Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1979SC1839; 1979CriLJ1365; (1980)82PLR69; (1979)4SCC229; [1980]1SCR151; 1979(11)LC596(SC)
S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, J.1. This appeal by Special Leave is directed against a judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dated 10th November, 1978 by which the High Court accepted the revision filed before it and set aside the order of the Sessions Judge and directed him to conclude the trial according to law.2. The points in controversy arise in the following circumstances :-The appellant Rohtas was being prosecuted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code for having caused the death of one Subhash on 23rd December, 1974. The trial proceeded before the Sessions Judge and after the evidence was concluded the case was adjourned to the 5th May, 1978 for recording the statement of the appellant. At this stage it appears to have been pointed out to the Sessions Judge that he had no jurisdiction to try the appellant as the appellant happened to fall within the provisions of the Haryana Children Act, 1974, for short, to be referred to as the Haryana Act. Thereafter the Sessions Judge re...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1979SC1915; (1979)4SCC761; [1980]1SCR156; 1979(11)LC676(SC)
N.L. Untwalia, J.1. This is an appeal by certificate filed by the judgment debtors from the decision of the Calcutta High Court given in appeal from that of a learned single Judge of that Court. The facts of the case clearly demonstrate the fighting attitude of the judgment-debtors to gain time for the satisfaction of the decree.2. On August 15, 1925 one Indera Chand Kejriwal instituted on the original side of the Calcutta High Court a suit on the basis of a mortgage against Ram Chander Saraogi, Sewbux Saraogi and Tejpal Saraogi for recovery of Rs. 38,000/- as principal and Rs. 6,082.8/- annas as interest. By art equitable mortgage the property mortgaged consisted of two houses (1) No. 126, Harrison Road and (2) No. 13/2, Syed Salley Lane in the town of Calcutta. On November 26, 1926 a consent decree was passed for a sum of Rs. 41,000/-together with interest thereon @ 6.3/4% per annum. On failure of the judgment-debtors to pay the amount the mortgaged properties were to be sold. On 3rd...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1979SC1758; 1979CriLJ1332; (1980)1SCC578; 1979(11)LC582(SC)
O. Chinnappa Reddy, J.1. The sole appellant was acquitted of the charge of murder by the learned Sessions Judge of Jamnagar but, on appeal by the State, he was convicted by the High Court under Section 302 Indian Penal Code and sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life He has preferred this appeal under the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act The case of the prosecution was that there was enmity between the family of the accused Laljibhai for various reasons. One of the reasons was that Laljibhai was alleged to have committed the murder of Hirji the brother of the accused. In fact on account of the disputes in the village, Laljibhai had moved to Jamnagar. About two days prior to she occurrence he had come to the village from Jamnagar for agricultural a operations. On 9th June, 1970, at about 11 a.m he alongwith labourers, P.Ws. 3, 4 and 32 went to his field from the village At about 3.30 or 4 p.m they started to return to the village from the field. The d...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1979SC1755; 1980Supp(1)SCC23; 1979(11)LC589(SC)
O. Chinnappa Reddy, J.1. The appellants and four others were tried by the learned First Additional Sessions Judge, Ujjain, for alleged offences under Sections 147, 148, 302, 307, 323 and other cognate offences. While the other four accused persons were acquitted of all charges, the five appellants were acquitted of the major charge of murder and convicted a various lesser offences, A-1 under Sections 148, 326 read with 149 and 34, 324, 323 and 352 Indian Penal Code, A 2 under Sections 147, 326 read with 149 and 34, 324 and 323 read with 149 and 352, A 3 under Sections 147 and 149 read with 324 and 323, and A-4 under Sections 147, 324 read with 149 and 34, 323 and 323, and A-5 under Sections 147, 324 read with 149 and 34, 323 Indian Penal Code. A-1, 2, 4 and 5 were sentenced to Various terms of imprisonment while A 3, a lad of 15 years of age, was released on probation of good conduct for a period of two years The present appellants preferred an appeal to the High Court of Madhya Prades...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1979SC1880a; (1979)4SCC60; [1980]1SCR161; 1979(11)LC646(SC)
R.S. Sarkaria, J.1. This appeal by the defendant, on certificate, is directed against a judgment, dated October 23, 1968, whereby in First Appeal, the High Court of Mysore set aside the judgment and decree passed by the joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, Belgaum.2. The pedigree of the family given below will be helpful in understanding the facts leading to this appeal:Ravalojirao (died before 1900) | ____________________________________________________ | | Narayanarao Ramachandrarao (died in 1924) (died on 20-1-1955) | | Tuljeramarao Krishnabi (died in 1944) (Defendant-appellant) | | ________________________________________________ | | Appasaheb Nanasaheb (Pltf.l.) (Pltf.2.) Sou. Vasundhararaje (Pltf. 3.) | ______________________________________________________________ | | | | | | Ashok Kumar Pushpendra Virendra Indrajit Ravalogirao Narayanarao (Pltf.3) Singh Singh Singh (Pltf.9) (Pltf.10) (Pltf.6) (Pltf.7) (Pltf.8)3. By a registered document, dated July 25, 1902 (Ex. 39), executed by...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1980SC1560; 1980CriLJ1098; (1979)4SCC11; [1980]1SCR148
