination of the appellant's service as legal and valid. The respondent, by its letter dated December 12, 1980 which was received by the appellant on December 19, 1980, intimated that the appellant wilfully absented from duty continuously for more than 8 days from December 3, 1980 without leave or prior information or intimation or previous permission from the management and, therefore, 'deemed to have left the service of the company on your own account and lost your lien and the appointment with effect from December 3, 1980.' In support thereof reliance was placed on Clause 13(2)(iv) of its certified standing Order. The appellant averred that despite his reporting to duty on December 3, 1980 and everyday continuously thereafter he was prevented entry at the gate and he was not al...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1994SC501; 1994Supp(1)SCC574
ORDER1. Special leave granted.2. The short point which arises for consideration is whether in the instant case the period of limitation under Article 119 in the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 runs from the date of filing of the Award or the date of service of notice thereof by the Court. The facts reveal that the Arbitrator forwarded his Award in a sealed cover to the Court on 17-2-1988. The Court opened the sealed cover in the presence of counsel for both the parties on 23-2-1988, pursuant to an application made in that behalf on 19-2-88. The objection petition was filed on 24-3-88 i.e. on the 31st day after the Award was made known to the parties on 23-2-88. The counsel for the appellant submits that under Article 119 referred to earlier, the period of limitation runs from 'the date of service of the notice of the filing of the Award'. Indisputably in the instant case no notice was issued by the Court but the Award was made known on 23-2-88. The point seems to be covered by the...
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