Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : [1987]166ITR66(SC); JT1987(3)SC117a
The Text below is only a summarized version of the order pronouncedAppellant conceded that matter raised in question was concluded by decision in another case. ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1986SC2019; [1986]161ITR824(SC); 1986(2)SCALE355; (1986)4SCC297; [1986]3SCR674
1. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal is right in holding that the assessee who has a life interest in the testamentary trust estate of late C.H. Kinnison comprising inter alia of the shares in an Indian company and commission from the managing agency of an Indian company can be said to have an interest in such shares and commission and that such interest is property located in India so as to be taxable under the Wealth-tax Act?2. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal is right in holding that the life interest of the assessee in the testamentary trust estate of late C.H. Kinnison is not an annuity which is exempt under Section 2(e)(iv) of the Wealth-tax Act?2. Heilgers & Co. were managing agents of the Kinnison Jute Mills Co. Ltd. and the Naihati Jute Mills Co. Ltd., both Indian companies, for several years. Heilgers & Co. entered into a sub-partnership from time to time with James Alexander Kinnison under which the...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1986SC2099; JT1986(1)SC291; 1986(2)SCALE331; (1986)4SCC193; 1986(2)LC598(SC)
B. C. Ray, J.1. We have heard the arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant and after considering the facts and circumstances of the case we have dismissed the appeal by our order dated 20.8.1986. The reasons for the dismissal of the appeal are stated herein below. This appeal on special leave arises out of the judgment and order dated 25th October, 1976 in Latters Patent Appeal No. 3 of 1976. The judgment debtor made application for setting aside the sale held on 17.4.1972 under Order 21 Rule 90 of the CPC alleging, inter alia, that there was no proper sale proclamation drawn up as it was stated there in that the sale of the attached property will be subject to decree in O.S. No. 282/68, that the valuation put on the sale proclamation was low, that is, Rs. 15.000/- for each lot and the judgment debtor's valuation of the property of Rs. l,40,000/- was not put in and for this material irregularity the property was sold at a low price of Rs. 24,000/-. It was further alleged that the ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1986SC1948; 1986LabIC1928; 1986MhLJ816(SC); 1986(2)SCALE362; (1986)4SCC59; [1986]3SCR665; 1987(1)SLJ207(SC); 1986(2)LC713(SC); 1986(2)WLN250
A.P. Sen, J1. The short point involved in this appeal by special leave pertains to the determination of age at a particular point of time. The question is whether the appellant having his date of birth as January 2, 1956 had attained the age of 28 years on January 1, 1984 and was therefore disqualified from being considered for direct recruitment to the Rajasthan Administrative Service under Rule 11-B of the Rajasthan State & Subordinate Service (Direct Recruitment by Competitive Examination) Rules, 1962 (for short 'the Rules').2. Put very briefly, the essential facts are these. The Rajasthan Public Service Commission invited applications for direct recruitment to the Rajasthan Administrative Service and allied services of the Government of Rajasthan by a competitive examination to be held in 1983. Under the directions issued by the Commission, the minimum age prescribed for candidates was 21 years and the maximum 28 years. It was prescribed that the candidate should have attained the ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1986SC2139; JT1986(1)SC280; 1986(2)SCALE306; (1986)4SCC162; 1987(1)LC300(SC)
S. Natarajan, J.1. This appeal by certificate is directed against a judgment of the High Court of Gujarat reversing the judgment of the Assistant Judge, Baroda and restoring the finding of the Charity Commissioner that a property known as Laxman Maharaj Math is a public trust and not the private property of the appellant herein. The property is also alternatively referred to as Ramji Mandir. It consists of two items viz. the main property known as Laxman Maharaj Math and its adjunct known as Nagarkhana on the other side of the road. As the Charity Commissioner has held that both the items form part and parcel of the Math and constitute a single unit we will refer to both the items under the common name of Laxman Maharaj Math.2. One Haribhat Maharaj is the propositus of the appellant, and his brothers. As per the genealogy table furnished by the appellant, he and his brothers are the descendents of Haribhat Maharaj in the fifth generation. Haribhat Maharaj (founder of the Math) | Ramakr...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1986SC1955; JT1986(1)SC249; 1986LabIC1806; (1986)IILLJ516SC; 1986(2)SCALE344; (1986)4SCC131; 1986(2)LC573(SC)
