Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1980SC604a; (1980)ILLJ211SC; (1980)1SCC583; 1980(12)LC170(SC)
V.R. Krishna Iyer, J.1. The main issue raised in this appeal turns on a construction of Section 32(5) of the Payment of Bonus Act and its application to the facts of the present case. The Trumila Tirupathi Devasth nam has a very wide circle of devotees who come from all over the country, The Devasthanama caters to their needs and provides the amenities since pilgrims flock to the shrine. One of those facilities is stated to be offering transport services for pilgrims to come to Tirupathi from oistant places. Inevitably the Transport Department is operating under the Devasthanam and employs a large number of transport workers. These workmen raised an industrial dispute making a demand for bonus for the years 1965 1973. The reference was duly made to the Tribunal which considered inter alia the question as to whether Section 32 of the Act excluded from the operation of the bonus obligation, the respondent institution. The plea was upheld and the reference was held do be invalid.2. The Ti...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1980SC691; (1980)2SCC247; [1980]2SCR307; 1980(12)LC246(SC)
ORDERP.S. Kailasam, J.1. The appellants in the appeal by special leave are plaintiffs 1 to 5 in the suit. The plaintiffs 1 to 5 are sisters and defendants 1 to 2 are their brothers. The third defendant is their unmarried sister. They are the children of the late Muthukumaraswamy Gounder who died intestate on 20-42-1962 leaving his father Vanavaraya Gounder who was managing all the ancestral joint family property as the head of the Hindu Undivided Joint Family till his death on 5-3-1972. The plaintiffs claimed that on the death of Muthukumaraswamy Gounder his 1/3rd share in the joint family property devolved on Ms sons and daughters, his sons, defendants 1 and 2 taking 1/3rd share each in 1/3rd share of the family property by birth and in the balance all the sons and daughters of Muthukumaraswamy Gounder taking an equal share each. The plaintiffs claimed to have been in joint possession of the properties alongwith Vanavaraya Gounder and his other sons. Similarly on the death of Vanavara...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1980SC600; 1980LabIC384; (1980)2SCC144; [1980]2SCR298; 1980(12)LC241(SC)
V.R. Krishna Iyer, J.1. An odd case of sentence of three months' civil imprisonment and attachment of assets of the Central Government and two of its officers for default in instant reinstatement of a Railway Inspector removed from service for misconduct occasions this appeal by special leave.2. The Court System is neither a cloistered virtue nor a self-righteous process and readily re-examines, in its appellate crucible, the judgments rendered at lesser levels even if the subject-matter be, as here, alleged disobedience of a judicial order. Justice is not hubristic and truth triumphs by self-criticism. And so, this Court, in keeping with such an invigilative perspective, must review the punitive directive of the trial court, affirmed upto the High Court but challenged before us, that the Union of India and its officers in the Railway Department-the appellants- do suffer distraint of property and imprisonment of person for the contempt of its authority by non-compliance with its order ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1980SC512; (1980)1SCC630; [1980]2SCR293; 1980(12)LC252(SC)
V.R. Krishna Iyer, J.1. Writes A.G. Gardiner, if we may start off with a strange flourish, that 'the supreme art is to achieve the maximum result with the minimum... effort. It is the art of the great either who with a line reveals infinity. It is the art of the great dramatist who with a significant word shakes the soul. Schiller, said Coleridge, burns a city to create his effect of terror: Shakespeare drops a handkerchief and freezes our blood. A.G. Gardiner, The Pillars of Society, p. 106 For this exquisite reason, brevity is the soul of art and justicing including judgment-writing, must practise the art of brevity, especially where no great issue of legal moment compels long exposition. Therefore, we mean to be brief to the bare bones, with a few facts here and a brief expression of law there, by adopting the technique which 'is simply the perfect economy of means to an end'. For another reason also the need for parsimony exists. The court is in crisis, docket-logged and fatigued. ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : (1980)1SCC585
R.S. SARKARIA, J.1. Radhey Shyam Narendra, Mochiram Paikera and Madhu alias Satyanarayan Paikerathi were tried by the Sessions Judge, Puri, for causing the murder of Mrusinga Charan Paikerathi. The Sessions Judge acquitted all the accused. The State preferred an appeal against the order of acquittal in the High Court, which by its judgment, dated January 16, 1973, reversed the acquittal and convicted Satyanarayan Paikerathi under Section 302, and Radhey Shyam Narendra and Mochiram Paikera under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code, and sentenced each of them to rigorous imprisonment for life. Hence this appeal under the Supreme Court (Englargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970, by the convicted persons.2. The prosecution case, as it emerges from the record, is as follows:2a. The appellants as well as the deceased are brothers. Their father had married twice. The appellants are the sons of the same mother, while the deceased was the son of another. Satyanar...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1980SC350; (1980)1SCC340; [1980]2SCR260; 1980(12)LC272(SC)
