Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1981SC13; (1981)1SCC444
V.R. Krishna Iyer, J.1. In this appeal, by special leave, the subject matter turns on the construction of Section 13(i)(g) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. The appellant is the tenant and the respondents are (i) a Building Co-operative Society and (ii) one of the allottee-members to whom a flat has been allotted by lots. The ground for eviction put forward by the landlord society was the requirement of the beneficiary respondent No. 2. Although the trial court dismissed the eviction suit, the Appellate Bench of the same Court allowed eviction. The decree for eviction was. affirmed by the High Court but appreciating the acute scarcity of accommodation, the High Court granted 2V2 years to the appellant-tenant to vacate the premises. This period expires by the end of June, 1981.2. We do not see any need to set out the facts of the case at length. We do not agree with the appellant's contention that Section 13(i)(g) does not apply. Indeed, without furth...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1981SC174b; (1981)1SCC430; 1980(12)LC816(SC)
V.R. Krishna Iyrr, J.1. Having heard Mr. Jitendra Sharma far the appellant we are satisfied that on the submission which merits consideration is as to the time that we should grant to him for vacating the premises.2. We have addressed ourselves to the rival submissions and feel satisfied that if the appellant gives an undertaking within one month from today containing two conditions, violation of which will involve instant eviction and proceedings for breach of undertaking, he will be allowed time upto 15th August, 1981 for vacation for possession. The conditions are:(a) That he will within three months from today deposit in this trial Court the entire arrears of rent and continue to pay rent for every month by the 15th of the succeeding month; &(b) That he will give vacant possession on or before that date we have fixed and see that he will not alienate or otherwise put in possession of the premises or part thereof any person other than himself.3. In case the undertaking is not filed ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1981SC521; 1980Supp(1)SCC343; 1980(12)LC800(SC)
V.R. Krishna Iyer, J.1. Having heard Mr. Ghosh for the appellant we are satisfied that the submission which merits consideration is as to the time that we should grant to him for vacating the premises, having regard to the circumstance that he has been in long possession and he has continued in possession by resourceful litigation since 1964. Shri Majumdar counters the submission for time because rents are in arrears and the appellant has been clinging to possession for too long.2. We have addressed ourselves to the rival submissions and feel satisfied that if the appellants given an undertaking within one month from today containing two conditions, voilation of which will involve instant eviction and proceedings for breach of undertaking, he will be given a period of one year from today, that it upto 6th August, 1980 for vacating possession. The conditions are:(a) That he will within three months from today deposit in the trial Court the entire arrears of rents and continue to pay ren...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1980SC2036; (1981)1SCC445; 1980(12)LC865(SC)
V.R. Krishna Iyer, J.1. This appeal by certificate turns on the character of a temple in the city of Madras as to whether it is a private temple or a public temple, that is, a temple within the meaning of Section 6(20) of the Madras Hindu Religious & Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 The trial Court held in favour of the plaintiff who claimed that the temple was private and brought a suit to set aside the order passed by the Commissioner, Hindu Religious & Charitable Endowments, but the High Court reversed the judgment and decree of the trial Court and held that the temple was public in character and the authorities constituted under the Act had jurisdiction to manage the temple on that footing.2. Shri Balakrishnan, appearing for the appellant, had takes us through the details of the evidence to impress upon us that the High Court had grievously erred in holding that the temple was a public one. It is undisputed law that so far as Tamil Nadu is concerned, there is an initial presumption ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1981SC14; 1980Supp(1)SCC613; [1981]1SCR373; 1980(12)LC806(SC)
Krishna Iyer, J.1. We have disposed of today applications from cycle rickshaw pliers of Amritsar Municipality where a scheme has been worked out to help them become owners of cycle rickshaws. A similar scheme, says the solicitor-General appearing for the Delhi Administration, will be extended to the Delhi territory. We, therefore, annex a copy of the judgment in Writ Petitions Nos. 839 of 1979 and 563 of 1979-Azad Rickshaw Pullers Union, Amritsar and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors. and Nanak Chand and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors., respectively to this judgment.2. There is another problem which arises in these two cases and that is that the Delhi Administration has put a ceiling on the total number of cycle rickshaws permissible to be plied within its territory perhaps-we do not know for certain-this number may not accommodate all the applicants for cycle rickshaws applying licencees. We are told that apart from the applicants in this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution, the...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1981SC174a; (1981)1SCC106; 1980(12)LC801(SC)
V.R. Kirshna Iyer, J.1. This election appeal would have invited adjudication of the issue raised by the appellant but for the fact that the U P. Legislative Assembly has since been dissolved, fresh elections having taken place and a fresh House having come into existence with newly elated representatives. Perhaps Shri Lakhi's client has a substantial grievance. It is also possible that the decision of the Court below was wrong but we are not inclined to investigate the question at all and, therefore, do not propose to hear either Shri Lakhi or Shri Yogsshwer Prasad. The subsequent events we have adverted to have rendered this litigation so wholly unreal that it will be a waste of this Court's time to consider the Issues. For this reason we dispose of this appeal without adjudication The same fate will be shared by the cross appeal, Patties will bear their own costs....
