Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1985SC579; 1985MPLJ252(SC); 1985(1)SCALE191; (1985)2SCC58; 1985(17)LC654(SC)
O. Chinnappa Reddy, J.1. The simple question for decision in this appeal is whether a reversioner who had succeeded to an estate on the death of a female limited owner could claim possession of land as 'home farm land' under the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950, notwithstanding the fact that such land was not in his physical possession on the specified date. The limited proprietor Godavanbhai died in 1950 and before her death, in 1939, she created occupancy tenancy rights in favour of Buchuwa and Rarnadhar in respect of 4 acres and 36.21 acres of land respectively. An extent of 13 acres remained with her and on her death in 1950, the land came into the possession of her husband, Gajadhar Prasad. Subsequent to the death of Godavaribhai, in 1951 the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950 came into force. By Section 3 of the Act all the rights of the proprietors in an estate, ma...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1985SC608; 1985(1)SCALE190; (1985)2SCC14; 1985(17)LC586(SC)
O. Chinnappa Reddy, J.1. The appeal arises out of a partnership action. The second defendant is the appellant. His express case was that he retired from the partnership with the consent of the other partners, that there was a dissolution of the firm consequent upon his retirement and that the suit so far as he was concerned was barred by limitation. The High Court has expressly found that the second defendant did retire from the partnership on January 19, 1948, that he was given a lorry and a certain sum at the time of his retirement from the partnership, that there was no final settlement of accounts of the firm at that time, nor was there a dissolution of the firm and that the suit for accounts even against the second defendant was within time. Shri M.K. Bhatt, learned counsel for the appellant, urged that the very circumstances on which the High Court relied to arrive at the conclusion that the second defendant had retired from the partnership were also, in the present case, suffici...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1985SC891; 1985CriLJ1134; 1985(2)SCALE1400; 1985Supp(1)SCC76
S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, J.1. The appellant, Lok Pal Singh, has been convicted by the High Court Under Section 302/34 I.P.C. for murder of six persons which took place on 25th September, 1981 at about 2.00 a.m. The facts of the case have been narrated in the judgment of the High Court and Sessions Court and it is not necessary for us to repeat the same.2. It appears that according to the prosecution case the accused inspired by unholy spirit of revenge and retaliation entered the house of the deceased persons at 2.00 a.m. on 25.9.1981 and killed as many as six persons in the house and one in the field. This was a most cruel and heinous murder and once the offence is proved then there can be no other sentence except the death sentence that can be imposed.3. The Sessions Judge acquitted all the accused except Lok Pal Singh and Charli Raja but the High Court while maintaining the conviction and sentence of Lok Pal Singh, set aside the conviction and sentence of Charli Raja. The High Court wa...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1985SC516; 1985(1)SCALE204; (1985)1SCC725; [1985]2SCR790; 1985(17)LC619(SC)
E.S.Venkataramiah, J.1. The lamentable delay of nearly fourteen years involved in the State Government of Uttar Pradesh passing its order under Section 68D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the Act') on a scheme published under Section 68C thereof has been the main cause of these appeals by special leave filed against the judgment of the High Court of Allahabad dated November 27, 1981.2. A notification dated November 17, 1971 was published under Section 68C of the Act by the State transport undertaking of the State of Uttar Pradesh in the U.P. Gazettee dated November 27, 1971 inviting objections to a draft scheme providing for the exclusive operation of its own stage carriages over thirteen routes within the jurisdiction of the Regional Transport Authority of Meerut. It is unfortunate that no decision has yet been taken by the State Government under Section 68D of the Act for one reason or the other. In the meanwhile the members of the public as well as the mo...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1985SC545; 1985(1)SCALE181; (1985)1SCC475; [1985]2SCR784; 1985(17)LC656(SC)
Y.V.Chandrachud, J.1. The appellant, the Bank of Baroda, agreed through its Banswara Branch to sanction a demand loan facility in the sum of Rs. 36,000/-in favour of respondent 1. In consideration thereof, respondent 1 executed a demand promissory note in favour of the Bank on June 18, 1973. He also executed a bond hypothecating the standing crop of his lands situated at Khandu and Surjipada in Rajasthan. Respondents 2 and 3 are the guarantors for the repayment of the loan. In order to further secure the repayment of the loan, respondent 1 executed a deed of simple mortgage in favour of the Bank, in respect of the lands at Khandu and Surjipada.2. The respondents having failed to repay the loan, the appellant filed against them a suit in the court of the learned District Judge, Banswara, for recovering a sum of Rs. 52,000/- odd which was due on the loan transaction. Respondents raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the suit on the ground that the claim in the suit was...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1985SC765; 1985CriLJ528; 1985(2)Crimes88(SC); 1985(1)SCALE184; (1985)1SCC637
