Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1978SC976; [1978(37)FLR116]; 1978LabIC706; (1978)IILLJ209SC; (1978)1SCC634
V.R. Krishna Iyer, J.1. A very short question as to the scope of Section 10(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. arises for consideration in this appeal by special leave. The appellant, Delhi Administration, was faced with the question of referring several disputes, 16 in number, for adjudication under Section 10(1) of the Act. The workmen had raised all these disputes although many of them were perhaps covered by an earlier settlement. We are not concerned with the facts of this particular case which have been set out at some length by the High Court in its judgment, but with a narrow issue as to when the power to prohibit a strike with which the State/appropriate Government is armed under Section 10(3) of the Act can be put into operation. This turns on a reasonable construction of the provision itself and the best beginning is to quote the section itself. Section 10(3) runs thus:Where an industrial dispute has been referred to a Board, (Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribuna...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1978SC977; [1978(36)FLR219]; 1978LabIC707; (1978)ILLJ482SC; (1978)2SCC45; 1978(10)LC143(SC)
V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. 1. This appeal by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution has been argued at some length by the Management, the appellant, against whom an award has been made for payment of compensation to fifteen workman whose services, according to the Labour Court, have been improperly terminated. The compensation was Rs. 2,000/- per head so that the total subject matter is Rs. 30,000/-, although the case itself has reached the Supreme Court on an earlier occasion with the result that the costs of the litigation for exceed the value of the subject-matter, in all probability. This is the besetting sin of Indian litigation, especially in the industrial jurisdiction.2. Be that as it may, the special jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 can be invoked ordinarily only where there is manifest injustice, fundamental flaw in law or perverse findings of facts. After having heard counsel elaborately, we are satisfied that this jurisdiction cannot be exercised on any ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1978SC527; 1978CriLJ651; (1978)1SCC579; [1978]2SCR777
ORDERV.R. Krishna Iyer1. The petitioners have moved for bail setting out special grounds in (support of the prayer. The State opposes on various grounds which we will presently set out. One of us sitting as a Chamber Judge in Gudikanti Narasihmalu and Ors. v. Public Prosecutor, Govt. of AP : 1978CriLJ502 had considered this question at some length and since the principles set out herein commend themselves to us, we are proceeding on the same lines and are inclined to reach the same conclusion.2. Briefly we will state the facts pertinent to the present petition and prayer and proceed thereafter to ratiocinate on the relevant criteria in considering the interlocutory relief of bail. Right at the beginning, we must mention that, at an earlier stage,, their application for bail was rejected by this Court on September 7, 1977. But an order refusing an application for bail does not necessarily preclude another, on (a later occasion, giving more materials, further developments and different c...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1978SC978; [1978(36)FLR205]; (1978)2SCC44; 1978(10)LC140(SC)
Krishna Iyer, J. 1. The sole question arising in this appeal by certificate under Article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution is as to whether the definition introduced into the Industrial Disputes Act by Section 2A will govern a dispute with reference to a dismissal which has been affected prior to the incorporation of Section 2A in the Act and governs cases where the dismissal has been effected prior to such date. Shri S.N. Prasad with commandable candor even before the arguments commenced, drew our attention to the decision of Rustom And Hornsby (I) Ltd. v. T.K. Kadam (1) where the precise question raised here has been decided against the appellant. The result is that the appellant for whom Shri Prasad appears cannot sustain his appeal in the light of this ruling. We find it difficult to see how the said decision can even be distinguished in any manner. Since that proposition squarely governs the present situation, the appeal must fail. We dismiss the appeal but in the circumstances, with...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1978SC764; [1978(36)FLR205a]; (1978)2SCC347; 1978(10)LC141(SC)
V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. 1. Shri Saharya, when the arguments were opened, expressed his difficulty in unfolding the facts of the case and when it became apparent that the subject matter of the appeal consisted of two trivial sums payable to the former conductors who later dismissed by the appellant, the Delhi Transport Corporation, contended that his client was primarily interested in the question of law as to whether the respondent conductors after their dismissal could rely upon Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act for enforcement of arrears of wages due.2. We are satisfied that the matter involved is so trivial that we should not agitate on this appeal at all. It is not as if once special leave is granted under Article 136 this Court is bound to decide every question of law, be it big, small or petty in the sence of the actual subject matter. In this view we are not inclined to go into the question of law raised before us but make it clear that the position of law canvassed be...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1978SC597; (1978)1SCC248; [1978]2SCR621