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1981SC14a; 1980Supp(1)SCC601; [1981]1SCR366; 1980(12)LC807(SC)
Krishna Iyer, J.1. The challenge in theses writ petitions compel us to remind ourselves that under our constitutional system courts are havens of refuge for the toiler, not the exploiter, for the weaker claimant of social justice, not the stronger pretender who seeks to sustain the status quo ante by judicial writ in the name of fundamental right. No higher duty or more solemn responsibility rests upon this Court than to uphold every State measure that translates into living law the preambular promise of social justice reiterated in Article 38 of the Constitution. We might have been called upon to examine from this angle of constitutionalised humanism, the vires of the Punjab Cycle Rickshaws (Regulation of Rickshaws) Act, 1976 (Punjab Act 41 of 1975) (the Act for short), designed to deliver the tragic tribe of rickshaw pullers, whose lot is sweat, toil, blood and tears, from the exploitative clutches of cycle rickshaw owners by a statutory ban on non-owner rickshaw drivers. But negativ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : (1982)2SCC145
R.S. SARKARIA, J.1. Nine persons including the appellant were tried by the Additional Sessions Judge, Mandleshwar, in respect of offences, under Sections 148 and 307 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code. There were eight eyewitnesses in the case. The learned trial Judge disbelieved the story propounded by the eyewitness and acquitted all the nine accused. On appeal by the State the High Court has reversed the acquittal of Jhabla, the appellant, while maintaining the acquittal of the remaining accused persons.2. In acquitting Jhabla of the charges against him the trial court gave three main reasons. Firstly, that there was discrepancy in the statements of the eyewitnesses with regard to the place and the posture in which Jhabla was at the time he fired the gun by which Anarsingh was injured. Secondly, there were a large number of possible eyewitnesses of the locality, none of whom had been examined by the prosecution, although the Investigating Officer had interrogated those p...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1981SC28; 1980CriLJ1286; (1981)2SCC175; [1981]1SCR353
Sarkaria, J.1. This is a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.2. On January, 31, 1980, an order of detention, dated January 30, 1980 under Section 3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (for short, called the COFEPOSA)', issued by the second respondent, Shri P.M. Shah, Deputy Secretary to the Government of Gujarat, Home Department, was served on Lallu Jogi Patel (hereinafter referred to as the 'detenu'). The order was expressed in the name of the Governor of Gujarat. On the same date (January 31, 1980), the grounds of detention were served on the detenu.3. The grounds of detention served on the detenu are very elaborate and detailed. They also contain the introductory background, including the history of the detenu. It is stated herein that the detenu was previously detained by an, order, dated September 1974, of the Government of India, under Section 3 of the Maintenance of Inte...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1980SC2037; 1980Supp(1)SCC226; 1980(12)LC813(SC)
O. Chinnappa Reddy, J.1. We are consternated to make some observations in the interests of judicial property, decorum and discipline and we co so with regret A learned single Judge of the High Court sitting in the vacation, has entertained a last minute application and granted 'exparte stay', for the mere making almost, in the teeth of a mandatory direction issued by this Court to do a certain thing in a certain time, thereby permitting, as it were, an abuse of the process of the Court and contumacious circumvention of this Court's order. The Supreme Court while supreme as an Apex Appellate Court with plenary appellate powers under Article 156 of the Constitution, is not a Court of superintendence and possesses no powers to suo mote call for the records and quash orders of Courts in the lower ranges of the judies al ladder. Had we such powers, we might have been sorely empted to use them in the present case. The facts are these; On an application made by seventeen unsuccessful bidders,...
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