O. Chinnappa Reddy, J.1. The perennial, nagging problem of delegated legislation and the so-called Henry VIII clause have again come up for decision in this appeal by the State of Kerala. Section 60 of the Madras Cooperative Societies Act 1932 and a notification issued under that provision were struck down by the High Court of Kerala on the ground of unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. Certain consequential directions were issued by the High Court. Those directions have long since worked themselves out and so the party who invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constituution has no longer any surviving interest. The State of Kerala is, however, interested in sustaining the validity of Section 60 and has filed this appeal.2. Lawyers and judges have never ceased to be interested in the question of delegated legislation and since the Delhi Laws Act case, we have been blessed(?) by an abundance of authority, the blessing not necessarily unmixed. W...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1980SC485; (1980)14CTR(SC)348; [1980]121ITR535(SC); [1980]2SCR268; 1980(1)SCC370
V.D. Tulzapurkar, J.1. These two appeals by certificate raise an important question as regards the proper construction of Section 33B of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 with particular bearing on the scope of Sub-section (4) thereof and the effect of Sub-section (2)(b) on the Sub-section (4).2. The facts giving rise to the aforesaid question may briefly be stated: The assessment years involved are 1957-58 and 1958-59 corresponding to the accounting years ending March 31, 1957 and March 31, 1958 respectively. On or about August 5, 1960 the respondent-assessee submitted voluntary returns, inter alia, for the said two assessment years alongwith a declaration dated August 8, 1960. The assessment for these years were completed on August 12, 1960 by the Income-Tax Officer, 'E' Ward, District II(1) Calcutta on total incomes of Rs. 7,000/- and 7,500/- respectively, the same having been made in the status of unregistered firm consisting of three partners, namely, Asha Devi Vaid, Santosh Devi Va...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : (1980)2SCC197; 1980(12)LC261(SC)
P.N. Shinghal, J.1. This appeal by Shiv Chand under Section 116A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, hereinafter referred to as the Act, arises from a judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dated May 25, 1979, dismissing the elections petition by which he had challenged the election of Ujagar Singh, respondent No. 1, hereinafter referred to as the respondent, to the Punjab Legislative Assembly from the Balauna (Reserve) constituency. The election was held in pursuance of the notification which was issued under Section 15(2) of the Acton May 11. 1977. The result of the election was declared on June 14, 1977, according to which the appellant received 18748 votes while the respondent received 21262 votes. The appellant challenged the respondent's election by a petition dated July 29, 1977. It was dismissed by the trial Court on October 12, 1977, on a preliminary objection of the respondent. An appeal was brought to this Court against the dismissal and was allowed by this...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1980SC367; (1980)0GLR6; (1980)1SCC308; [1980]2SCR284; 1980(12)LC294(SC)
A.P. Sen, J.1. appeal on certificate from a judgment of the Gujarat High Court raises a question as to the validity or otherwise of a fresh notification issued by the Government of Gujarat under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, consequent upon an earlier notification under Section 6 of the Act being discovered to be invalid.2. The first respondent in this case owned certain land bearing Final Plot No. 38 forming part of Town Planning Scheme No. III (Ellisbridge) situate within the city of Ahmedabad. At the request of the second respondent Sri Ayodhya Nagar Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., registered under the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act, 1925, now deemed to be registered under the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961, formed with the object of enabling its members to construct houses, the State Government on August 3, 1960 issued a notification under Section 4 stating that the land was likely to be needed for a public' purpose. This was followed by a notificatio...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : (1980)1SCC615; 1980(12)LC139(SC)
V.R. Krishna Iyer J.1. Having heard Mr. Vohra and Mr. Bhandare, we do not think there is any need to change the earlier order passed by us where we had allowed the appeal.2. The subject matter of the appeal is one of Court-fee and of delay in filing the appeal. But there is no room for doubt in the light of the happening as set out before us. Actually, the subject matter of the appeal to the High Court itself is only one of Court-fee. The plaint having been rejected on the ground that sufficient Court-fee was not paid, it is all a storm in a tea cup. Apart from that we have examined the matter and feel satisfied that the appeal to this Court should be allowed and the High Court directed to deal with the appeal denovo. The High Court will certainly remember that after all the matter is only one of Court fee and the appellant is willing to pay the alternative Court fee which is a larger sum. Even so the appeal will have to be disposed of by the High Court and so we remit the case back to...
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