Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1991SC966; (1991)94CTR(SC)174; [1991]187ITR546(SC); 1993Supp(1)SCC408
1. These appeals have arisen against similar Orders of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh failing to be persuaded, Income-tax Appellate Tribunal before hand, to refer the following three questions of law to the High Court said to arise from the appellate Orders of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Hyderabad. Those questions are taken and reproduced below from one case and in the others they are substantially same. (1) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was justified in holding that by the levy of interest under Section 139 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 the Income-tax Officer must be deemed to have granted time up to the date of filing the return of income? (2) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the Appellate Tribunal was correct in holding that even if the return was treated as filed under Section 139(4) penalty was not liable? (3) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the penalty liable within the ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : [1991]187ITR333(SC); 1993Supp(1)SCC420
ORDER1. This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment of the Madras High Court in an estate duty matter. The question involves the interpretation of the provisions of the Estate Duty Act, 1953. We are however, of the opinion that the issue raised is purely of academic interest and not of any practical importance in view of the following circumstances :The Estate Duty Act itself has been repealed with effect from 1985. The amount of tax or duty involved in this appeal is very negligible. The matter also relates to the estate of a person who passed away in 1962. Having regard to the fact that the provisions are not likely to come up for consideration hereafter, we do not think that this appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution need be proceeded with. We, therefore, dismiss this appeal. We, however, express no opinion on the question which has been raised before and decided by the High Court. The appeal is dismissed accordingly. There is no order as to costs. ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1991SC417; 1991CriLJ2648; [1991(61)FLR759]; JT1990(4)SC263; 1991LabIC231; (1991)1MLJ44(SC); 1990(2)SCALE947; (1991)1SCC283; [1991]3SCR312; [1990]Supp2SCR518; 1991(1)LC16
ORDERM.H. Kania, J.1. This petition under Article 32 of the Constitution has been brought before this Court by way of a Public Interest Litigation and is connected with the problem of employment of children in Match factories of Sivakasi in Kamaraj District of Tamil Nadu State. On notice the State has filed its return.2. Sivakasi has been the traditional center for manufacture of match boxes and fire works for almost the whole country and a part of its output is even exported. From the affidavit of the State it appears that as on December 31, 1985, there were 221 registered match factories in the area employing 27338 workmen of whom 2941 were children. We would have been happy to have updated particulars but for disposal of this case total figure and the proportion between adult workmen and children perhaps may be taken as the foundation.3. The manufacturing process of matches and fireworks is hazardous one. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that almost every year, notwithstandi...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : JT1991(5)SC452; (1991)2SCC407; (1990)3UPLBEC1449
ORDERM.M. Punchhi, J.1.This appeal by certificate from the Punjab and Haryana High Court apparently raises three questions of law stated to be of substantial and general importance. The first one is whether the State Trading Corporation is an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, and as such amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. This question does not arise any more in view of the settled position of the expanded meaning given to the word 'authority'. The second question whether relief can be obtained by a party in writ jurisdiction, even if it arises out of breach of contract of obligations, also does not survive for obvious reasons that the jurisdiction of the High Court is wide and it knows where to grant relief and deny where. The third question has not even been properly formulated and what is required is an authoritative decision from this Court. Having perused the judgment of the High Court with the assistance of learned C...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1991SC1374; (1990)3CompLJ301(SC); (1990)90CTR(SC)19; [1991]18ITR54(SC); JT1990(4)SC451; 1991Supp(2)SCC730; [1990]Supp2SCR523; 1991(1)LC119(SC)
ORDERS.C. Agrawal, J.1. This appeal by certificate is directed against the judgment and order dated 30.11.1973 of Allahabad High Court at Allahabad in Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 6122 of 1973 whereby U.P. State Ware Housing Corporation, the respondent herein, was granted exemption as envisaged Under Section 10(29) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.2. The U.P. State Ware Housing Corporation is a creature if the Ware Housing Corporations Act, 1962. The Income Tax Officer, Lucknow, required the respondent to pay a sum of money as advance tax for the Assessment Year 1974-75. The view of the Income Tax Officer throughout in the previous years was that rental income derived by the assessee from its godowns and warehouses was not exempt from income tax. The claim of the assessee having repeatedly been rejected it thought it proper and did file a writ petition in the High Court of Allahabad challenging the notice. The High Court quashed the notice. The view of the High Court has been assai...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1991SC1145; 1991Supp(1)SCC733
