Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1975SC1329; [1975(30)FLR212]; 1975LabIC819; (1975)ILLJ374SC; (1975)1SCC485; [1975]3SCR616
1. In Writ Petition No. 43 of 1972 the petitioner who is junior stenographer in the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research asked for an order declaring two letter to be discriminatory and violative of Article 14. The two letters relate to recommendations of the Finance Sub Committee of the Council of Scientific and industrial Research with regard to remuneration of stenographers. In short, the petitioners allegations are that he should be granted the same number of advance increments as approved and granted to new (sic)entrants.2. In order to entitle the petitioner to impeach the circular on the ground of infraction of Article 14 and 16, the petitioner has to establish that the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research is an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution.3. The Council is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act. Reliance was placed by counsel for the petitioner on these features of the society. Under Rule 3, the Prime Minist...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1975SC1499; (1975)4SCC457; 1975(7)LC255(SC)
V.R. KRISHNA IYER, J.1. The appeal relates to a suit and later stage thereof certain remedies were sought under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 as amended by U.P. Act 21 of 1966. During the pendency of the appeal in this Court, a notification has been issued under Section 4 of the Act. By virtue of the operation of Section 5(2)(a) of the said Act, there is a statutory abatement of the suit and other proceedings pending therefrom. This Court has in Ram Adhar Singh v. Ramroop Singh1 held that even appeals pending before this Court will abate consequent on the above statutory provision. The appellants have moved in CMP No. 19 of 1975 for passing an order of Holdings Act. Counsel for the respondent faced with the decision of this Court and the clear statutory provision agrees that the stand taken by the appellants is correct. We therefore hold that the suit and the appeal stand abated. It is open to the parties to work out their rights before the appropriate consolidation auth...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1975SC1331; [1975(30)FLR283]; 1975LabIC881; (1975)ILLJ399SC; (1975)1SCC421; [1975]3SCR619
1. There are two questions for consideration in these appeals. First, whether an order for removal from service contrary to regulations framed under the Oil and Natural Gas Commission Act, 1959; the Industrial Finance Corporation Act, 1948; and the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 would enable the employees to a declaration against the statutory corporation of continuance in service or would only give rise to a claim for damages. Second whether an employee of a statutory corporation is entitled to claim protection of Articles 14 and 16 against the Corporation. In short the question is whether these statutory corporations are authorities within the meaning of Article 12.2. The statutes for consideration are the Oil and Natural Gas Commission Act, 1956; the Industrial Finance Corporation Act, 1948; and the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The question which really falls for decision is whether regulations framed under these statutes have the force of law.3. The Oil and Natural G...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1975SC1022; (1975)4SCC809; [1975]3SCR601
1. The only question arising for decision in these two appeals, brought on certificates granted by the Assam and Nagaland High Court, is whether the jurisdiction of the. District Council of the United Khasi-Jaintia Hills, extends to the area called Bara Bazar in village Mawkhar in Shillong.2. The question arises in this way. The first respondent in each of these appeals had a shop in Bara Bazar, which is a well-known market area, and both these shops were destroyed by fire. In December 1964 the Siem of Mylliem permitted Ka Tiewmon Kharkongar, the first respondent in Civil Appeal No. 1476 of 1969, to construct on the old site a shop similar to the one she had which was gutted by fire. A similar permission was given in May 1965 to Ka Drepsile Lyngdob, the first respondent in Civil Appeal No. 1475 of 1969. On July 19, 1965, however, the Siem of Mylliem by a written order asked respondent Ka Tiewmon Kharkongar not to proceed with the construction of the shop; it was stated in the order tha...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1975SC1007; (1975)1SCC492; [1975]3SCR607; [1975]35STC537(SC)
1. The appellant was an excise contractor. He secured the privilege of vending arrack in retail in certain taluks in the State of Karnataka for a period of 18 months beginning from 28-12-1967 and ending on 30-6-1969. He purchased arrack from the Government at a price of 17 paise per litre and the Government collected besides the sale price of arrack, excise duty, health cess and education cess. The Government also collected sales tax on the sale price of arrack, on excise duty, on health cess and on education cess for the period from 28-12-1967 to 31-1-1968 and made similar demands for the month of February, 1968 also. The appellant and other excise contractors filed Writ petitions in the High Court of Karnataka challenging the validity of the levy and collection of excise duty, education cess, health cess and sales tax. The High Court accepted some of the contentions of the appellant, granted him reliefs on that basis but rejected the other prayers. The appellant has filed these appea...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : (1975)4CTR(SC)71