ORDER1. The short point involved in this special leave petition is whether an order of transfer of a Government servant made by an authority other than the Government itself, is appealable before the Government under Rule 19 of the Karnataka Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1957. There was a divergence of opinion in the High Court on the question as to the maintainability of such appeals. In a series of writ petitions, Rama Jois, J. took the view that 'transfer' is a condition of service and therefore the Government servant has a right of appeal against the order of transfer under Rule 19. Dodda Kalegouda, J., on the other hand, dismissed the writ petition filed by the petitioner holding that no appeal lay to the State Government against an order of transfer made by the Commissioner of Labour transferring him from Bangalore to Tarikere under Rule 19 of the Rules. A number of appeals by the Government as well as the civil servants against the orders passed by the...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1987SC190; 1986(2)SCALE304; (1986)4SCC160; 1986(2)LC565(SC)
ORDERChinnappa Reddy, J.1. Special leave granted. 2. This appeal by the State of U.P., the Director of Medical Education and Principal, Motilal Nehru Medical College is directed against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court by which the Post Graduate medical courses scheduled to commence in January 1987 has been advanced to July 1986 at the instance of some students (now doctors) who joined the medical college in August-September, 1979. The duration of the MBBS course is four and half years. After that, students are expected to do internship for one year and a house-job for another year. This would take them altogether six and half years. In, the ordinary course the students who commenced the MBBS course in August-September, 1979 would have completed the MBBS course, internship and house-job by December, 1985 and would have been eligible for admission to the Post Graduate course which was to commence in January, 1986, but which actually commenced in March, 1986. Unfortunately for so...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1986SC1952; JT1986(1)SC253; 1986(2)SCALE347; (1986)4SCC155; [1986]3SCR622; 1986(2)LC701(SC)
E.S. Venkataramiah, J.1. The Ist Respondent Om Parkash is the landlord of a building situated in Ferozpur Jhirka, District Gurgaon in the State of Haryana. He had leased out the said premises in favour of one Musadi Lal for a commercial purpose. After Musadi Lal took the premises on lease he sub-let the premises in favour of Med Ram-Respondent No. 2 without the written consent of the landlord Om Parkash. Thereupon Om Parkash filed a petition for eviction against Musadi Lal and Med Ram before the Rent Controller, under the provisions of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 (Act No. 11 of 1973) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') on the ground mentioned in Section 13(2)(ii)(a) of the Act which entitled the landlord to file a petition for eviction where the tenant had after the commencement of the Act without the written consent of the landlord transferred his right under the lease or sub-let the building. Musadi Lal and Med Ram, the tenant and the alleged sub-ten...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1986SC1999; JT1986(1)SC261; 1986(2)SCALE313; (1986)4SCC198; [1986]3SCR628
Chinnappa Reddy, J.1. These appeals preferred by the Kerala State Electricity Board raise the question of the extent of the authority of the Board to increase the Electricity Tariff under the Electricity Supply Act. The upward revision of tariff made by the Board in 1980, 1982 and 1984 was successfully challenged in the Kerala High Court. The first two revisions were struck down by a Full Bench of three judges by a majority of two to one and, later, all three revisions were struck down by a Full Bench of Five judges by majority of four to one. The principal ground of challenge and that which was accepted by the High Court was that the Kerala State Electricity Board acted outside its statutory authority by formulating a price structure intended to yield sufficient revenue to off set not merely the expenditure properly chargeable to the revenue account for the year as contemplated by Section 59 of the Act but also expenditure not so properly chargeable. Had Section 59 been strictly follo...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1987SC45; 1986(2)SCALE350; (1986)4SCC151; [1986]3SCR660; 1986(2)LC570(SC)
A.P. Sen, J.1. In these special leave petitions which are much belated, the only question was whether the Court should entertain the petitions despite the delay and grant special leave merely because this Court in Paltu Singh and Anr. v. State of Haryana and Nand Kishore and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Ors. (Civil Appeals Nos. 1251 and 1252 of 1982, both decided on April 1, 1982) enhanced the rate of compensation for the adjacent land acquired to Rs. 17.50 per square yard. The petition of Mewa Ram is barred by 1079 days, that of Pat Ram by 1146 days and of Ram Sarup by 1098 days. We heard the matter thrice on the question whether there was any sufficient cause for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. We were not satisfied that there was any cause much less sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay. The petitioners then took time to file further and better affidavits explaining the unexplained, inordinat...
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