Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : 1987Supp(1)SCC56
ORDER 1. Special leave granted limited to the question of the date from which the appellant should be paid interest on the pension and gratuity amount etc. due to him. 2. Heard both the sides. The High Court has awarded interest with effect from the date of the institution of the writ petition instead of with effect from the date on which the pension and gratuity amount etc. became due on his superannuation about four years earlier. The appeal is, therefore, partly allowed to the extent that the appellant will be awarded interest from the date of his superannuation in 1981 instead of the date of the institution of the writ petition (i.e. August 5, 1985). The respondents will pay the costs of this appeal to the appellant which we quantify at Rs 2000. Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No. 4968 of 1986...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1987SC398; (1987)89BOMLR63; 1986(2)SCALE957; (1987)1SCC160; 1987(1)LC111(SC)
O. Chinnappa Reddy, J.1. Ganoba had four sons, Raoji, Ramchandra, Narsoba and Shanker. Raoji, Narsoba and Shanker died in that order. Shanker died in 1951. Vasant and Yaswant, defendant Nos. 4 & 5 are Raoji's sons. Ramchandra is the first defendant and his sons are Manik and Moti, defendant Nos. 2 & 3. Narsoba died leaving behind him two widows Subabai and Kadubai. Shanker died leaving behind him a widow Aaubai.2. We may mention here that at the time of death of Raoji. Narsoba and Shanker, the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937 was not applicable to the parties, as they were residents of the erstwhile native state of Hyderabad. In 1961 Kadubai the widow of Narsoba adopted Dattu. Aaubai, the widow of Shanker adopted Vilas. Soon after the adoptions, Dattu and Vilas filed the suit, out of which the present appeal arises for partition and separate possession of their shares in the joint family properties. Defendants 4 and 5 were the main contestants of this suit. Among several pleas...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : 1987Supp(1)SCC18
ORDER The petitioners who were Field Publicity Officers, Grade IV were upgraded to Grade III pursuant to the recommendations of the Third Pay Commission. The scale of salary was also revised but effect was given to the revision from October 1, 1975 instead of from January 1, 1973 as in the case of all other persons. It has been pointed out in the writ petition that in the case of Field Publicity Officers (Border) effect was given to the revised grade and scales from January 1, 1973. These facts are admitted in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the government but it is stated that the petitioners could not be given the revised scales with effect from January 1, 1973 on account of some administrative difficulties. We do not think that it is open to the government to deny the benefit of the revised grade and scale with effect from January 1, 1973 as in the case of all other persons merely because of some administrative difficulties. To do so will be discriminatory. A directio...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : 1987Supp(1)SCC63
M.P. Thakkar and; B.C. Ray, JJ.1. This is a defendants' appeal. It appears that the defendants had issued documents of title to goods showing that said goods had been lodged with them and the same would be delivered to the holder of the documents. The documents in question related to 96 bales of cotton which were lodged by the owner of the goods with the appellants for the purpose of ginning. The High Court has rightly taken the view that the Bank as the holder in due course of these documents of title was entitled to claim the delivery of the goods covered by the documents. The appellant was unable to deliver the goods. The plea taken by the appellant-defendant was that the goods in question had been already delivered to the owner of the goods who had dealings with the Bank. This contention was negatived by the trial court as also by the High Court on a careful appraisal of evidence. We agree with the reasoning and conclusion of the High Court.2. The High Court was fully justified in ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : 1987Supp(1)SCC61
M.P. Thakkar and; B.C. Ray, JJ.1. We have perused the relevant record and heard counsel for the appellants in support of this appeal. The questions which are raised by the learned counsel are essentially questions of fact. In regard to these questions, we are in complete agreement with the reasoning of the High Court and the conclusion reached by the said Court. We do not see any good reason to interfere with the finding recorded by the High Court on the questions of facts sought to be reagitated before this Court. The High Court has considered the matter carefully and recorded findings of facts which are fully supported by the evidence and has arrived at a just conclusion insofar as the grievances made by the appellants are concerned. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs.CA No. 1319 of 19732. We are of the view that the appellant-plaintiffs' grievance on one point is justified. Insofar as the other points which have been raised by the learned counsel for the appell...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : 1987Supp(1)SCC57
A.P. Sen and; S. Natarajan, JJ.1. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, we feel that the High Court was not justified in dismissing the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution on the ground of laches. There was no inordinate or unexplained delay on the part of the appellants in filing the writ petition. The delay, if any, was on the part of the State Government in disposing of the application for review and, therefore, could not be a reason for dismissing the writ petition on the ground of laches. The writ petition does raise questions which merited hearing on merits.2. We accordingly, grant leave, set aside the judgment and order of the High Court and remit the writ petition for hearing on merits after notice to the parties.3. The appeal is disposed of accordingly with no costs....