M.H. Beg, C.J.1. The case before us involves questions relating to basic human rights. On such questions I believe that multiplicity of views giving the approach of each member of this Court is not a disadvantage if it clarifies our not infrequently differing approaches. It should enable all interested to appreciate better the significance of our Constitution.2. As I am in general agreement with my learned brethren Bhagwati and Krishna Iyer. I will endeavour to confine my observations to an indication of my own approach on some matters for consideration now before us. This seems to me to be particularly necessary as my learned brother Kailasam, who has also given us the benefit of his separate opinion, has a somewhat different approach. I have had the advantage of going through the opinions of each of my three learned brethren.3. It seems to me that there can be little doubt that the right to travel and to go outside the country, which orders regulating issue, suspension or impounding,...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1978SC484; (1978)2SCC91; [1978]2SCR614; 1978(10)LC162(SC)
1. This appeal by special leave indicates how, despite the settled practice of this Court not to interfere, as a general rule, with orders of an interlocutory nature, such as one on an application for the amendment of a plaint, this Court feels compelled, in order to promote uniform standards and views on questions basic for a sound administration of justice and, in order to prevent very obvious failures of justice, to interfere even in such a matter in a very exceptional case such as the one now before us seems to us to be.2. Procedural law is intended to facilitate and not to obstruct the course of substantive justice. Provisions relating to pleadings in civil cases are meant to give to each side intimation of the case of the other so that it may be met, to enable Courts to determine what is really at issue between parties, and to prevent deviations from the course which litigation on particular causes of action must take.3. Order 6, Rule 2, Civil Procedure Code says:Every pleading s...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1978SC768; (1978)1SCC620; [1978]2SCR606
ORDERV.R. Krishna Iyer, J.1. We have heard counsel Mr. Chatterjee on two grievances of his clinet. According to him, the land belongs to the petitioner, the huts belong to his tenants, but the municipal assessment is based upon valuation of the land and the huts together. This grievance is taken care of in two ways. The High Court had directed that in. regard to each bit of land and hut thereon, there will be particularisation of the assessment separately on the consolidated valuation. Secondly, there is also provision in Section 202 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') for collection by the owner of the land of so such of the rate as is attributable to the hut which belongs not to the owner but to the tenant, if we may put it loosely that way. The details have been spelt out in Section 202 of the Act. : We consider Section 202 as more or less a self-contained code with the result that what is leviable under that provision cannot be prejudiced by t...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : [1978(36)FLR217]; (1978)ILLJ322SC; (1978)2SCC42a; [1978]2SCR608; 1978(10)LC69(SC)
Krishna Iyer, J.1. Affirming judgments need not speak elaborately, and so, in these two appeals where we do not disagree with the High Court, only a brief statement of reasons is called for.2. The subject matter is a bonus dispute between the management-respondent and the workmen union revolving round the applicability of the proviso to Section 3 of the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965 (here in after referred to is the Act) for the years 1964-65 and 1965-66. A thumbnail sketch of the facts:3. The K.C.P. Limited, a public limited company, carries on three business adventures, viz., manufacture, of sugar, of cement and of heavy engineering machinery. The concerned factories are in three different places in South India and employ workmen on different terms in three different units. We are directly concerned with the engineering unit known as the Central Workshops run at Tiruvottiyur, Madras. When the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965 came into force the workmen of this Unit, which was financially fari...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1978SC725; (1979)1SCC166
N.L. Untwalia, J.1. This is an appeal by the defendant by certificate. It arises out of a suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent lor cancellation or setting aside of the registered assignment deed dated 31-10-1957 executed In the latter in favour of the former purporting to transfer the decree in O. S. No. 88 of 1949 on the file of Court of Subordinate Judge. Kakinada, for recovery of the possession of the scheduled, properties measuring about 20 to 25 acres of land and for future mesne profits.2. The trial court decreed the suit in pan and granted a decree for cancellation of the assignment deed aforesaid on the plaintiffs paying Rupees 13,000/- to the defendant. Under the decree defendant was required to deliver possession of the suit properties to the plaintiff on the payment of the said sum of Rs. 13.000/-.3. The defendant filed an appeal in the High Court and a cross objection was filed by the plaintiff. In the cross objection the grounds taken were in regard to two matters only. ...
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