Mathew, J. - The appellant was an excise contractor. He secured the privilege of vending arrack in retail in certain taluks in the State of Karnataka for a period of 18 months beginning from 28-12-1967 and ending on 30-6-1969. He purchased arrack from the Government at a price of 17 paise per litre and the Government collected besides the sale price of arrack, excise duty, health cess and education cess. The Government also collected sales-tax on the sale price of arracks on excise duty, on health cess and on education cess for the period from 28-12-1967 to 31-1-1968 and made similar demands for the month of February, 1968 also. The appellant and other excise contractors filed writ petitions in the High Court of Karnataka challenging the validity of the levy and collection of excise duty, educations cess, health cess and sales tax. The High Court accepted some of the contentions of the appellant, granted him reliefs on that basis but rejected the other prayers. The appellant has filed ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1975SC1012; (1975)1SCC597; [1975]3SCR595
1. Respondent No. 1 in this appeal was elected a Member of the Madhya Pradesh State Legislative Assembly from the Ujjain North Assembly Constituency. The third respondent filed an election petition on. 25-4-1972 in the Madhya Pradesh High Court for declaring the election of the first respondent void. After service of the notice of the election petition alongwith the enclosures thereto. Respondent No. 1 made an application on 28-11-1972 to the High Court raising an objection that out of the copies of the election petition, list of Annexures, Annexures and Affidavits served on him, only the annexures were signed by Respondent No. 3 and the rest were not signed by him. Respondent No. I submitted to the Court that there was non-compliance with the requirement of sub-section 3 of Section. 81 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951-(hereinafter called the Act) and hence the election petition was liable to be dismissed under Section 86(1). A learned single Judge of the High Court to who...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1975SC1045; (1975)1SCC535; [1975]3SCR584
1. Pritam Singh, the appellant before us under Section 116A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), was elected at an election held on 11-3-1972 for the Haryana State Legislative Assembly, the result of which was declared on 12-3-1972. The Respondent Balbir Singh questioned this election by means of an election petition alleging that the election was void as the appellant had committed corrupt practices hit by Section 123. Sub-section 4, 5 and 6 of the Act. The petition was allowed by a learned Judge of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana, solely on the ground that the corrupt practice, provided for as follows, in Section 123(5) of the Act, was committed by the appellant:123(5). The hiring or procuring, whether on payment or otherwise, of any vehicle or vessel by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent, or the use of such vehicle or vessel for the free conveyance of any elector (o...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1975SC1632; 1975LabIC1082; (1975)2SCC244; 1975(7)LC252(SC)
A. ALAGIRISWAMI, J.1. This is an application by the first respondent in the appeal to set aside the compromise decree dated February 7, 1972. The Memorandum of Compromise on the basis of which the appeal was disposed of was signed by the counsel for the appellants as well as Mr P.K. Mukherjee, Advocate purporting to appear on behalf of the petitioner-respondent. The writ petition out of which this appeal arises was disposed of as early as January 13, 1966. The petitioner alleges that the appeal has been disposed of without even service of any notice on him and of any intimation of the lodgment of the appeal. He also alleges that he had not empowered any lawyer to act in this case.2. It is obvious that his contention that no notice was even served on him cannot be accepted and it is also clear that Mr Mukherjee had been engaged to appear on behalf of the petitioner. The High Court of Patna has sent a certificate that the notice of lodgment of petition of appeal was given to the Advocate...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1975SC1505; 1975CriLJ1319; (1975)1SCC525; [1975]3SCR582; 1975(7)LC354(SC)
1. Shri Madhu Limaya, M.P. moved this petition while he was prisoner, imbued more by the pro bono public spirit than perhaps by his own invidious lot in jail. The gravamen of this public grievance in that a long silver jubilee span of years having elapsed after India became a Sovereign Democratic Republic, it is obnoxious that racial discrimination, smacking of colonial hangover, should stubbornly resist Articles 14 & 15 of the Constitution and survive in the Punjab Jail Manual. If it were so, it were a matter to blush for but the preliminary objection raised by the Solicitor General is that the petitioner having been freed from prison years ago, this Court should not be invited into an academic exercise on a Constitutional issue. Of course, he concedes that the Court is not deprived of jurisdiction by the cessation of incarceration. An inflexible rule that as soon as a custodial term or prohibitory order expires the Court will not investigate its legality may well immunize ephemeral i...
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