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1987SC413; 1987LabIC236; (1995)IIILLJ465SC; 1986(2)SCALE998; 1986Supp(1)SCC501; 1986(2)SLJ998(SC); 1987(1)LC51(SC)
O. Chinnappa Reddy, J.1. The Army Medical Corps Civilian Employees Union, Lucknow was registered on January 27, 1964 with the Registrar of Trade Unions, Uttar Pradesh under the provisions of the Indian Trade Unions Act. The members of the Union are carpenters, tailors, bootmakers, gardeners, sweepers, cooks, messengers etc. who may be compendiously described as 'Camp-followers' of the Army. The registration of the Trade Union was cancelled on January 6, 1978 by the Registrar of Trade Unions on the ground that such registration had ceased to be valid in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 1821 of 1974. It was said that the registration was initially granted under a mistake and it was therefore, cancelled. This order of cancellation of registration of the Union is challenged in these petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution.2. The submission of Shri Anil Kumar Gupta, learned Counsel for the petitioners is that the members of the Union who are civilian empl...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : 1986Supp(1)SCC679
O. Chinnappa Reddy and; V. Khalid, JJ.1. Special leave granted.2. The Labour Court has held that Section 6-N of the U.P. Indusuial Disputes Act controls Section 6-P also and, therefore, for the application of Section 6-P, the requirement of Section 6-N that a workman must be continuously employed for the prescribed period must be satisfied. We do not think so. Section 6-P is independent of Section 6-N and by its own force it prescribes that the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in the category. The order of the Labour Court is set aside and the matter is remitted back to the Labour Court for granting appropriate relief to the workman by applying Section 6-P. The workman is entitled to his costs. Parties are at liberty to adduce additional evidence, if necessary. The appeal is disposed of accordingly....
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : 1987Supp(1)SCC28
1. Two questions arise in this appeal by special leave from the judgment of the Mysore High Court rendered in Writ Petition No. 4407 of 1970 dated March 14, 1973 viz.: 1. Whether the High Court has committed an error in taking the view that the appellant has not acquired any right for re-grant in respect of land in question which was earlier acquired for a public purpose under Section 54-A of the Hyderabad Land Revenue Act 8 of 1317 from him. 2. Whether the State Government was in error in making a grant in favour of Respondent 5 without taking into account the claim of the appellant for a grant in his capacity as the original owner of the acquired land upon the State Government being satisfied that the land is not required any longer for the public purpose for which it was acquired under Order No. RD 105, ACP 69 dated January 23, 1970. 2. Insofar as the first question is concerned, we agree with the reasoning and conclusion of the High Court particularly having regard to the fact that...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : 1987Supp(1)SCC23
M.P. Thakkar and; B.C. Ray, JJ.1. Since we are unable to agree with each other for the reasons recorded by us separately, the papers may be placed before Hon'ble Chief Justice of India for directions regarding listing of the same for hearing and disposal before another Bench. M.P. THAKKAR, J.— My reasons for concurring with the view taken by the High Court that the impugned notice (affording opportunity to show cause against proposed supersession) as per Annexure II dated May 9, 1976 (at p. 37 of the SLP paper-book) does not deserve to be quashed are four viz.:(1) The notice is not without jurisdiction in the sense that the State Government is empowered under proviso to Section 402(2) read with the relevant provisions to issue such a notice.(2) The issuance of such notice is neither illegal nor does it occasion any prejudice or detriment to the petitioner or to the councillors or to the Municipal Council so as to justify the quashing of the notice.(3) To accede to the submis...
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