Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1973SC2438; [1973]89ITR246(SC); (1973)2SCC288
K.S. Hegde, J.1. These appeals by certificate raise a common question of law, namely whether the compensation distributed to the junior members in a zamindari family under Section 45 of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948, as adopted by Andhra Pradesh (to be hereinafter called the 'Act'), can be taken into consideration in computing the net wealth of the family? For the purpose of deciding that question it would be sufficient if we refer to the facts in Civil Appeal No. 1628 of 1970.2. In this case we are concerned with the net wealth of the family of former zamindari of Venkatagiri, for the assessment year 1957-58. The Wealth Tax Officer, while completing the assessment for the year in question included in the assessment the amount of final compensation receivable from the Government not only by the holder of the estate but also by his sons. The amount of compensation as per data sheet made available to the Wealth Tax Officer worked out to Rs. 6,16,41...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1973SC1164; (1973)1SCC668
J.M. Shelat, J.1. The main question arising in these appeals, by certificate obtained from the High Court of Allahabad, is whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, a concluded contract could be said to have been arrived at between the respondent firm and the Chief Conservator of Forests, Vindhya Pradesh for and on behalf of that State.2. By a notice, dated August 27, 1953, the Chief Conservator of Forests invited tenders for the purchase of certain lac and lac products, the quantities whereof were set out therein. The conditions of sale, subject to which the said tenders were to be made, were as follows:X X X X5. 25 per cent of the purchase price shall be deposited in cash or G.C. notes immediately after the close of sale.-6. The sanction of the Government of final bids will be given at the spot.7. All lac purchased must be removed within one month and on full payment; credit will be given on 25 per cent deposit. The lac will remain at the godowns at the risk of the purchas...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1973SC1124; 1970LabIC800; (1973)ILLJ435SC; (1973)1SCC680; [1973]3SCR637
A. Alagiriswami, J.1.This appeal is by way of special leave against the judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana dismissing the Second Appeal filed by the appellant. He was a clerk in the Treasury at Ludhiana. He filed the suit out of which this appeal arises for three different reliefs out of which the only one that now survives is regarding the order withholding his increment for one year with cumulative effect.2. The sole point raised on behalf, of the appellant before the High Court was overruled by it on the basis of the full bench decision of the High Court in Malvinderjit Singh v. The State of Punjab and Ors. I.L.R. 1970 Pun 580 which overruled the decision in Kalyan Singh v. The Stale of Punjab I.L.R. (1967) Pun 471.3. This is perhaps the first case that comes to this Court in the matter of a minor punishment. The appellant relied upon the decision of this Court in B.D. Gupta v. State of Haryana : (1973)ILLJ26SC , the facts of which art rather complicated, and are unnec...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1976SC909a; [1975]99ITR579(SC); (1975)4SCC834
K.S. Hegde, J.1. The only question that arises for decision in this appeal is whether the assessee is entitled to claim interest on the refund which became due to him on the strength of the decision of this Court. The assessment in this case was completed long before the Income-tax Act, 1961 came into force. Under these circumstances, this case clearly comes within the scope of Section 297(2)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and not under Section 66(7) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. Under the new Act, there is no provision for payment of interest unless the same comes within the scope of Section 243 of that Act. It is not the case of the assessee that the facts of this case come within the scope of Section 243.2. In the result, this appeal fails and the same is dismissed. But in the circumstances of the case, we make no Order as to costs....