1. This appeal, by certificate, is directed against the order dated 30th April, 1973, of the Judicial Commissioner, Goa, Daman and Diu dismissing Special Civil Application No. 43 of 1972 by which appellant sought a mandamus directing the respondents to absorb him in a equivalent to that of Treasurer of a financial institution of the former Portuguese Government in Goa, after its take-over by the Indian Government.2. The appellant was in the service of 'Caixa Economica De Goa' as instrumentality of the then Portuguese Government. The petitioner joined the service as 'Aspirante' said to correspond to the post of an Upper Division Clerk but he was acting in the higher post of Grade III Officer in the said Caixa Economica. On 30-8-1963 the post of Treasurer in the establishment of Caixa Economica having fallen vacant upon the death of the person who then held that post, appellant was asked to perform the duties of the treasurer on the stipulation that he would draw, besides the monthly sal...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1991SC318; 1991CriLJ402; 1991(1)Crimes74(SC); JT1991(5)SC217; (1991)1SCC519; [1990]Supp2SCR503
ORDERM. Fathima Beevi, J. 1. Sukhdev Singh, the appellant, and his uncle Teja Singh were tried on the charge Under Sections 302/34, I.P.C., for the murder of one Sucha Singh. The trial court acquitted Teja Singh and convicted Sukhdev Singh for the offence Under Section 302, I.P.C., and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000. The State did not file any appeal against the order of acquittal. Sukhdev Singh appealed against his conviction. The High Court altered the conviction of Sukhdev Singh to one Under Section 302 read with Section 34, I.P.C., and maintained the sentence.This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the High Court.2. The occurrence that resulted in the death of Sucha Singh happened on January 1, 1975 at 3.30 P.M. The prosecution alleged that Sukhdev Singh and Teja Singh in furtherance of their common intention attacked Sucha Singh with kirpans while he was returning home from his field along the street in the vi...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : 1991Supp(1)SCC217
M.M. Punchhi and; S.C. Agrawal, JJ.1. Leave granted.2. The Chandigarh Administration, the appellant, challenges the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench, holding that the respondent-employee was a workman within the meaning of Fundamental Rule 56(b).3. The employee attained the age of 58 years on April 15, 1988. If the age of retirement is 58, as contended by the appellant-Administration, the employee had retired on April 30, 1988. On the other hand, if the right age of his retirement is 60 years, he retired only on April 30, 1990. The question, therefore, is whether the Administration was right in superannuating the employee on completion of the age of 58. According to the employee, the right age for retirement being 60 years, as provided under clause (b) of F.R. 56, he should have been retained in service, as found by the Tribunal, till April 30, 1990.4. Clauses (a) and (b) of F.R. 56 read as under:“F.R. 56(a) Except as otherwise provided in this rule,...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1991SC416; (1991)3SCC11
1. Special leave granted.2. The appellant was working as a Lieutenant Nursing Officer in the Military Nursing Service. She got married on 29-4-1988. She had obtained the requisite permission of the authorities to get married. Subsequent to the marriage, her service was discontinued by release order dated 7-10-1988.3. The discontinuation of service was challenged by the appellant in the High Court. The High Court by its impugned judgment held that the termination was caused not by reason of marriage, but by reason of her comparatively poor performance.4. We have heard counsel on both sides. We have perused the records. It is not disputed that, but for the marriage, the appellant's performance would have been of sufficiently good average to be retained in service and to be considered for promotion to the next higher post on the basis of her seniority. However, by reason of certain executive orders, it was decided that, not with standing her fairly good average record, her service had to ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1991SC338; 1991Supp(2)SCC383
ORDER1. The litigative resourcefulness of the parties in this case appears inexhaustible. By consent order dated 17-12-87 made by this Court in Civil Appeal No. 2950/87, the appellant Smt. Kanta Gupta who had secured an Order of allotment as tenant under the provisions of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulations of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 in respect of the premises concerned in the proceedings, undertook to yield-up and deliver vacant possession of the premises to the landlords on the expiry of two years from 17-12-1987. The order was accompanied by a written undertaking filed by Smt. Kanta Gupta to act in aid of its terms.2. Later her husband, Bhagwan Das, attempted to assert certain rights of his own for possession on the basis of some partnership. Appellant sought to urge that in view of this claim of her husband her own obligations under the consent order and the undertaking amount only to an obligation merely to declare that she had ceased to have any interest in the pr...
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