Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1963SC1098; [1964]1SCR220
Wanchoo, J.1. This petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution challenges the constitutionality of a scheme finalised under s. 68D(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, No. IV of 1939, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) in the State of Rajasthan. The petitioners are holders of stage-carriage permits on Jodhpur-Bilara and Bilara-Beawar routes. A draft scheme was published under s. 68C of the Act by the Rajasthan Roadways, which is a State Transport Undertaking, (hereinafter referred to as the Roadways), on January 26, 1961. It provided for taking over of the transport service on the Jodhpur-Bilara, Beawar-Ajmer route by the Roadways. Further it provided for taking over three overlapping routes or portions thereof which were entirely on Jodhpur-Bilara, Beawar-Ajmer road, namely, Jodhpur-Bilara, Bilara-Beawar, and Beawar-Ajmer, and as required by r. 3 of the Rajasthan State Road Transport Services (Development) Rules, 1960, (hereinafter referred to as the Rules), the names of the permit-holders ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1964SC436; (1964)66BOMLR129; [1964]1SCR200
Mudholkar, J.1. This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment of the High Court of Bombay affirming the decree of the District Judge, Thana, setting aside the decree in favour of the Plaintiff-appellant. 2. The relevant facts which are no longer in dispute are these : The plaintiff's family are grantees of the Patilki Watan of some villages in Umbergaon taluka of the Thana District of Maharashtra, including the villages of Solsumbha, Maroli and Vavji. Defendants 2 to 4 also belong to the family of the plaintiff. The plaintiff represents the seniormost branch of the family while the defendants 2 to 4 represent other branches. The dispute with which we are concerned in this appeals relates to the Patilki of Solsumbha. Under the Bombay Hereditary Offices Act, 1874 (III of 1874) the person who actually performs the duty of a hereditary Office for the time being is called an Officiator. It is common ground that the Officiator had been selected from the branch of the plaintiff from th...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1963SC1480; [1963(6)FLR325]; (1963)IILLJ72SC; [1963]3SCR995
Wanchoo, J.1. This writ petition was heard along with writ petition No. 62 of 1962 (Bridge and Roof Company (India), Limited v. Union of India), as the short question in both of them was whether production bonus was excluded from the term 'basic wages' as defined in s. 2(b) of the Employees Provident Funds Act, No. 19 of 1952, (hereinafter referred to as the Act). A further question also arose in this writ petition as to the nature of the production bonus scheme in force in the petitioner-company, and the parties were given time to file additional affidavits in that connection. The main point raised in the two writ petitions was decided in Bridge and Roof Company (India) Limited v. Union of India : (1962)IILLJ490SC . The only question that now remains is whether the production bonus scheme in force in the petitioner-company is of the same type as in Bridge & Roof Company : (1962)IILLJ490SC . If it is of the same nature the present petition would be governed by that decision and product...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1963SC1144; [1964]1SCR2
Subba Rao, J.1. This appeal on certificate relates to an internal dispute of the members of a Masonic Lodge called the 'Lodge Victoria No. 363 S.C.' at Belgaum. 2. There is a Scotish institution known as 'Grand Lodge of Ancient Free and Accepted Masons of Scotland' at Edinburgh, hereinafter called the 'Grand Lodge of Scotland'. Under its supervision there are Provincial or District Grand Lodges spread throughout the world. There are Daughter Lodges under the superintendence of the District Grand Lodges. The Grand Lodge of Scotland is governed by its own written Constitution and Laws. There is also a separate Constitution and Laws for every District Grand Lodge. One such District Grand Lodge known as 'The Grand Lodge of All Scotish Freemasonary in India and Pakistan' has is headquarters at Bombay. The aforesaid daughter Lodge at Belgaum is directly under the said District Grand Lodge and is governed by the Constitution and Laws of the latter. 3. The appellant was a member of the Lodge V...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1963SC1399; [1963]49ITR88(SC); [1962]1SCR130
S.K. Das, J. 1. The facts of this appeal have been stated by my learned brother, Kapur J. As I am in agreement with him, I need not re-state the facts. 2. The assessment years were 1944-45, 1945-46 and 1946-47. The notice was issued by the Income-tax Officer on February 18, 1957, pursuant to a direction given by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in an appeal of another assessee. The only question is whether the second proviso to sub-s (3) of s. 34, as amended in 1953 saves the proceedings impugned. 3. For the reasons given by me in S. C. Prashar, Income-tax Officer v. Vasantsen Dwarkadas : [1963]49ITR1(SC) , in which judgment has been delivered to-day, I would dismiss the appeal with costs. Kapur, J. 4. This is an appeal brought on behalf of the Revenue against the judgment and order of the High Court of Bombay on a certificate granted by that Court. 5. In W.P. No. 1400/57 the present respondent challenged that jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officer to issue notice under section 34(...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1963SC1044; [1964]1SCR19