Ranganath Misra, J.1. Appellant filed an application for maintenance under Section 125 of the CrPC for herself as also a minor daughter alleging that she had been married to the respondent some time in 1971 and out of the wedlock the child had been born. She further alleged that the fact that the respondent was already married and his spouse was living was not known. After the discovery of the previous marriage of the respondent the relationship between the parties gradually became strained and ultimately the respondent started totally neglecting the appellant and refused to maintain her. She had, therefore, no option left but to ask for maintenance for herself as also for the child,2. The respondent did not dispute the marriage as a fact though he pleaded that such marriage was void. According to him the appellant's father was the local Gram Rakhi and taking advantage of his position and presence in the village he had prevailed upon the respondent to enter into marriage with the appel...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1985SC550; 1985(1)SCALE193; (1985)2SCC43; 1985(17)LC382(SC)
Acts/Rules/Orders: Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 - Sections 2(6), 2(18) and 31O. Chinnappa Reddy, J.1. One Parappa died leaving behind him two wives Basawa and Basavannewa and an adopted son also named Parappa. Basavannewa died in the year 1933-34 while Basawa died on May 22, 1959. When Basawa was alive, Parappa, the adopted son, had executed a deed of maintenance dated July 30, 1927 in her favour giving her certain land to be enjoyed by her during her life time. She inducted the defendant as her tenant. After the death of Basawa, the plaintiff, Parappa called upon the defendant to deliver possession of the land and on his refusal to do so instituted the suit out of which the present appeal arises. The suit was resisted by the defendant on the ground that he was a tenant and that he was not liable to be evicted under the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. The plea of the defendant was accepted by all the three courts below and the plai...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1985SC511; 1985CriLJ793; 1985(1)SCALE177; (1985)1SCC571
A. Varadarajan, J.1. We dismissed this Writ Petition on 18.1.1985, after hearing the learned counsel for the parties, for reasons to, follow. We now give our reasons.2. This habeas corpus petition under Article 32 of the Constitution has been filed by the petitioner Tusher Govindji Shah on behalf of Bakshish Singh who is under detention from 23.3.1984 under an order dated 11.1,1984 made by the Government of Maharashtra under Section 3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974. The detenu is now lodged in the Central Jail, Nasik. The grounds of detention were supplied to the detenu at the time of his arrest on 23.3.1984. In the note, directed by the Detaining Authority to be treated as part of the order of detention, it is stated that the detenu is one of the principal conspirators in the conspiracy to smuggle hashish into India from Pakistan and to smuggle it out of India. Pursuant to the conspiracy he had arranged to acquire hashish of...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1985SC421; (1985)1CompLJ249(SC); (1985)44CTR(SC)328; [1985]152ITR308(SC); 1985(1)SCALE115; (1985)2SCC197; [1985]2SCR686
P.N. Bhagwati, J. 1. These writ petitions raise an interesting question of law relating to the interpretation of Section 80J of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and on the basis of certain interpretation, they challenge the validity of Rule 19A of the Income Tax Rules, 1962 and also call in question the constitutionality of the retrospective amendment made in Section 80J. by Finance (No. 2) Act, 1980. The questions arising in these writ petitions are of considerable importance since they involve revenue aggregating to crores of rupees and they have been argued at great length on both sides. 2. The principal controversy between the parties turns on the true interpretation of Section 80J. of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and hence we may begin our discussion of the issues arising in the writ petitions by examining the language of that Section, But before we do so, we may usefully refer to the genesis of the provision enacted in Section 80J. and the transformation it has undergone from time to time o...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1985SC581; 1985CriLJ796; 1985(1)SCALE107; (1985)1SCC562; 1985(17)LC409(SC)
O. Chinnappa Reddy, J.1. These three writ petitions have also to be allowed. Though the petitioners alleged that they were in custody from long before June 28, 1984, this is denied in the counter-affidavit filed by the respondents. But it is admitted that they were arrested on June 28, 1984 pursuant to orders of detention made against them under the Jammu & Kashmir Public Safety Act. These orders were however revoked on September 4, 1984. The counter-affidavit does not disclose and the records produced before us do not disclose why the orders of detention were revoked. All that is mentioned in the counter-affidavit is that the orders of detention were revoked for technical reasons. What those technical reasons were, we are riot informed. However, fresh orders of detention were made against the petitioners on September 6, 1984. A reading of the grounds of detention does not indicate that the detaining authority was aware that the detenus were already in detention for some months; nor do...
Tag this Judgment!