ORDERR.S. Sarkaria, J.1. This appeal by special leave is directed against an order, dated March ,28, 1979, whereby the High Court of Rajasthan dismissed the appellant's application under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code and refused to set aside an Order dated August 14, 1978 of the Sessions Judge framing a charge under Section 201, Penal Code against the appellant.201201...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1979SC1918; (1979)4SCC782; [1980]1SCR136; 1979(11)LC743(SC)
ORDERV.R. Krishna Iyer, J.1. All the parties are represented by counsel and we have heard them in extenso. We therefore proceed to pass a speaking order.2. The princely family of Cochin with a proletarian plurality of members has been the cynosure of special legislations, the last of which is Act 15 of 1978, the target of attack in this special leave petition. Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution have been the ammunition used by the petitioner in the High Court and here to shoot down the legislation as ultra vires.3. A brief sketch of the family law of the Cochin royalty may serve to appreciate the scheme of the latest legislation tinder challenge. The Maharaja of Cochin, reigned and ruled over a pretty princely State, Cochin, which is now an integral part of the Kerala State. When the curtain of history rose to find India free, the constellation of princedoms fused into Independent India's democratic geography. Cochin and Travancore finally fell in with this trend. As a first step t...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1980SC1621; (1980)1SCC582; 1979(11)LC580a(SC)
R.S. Sarkaria, J.1. We have heard Mr., B D. Sharma, counsel for the appellant State and Shri., O.P. Rana, amicus curiae for the respondent, and examined the evidence on record carefully. The prosecution demanded conviction of the respondent on two types of evidence. First, the ocular account of the sole eye-witness; Kumari Kamla, aged about: 9 or 10 years. Second, the oral extra judical confession of the accused before P.Ws. Om Prakash and Ghanshyam Das. The High Court found that the evidence of the extra judical confession was wholly untrustworthy. As regards PW Kamla Kurnari, the High Court has found it highly unsafe to convict the appellant on the uncorroborated testimony of this child witness. The High Court has pointed out infirmities in her evidence and given cogent reasons why they think it unsafe to act upon her uncorroborated evidence. We do not think it necessary to reiterate all those reasons. It will suffice to reproduce one of them in the words of the learned Judges of the...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1980SC15; 1979(4)ELT510(SC); (1979)4SCC19; [1980]1SCR131; 1979(11)LC681(SC)
ORDERN.L. Untwalia, J.1. This is an appeal by certificate. The Allahabad High Court decided that the date of the communication of the order will be the starting point of limitation for filing an appeal under Section 15 of the U.P, Motor Vehicles Taxation Act. The respondent wanted exemption of tax in respect of his motor vehicle for a certain period. He applied to the Taxation Officer, Kanpur. The order rejecting his prayer was communicated in the letter of Taxation Officer dated October 20/24, 1964 through the Regional Transport Authority, Kanpur. The respondent received that letter on October 29, 1964. His appeal was within 30 days of October 29, 1964 but beyond 30 days of October 24, 1964. If October 24, 1964 could be taken to be the date of the order then obviously the appeal was out of time. If, however, the date of the order in Section 15 of the U.P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, in the context, meant the date of the communication of the order, then the appeal was within time. Fol...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1980SC103; (1979)4SCC21; [1980]1SCR128
ORDERN.L. Untwalia, J.1. These two appeals by certificate arise out of the same proceedings between the parties. The respondent company applied to the Trial Court for the filing of the Arbitration agreement under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 hereinafter called the Act and for appointment of an Arbitrator under Section 8. The applications were allowed. An Arbitrator was appointed. The Union of India took the matter in appeals to the Allahabad High Court. The High Court has dismissed the appeal arising out of the order of the Trial Court under Section 20 of the Act and has treated the appeal arising out of Section 8 order as a revision and dismissed the same also. The Union of India has come to this Court.2. The decisions of the courts below in regard to Section 20 matter is at an end now. It was denied on behalf of the appellant that there was any Arbitration agreement. The findings of the court below in this regard could not be assailed at all.3. The Arbitration clause in th...
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