Shah, J. 1. The appellants are a firm carrying on business as importers in the name and style of 'M. Golodetz & Company' at 120, Wall Street, New York in the United States of America. The respondents are a firm carrying on business, among others as exporters of manganese ore and their principal office of business is at Bentinck Street in the town of Calcutta. By a contract in writing dated July 5, 1955 the respondents agreed to sell and the appellants agreed to buy 25,000 tons of manganese ore on the terms and conditions set out therein. The contract contained the following arbitration clause : 'Arbitration : Any dispute arising out of the contract is to be settled by arbitration in New York according to the rules of the American Arbitration Association.' 2. Between September 1956 and August 1957 the respondents supplied 5478 tons of manganese ore. Disputes having arisen between the parties about the liability of the respondents to ship the balance of the goods not delivered, the appel...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1964SC818; [1963]Supp2SCR995
Mudholkar, J.1. This is an appeal by a certificate granted by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh under Art. 133(1)(a) of the Constitution. 2. The relevant facts are these : 3. The plaintiff-respondent Ramaswamy & Co. who carry on business in tobacco at Guntur instituted a suit against the appellant-firm which also carries on similar business at that place and its alleged partners Kurapati Venkata Mallayya and Mittapalli Abbayya, for the recovery of the price of 112 bales of DB tobacco strips (hereafter referred to as DB strips) sold to them on June, 5, 1946, amounting to Rs. 14,099/- and interest thereon from the date of purchase to the date of suit. In addition, the respondent firm claimed interest from the date of suit to the date of realization. It is the respondent firm's case that the tobacco weighed 28,196 pounds and that the appellant firm purchased it by agreeing to pay its price at 8 annas per pound. Further according to the respondent-firm the appellant firm agreed to pay inter...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1963SC1401; [1964]1SCR137
S.K. Das, J. 1. The facts of this appeal have been stated by my learned brother Kapur, J., and as I am in agreement with him, I need not re-state the facts. 2. The relevant assessment year was 1942-1943. The proceedings under s. 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, were initiated with the issue of a notice on July 25, 1949. The assessee's contention was that the initiation of proceedings on July 25, 1949, was invalid as the department's right to revive the assessment was governed by old s. 34 where the period of limitation prescribed was only four years in the case of a failure to file a return and this period having expired on March 31, 1947, and the Amending Act of 1948 (XLVII of 1948) having come into force on March 30, 1948, the eight years provided period therein could not invoked. The High Court upheld this contention and said : 'In our opinion, the contention of the learned counsel for the assessee is well founded, that the new rule of limitation of eight years prescribed by t...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1963SC1394; [1963]49ITR70(SC); [1964]1SCR148
S.K. Das, J. 1. The facts out of which these two appeals have arisen have been stated in the judgment of my learned brother Kapur, J., and as I am in full agreement with the conclusion reached by him, I need not re-state the facts. 2. The relevant assessment years were 1946-1947 and 1947-1948. The assessment orders were made on November 27, 1953. It is obvious that the assessments were not made within the time prescribed by sub-s. (3) of s. 34, the period being four years in this case. The Tribunal relied on the second proviso to sub-s. (3) of s. 34 as amended by the Amending Act of 1953 which came into force on April 1, 1952. For reasons which I have given in S. C. Prashar, Income-tax Officer v. Vasantsen Dwarkadas, in which judgment has been delivered to-day, the second proviso to sub-s. (3) of s. 34 does not revive a remedy which became barred before April 1, 1952, when the amended proviso came into force. 3. Next, the appellant relied on s. 31 of the Amending Act of 1953. I agree w...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1963SC1343; [1963]48ITR237(SC); [1964]1SCR163
S.K. Das, J. 1. This is an appeal on a certificate of fitness granted by the High Court of Bombay under s. 66-A(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. 2. The relevant facts lie within a narrow compass. The Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay, is the appellant before us and the assessee, E. D. Sheppard, is the respondent, Killick Nixon & Company was a partnership concern carrying on business on a fairly large scale in India. It owned various mills and managing agencies of a number of limited companies. This partnership firm used to employ officer-assistant mostly Europeans, on the basis of a contract for three years; if the services of the assistants, so employed were found satisfactory, extensions were invariably given after every three years on increased salary. Subject to their works being satisfactory, the assistants so employed expected to become partners of the firm one day. The assessee was one such assistants who joined the firm in 1930. The original contract relating to the asse...
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