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1973SC1227; [1973(26)FLR359]; (1973)ILLJ278SC; (1973)1SCC813; [1973]3SCR587
C.A. Vaidialingam, J.1. In these appeals, by special leave, two common questions arise for consideration :-(1) proper interpretation of Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act; and(2) whether the above section applies to industrial disputes which have already been referred to for adjudication and were pending as on 15-12-1971.2. Section 11A was incorporated in the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) by Section 3 of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Amendment Act). The Amendment Act passed by Parliament, received the assent of the President on December 8, 1971. Sub-section 2 of Section 1 provided for its coming into force on such date as the Central Government by notification in the official gazette appoints. The Central Government by notification No. F.S.-11013/1/71-LR.I dated 14-12-1971 appointed the 15th day of December, 1971, as the date on which the said Act would come into force. Accordingly, the Amendment...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1973SC1204; 1973CriLJ769; (1973)1SCC714; [1973]3SCR571
I.D. Dua, J.1. The ten appellants have appealed to this Court by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution from the judgment and order of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad dated October 31, 1968 allowing the appeal of the State of U. P. from the judgment and order of the Temporary Sessions Judge, Hamirpur dated January 15, 1965 acquitting all the 15 accused persons, including the appellants, of the charges under Sections 148 302/149 and 201 I.P.C. During the pendency of the State appeal in the High Court against the order of acquittal, Chandrapal Singh, accused No. 1 (in the trial court), died on September 30, 1967 with the result that appeal against him abated on his death. The appellants were, however, held liable to be convicted under Sub-sections 302/149, 201/149 and 148, I.P.C. Against he remaining accused persons the order of acquittal was affirmed. Under Section 302/149, I.P.C. each of the appellants was sentenced to imprisonment for life and under Section 301/...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1973SC2598; [1973]91ITR1(SC); (1974)3SCC268
K.S. Hegde, J.1. The question of law referred to the High Court for its opinion was 'Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the sum of Rs. 1,29,924 was liable to estate duty as property deemed to pass on the death of the deceased under Section 10 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953?'. The High Court answered that question in the negative and in favour of the assessee. Aggrieved by that decision the Department has come up in appeal to this Court. The facts of the case as can be gathered from the statement of case submitted by the Tribunal are as follows:The deceased Sri N.S. Ramaswami Iyer was a partner in the firm of Messrs. Ennessor and Company. The other partners of the firm consisted of the three sons and the daughter of the deceased. The firm was engaged in money-lending and financing business. The firm was registered under Section 26-A of the Income-tax Act, 1922. At the end of the accounting year 1952-53, the current account of the deceased showed a credit balance of...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1973SC2600; [1973]91ITR542(SC); (1974)3SCC516
K.S. Hegde, J.1. This is an appeal by certificate. It has a long history. The assessment with which we are concerned relates to the assessment year 1943-44. This case along with other cases appears to have come in this Court earlier and the matter was remanded to the High Court for disposal in accordance with the directions given by this Court. Thereafter, the High Court called for a supplementary statement from the Tribunal. The Tribunal, after setting out the material facts, has referred the following question to the High Court:Whether the Tribunal was right in its finding that the assessee would not be liable to tax in respect of the goods sold by the assessee on railway receipts in the names of the consignees to the tune of Rs 2,73,488/- effected in the assessment year 1943-44The High Court has answered that question in the affirmative in favour of the assessee.2. The assessee is a dealer in cloth in the Bhilwara town in one of the former Indian States. He sold certain bales of clo...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1973SC2348; [1973]89ITR61(SC); (1973)4SCC115; [1973]3SCR567
K.S. HEGDE, J.1. These are appeals by certificate, A common question of law is involved in these appeals. These appeals relate to a common assessee but arise from three different assessments in respect of three different assessment years (1956-57 to 1958-59), the accounting years being the respective calendar years.2. The question of law arising for decision is whether the assessee was entitled to claim deduction of compound interest under Section 9(1)(iv) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. The High Court answered that question in the negative and in favour of the Department. Aggrieved by that decision the assessee has come up in appeal to this Court.3. To decide the question set out above, it will be sufficient if we refer to the facts relating to one of the assessment years i.e. 1956-57. The material facts are as follows :-4. The assessee is a trustee of a house property at Chandmari Road, Howrah. In respect of that house there was a title suit filed by one Durga Prasad Chamria agai...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1973SC1130; 1975(0)BLJR146; (1973)1SCC672; [1973]3SCR562
K.K. Mathew, J.1. This is an appeal, by special leave, by the plaintiffs from a decree passed in appeal by the Patna High Court dismissing their suit for recovery of the plaint property with mesne profits.2. Plaintiffs 1 to 4 are the daughter's sons of one Kishundeo Singh, plaintiffs 5 and 6 are his daughters and plaintiff 7 is his widow. The plaint property together with some other properties belonged to the joint family of which Kishundeo Singh and his brothers were the members. Suit No. 60/34 of 1944-46 was instituted for partition of the properties. That suit was compromised on July 4, 1947 and different schedules were prepared for the property allotted to the shares and sons property was left in the joint possession of all of them. The plaint property fell to the share of Kishundeo Singh under the compromise. It may be mentioned that as none of the parties to the compromise produced the necessary stamp paper as directed by the Court, no decree was drawn up by the Court.3. In the s...
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